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ville (1894) 153 U. 8. 289, 14 Sup. Ct. 829, the cense, was, as applied to a sale of liquors in decision in Robbins v. Taxing Dist. was fol the original packages, and by the person who lowed. Asher's Case was strictly one of a had brought them into the state from another drummer soliciting orders on behalf of man state, held to be inconsistent with the power ufacturers residing in another state, and was of congress to regulate commerce among the decided upon the ground that the circum several states; and that conclusion stances in that case and in Robbins' Case reached by applying to the case the rule laid were substantially the same. 128 U. S. 131, 9 down by Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. Sup. Ct. 1. In* Brennan's Case it was ex Maryland, above cited, and stated by the pressly agreed by the parties that the goods present chief justice in these words: “That offered by him for sale in Pennsylvania were the point of time when the prohibition ceases, afterwards sent by their owner in the other and the power of the state to tax commences, state directly to the purchasers. 153 U. S. is not the instant when the article enters the 290, 14 Sup. Ct. 829. The case of Stouten- | country, but when the importer has so acted burgh v. Hennick (1889) 129 U. S. 141, 9 Sup. upon it that it has become incorporated and Ct. 256, in which an act of the legislature of mixed up with the mass of property in the the District of Columbia taxing commercial country, which happens when the original agents "offering for sale goods, wares or package is no longer such in his hands; that merchandise, by sample, catalogue or other the distinction is obvious between a tax wise,” was held to be unconstitutional, as ap which intercepts the import as an import on plied to a commercial agent offering for sale its way to become incorporated with the gengoods of a Maryland house, did not substan- | eral mass of property, and a tax which finds tially differ in principle or in circumstances. the article already incorporated with that
In Leloup v. Port of Mobile (1888) 127 U. S. mass by the act of the importer.” 133 U. S. 640, 8 Sup. Ct. 1380, in which a general 110, 10 Sup. Ct. CS1. The decision made at license tax imposed by a statute of Alabaina the same time in Lyng v. Michigan was to on a telegraph company, affecting its entire the same effect. 135 U. S. 161, 10 Sup. Ct. business, interstate as well as domestic or 725. Presently after those decisions, coninternal, without discrimination, was held gress, by the act of August 8, 1890 (chapter unconstitutional, Mr. Justice Bradley, in de 728), enacted that all intoxicating liquors or livering judgment, took occasion to observe liquids brought into or remaining in a state that “there are sufficient modes in which'the should, upon their arrival therein, be subinternal business, if not already taxed in ject, like domestic liquors, to the operation of some other way, may be subjected to taxa- | laws enacted by the state in the exercise of tion, without the imposition of a tax which its police powers. 26 Stat. 313. After concovers the entire operations of the company"; gress had thus, as said by the chief justice, and to repeat that “this exemption of inter "declared that imported liquors or liquids state and foreign commerce from state regu- shall, upon arrival in a state, fall within the lation does not prevent the state from taxing category of domestic articles of a similar nathe property of those engaged in such com ture," this court unanimously held that inmerce located within the state as the proper- | toxicating liquors brought into a state before ty of other citizens is taxed, nor from regu this act of congress, were subject to the oplating matters of local concern, which may eration of the earlier statutes of the state reincidentally affect commerce.” 127 U. S. 647, maining unrepealed. In re Rahrer (1891) 140 649, 8 Sup. Ct. 1380. See, also, Pullman's U. S. 545, 560, 561, 11 Sup. Ct. 865. Palace-Car Co. v. Pennsylvania (1891) 141 U. In Plumley V. Massachusetts (decided at S. 18, 11 Sup. Ct. 876; Ficklen v. Taxing the present term) the question, as stated by Dist. (1892) 145 U. S. 1, 12 Sup. Ct. 810; | the court, was, “Does the freedom of comPostal Tel. Cable Co. v. City Council of merce among the states demand a recogni. Charleston (1891) 153 U. S. 692, 14 Sup. Ct. tion of the right to practice a deception upon 1094; Cable Co. V. Adams (1895) 155 U. S. 658, the public in the sale of*any articles, even 15 Sup. Ct. 268.
