(- Md. -, 130 Atl. 57.) Trademarks, etc., § 40 - right to use of corporate name. 2. The right of a corporation to the exclusive use of its own name exists at common law, and includes the right to prohibit another from using a name so similar to the corporate name as to be calculated to deceive the public. [See 26 R. C. L. 861.] Trademarks, etc., § 29 - "U drive it." 3. The phrase "U drive it" as applied to an automobile livery business is merely descriptive, and is not subject to exclusive appropriation by the common phrase has acquired a secondary meaning, so as to give the user a monopoly of it, is one of fact. Trademarks, etc., § 30 when secondary meaning of words acquired. 6. The use for eighteen months in a city of 800,000 population of the phrase "drive it yourself," in connection with an automobile livery business, resulting in a clientele of less than six thousand persons, and an equipment of only forty-five cars, does not give the phrase a secondary meaning entitling the user to a monopoly, although the business was widely advertised under that name. [See 26 R. C. L. 886; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 1685. See also annotation in 40 A.L.R. 433.] Injunction, § 175 - against use of corporate name. 7. The mere facts that the good will of a business is valuable, and that the business is identified by the corporate name of the proprietor standing alone, are not sufficient to entitle it to an injunction against the use by another of a similar name. APPEAL by complainant from a decree of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Solter, J.) dismissing a bill filed to enjoin defendants from using or imitating the phrase "drive it yourself" in connection with the business of letting automobiles. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The general rule is that a corporation has a right to its name, and another will be restrained from its use. 7 R. C. L. p. 134, 104; 14 C. J. pp. 310, 326, §§ 374, 396; Thomp. Corp. §§ 284-296; American Order, S. C. v. Merrill, 151 Mass. 558, 8 L.R.A. 320, 24 Ν. Ε. 918. In order to invoke this rule it is not necessary to show that there is fraud or even a deliberate intention to get business away from the plaintiff; it is sufficient if the public is likely to be deceived and business thereby diverted. 14 C. J. 328, 397; 26 R. C. L. pp. 883-885, 59, 60; Plant Seed Co. v. Michel Plant & Seed Co. 37 Mo. App. 313; Bagby & R. Co. v. Rivers, 87 Md. 423 (see note on page 759) 40 L.R.A. 632, 67 Am. St. Rep. 357, 40 Atl. 171; Afro-American, O. O. v. Talbot, 123 Md. 472, 91 Atl. 570. The corporate name is a trademark from the necessity of the thing, and upon every consideration of private justice and public policy deserves the same consideration and protection in a court of equity, because the corporate name is a necessary element of the corporation's existence, and without it the corporation cannot exist. Newby v. Oregon C. R. Co. Deady, 609, Fed. Cas. No. 10,144; Investor Pub. Co. v. Dobinson (C. C.) 72 Fed. 603; Koehler v. Sanders, 122 N. Y. 65, 9 L.R.A. 576, 25 N. E. 235; Merchants' Detective Asso. v. Detective Mercantile Agency, 25 Ill. App. 250. If the defendants were wrongfully using the tradename of plaintiffs, they should be enjoined in its use in toto, and not only partially. Saunders System Atlanta Co. v. Drive It Yourself Co. 158 Ga. 1, 123 S. E. 132. Messrs. Sauerwein, Lindsay, & Donoho, George W. Lindsay, and Everett C. Wilson, for appellees: Phrases or tradenames descriptive of the business carried on are not and Colonial Life Assur. Co. v. Home & Colonial Assur. Co. 33 Beav. 548, 55 Eng. Reprint, 482; Employers' Liability Assur Corp. v. Employers Liability Ins. Co. 61 Hun, 552, 16 N. Y. Supp. 397; Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co. 128 U. S. 598, 32 L. ed. 535, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 166; Computing Scale Co. v. Standard Computing Scale Co. 55 C. C. A. 459, 118 Fed. 965; Cellular Clothing Co. v. Maxton [1899] A. C. 326-H. L.; Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139 U. S. 540, 35 L. ed. 247, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625. The courts have uniformly refused to restrict the use of ordinary words in their usual and ordinary meaning, on the theory that they are public property and everyone has the right to use them in carrying on trade and industry. Brennan v. Emery-Bird-Thayer Dry Goods Co. 47 C. C. A. 532, 108 Fed. 624. The injection of ordinary words into a corporate name cannot give the corporation any greater right to the exclusive use of the words than an individual could acquire. Car Adv. Co. v. New York City Car Adv. Co. 57 Misc. 105, 107 