will be disbarred for engaging in the Appearing in court in a state of intoxication is professional misconduct. Re Macy (1921) 109 Kan. 1, 14 A.L.R. 848, 196 Pac. 1095. XI. Miscellaneous offenses. a. Conduct warranting disbarment or suspension. (Supplementing annotation in A.L.R. 204.) In the case of Re Snelling (1924) 129 Wash. 56, 224 Pac. 600, an attorney was suspended for three months on proof that he secured signatures to a petition whereon he was appointed a notary public, knowing that by reason of insufficient residence in the state he was not eligible. In the case of Re Richter (1925) Wis. 41 A.L.R. 485, 204 N. W. 492, an attorney was disbarred for putting in an answer, in a suit against him by a woman for wages as domestic servant, which contained scandalous charges against the plaintiff, which he made no effort to prove. The court said: "This court does not sit in this or any other case as a court of inquisition to search out the private life and censor the morals of the attorneys who are its officers. The delinquencies of the respondent in this case were thrust upon our attention by the respondent himself, with an audacious effrontery. They could not fail to receive our attention. We should have been recreant to our duty had we ignored them. Reams of testimony could add little, if anything, to what appears of record in this matter. The offense of the respondent was committed in the course of a judicial proceeding. His willingness to prostitute the forms of law and defile the judicial process is perfectly apparent. He has flouted the obligations which he assumed by the taking of his oath of admission to the bar in the most flagrant and shameless manner. Throughout the entire proceeding, he has never exhibited the slightest sense of shame, or feeling of regret, or any evidence of any appreciation of his moral and ethical obliquities. How can a man who thus conducts himself be a proper person to guide those unlearned in the law and to act as their friend and counselor? Would a suggestion on the part of a client that untruthful testimony be produced, be rebuked by an attorney who had no regard for his own oath? Can it be otherwise than that the fountain of justice is poisoned at its source, if men of this character are permitted to direct the course of judicial proceedings? The respondent seems to be under the impression that the fact that he was a party to the suit entitles him to some privilege that he would not otherwise have. It is true that the court has no jurisdiction over private litigants, except as that jurisdiction is invoked in a proper judicial proceeding. The fact that an attorney is also a party, however, does not lessen the court's duty or its power with respect to its officers. The inquiry in this case is not whether the respondent is guilty of some crime or misdemeanor. The question is, Has he been guilty of such misconduct in his office as shows him to be so wanting in moral character as to be an unfit person to hold the office of attorney and counselor at law? Upon the record in the case wherein Clara Stark was plaintiff and the respondent was defendant, and upon the record in this proceeding, the court finds that the respondent has been guilty of misconduct which justifies a revocation of his license in the particulars already pointed out, in that he did, in said case, advance facts prejudicial to the honor and reputation of Clara Stark, the plaintiff therein, by the allegations of the fourth paragraph of the answer. The advancement of such facts was not required by the justice of the cause, and the same was done by the respondent in violation of his oath as an attorney of this court. And the court further finds that the respondent is wanting in that good moral character which is a condition precedent to his right to continue to exercise the rights and privileges of In the case of Re A Solicitor, 68 Sol. Jo. (Eng.) 756, a solicitor was suspended for two years for paying money to a clerk in the office of the public trustee as a reward for the introduction of clients to the solicitor. In the case of Re Isles, 66 Sol. Jo. (Eng.) 297, a solicitor was stricken from the rolls for altering the date of a deed to evade the payment of stamp duty. In Re Aydelotte (1923) 206 App. Div. 93, 200 N. Y. Supp. 637, an attorney was suspended for one year for threatening, in order to enforce payment of a bill, to expose matters learned in the course of professional relations. Violation of a stipulation made with another attorney was given in the case of Re Steinberg (1920) 193 App. Div. 502, 184 N. Y. Supp. 450, as one of the grounds for which the respondent was disbarred. Knowingly casting false aspersions on an adversary is professional misconduct. Re Macy (1921) 109 Kan. 1, 14 A.L.R. 848, 196 Pac. 1095, wherein the court said: "It is an attorney's duty to protect the rights of his client, but it is likewise an attorney's duty to refrain from doing an intentional wrong to the adverse party. In the United States of America, the attorney at law occupies a peculiar and very important position. Because of his integrity, his ability, and his learning, he is often called on to administer the executive departments of government, and he fills a large place in all our legislative bodies. He has taken a most important part in framing our form of government and in guiding its growth and development. Possibly democratic government cannot long exist without a strong, able, honest, conscientious, and patriotic bar. If a lawyer is not honest, if he is not conscientious, or if he is not patriotic, he is not fit to represent others in the court room. Justice is administered almost wholly by and through lawyers. The administration of justice is one of the highest, if not the highest, of governmental functions. 