Boundary Mountains. Boundary (4) In a narrow strait separating the lands of two different States the boundary line runs either through the middle or through the mid-channel,' unless special treaties make different arrangements. § 200. Boundary mountains or hills are such natural elevations from the common level of the ground as separate the territories of two or more States from each other. Failing special treaty arrangements, the boundary line runs on the mountain ridge along with the watershed. But it is quite possible that boundary mountains belong wholly to one of the States which they separate.2 § 201. Boundary lines are, for many reasons, of such Disputes. vital importance that disputes relating thereto are inevitably very frequent and have often led to war. During the nineteenth century, however, a tendency began to prevail to settle such disputes peaceably. The simplest way in which this can be done is always by a boundary treaty, provided the parties can come to terms.3 In other cases arbitration can settle the matter, as, for instance, in the Alaska Boundary dispute between Great Britain (representing Canada) and the United States, settled in 1903. Sometimes International Commissions are specially appointed to settle the boundary lines. In this way the boundary lines between Turkey, Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Roumania were settled after the Berlin Congress of 1878. It sometimes happens that the States concerned, instead of settling the boundary line, keep a strip of land between their territories under their joint tenure and administration, so that a so-called condominium comes into existence, 1 See Twiss, I. §§ 183 and 184, and above, § 194. 2 See Fiore, II. No. 800. A good example of such a boundary treaty is that between Great Britain and the United States of America respecting the demarca tion of the international boundary between the United States and the Dominion of Canada, signed at Washington on April 11, 1908. See Martens, N.R.G. 3rd Ser. IV. (1911), p. 191. as in the case of Moresnet (Kelmis) on the PrussoBelgian frontier.1 2 Boun sensu politico. § 202. Whereas the term "natural boundaries in Natural the theory and practice of the Law of Nations means daries natural signs which indicate the course of boundary lines, the same term is used politically in various different meanings. Thus the French often speak of the river Rhine as their "natural" boundary, as the Italians do of the Alps. Thus, further, the zones within which the language of a nation is spoken are frequently termed that nation's "natural" boundary. natural" boundary. Again, the line enclosing such parts of the land as afford great facilities for defence against an attack is often called the "natural" boundary of a State, whether or not these parts belong to the territory of the respective State. It is obvious that all these and other meanings of the term "natural boundaries" are of no importance to the Law of Nations, whatever value they may have politically. X STATE SERVITUDES Vattel, I. § 89-Hall, § 42*-Westlake, I. p. 61-Phillimore, I. §§ 281-283— Twiss, I. § 245-Taylor, § 252-Moore, I. §§ 163-168, II. § 177Bluntschli, §§ 353-359-Hartmann, § 62-Heffter, § 43-Holtzendorff in Holtzendorff, II. pp. 242-252-Gareis, § 71-Liszt, §§ 8 and 19Ullmann, § 99-Bonfils, Nos. 340-344-Despagnet, Nos. 190-192Mérignhac, II. pp. 366-368-Pradier-Fodéré, II. Nos. 834-845, 1038Rivier, I. pp. 296-303-Nys, II. pp. 271-279-Calvo, III. § 1583-Fiore, I. § 380, and Code, Nos. 1095-1097-Martens, I. §§ 94-95-Clauss, "Die Lehre von den Staatsdienstbarkeiten" (1894)-Fabres, "Des servitudes dans le droit international" (1901)-Hollatz, "Begriff und Wesen der Staatsservituten (1909)-Labrousse, "Des servitudes en droit international public" (1911)-Nys in R.I. 2nd Ser. VII. (1905), pp. 118-125, and XIII. (1911), pp. 312–323. tion of § 203. State servitudes are those exceptional and Concepconventional restrictions on the territorial supremacy State Serof a State by which a part or the whole of its territory vitudes. 1 See above, § 171, No. 1. VOL. I. 2 See Rivier, I. p. 166. is in a limited way made perpetually to serve a certain purpose or interest of another State. Thus a State may by a convention be obliged to allow the passage of troops of a neighbouring State, or may in the interest of a neighbouring State be prevented from fortifying a certain town near the frontier. 