poisoned or injured, must be specified; an allegation that the prisoner maimed certain cattle is not sufficient.—R. v. Chalkley, R. & R. 258.

No malice against the owner is necessary; post, sect. 60. Other acts of administering poison to cattle are admissible in evidence to show the intent with which the drug is administered.-R. v. Mogg, 4 C. & P. 364. The word wound is contradistinguished from a permanent injury, such as maiming, and a wounding need not be of a permanent nature.-R. v. Haywood, 2 East, P. C. 1076; R. & R. 16.

In R. v. Jeans, 1 C. & K. 539, it was held that where part of the tongue of a horse was torn off, there was no offence against the statute, because no instrument was used. But, under the present statute, the same act was held to be a wounding within this section.-R. v. Bullock, 11 Cox, 125. Upon a case reserved, in R. v. Owens, 1 Moo. C. C. 205, it was held that pouring acid into the eye of a mare, and thereby blinding her, is a maiming.-Setting fire to a building with a cow in it, and thereby burning the cow to death, is a killing within the statute.-R. v. Haughton, 5 C. & P. 555.

The prisoner by a reckless and cruel act caused the death of a mare. The jury found that he did not intend to kill, maim or wound the mare, but that he knew that what he did would or might kill, maim or wound the mare, and that he nevertheless did the act recklessly, and not caring whether the mare was injured or not.

Held, that there was sufficient malice to support the conviction.-R. v. Welch, 13 Cox, 121.

In an indictment purporting to be under 32-33 V., c. 22, s. 45, for malicious injury to property the word "feloniously" was omitted.

Held, bad, and ordered to be quashed.—The Queen v. Gough, 3 O. R. 402.

KILLING OR MAIMING OTHER ANIMALS.

45. Every one who unlawfully and maliciously kills, maims, wounds, poisons or injures any dog, bird, beast, or other animal, not being cattle, but being either the subject of larceny at common law, or being ordinarily kept in a state of confinement, or kept for any domestic purpose, or purpose of lawful profit or advantage or science, shall, on summary conviction, be liable to a penalty not exceeding one hundred dollars, over and above the amount of injury done, or to three months' imprisonment with or without hard labor;

2. Every one who, having been convicted of any such offence, afterwards commits any of the offences in this section mentioned, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and liable to fine or imprisonment, or both, in the discretion of the court.-32-33 V., c. 22, s. 47. 24-25 V., c. 97, s. 41, Imp.

The words in italics are not in the Imperial Act.

As to the proceedings on a subsequent offence, see secs. 139 and 207 of the Procedure Act. As to the punishment under sub. sec 2, see secs. 24, 26 and 31 of c. 181, post.

As to a verdict of attempt to commit the offence charged in certain cases, see sec. 183 of the Procedure Act.

Greaves says: "This clause is new, and is a great improvement of the law, as it will protect domestic animals, from malicious injuries. It includes any beast or animal, not being cattle, which is the subject of larceny at common law. It also includes birds which are the subject of larceny at common law; such as all kinds of poultry, and, under certain circumstances, swans and pigeons. So also it includes any bird, beast or other animal ordinarily kept in a state of confinement, though not the subject of larceny, such as parrots and ferrets; and it is to be observed that the words ordinarily kept in a state of confinement, are a description of the mode in which the animals are usually

kept, and do not render it necessary to prove that the bird or animal was confined at the time when it was injured. Lastly the clause includes any bird or animal kept for any domestic purpose, which clearly embraces cats."

The words or purpose of lawful profit included in our statute cover all animals kept in a circus, menagerie, etc.

INJURIES TO SHIPS.

46. Every one who unlawfully and maliciously sets fire to, casts away or in anywise destroys any ship or vessel, whether the same is complete or in an unfinished state, is guilty of felony, and liable to imprisonment for life.-32-33 V., c. 22, s. 48. 24-25 V., c. 97, s. 42, Imp.

47. Every one who unlawfully and maliciously sets fire to or casts away or in anywise destroys any ship or vessel, with intent thereby to prejudice any owner or part owner of such ship or vessel, or of any goods on board the same, or any person who has underwritten or who underwrites any policy of insurance upon such ship or vessel, or on the freight thereof, or upon any goods on board the same, is guilty of felony, and liable to imprisonment for life.-3233 V., c. 22, s. 49. 24-25 V., c. 97, s. 43, Imp.