43 A.L.R.-8. An attorney at law in the preparation and trial of an action in court represents his client, but he does more than that he is there, not only as an advocate, but also as a person trusted and authorized by the state to assist the court in determining what is right between the parties before it. He cannot excuse himself by saying that his duty to his client demands that he adopt a line of conduct detrimental to the interests of the public. The state is vitally interested in seeing that justice is done, and goes to great expense and provides machinery for that part of its government work. If attorneys at law are permitted to resort to unscrupulous practice for the protection of the supposed rights of their clients, one of the purposes of the state will be defeated, its foundations will crumble, and life, liberty, property, and happiness will be at the mercy of lawyers who care for nothing except the advantage of their clients." An attorney who writes a letter for a client, threatening criminal prosecution unless certain property is returned, is guilty of misconduct. Re Penn (1921) 196 App. Div. 764, 188 N. Y. Supp. 193 (respondent dismissed with censure in view of youth and inexperience). Censure was imposed for a similar act in the case of Re Bookman (1921) 196 App. Div. 765, 188 N. Y. Supp. 271, the attorney believing that his act was proper. In the case of Re Stevens (1922) 59 In the case of Re Bartlett (1924) 47 who participated in a conspiracy to extort money from men guilty of sexual offenses was released with a reprimand. But in the later case of Re Waggoner (1925) S. D., 206 N. W. 427, the court said that it erred on the side of leniency in the Bartlett Case. In the case of Re Frederick (1924) 71 Mont. 205, 227 Pac. 999, an attorney was suspended for thirty days for using a void writ to coerce the payment of a debt, having made an arrangement with a justice of the peace by which he was furnished with blank writs signed by the justice. In People ex rel. Cline v. Kerker (1925) 315 Ill. 572, 146 N. E. 439, the evidence was held to be insufficient to establish charges consisting in the main of subornation of perjury and attempts to extort money by threat of suits charging disgraceful conduct, the court intimating that the charges were sufficient, if proved, to warrant disciplinary measures. Publishing defamatory articles about corporate officers and threaten ing to continue the publication in order to coerce payment of a claim of the attorney against the corporation has been held to be ground for disbarment. People ex rel. Brundage v. Blakemore (1923) 309 III. 311, 141 N. E. 138. In the case of Re Mohn (1921) 149 Minn. 373, 184 N. W. 14, the court held the evidence to be insufficient to show that an attorney had signed his name as a witness to a will after the death of the testatrix, saying, obiter, that such conduct, if proven, would warrant disciplinary action. Although a conviction for misdemeanor does not automatically require disbarment, a conviction of an attorney for petty larceny in cashing a check upon a bank in which the attorney had no account, demonstrates his unfitness, and he should be disbarred. Re Smith (1926) App. Div. -, 213 N. Y. Supp. 751. b. Conduct not warranting disbarment or suspension. No later decisions herein. For earlier cases, see 9 A.L.R. 205. W. A. S. 1. An infant cannot have specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of real estate because of lack of mutuality in the contract. [See annotation on this question beginning on page 120.] (— Ark. —, 278 S. W. 41.) APPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of the Pulaski County Chancery Court (McMillan, Sp. Ch.) dismissing the complaint in an action brought to compel specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion Mr. Horace Chamberlin, for appellant: One who voluntarily makes an executory contract with an infant is charged with knowledge of the fact that the infant has a designated period of time after he reaches his majority in which to elect whether he will affirm or disaffirm his contract. Western Lawrence County Road Improv. Dist. v. Friedman-D'Oench Bond Co. 162 Ark. 362, 258 S. W. 378. An infant, though not bound by his contract, may supply the want of mutuality both in contract and remedy, after attaining his majority, by making part or whole performance, or by maintaining an action in court on the contract, or by express or implied ratification, or by ratification by lapse of time. Wynn v. Garland, 19 Ark. 23, 68 An infant may sue in his own name by next friend, and if, while such action is pending, he attains his majority, he may, by his motion, be permitted to prosecute the cause in his own name as an adult. Ohio Valley Tie Co. v. Hayes, 180 Ky. 469, 203 S. W. 193; Webb v. Harris, 32 Okla. 491, 121 Pac. 1082, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 602; Mahoney v. Park Steel Co. 217 Pa. 20, 66 Atl. 90; Seigler v. Southern R. Co. 85 S. C. 345, 67 S. E. 296. of the court. Only