N. Y. Supp. 547; Industrial Mut. Deposit Co. v. Central Mut. Deposit Co. 112 Ky. 937, 66 S. W. 1032; Cellular Clothing Co. v. Maxton [1899] А. С. 326-H. L.; Hopkins, Trade Marks, p. 188; Jordan Sulphur Springs & Mud Bath Sanitarium Co. v. Mudbaden Sulphur Springs Co. 135 Minn. 123, 160 N. W. 252; 7 R. C. L. § 103, p. 133; Machen, Corp. § 451; 14 C. J. p. 329. Ordinary words by continual association with one particular business may lose their primary meaning and acquire a secondary meaning as applied to that particular line of busiUnder such circumstances a second user of these words cannot be prevented from using them, but must do so with some qualifying words to prevent confusion. ness. Saunders System Atlanta Co. v. Drive It Yourself Co. 158 Ga. 1, 123 S. Ε. 132. Walsh, J., delivered the opinion of the court: According to the agreed statement of facts in this case, one Philip Milstone in January, 1923, began the business of hiring automobiles in the city of Baltimore to people who wished to drive the automobiles themselves. In August 1923, Mr. Milstone, who was the pioneer in this field in Maryland, formed a corporation known as the "Drive It Yourself Company," which corporation continued the same business, with Mr. Milstone as president of the company. From the inception of the business the phrase "drive it yourself" was used to describe and designate it, and large sums of money were spent in advertising it. The business has been continuously carried on at No. 1725 North Charles street, and has proved successful, forty-five automobiles being now used by the company, and the number of its customers being more than five thousand. ness. In 1916, one Warwick Saunders originated in Omaha, Nebraska, the business of letting automobiles without drivers to people who desired to do their own driving, and used the slogan "drive it yourself" to designate and advertise the busiFrom this small local beginning Saunders and his associates have gradually developed and expanded the business until it is now in operation in 45 cities in the United States. In the course of this expansion, a simple, efficient, and practical plan of conducting the business, including a system of bookkeeping, method of handling the cars, and form of advertising, was developed, and the whole plan was finally called the "Saunders Drive It Yourself System." This system is owned by the "Saunders Drive It Yourself Company," but the "drive it yourself" business in various cities is managed by local corporations or representatives to (-Md., 130 Atl. 57.) whom the system is supplied by the original company. It is also stated that a red and green label containing the words "Saunders Drive It Yourself System" was copyrighted by the original company, and appears on practically all advertising matter used by members of the system throughout the country, including their envelopes, letterheads, contract forms, operating blanks, newspaper notices, etc. Shortly before August 20, 1924, the appellees, who were the defendants below, opened up, as copartners, a business known as the "Saunders Drive It Yourself System" at No. 8 East North avenue in Baltimore city, just a few blocks from the place of business of the appellant, and on the date just mentioned the appellant filed its bill of complaint against the appellees, asking that they "be permanently enjoined and restrained from using or imitating the phrase or slogan 'drive it yourself,' either separately or in the window design at present employed by them on or about their place of business, or elsewhere, either on signs or by any device, or on their letterheads, billheads, advertisement stationery, either in full or as part of its name." The bill of complaint pointed out the use of the phrase "drive it yourself" as part of the complainant's corporate name, set out the establishment by the complainant of this sort of business in Baltimore, and alleged that the use of the phrase by the defendants confused the customers of the complainant, and caused many of them to think that the place of business of the defendants was a part or branch of the complainant's business, but it did not allege any fraud or active deception by the defendants, other than the deception which the complainant alleged arose from the use of the phrase in question, and the proximity of the appellees' place of business to the place of business of the appellant. The defendants' answer denied that their use of this 43 A.L.R.