App. Div.] First Department, April, 1916. If this policy shall be cancelled as hereinbefore provided, or become void or cease, the premium having been actually paid, the unearned portion shall be returned on surrender of this policy or last renewal, this company retaining the customary short rate; except that when this policy is cancelled by this company by giving notice it shall retain only the pro rata premium." Plaintiff claims that the cancellation is ineffective because the unearned premium money which had been paid to the Perry Company was not returned by the defendant therewith. The defendant's position is that the clause above quoted does not require a return or tender of the premium at the time of notice, but only on surrender of the policy, and that in any case the payment of premium to the Perry Company did not constitute a payment to the defendant, and, therefore, a return was unnecessary. The first ground of defense is unavailing under the decision in the case of Tisdell v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. (155 N. Y. 163). This was approved in a dictum in Buckley v. Citizens' Ins. Co. (188 N. Y. 399). The decision in the Tisdell case, notwithstanding the new form of cancellation clause of the standard policies, above quoted, leaves unaltered the rule which had been laid down by the Court of Appeals in Van Valkenburgh v. Lenox Fire Ins. Co. (51 N. Y. 465), to the effect that notice of cancellation, unaccompanied by an actual tender of the unearned portion of premium money paid, is absolutely ineffective. In that case the cancellation clause read: "The insurance may also be at any time terminated at the option of the company, on giving notice to that effect and refunding a ratable proportion of the premium for the unexpired term of the policy." The establishment of the second defense, that the Perry Company was not an agent of the defendant, raised a question of fact for the jury. (Lounsbury v. Duckrow, 22 Misc. Rep. 434.) Since it is clear on reason as well as on the cases that a broker may occupy such relations to an insurance company as to be its agent in many ways, including the receipt of premium moneys (Bini v. Smith, 36 App. Div. 463; appeal dismissed, 161 N. Y. 120; Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Robbins & Myers Co., 109 App. Div. 530; Wilber v. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co., 122 N. Y. 439; Stone v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., First Department, April, 1916. [Vol. 172. 105 id. 543), the plaintiff should have been allowed to introduce evidence tending to prove that the relations were such in this instance. The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event. CLARKE, P. J., MCLAUGHLIN, DOWLING and DAVIS, JJ., concurred. Judgment reversed, new trial ordered, costs to appellant to abide event. KERN HORSE REMEDY CO., INC., Appellant, v. WILLIAM SELNER and GUSTAVE SELNER, Respondents. Injunction First Department, April 7, 1916. agreement not to divulge secret formulæ - breach— illegal change of corporate place of business immaterial. Where the defendants, owners of receipts and formulæ for horse medicines, on transferring their rights to a corporation organized by them, and in consideration of stock received, agreed not to divulge any of the formulæ sold or make use thereof for their own personal advantage, and further agreed that an injunction should issue should they make a breach of their agreement irrespective of proof of damage, the corporation suing to enforce the agreement by injunction is entitled to an injunction pendente lite restraining the defendants from vending the horse medicines on their own account. Such injunction should issue although the corporation may have unlawfully changed its principal place of business without complying with the requirements of section 13 of the Stock Corporation Law. APPEAL by the plaintiff, Kern Horse Remedy Co., Inc., from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 14th day of February, 1916, denying its motion for an injunction pendente lite. Charles Weishaupt, for the appellant. SMITH, J.: for the respondents. Plaintiff is a domestic corporation organized under the Business Corporations Law of the State of New York. Prior to Feb App. Div.] First Department, April, 1916. ruary 2, 1914, one George F. Kern, a duly licensed veterinary surgeon, authorized to practice as such within the State, discovered, compounded and sold throughout the United States, under the business name and style of "Kern Horse Remedy Company," various horse medicines and compositions and remedies, the names of which are set forth in the complaint. On February 2, 1914, Kern, for a valuable consideration, sold his rights to the manufacture of these medicines and the formulæ therefor to Josephine J. Schnurmacher, Hector Garten and the two defendants herein. Thereupon the four vendees organized the plaintiff corporation and transferred their rights to said corporation by a bill of sale dated the 14th day of February, 1914. Upon the 4th day of March, 1914, Schnurmacher, Garten and these two defendants executed an agreement covenanting one with the other as follows: "That neither or any of them will divulge, expose, sell or communicate in any way, shape, form or manner whatsoever, any of the formulas above mentioned, and that neither or any of them will make use