is not sufficient.-R. v. Howell, 9 C. & P. 437. A demolition by fire is within the Statute. Prove that the defendants were either active in demolishing the house, or present, aiding and abetting. To convict under sect. 9, the jury must be satisfied that the ultimate object of the rioters was to demolish the house, and that if they had carried their intention into effect, they would in point of fact have demolished it; for if the rioters merely do an injury to the house, and then of their own accord go away as having completed their purpose it is not a beginning to demolish within this section. But a total demolition is not necessary, though the parties were not interrupted, and the fact that the rioters left a chimney remaining will not prevent the Statute from applying.Archbold. But if the demolishing or intent to demolish be not proved, and evidence of riot and injury or damage to the building is produced, the jury may find the defendant guilty of the misdemeanor created by sect. 10, by the proviso contained in the aforesaid sect. 206 of the Procedure Act.

Divers persons assembled in a room, entrance money being paid, to witness a fight between two persons. The combatants fought in a ring with gloves, each being attended by a second, who acted in the same way as the second at prize fights. The combatants fought for about 40 minute with great ferocity, and severely punished each other. The police interfered and arrested the defendants, who were among the spectators.

Upon the trial of an indictment against them for unlawfully assembling together for the purpose of a prize fight, the Chairman directed the jury that, if it was a mere exhibition of skill in sparring, it was not illegal; but, if the parties met intending to fight till one gave in from

exhaustion or injury received, it was a breach of the law and a prize fight, whether the combatants fought in gloves or not, and left it to the jury to say whether it was a prize fight or not.

Held, that the jury were properly directed.—R. v. Orton, 14 Cox, 226. See R. v. McNaughton, 14 Cox, 576.

The appellants with a considerable number of other persons, forming a body called "Salvation Army," assembled together in the streets of a town for a lawful object, and with no intention of carrying out their object unlawfully, or by the use of physical force, but knowing that their assembly would be opposed and resisted by other persons, in such a way as would in all probability tend to the committing of a breach of peace on the part of such opposing persons. A disturbance of the peace having been created by the forcible opposition of a number of persons to the assembly and procession through the streets of the appellants and the Salvation Army, who themselves used no force or violence, it was

Held, by Field and Cave, J. J. (reversing the decision of the justices), that the appellants had not been guilty of "unlawfully and tumultuously assembling," etc., and could not therefore be convicted of that offence, nor be bound over to keep the peace.

Held, also, that knowledge by persons peaceably assembling for a lawful object, that their assembly will be forcibly opposed by other persons, under circumstances likely to lead to a breach of the peace on the part of such other persons, does not render such assembly unlawful.-Beatty v. Gillbanks, 15 Cox, 138.

A procession being attacked by rioters a person in it fired a pistol twice. He appeared to be acting alone and nobody was injured.

Held, that he could not be indicted for riot, and, on a case reserved, a conviction on such an indictement was quashed.-R. v. Corcoran, 26 U. C. C. P. 134.

On the trial of an indictment for riot and unlawful assembly on the 15th Jan., evidence was given on the part of the prosecution of the conduct of the prisoners on the day previous, for the purpose of showing (as was alleged) that B., in whose office one act of riot was committed, had reason to be alarmed when the prisoners came to his office. The prisoner's counsel thereupon claimed the right to show that they had met on the 14th to attend a school meeting, and to give evidence of what took place at the school meeting, but the evidence was rejected.

Held, per Allen, C. J., and Fisher and Duff, J. J., Weldon and Wetmore, J. J., dis., that the evidence was properly rejected because the conduct of the prisoners on the 14th could not qualify or explain their conduct on the following day.

It is no ground for quashing a conviction for unlawful assembly on one day that evidence of an unlawful assembly on another day has been improperly received, if the latter charge was abandoned by the prosecuting counsel at the close of the case, and there was ample evidence to sustain the conviction.