-14. phrase was confusing to the customers of the complainant, and alleged that they had done nothing to deceive those customers, or to cause them to think that there was any connection whatever between the complainant's business and that of the defendants, and the answer then alleged that the business they were starting was simply a further extension of the business established many years before by Warwick Saunders; that they were the Maryland representatives of the Saunders System, and were using the label, advertising matter and other features of that system. A large mass of exhibits showing the label and advertising matter used by the Saunders System in other states was filed in the case, and from these it appeared that the phrase "drive it yourself" has been constantly used by the Saunders System all over the United States, and the agreed statement of facts also shows that the phrase is used by many others engaged in the same business outside of Maryland, and that similar expressions, such as "U drive it," have also been used. ap The case was submitted to the court below on the bill of complaint, answer, agreed statement of facts, and exhibits, and that court having declined to grant the relief asked, and having dismissed the bill of complaint, the complainant pealed. The appellant contends that it is entitled to an injunction for two reasons: First, to protect its corporate name; and second, on the ground that even if the phrase "drive it yourself" is held to be descriptive, and hence not subject to exclusive appropriation as part of a corporate name, it has nevertheless acquired a secondary meaning in Maryland which refers entirely to the appellant's business, and hence its use by the appellees constitutes unfair competition. There is no statute in Maryland governing the right of a corporation to the exclusive use of its own name, but such right exists at com Trademarks, etc.-right to use of corporate name. mon law, and it in- other from using a name so similar to the corporate name as to be calculated to deceive the public. Afro-American, O. O. v. Talbot, 123 Md. 465, 91 Atl. 570. In the case just cited this court held that an organization known as the "Order of Owls" could not, in the absence of any proof of injury, restrain another corporation from using the name "Afro-American Order of Owls," and it was further held that the rule for determining whether or not the right to the exclusive use of a name had been infringed was "that where, in the opinion of the court, the similarity of names was such as was shown to have deceived the public, or to be liable to deceive the public, the injunction has been granted, and, where this was not the case, the injunction asked has uniformly been refused." See also Creswill v. Grand Lodge, K. P. 225 U. S. 246, 56 L. ed. 1074, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 822; American Clay Mfg. Co. v. American Clay Mfg. Co. 198 Pa. 189, 47 Atl. 936; Plant Seed Co. v. Michel Plant & Seed Co. 37 Mo. App. 313; 14 C. J. 310, 326. This general right of a corporation is, however, subject to certain qualifications and exceptions, one of which is that "unless the words have acquired in the mind of the public a secondary meaning as denoting the goods or business of a particular company, a corporation cannot acquire the right to the exclusive use of words merely generic or descriptive of a particular business, class of goods, process, sect, etc., which any one may lawfully use so as to be entitled to enjoin their use by another corporation or association in its name, in the absence of actual fraud or intent to deceive." 14 C. J. 329, 330. See also Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co. 128 U. S. 598, 32 L. ed. 535, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 166; Koebel v. Chicago Landlords' Protective Bureau, 210 Ill. 176, 102 Am. St. Rep. 154, 71 N. E. 362; Edison v. Mills-Edisonia, 74 N. J. Eq. 521, 70 Atl. 191; Michigan Sav. Bank v. Dime Sav. Bank, 162 Mich. 297, 139 Am. St. Rep. 558, 127 N. W. 364; and a number of cases collected in the note in L.R.A. 1917C, 958. -"drive it In view of the rule just quoted, we find it unnecessary to decide whether or not the similarity between the names "Drive It Yourself Company" and "Saunders Drive It Yourself System" is sufficient to justify the court in enjoining the use of the latter as being a deceptive infringement of the former, because in our opinion the phrase "drive it yourself" yourself." is descriptive of the business in which the parties to this suit are engaged, and hence, under the authorities heretofore cited, it is not the subject of exclusive appropriation. There are innumerable cases in which the courts have been called upon to decide whether or not certain names were descriptive of the business being conducted under them, but, as the decisions in these cases depend upon the particular name and business involved, they