those that may have become the subject of In Dent y. West Virginia (1889) 129 U. S. trade in different parts of the country?" 114, 9 Sup. Ct. 231, this court upheld the va After reviewing many of the cases, citing lidity of a statute of West Virginia requiring the passages above quoted from the opinions every person practicing medicine in the state in Walling v. Michigan and in Dent v. West to obtain a certificate from the state board of Virginia, and distinguishing Leisy v. Hardin, health, and, speaking by Mr. Justice Field, the court answered the question in the negsaid: “The power of the state to provide for ative, and therefore held that the statute of the general welfare of its people authorizes Massachusetts prohibiting the sale of Oleoit to prescribe all such regulations as, in its margarine colored to imitate butter was conjudgment, will secure, or tend to secure, stitutional and valid, as applied to a sale by them against the consequences of ignorance an agent within the state of articles manuand incapacity, as well as of deception and factured in another state by citizens thereof. fraud." 129 U. S. 122, 9 Sup. Ct. 231.
155 U. S. 461, 468, 471-474, 15 Sup. Ct. 154. *In Leisy v. Hardin (1890) 135 U. S. 100, 10 The necessary conclusion, upon authority Sup. Ct. 681, a statute of a state, prohibiting as well as upon principle, is that the statute the sale of intoxicating liquors without a li of Missouri now in question is nowise repug
, among other
is a valid exercise of the power of the state month of February, 1893, was organized unover persons and business within its borders der the laws of Pennsylvania by the indiJudgment affirmed.
vidual stockholders and officers of the Virginia Company, a corporation organized and
exi ng under the laws of Virginia and a (156 U. S. 322)
* citizen of that state, and that the land in: In re LEHIGH MIN. & MANUF'G CO.
controversy was conveyed by the Virginia
Company to the Lehigh Company; "that the (March 4, 1895.)
purpose of organizing said Lehigh Mining SUPREME COURT-APPEAL FROM CIRCUIT COURT & Manufacturing Company, and in making CERTIFICATE OF QUESTION OF TRIAL COURT's
to it said conveyance, was to give to this JURISDICTION-SUFFICIENCY.
court jurisdiction in this case; but that said Where, in an action in the circuit court
conveyance passed to said Lehigh Mining in which the only question involved is one of jurisdiction, the judgment not only recites that,
& Manufacturing Company all of the right, for reasons filed as part of the order, the court title, and interest of said Virginia Coal & considers it has no jurisdiction, and dismisses Iron mpany in and to said land; and that it for want of jurisdiction, but the judge certi
since said conveyance, said Virginia Coal & fies, in the bill of exceptions, that it was "held that the court did not have jurisdiction of the
Iron Company has had no interest in sald suit, and ordered the same to be dismissed," land, and has not and never has had any and, in the order allowing a writ of error, certi interest in this suit; and that it owns none fies that it is allowed on "the question of jurisdiction," there is a sufficient compliance with
of the stock of the Lehigh Mining & ManuJudiciary Act March 3, 1891, § 5, which pro facturing Company, and has no interest vides that in any case in which the jurisdiction therein whatever.” The court, being of opinof the circuit court is in issue the question of
ion that “the organization by the individual jurisdiction alone shall be certified to the supreme court from the court below for decision.