If a man knowingly does acts which are unlawful, the presumption of law is that the mens rea exists; ignorance of the law will not excuse him.-The Queen v. Mailloux, 3 Pugs. (N. B.) 493.

HER

CHAPTER 154.

AN ACT RESPECTING PERJURY.

ER Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:

1. Every one who commits perjury or subornation of perjury is guilty of a misdemeanor, and liable to a fine in the discretion of the court and to fourteen years' imprisonment.-32-33 V., c. 23, s. 1.

2. Every one who,

(a.) Having taken any oath, affirmation, declaration or affidavit in any case in which by any Act or law in force in Canada, or in any Province of Canada, it is required or authorized that facts, matters or things be verified, or otherwise assured or ascertained, by or upon the ́oath, affirmation, declaration or affidavit of any person, wilfully and corruptly, upon such oath, affirmation, declaration or affidavit, deposes, swears to or makes any false statement as to any such fact, matter or thing,—

(b.) Knowingly, wilfully and corruptly, upon oath or affirmation, affirms, declares, or deposes to the truth of any statement for so verifying, assuring or ascertaining any such fact, matter or thing, or purporting so to do, or knowingly, wilfully and corruptly takes, makes, signs or subscribes any such affirmation, declaration or affidavit, as to any such fact, matter or thing,-such statement, affidavit, affirmation or declaration being untrue, in the whole or any part thereof, or

(c.) Knowingly, wilfully and corruptly omits from any such affidavit, affirmation or declaration, sworn or made under the provisions of any law, any matter which, by the provisions of such law, is required to be stated in such affidavit, affirmation or declaration,

Is guilty of wilful and corrupt perjury, and liable to be punished accordingly:

2. Provided, that nothing herein contained shall affect any case amounting to perjury at common law, or the case of any offence in respect of which other or special provision is made by any Act.-32-33 V., c. 23, s. 2.

3. Every person who wilfully and corruptly makes any false affidavit, affirmation or declaration, out of the Province in which it is to be used, but within Canada, before any functionary authorized to

take the same for the purpose of being used in any Province of Canada, shall be deemed guilty of perjury, in like manner as if such false affidavit, affirmation or declaration had been made in the Province in which it is used, or intended to be used, before a competent authority. -33 V., c. 26, s. 1, part.

4. Any judge of any court of record, or any commissioner, before whom any inquiry or trial is held, and which he is by law required or authorized to hold, may, if it appears to him that any person has been guilty of wilful and corrupt perjury in any evidence given, or in any affidavit, affirmation, declaration, deposition, examination, answer or other proceeding made or taken before him, direct such person to be prosecuted for such perjury, if there appears to such judge or commissioner a reasonable cause for such prosecution,-and may commit such person so directed to be prosecuted until the next term, sittings, or session of any court having power to try for perjury, in the jurisdiction within which such perjury was committed, or permit such person to enter into a recognizance, with one or more sufficient sureties, conditioned for the appearance of such person at such next term, sittings or session, and that he will then surrender and take his trial and not depart the court without leave,-and may require any person such judge or commissioner thinks fit, to enter into a recognizance conditioned to prosecute or give evidence against such person so directed to be prosecuted as aforesaid.-32-33 V., c. 23, s. 6.

5. All evidence and proof whatsoever, whether given or made orally or by or in any affidavit, affirmation, declaration, examination or deposition, shall be deemed and taken to be material with respect to the liability of any person to be proceeded against and punished for wilful and corrupt perjury or for subornation of perjury.-32-33 V., c. 23, s. 7.

Perjury, by the common law, appears to be a wilful false oath by one who, being lawfully required to depose the truth in any proceeding in a "court" of justice, swears absolutely in a matter of some consequence to the point in question, whether he be believed or not. 3 Russell, 1.

Hawkins, Vol. 1, p. 429, has the word "course" of justice, instead of "court" of justice.

Bishop, Cr. Law, Vol. 2, 1015, says a "course" of justice, and thinks that the word "court" in Russell is a