the infant can take advantage of his voidable contract. Davie v. Padgett, 117 Ark. 544, 176 S. W. 333; Bozeman v. Browning, 31 Ark. 364. Messrs. Carmichael & Hendricks for appellee. Smith, J., delivered the opinion of the court: On May 11, 1922, appellant, Bracy, then a minor under nineteen year of age, entered into the following contract: "Received of Buford Bracy the sum of fifty and no/100 dollars as part payment on the following described property: Lots 1 and 2, block 2, C. H. Taylor's addition. "Balance to be paid as follows: $500.00 on or before June 12, 1922, and $1,300.00 on or before August 12, 1922, with interest at seven per cent. per annum from date. "The purchase price of this property is $1,850.00 and the above payment is accepted on the follwing conditions, viz.: That the owner will approve the terms of sale and furnish a good title, otherwise the above payment shall be returned to Budford Bracy and the deal canceled. Property to be free of all incumbrances. If the deal is not completed as above specified, then the payment made herewith shall be forfeited as liquidated damages. "Accepted: Buford Bracy, Purchaser. "Louis Miller, Owner and Agent." This suit was brought by appellant to enforce the specific performance of this contract, and it was alleged in the complaint that Louis Miller was the authorized agent of his mother, Mrs. Christiana Miller, who was the defendant below and is the appellee here. The payments required by the contract to be made on June 12, 1922, and August 12, 1922, were duly tendered, with in terest, but were refused by Mrs. Miller, who declined to execute a deed. Thereupon appellant tendered the sum due under the contract, with interest, and again demanded a deed, and, when this demand was refused, he brought this suit, and prayed that the specific performance of the contract be decreed. This suit was brought by appellant's father as next friend, and remained on the docket without being tried until appellant had attained his majority, at which time he prayed, and was granted, permission to prosecute the suit in his own name. The chancery court found all the disputed questions of fact in appellant's favor, but denied the relief prayed upon the ground that appellant was a minor at the time the contract was made and also at the time suit was brought to enforce it, and, notwithstanding the fact that he had attained his majority before the date of the trial and had affirmed the contract, the court held he was not entitled to equitable relief because of his infancy at the time the contract was signed and at the time suit was begun. Was appellant entitled to the relief prayed? The appeal presents no other question. In Fry on Specific Performance, § 460, it is said: "A contract to be specifically enforced by the court must, as a general rule, be mutual, that is to say, such that it might, at the time it was entered into, have been enforced by either of the parties against the other of them. When, therefore, whether from personal incapacity to contract, or the nature of the contract, or any other cause, the contract is incapable of being enforced against one party, that party is, generally, incapable of enforcing it against the other, though its execution in the latter way might in itself be free from the difficulty attending its execution in the former." Illustrating this statement of the law it is said, in the following section of the same work, that "an in fant cannot sue (for specific performance), because he could not be sued for a specific performance." At § 196 of Waterman on the Specific Performance of Contracts, it is said: "To entitle a party to specific performance, there must not only be a valid and binding agreement; but, as a rule, the contract, at the time it was entered into, must have been capable of being enforced by either of the parties against the other. In other words, there must be mutuality both as to the obligation and the remedy. It follows that a party not bound by the agreement itself has no right to call upon the court to enforce performance against the other contracting party by expressing a willingness in his bill to perform his part of the agreement." In 25 R. C. L. p. 232, at § 33 of the chapter on Specific Performance, it is said: "It is frequently stated as a general principle of equity that a contract will not be specifically enforced unless it has such mutuality that it may be enforced by either party, and the language adopted by numerous courts is to the effect that equity will grant a decree of specific performance only in cases where there is a mutuality of obligation and of remedy. In accordance with this doctrine of mutuality it is held that when a contract for any reason cannot be enforced against one of the parties such party will not be permitted to enforce it specifically against the other party, although except for this particular rule the contract would otherwise have been enforceable. It has been said that the whole contract must be enforceable on both sides, or at least such part of it as the court can ever be called upon to enforce; but this rule seems to be subject to some exceptions, and among the exceptions are the cases of contracts where the consideration is entire, but the performance separate." At $ 35 of the same chapter it was also said: "By reason of the doctrine of mutuality an executory contract containing mutual cove |