stockholders and officers of a corporation ex
isting under the laws of one state of a cor• The Lebigh Mining & Manufacturing Com
ation under the laws of another state, for pany, alleging itself to be "a corporation or
the express purpose of bringing a suit in the ganized and existing under the laws of the
federal court to try the title to a tract of state of Pennsylvania, and a citizen and
land claimeu by the former corporation, and resident of the said state of Pennsylvania,”
conveyed to the latter after its organization, brought its action of ejectment in the cir and before suit brought, will not enable the cuit court of the United States for the West
grantee to maintain a suit in ejectment in ern district of Virginia against J. J. Kelly, such court'; that the suit did not really and Jr., and others, tenants and lessees of Kelly, substantially involve a dispute or controverto recover the land described in the declara
sy properly within the jurisdiction of the tion. The defense pleaded not guilty, and
court; and that the plaintiff bad been colalso filed two pleas to the jurisdiction of the lusively made a party to it, for the purpose court. These pleas averred that, for 10 years of making a case cognizable in the federal prior to the commencement of the action in
court,-sustained the pleas and dismissed ejectment, the Virginia Coal & Iron Com
the action. 64 Fed. 401. pany, a corporation existing under the laws of
The judgment of the court was as follows: Virginia and a citizen of Virginia, bad been
“This day came again the parties by their claiming title to the lands of the defendant attorneys, and on motion of the defendants Kelly described in the declaration; that, im. to dismiss this suit, because instituted and mediately preceding the commencement of prosecuted in fraud of the jurisdiction of the the action, the Virginia Coal & Iron Com court, by consent of the parties the cause pany, its stockholders, officers, and mem came on to be heard upon the two pleas in bers, organized, under the laws of the state writing to the jurisdiction heretofore filed of Pennsylvania, the Lehigh Mining & Man in the case, at the proper time, and general ufacturing Company, to which the Virginia replication thereto, and the agreed statement Company conveyed said land, in order to en of facts, signed by the attorneys and filed abe the Lehigh Company to institute suit in therein, the exceptions indorsed thereon; and the arcuit court, said Lehigh Company be the court having fully considered the said ing simply another name for the Virginia two pleas, the agreed statement of facts Company, being composed of the same par aforesaid, and the exception to a certain ia ces, and organized alone for the purpose of paragraph in the said agreed statement of taking a conveyance of the land from the
facts, and argument of counsel, dotb*consider* Virginia Company, and the Virginia Com that the said exceptions are not well taken, pany making the conveyance, fraudulently and overrule the same. And the court furand collusively, for the purpose of conferring ther considers that the said pleas be, and jurisdiction on the circuit court.
they are hereby, sustained. And for reajoined upon the pleas, and on the 30th day sons in writing filed herewith, as part of this of May, 1894, was tried by the court, Hon. order, the court doth further consider that it John Paul, district judge, holding the cir has no jurisdiction of this case, and that cuit court, presiding, upon an agreed state the said action of ejectment be, and the same
is hereby, dismissed for want of jurisdiction, R. A. Ayeres, for petitioner. F. S. Blair, but without prejudice to the parties to this for respondent suit.” Thereupon the plaintiff, upon the same day
Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating (May 30, 1891), tendered the court a bill of
the facts in the foregoing language, delivexceptions, which was that day signed, seal
ered the opinion of the court. ed, and made part of the record by the dis
In Maynard v. Hecht, 151 U. S. 324, 14 trict judge. This bill of exceptions contain
Sup. Ct. 353, we held that in the instance of ed the two pleas and the agreed statement of
an appeal or writ of error from a circuit facts, and declared that the court "held that
court upon the question of jurisdiction un
der the fifth section of the judiciary act of the court did not have jurisdiction of this suit, and ordered the same to be dismissed,
March 3, 1891, a certificate by the circuit to which opinion and action of the court the
court presenting such question for determin. plaintiff did then and there except." The
ation was required in order to invoke the
exercise by this court of its appellate jurisplaintiff thereupon prayed for a writ ol er
diction. The first of the six classes of cases mr from the supreme court of the United
described in that section in which a writ of States, which was allowed by the following order, under the band of the district judge, directly to this court from the circuit courts
error or appeal could be taken or brought and entered of record:
was: “The plaintiff, considering itself aggrieved
"In any case in which the jurisdic
tion of the court is in issue; in such case, by the rulings of said court in the said case,
the question of jurisdiction alone shall be in which final judgment was rendere at
certified-to the supreme court from the court the May term, 1891, to wit, on May 30, 1891,
below for decision." We were of opinion of said circuit court held at this place, dis
that the intention of congress as to the cermissing the said case because the said court,
tification mentioned in that section, and also in its opinion, did not have jurisdiction there
in section 6, in relation to the circuit court of, and having on the thirtieth day of May,
of appeals, was to be arrived at in the light 1894, filed its bill of exceptions, and having of the rules theretofore prevailing in referon tnis day filed its assignment of errors
ence to certificates on division of opinion. anu ts petition praying for a writ of error
Rev. St. 88 650–652, 693, 697. In reference to said judgment and proceedings to the su
to such certificates, it was provided that preme court of the United States upon the
the point on which the disagreement occursaıd question of jurisdiction, and praying
red should be certified during the trial term;. that said writ of error be allowed it to the
and it is argued that by analogy the certifisaid supreme court of the United States, and
cate of the circuit courts, under the act of that a full transcript of the record and pro
March 3, 1891, must also be made at the ceedings in said cause, duly authenticated,
term at which the final judgment or decree be sent to said supreme court.