furnish at best only a general guide by which future cases can be determined. However, it may prove helpful, and it is certainly of interest, to consider some of these decisions. It is to be noted that the rule prohibiting the exclusive appropriation of descriptive words as part of a corporate name is similar to the rule prohibiting the exclusive use of such words as trade-marks or tradenames, and, as both rules are based on the same principles, we have cited cases indiscriminately from each class. In Motor Accessories Mfg. Co. v. Marshalltown Motor Material Mfg. Co. 167 Iowa, 202, 149 N. W. 184, the first named company was held to have no right to restrain the second from using the name "Marshalltown Motor Material Manufacturing Company," though both were engaged in the sole business of manufacturing spark plugs. In Travel (- Md., 130 Atl. 57.) ers Ins. Mach. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co. 143 Ky. 216, 136 S. W. 154, the term "travelers' insurance" was held to be descriptive. In Basket Stores v. Allen, 99 Neb. 217, 155 N. W. 893, the phrase "Basket Store" was held to be descriptive. In Choynski v. Cohen, 39 Cal. 501, 2 Am. Rep. 476, the name "Antiquarian Bookstore" was held to be descriptive. In Ball v. Broadway Bazaar, 194 N. Y. 429, 87 N. E. 674, the combination of the words "Lilliputian Bazaar" was held to be descriptive. In Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. (Sup.) 1 N. Y. Supp. 44, the phrase "Loan & Trust Company" was held to be descriptive. In Car Adv. Co. v. New York City Car Adv. Co. 123 App. Div. 926, 108 N. Y. Supp. 1126, the term "car advertising" was held to be descriptive. And in Bolander v. Peterson, 136 III. 215, 11 L.R.A. 350, 26 Ν. Ε. 603, the term "Svenska Sunsmagasiat," which is Swedish for "Swedish Snuff Shop," was held to be descriptive. In Winchester Repeating Arms Co. v. Peters Cartridge Co. 30 App. D. C. 505, the term "self-loading" was held to be descriptive as applied to cartridges, and hence invalid as a technical trademark, and the same was held of the phrase "what is it?" in Oakes v. St. Louis Candy Co. 146 Mo. 391, 48 S. W. 467; of "roachsault" as applied to an insecticide in Barrett Chemical Co. v. Stern, 176 N. Y. 27, 68 N. E. 65; of "keepclean" as applied to toothbrushes in Florence Mfg. Co. v. Dowd, 101 C. C. A. 565, 178 Fed. 73; of "toothache gum" in Delvin v. Peek (C. C.) 135 Fed. 167, affirmed in 73 C. С. А. 619, 144 Fed. 1021; of "International Banking Company" in Koehler v. Sanders, 122 N. Y. 65, 9 L.R.A. 576, 25 Ν. Ε. 235; of "Aerators" in Aerators v. Tollit, 86 L. T. N. S. 651. And see generally the cases collected in the notes in 38 Cyc. 711, 712; 14 C. J. 313-329, 330; L.R.A.1917C, 958; and L.R.A.1918A, 975. The best statement we have found of any general rule by which it can be determined whether or not a par ticular name or phrase is descriptive is that announced by Judge Morris in the case of Rumford Chemical Works v. Muth (C. C.) 1 L.R.A. 44, 35 Fed. 524, in which he said: "The true test, it appears to me, must be, not whether the words are exhaustively descriptive of the article designated, but whether in themselves, and as they are commonly used by those who understand their meaning, they are reasonably indicative and descriptive of the thing intended." Measured by this rule, we have no hesitancy in holding that the phrase "drive it yourself" is descriptive of the business in which the appellant is engaged. The words are ordinary English words in everyday use. The combination in which they are used, when applied to the hiring of automobiles, accurately designates and describes the character and nature of the business to which they refer, and the exhibits filed in the case show that the phrase is used and understood throughout the country as indicating that particular business. The growth of the automobile industry in this country has, during recent years, been enormous, and, with the steadily increasing use of cars and the corresponding increase in the number of persons who can drive them, it is not at all improbable that there will be in the immediate future a very large and constantly growing demand for automobiles hired on the "drive it yourself" plan. Twenty-five years ago the words "taxicab" and "garage," and the terms "oil station," "gas station," and filling station" were not in more common use than the phrase "drive it yourself" appears to be now, and it would certainly have led to very regrettable results had the courts of a quarter of a century ago held that the words and terms above mentioned were not descriptive, and could be exclusively appropriated by the person, or organization first using them. Nor do |