The case of Walker v. Mayor of London, 11 Cox, 280, has no application in Canada. In R. v. In R. v. Stancliffe, 11 Cox, 318, it was held that the present section applies to cases of false pretences as well as felony, and that the fact that the prisoner parted with the goods to a bona fide pawnee did not disentitle the original owner to the restitution of the goods.-See 2 Russ. 355.

The court is bound by the statute to order restitution of property obtained by false pretences and the subject of the prosecution, in whose hands soever it is found; and so likewise of property received by a person knowing it to have been stolen or obtained by false pretences; but the order is strictly limited to property identified at the trial as being the subject of the charge, therefore it does not extend to property in the possession of innocent third persons which was not produced and identified at the trial as being the subject of the indictment.-R. v. Goldsmith, 12 Cox, 594.

An order of restitution of property stolen will extend only to such property as is produced and identified in the course of the trial, and not to all the articles named in the indictment, unless so produced and identified and in the possession of the court.-R. v. Smith, 12 Cox, 597.

It was held, on this clause, (R. v. Atkin, 18 L. C. J. 23,) that the court will not give an order for the restitution of stolen goods, where the ownership is the subject of a dispute in the civil courts. See R. v. Macklin, 5 Cox, 216,

Restitution can be ordered to the owner only.-R. v, Jones, 14 Cox, 528.

See 1 Hale, 543, 4 Blackstone, 363.

A. Blenkarn took premises at 37 Wood street, and wrote to the plaintiffs at Belfast ordering goods of them. The

letters were dated 37 Wood street, and signed A. Blenkarn & Co. in such a way as to look like "A. Blenkiron & Co.” there being an old established firm of Blenkiron & Sons, at 123 Wood street. One of the plaintiffs knew something of that firm, and the plaintiffs entered into a correspondence with Blenkarn, and ultimately supplied the goods ordered, addressing them to "A. Blenkiron & Co., 37 Wood street."

The fraud having been discovered, Blenkarn was indicted and convicted for obtaining goods by falsely pretending that he was Blenkiron & Sons.

Before the conviction the defendant had purchased some of the goods bonâ fide of Blenkarn without notice of the fraud, and resold them to other persons. The plaintiffs having brought an action for the conversion of the goods: Held, that the plaintiffs intended to deal with Blenkiron & Sons, and therefore there was no contract with Blenkarm: that the property of the goods never passed from the plaintiffs; and that they were accordingly entitled to recover in the action.-Lindsay v. Cundy, 2 Q. B. D. 976; 13 Cox, 583.

The plaintiff had stolen money of the defendant, and had been prosecuted for it, but acquitted on a technical ground. The plaintiff had, previously to the prosecution, converted the money into goods, which were now in the possession of the defendant as being the proceeds of the money stolen from him by the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought an action to claim the said goods. Held, that he had no right of action. Cattley v. Loundes, 34 W. R. 139.

A thief's money in the hands of the police after his conviction is not a debt of the police to the thief, and cannot be attached under garnishee proceedings.—Bice v. Jarvis, 49 J. P. 264.

Under this section the court can order the restitution

of the proceeds of the goods, as well as of the goods themselves, if such proceeds are in the hands of the criminal or of an agent who holds them for him.-R. v. The Justices, 16 Cox, 143, 196. (Quare? by the interpretation clause of the Procedure Act, the word "property" has not the extensive meaning given by the interpretation clause of the Larceny Act.)

A man was convicted of stealing cattle, which he had sold since in market overt, and had been resold immediately also in market overt, the purchasers being in good faith. Restitution ordered to the person from whom they had been stolen.-R. v. Horan, 6 Ir. R. C. L. 293.

M. was indicted for stealing $95 in bank notes, and acquitted. He applied to have $37 in notes, found on his person when arrested, returned to him, which the prosecutor resisted. The statute of P. E. I., 6 W. 4, c. 22, s. 38, enacts that "when a prisoner is not convicted, the court may, if it sees fit, order restitution of the property where it clearly appears to have been stolen from the owner. When arrested prisoner had the money sewed up in his trousers, and among the notes was a $5 note, bank of N. B., $5 note, bank of Halifax, and a $5 note, bank of Montreal. Prisoner said he put the money there to hide it from the police. Prosecutor had sworn that he had carefully counted the money before the robbery, and that it included. a $5 bank of N. B. note, and a $5 bank of Halifax note.