is entered; and, moreover, that as, after the “Now, on this day, to wit, May 30, 1894, it
close of such term, the parties are out of is ordered and considered by this court that
court, and the litigation there at an end, said writ of error be allowed and awarded
the court has no power to grant such certifias prayed for.
cate, and cannot certify, nunc pro tunc, if no On November 23, 1891, at a subsequent such certificate was made or intended to be term of the court to that at which the judg. made at the term, as was thecase here. But it. ment dismissing the cause for want of juris is unnecessary to determine how this may be, diction had been entered, the Lehigh Com as we think the district judge was quite pany applied to we district judge holding the right in holding that the question had al-circuit court for the Western district of Vir ready been sufficiently certified. The ques-ginia to enter an order certifying the ques tion involved was only the question of juristion of jurisdiction to the supreme court of diction, and the judgment not only recited the United States, pursuant to the fifth sec that for reasons in writing, filed as part of tion of the judiciary act of March 3, 1891. the order, the court considered that it had This application was denied, upon the ground no jurisdiction of the case, and therefore that the question of jurisdiction had al dismissed it for want of jurisdiction; but ready been sufficiently certified, and, fur the district judge certified in the bill of ex. ther, that, if not, the court had then no pow ceptions that it was "held that the court did. er to enter the order requested.
not have jurisdiction of the suit, and ordered The Lehigh Mining & Manufacturing Com the same to be dismissed," and, in the order pany applied to this court for leave to file allowing the writ of error, certified in effect a petition, setting forth the foregoing facts that it was allowed "upon the question of in substance, for a mandamus requiring the jurisdiction." district judge for the Western district of We observed in U. S. v. Jahn, 153 U. S. Virginia, holding the circuit court of the 109, 112, 15 Sup. Ct. 39, that “the provision United States for that district, to certify the that any case in which the question of jurisquestion of jurisdiction, and to enter the diction is in issue may be taken directly to order tendered by petitioner, November 23, this court necessarily extends to other cases. 1894.
than those in which the final judgment rests.
on the ground of want of jurisdiction, for in plea was subsequently filed, but, by order of them that would be the sole question, and the court, was striken from the record. The the certificate, though requisite to our juris demurrer was overruled. After answer tiled, diction under the statute, would not be in the case was submitted to the court, without itself essential, however valuable in the in the intervention of a jury. Judgment was terest of brevity of record. But in such thereupon rendered for the plaintiff in the other cases the requirement that the ques sum of $2,030, and the defendant brought the tion of*jurisdiction alone should be certified case here by error. for decision was intended to operate as a limitation upon the jurisdiction of this court
J. H. Blair, for plaintiff in error. Frank of the entire case, and of all questions in
W. Hackett, for defendant in error. volved in it,-a jurisdiction which can be exercised in any other class of cases taken Mr. Justice WHITE, after stating the case, directly to this court, under section 5.” If delivered the opinion of the court. in this case the jurisdiction had been sus The only error complained of here is the tained, and the defendants had preserved absolute want of jurisdiction in the court bethe question by certificate in the form of a low, which it is asserted is apparent on the bill of exceptions, and the cause had sub face of the record. The argument is that the sequently proceeded to a final decree against matter in dispute did not exceed $2,000, exthem, it would seem that they could bave clusive of interest and costs, and hence the brought the case, at the proper time, on the alleged want of jurisdiction. The demand question of jurisdiction solely, directly to of the plaintiff was for damages in the sun this court, although not compelled to do so. of $6,000. This was the principal contro
At all events, where the question is cer versy. It is insisted, however, that as, under tified as it was here, we think the requisi the law of Nebraska, damages in case of tion of the statute sufficiently complied with. eviction involved responsibility only for the Leave denied.