66 Servitudes must not be confounded1 with those general restrictions upon territorial supremacy which, according to certain rules of the Law of Nations, concern all States alike. These restrictions are named natural" "restrictions of territorial supremacy (servitutes juris gentium naturales), in contradistinction to the conventional restrictions (servitutes juris gentium voluntariae) which constitute the State servitudes in the technical sense of the term. Thus, for instance, it is not a State servitude, but a natural" restriction on territorial supremacy, that a State is obliged to admit the free passage of foreign merchantmen through its territorial maritime belt. 66 That State servitudes are or may on occasions be of great importance, there can be no doubt whatever. The vast majority of writers and the practice of the States accept, therefore, the conception of State servitudes, although they do not agree with regard to the definition and the width of the conception, and although, consequently, in many cases the question is disputed whether a certain restriction upon territorial supremacy is or is not a State servitude. The theory of State servitudes has of late been rejected by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague in the case (1910) of the North Atlantic 1 This is done, for instance, by Heffter (§ 43), Martens (§ 94), Nys (II. p. 271), and Hall (§ 42*); the latter speaks of the right of innocent use of territorial seas as a servitude. The conception of State servitudes is rejected by Bulmerincq (§ 49), Gareis (§ 71), Liszt (§§ 8 and 19), Jellinek ("Allgemeine Staatslehre," p. 366). 3 See the official publication of the case, pp. 115-116; Hogg in The Law Quarterly Review, XXVI. (1910), pp. 415-417; Richards in The Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, New Series, XI. (1910), pp. 18-27; Lansing in A.J. V. (1911), pp. 1-31; Balch and Louter in R.I. 2nd Ser. XIII. (1911), pp. 5-23, 131-157. Coast Fisheries between Great Britain and the United States, chiefly for the three reasons that a servitude in International Law predicated an express grant of a sovereign right, that the doctrine of international servitude originated in the peculiar and now obsolete conditions prevailing in the Holy Roman Empire, and that this doctrine, being little suited to the principle of sovereignty which prevails in States under a constitutional government and to the present international relations of Sovereign States, had found little, if any, support from modern publicists. It is hardly to be expected that this opinion of the Court will induce theory and practice to drop the conception of State servitudes, which is of great value because it fitly covers those restrictions on the territorial supremacy of the State by which a part or the whole of its territory is in a limited way made perpetually to serve a certain purpose or interest of another State. That the doctrine of State servitudes originated in the peculiar conditions of the Holy Roman Empire does not make it unfit for the conditions of modern life if its practical value can be demonstrated. Further, the assertion that the doctrine is but little suited to the principle of sovereignty which prevails in States under a constitutional government, and has, therefore, found little, if any, support from modern publicists, does not agree with the facts. Lastly, the statement that a servitude in International Law predicated an express grant of a sovereign right, is not based on any other authority than the contention of the United States, which made this unfounded statement in presenting their case before the Tribunal. The fact is that a State servitude, although to a certain degree it restricts the sovereignty (territorial supremacy) of the State concerned, does as little as any other restriction upon the sovereignty of a State confer a sovereign right upon the State in favour of which it is established. of State Servitudes. Subjects $204. Subjects of State servitudes are States only and exclusively, since State servitudes can exist between States only (territorium dominans and territorium serviens). Formerly some writers maintained that private individuals and corporations were able to acquire a State servitude; but nowadays it is agreed that this is not possible, since the Law of Nations is a law between States only and exclusively. Whatever rights may be granted by a State to foreign individuals and corporations, such rights can never constitute State servitudes. Object of State Servitudes. On the other hand, every State can acquire and grant State servitudes, although some States may, in consequence of their particular position within the Family of Nations, be prevented from acquiring or granting some special kind or another of State servitudes. Thus neutralised States are in many points hampered in regard to acquiring and granting State servitudes, because they have to avoid everything that could drag them indirectly into war. Thus, further, half-Sovereign and part-Sovereign States may not be able to acquire and to grant certain State servitudes on account of their dependence upon their superior State. But apart from such exceptional cases, even not-full Sovereign States can acquire and grant State servitudes, provided they have any international status at all. § 205 The object of State servitudes is always the whole or a part of the territory of the State the territorial supremacy of which is restricted by any such servitude. Since the territory of a State includes not only the land but also the rivers which water the land, the maritime belt, the territorial subsoil, and the terri 1 Bluntschli, § 353; Heffter, § 44. States, adopted by the Hague Fisheries, that a State servitude conferred a sovereign right upon the State in favour of which it is established, was refuted above in § 203, p. 275. |