of said formula or formulas for their own personal use or advantage, directly or indirectly, except while in the employ, or in any way connected with the said corporation known as KERN HORSE REMEDY CO., INC. "It is further agreed between the parties hereto that in the event of a breach, or a threatened breach of the terms of this agreement, that any or all of the parties thereto shall be entitled to an injunction restraining said party or parties about to commit any breach of this agreement, or who have committed a breach thereof, without showing or proving any actual damage sustained by any or either of them, or by the said KERN HORSE REMEDY CO., INC., and that this agreement is made for the benefit of themselves as well as for the benefit of said KERN HORSE REMEDY CO., INC." At the original formation of this corporation each of the parties had apparently twenty-five per cent of the stock, which consisted of 100 shares. These four persons were directors of this corporation. Thereafter Gustave Selner, one of the defendants, sold out his interest to his codirectors and separated himself from the business. William Selner, his brother, sold all except 8 shares of the stock of the corporation. He remained, First Department, April, 1916. [Vol. 172. however, as treasurer of the company and a director. The place of business of the corporation was 247 North Seventh street, Brooklyn. That location was held under a lease by Marcus Schnurmacher, who was the husband of Josephine Schnurmacher, a stockholder and director of plaintiff corporation. He ran a sales and exchange stable. He afterwards transferred his lease to a man by the name of Kelly, and the corporation moved its business to 426 East One Hundred and Tenth street, Manhattan. The two Selners, however, made some arrangement with Kelly, the assignee of the lease, to retain space in the old building at North Seventh street, Brooklyn, and advertised that the corporation was still there and sold these horse remedies from that place at cut prices, retaining the proceeds thereof and materially interfered with the plaintiff's business. This action is brought for a permanent injunction, and a temporary injunction is asked during the pendency of the action. From the order of the court denying the plaintiff's motion for a temporary injunction this appeal has been taken. Upon the facts recited the plaintiff would seem to be entitled to the injunction asked for. These defendants transferred their interest in these remedies to the corporation, and covenanted for a valuable consideration not to divulge the formulæ of the medicines and not to sell except as employees of the corporation, and consented that in case of violation of their agreement an injunction might be granted by the court restraining such violation. The only justification which they urge in answer to this action is that the plaintiff unlawfully changed its principal place of business and that the requirements of section 13 of the Stock Corporation Law (Consol. Laws, chap. 59 [Laws of 1909, chap. 61], as amd. by Laws of 1915, chap. 117) were not complied with in making such change. A failure to comply with such requirements, however, in no way authorizes these defendants to violate their covenants and to sell these remedies independently and for their own personal use. The defendants claim that William Selner, holding eight and one-third shares of stock, did not consent to the change of the place of business. He is overborne, however, by the weight of the testimony to the effect that he did consent. But whether App. Div.] First Department, April, 1916. or no he consented, he is not justified in proceeding to sell these medicines at the old place of business of the corporation. The order should, therefore, be reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and the motion granted, with ten dollars costs. CLARKE, P. J., MCLAUGHLIN, DOWLING and DAVIS, JJ., concurred. Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and motion granted, with ten dollars costs. In the Matter of the Application of E. I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS POWDER COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent, for an Order Continuing Mechanic's Lien Filed against THOMAS MCNALLY COMPANY January 12, 1915. BENJAMIN B. ODELL, JR., Sole Receiver of THOMAS MCNALLY COMPANY, Appellant. First Department, April 7, 1916. Mechanic's lien-satisfaction of lien and acceptance of receivers' certificates in payment-refiling of lien unauthorized — extension of lien. Where a mechanic's lien duly filed for material furnished for a municipal improvement has been canceled and satisfied by the lienor in consideration of the receipt by it of receivers' certificates duly issued under permission of the court after the insolvency of the contractor, which certificates represent in value the amount of the claim, there is no authority for the subsequent refiling of the lien when the city refused to pay sums due under the contract to the receiver. As there is no authority for the refiling of such lien, the court should not grant an order extending the same. APPEAL by Benjamin B. Odell, Jr., as receiver, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 14th day of February, 1916, denying his motion to vacate an order of the Special Term dated October 5, 1915, continuing and extending the lien of the respondent |