48. Every one who unlawfully and maliciously, by any overt act attempts to set fire to, cast away, or destroy any ship or vessel, under such circumstances that, if the ship or vessel were thereby set fire to, cast away or destroyed, the offender would be guilty of felony, is guilty of felony, and liable to fourteen years' imprisonment.-32-33 V., c. 22, s. 50. 24-25 V., c. 97, s. 44, Imp.

Indictment under sec. 46—......... that J. S., on....................... feloniously, unlawfully and maliciously did set fire to a certain ship called "the Rattler," the property of J. N., against the form ......

As to setting fire, etc., see notes under sections 2 and 3, ante.-A pleasure boat, eighteen feet long was set fire to, and Patteson, J., inclined to think that it was a vessel within the meaning of the act, but the prisoner was acquitted on the merits, and no decided opinion was given. -R. v. Bowyer, 4 C. & P. 559. Upon an indictment for

firing a barge, Alderson, J., seemed to doubt if a barge was within the meaning of the statute.-R. v. Smith, 4 C. & P. 569. The burning of a ship of which the defendant was a part owner is within the statute.-R. v. Wallace, 2 Moo. C. C. 200. See, post, sect. 61.

Indictment under sect. 47 ......... that J. S., on......... on board a certain ship called "the Rattler," the property of J. N., on a certain voyage upon the high seas, then being upon the high seas, feloniously, unlawfully and maliciously did set fire to the said ship, with intent thereby to prejudice the said J. N., the owner of the said ship, against the form......... (The intent may be stated in different ways, in different counts.)

In R. v. Philp, 1 Moo. C. C. 263, there was no proof of malice against the owners, and the ship was insured for more than its value, but the court thought that the defendant must be taken to contemplate the consequences of his act, and held that, as to this point, the conviction. was right.-See R. v. Newill, 1 Moo. C. C. 458. The destruction of a vessel by a part-owner shows an intent to prejudice the other part-owners, though he has insured the whole ship, and promised that the other partowners should have the benefit thereof.-Idem. The underwriters on a policy of goods fraudulently made are within the statute, though no goods be put on board,— Idem. If the intent be laid to prejudice the underwriters, then prove the policy, and that the ship sailed on her voyage.-R. v. Gilson, R. & R. 138. It would seem, however, that the general provision of the 46th section of this statute renders unnecessary in any case the allegation or the proof of the intent mentioned in the 47th section. Proof that it was done wilfully is of itself evidence that it was done with intent to prejudice.

While tapping

A sailor goes on a ship to steal rum. the casks, a lighted match held by him set the rum on fire, and a conflagration ensued which destroyed the vessel.Held, that a conviction for arson of the ship could not be upheld.-R. v. Faulkner, 13 Cox, 550.

Held, on the trial of the master of a vessel indicted for scuttling her (by Allen, C. J., and Fisher and Duff, J. J.), that s. 64 of the statute of Canada, 32-33 V., c. 29, allowing a witness to be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, would not apply to protests made by the prisoner, or to policies of insurance issued to the witness, or to receipts which it did not appear the witness had either written, signed or even seen until they were shown to him in the witness box; but held, by Weldon, J., that it was competent, on the cross-examination of the witness, to put into his hands a policy of insurance not in evidence, and ask him if he did not see certain words in it; also, to read from a paper purporting to be a protest made by the prisoner and ask the witness if he did not write the protest and if certain words were not in it. Held, also, (by Allen, C. J., and Fisher and Duff, J. J.), that where the indictment in certain counts charged the destruction of the vessel with intent thereby to prejudice the underwriters, and in others simply charged the crime without alleging the intent, and the prisoner was found guilty on all the counts, that even if it was necessary to show that the prisoner had knowledge, as to which they expressed no opinion, the court could, if necessary, alter the verdict to a finding on the counts which did not allege the intent,

Per Weldon, J., that it was not necessary to show the prisoner's knowledge of the insurance, as he must be pre