Held, that the evidence was not sufficient to identify the notes as the prosecutor's, and the application must be granted. The Queen v. McIntyre, 2 P. E. I. Rep. 154.

251. When any prisoner has been convicted, either summarily or otherwise, of any larceny or other offence, including the stealing or unlawfully obtaining any property, and it appears to the court, by the evidence, that the prisoner sold such property or part of it to any person who had no knowledge that it was stolen or unlawfully obtained,

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and that money has been taken from the prisoner on his apprehension, the court may, on the application of such purchaser and on restitution of the property to its owner, order that out of the money so taken from the prisoner, a sum not exceeding the amount of the proceeds of the sale be delivered to such purchaser.—32-33 V., c. 21, s. 114. 3031 V., c. 35, s. 9, Imp.

The English Act does not, expressly, provide by the corresponding clause, for cases of obtaining by false pretences. The section provides for the sale only of the stolen property. R. v. Stancliffe, 11 Cox, 318, supra, would not be affected by it.

See R. v. Roberts, 12 Cox, 574.

INSANE PRISONERS.

252. Whenever it is given in evidence upon the trial of any person charged with any offence, whether the same is treason, felony or misdemeanor, that such person was insane at the time of the commission of such offence, and such person is acquitted, the jury shall be required to find, specially, whether such person was insane at the time of the commission of such offence, and to declare whether he is acquitted by it on account of such insanity; and if it finds that such person was insane at the time of committing such offence, the court before which such trial is had shall order such person to be kept in strict custody in such place and in such manner as to the court seems fit, until the pleasure of the Lieutenant Governor is known.-32-33 V., c. 29, s. 99.

253. The Lieutenant Governor of the Province in which the case arises may, thereupon, make such order for the safe custody of such person during his pleasure, in such place and in such manner as to him seems fit.-32-33 V., c. 29, s. 100.

254. If any person, before the passing of this Act, whether before or after the first day of July, one thousand eight hundred and sixtyseven, was acquitted of any such offence on the ground of insanity at the time of the commission thereof, and has been detained in custody as a dangerous person by order of the court before which such person was tried, and still remains in custody, the Lieutenant Governor may make a like order for the safe custody of such person during pleasure. -32-33 V., c. 29, s. 101. 40 V., c. 26, s. 7.

255. If any person indicted for any offence is insane, and upon arraignment is so found by a jury empanelled for that purpose, so

that such person cannot be tried upon such indictment, or if, upon the trial of any person so indicted, such person appears to the jury charged with the indictment to be insane, the court, before which such person is brought to be arraigned, or is tried as aforesaid, may direct such finding to be recorded, and thereupon may order such person to be kept in strict custody until the pleasure of the Lieutenant Governor is known.-32-33 V., c. 29, s. 102.

256. If any person charged with an offence is brought before any court to be discharged for want of prosecution, and such person appears to be insane, the court shall order a jury to be empanelled to try the sanity of such person; and if the jury so empanelled finds him insane, the court shall order such person to be kept in strict custody, in such place and in such manner as to the court seems fit, until the pleasure of the Lieutenant Governor is known.—32-33 V., c. 29, s. 103.

257. In all cases of insanity so found, the Lieutenant Governor may make such order for the safe custody, during pleasure, of the person so found to be insane, in such place and in such manner as to him seems fit.—32-33 V., c. 29, s. 104.

258. The Lieutenant Governor, upon such evidence of the insanity of any person imprisoned for an offence, or imprisoned for safe custody charged with an offence, or imprisoned for not finding bail for good behavior or to keep the peace, as the Lieutenant Governor consi. ders sufficient, may order the removal of such insane person to a place of safe keeping; and such person shall remain there, or in such other place of safe keeping, as the Lieutenant Governor from time to time orders, until his complete or partial recovery is certified to the satisfaction of the Lieutenant Governor, who may then order such insane person back to imprisonment, if then liable thereto, or otherwise to be discharged.-36 V., c. 51, s. 1.

It is said in 1 Russ., 29: "If a man in his sound. memory commits a capital offence, and before arraignment for it he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it, because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner become mad, he shall not be tried, as he cannot. make his defence. If, after he is tried and found guilty, he loses his senses before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced, and if after judgment, he becomes of nonsane