return of the price, with interest thereon, and the price here was only $1,200, the sum in
controversy could not exceed $2,000, exclusive •(156 U. S. 328)
of interest; that is to say, as the measure BROWN v. WEBSTER.
of the damage was price and interest, the (March 4, 1895.)
price being below $2,000, the jurisdictional No. 160.
amount could not be arrived at by adding the FEDERAL COURTS-JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT. interest to the price. Tuis contention overWhere an evicted grantee sues the gran.
looks the elementary distinction between intor in Nebraska for $6,000 damages, the amount terest as such and the use of an interest cal. in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds $2,000, though the price paid by plain
culation as an instrumentality in arriving at tiff for the land was only $1,200; and the law
the amount of damages to be awarded on the of such state, in case of eviction, imposes a re principal demand. As we have said, the responsibility only for the return of the price,
covery sought was not the price and interest with interest thereon.
thereon, but the sum of the damage resulting In Error to the Circuit Court of the United from eviction. All such damage was thereStates for the District of Nebraska.
fore the principal demand in controversy, alThe plaintiff below (defendant in error) though interest and price and other things bought in 1881, from the defendant below, may have constituted some of the elements with full warranty, a tract of land, the pur- entering into the legal unit, the damage which chase price of which was $1,200. In 1886, one the party was entitled to recover. Whether, Thomas Hugh sued to recover the land in therefore, the court below considered the in. question, averring that he had a superior title terest as an instrument or means for ascerto that which had been purchased and con taining the amount of the principal demand, reyed as above stated. This action culmi is wholly immaterial, provided the principal nated in a final judgment, ousting the de demand as made and ascertaineu was wlue fendant therein from the property. The plain in the jurisdiction of the court. Indeed, the tiff here, who was defendant in the suit in confusion of thought which the assertion of ejectment, then brought this suit in the cir want of jurisdiction involves is a failure cuit court of the United States for the dis to distinguish between a principal and an trict of Nebraska, to recover the sum of accessory demand. The sum of the princi$6,342.40 and costs. The alleged cause of ac pal demand determines the question of juristion was the sale,*the warranty, and the evic diction. Theaccessory or the interest demand tion, and the suin above mentioned was laid cannot be computed for jurisdictional puras the amount of damages claimed. The de. poses. Here the entire damage claimed was fendant demurred, on the ground that the the principal demand, without reference to court had no jurisdiction of the subject of the the constituent elements entering therein. action, "for that it appears on the face of This demand was predicated on a distinct said amende:l petition that the amount in con cause of action,-eviction from the property troversy herein between the plaintiff and de bought. Thus considered, the attack on the fendant, exclusive of interest and costs, does jurisdiction is manifestly unsound, since its not exceed the sum and value of $2,000." A premise is that a sum, which was an essential
ingredient in the one principal claim, should therein stated to the purposes therein set be segregated therefrom, and be considered forth, and forbade the diversion of any of as a mere accessory thereto.
the receipts from the particular purposes to Judgment affirmed.
which they were then appropriated.
In 1882, in an act reincorporating the city
of New Orleans, the foregoing provision as (156 U. S. 353)
to the annual estimate and budget was pracUNITED STATES ex rel. SIEGEL V. THO. | tically re-enacted, with the direction that the MAN, Comptroller of City of New Orleans. budget be published in the official journal. (March 4, 1895.)
This law, in addition, provided as follows: No. 125.
"The council in fixing the budget of rerCITIES—INDEBTEDNESS-APPLICATION OF SURPLUS
enue and expenses as herein provided shall REVENUE-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
not consider and adopt as a revenue miscelExtra Sess. Acts La. 1877, p. 47, pro laneous or contingent resources and affix viding that all the revenues of a city of each thereto either an arbitrary or nominal value year "shall" be devoted to, the expenditures bf
or amount; but whenever such resources are that year, provided that any surplus of said revenues “may” be applied to the payment of in
considered and adopted they shall be estidebtedness of former years, is merely permis mated on a real and substantial basis, girsive as to the surplus, and does not contractu ing the source whence to be derived, the speally dedicate the surplus of any year to pay ment of claims of years prior to that year, but
cific sum to be received from each item there. subsequent to 1877, so that Act 1882, No. 20, of, and no more. The council is hereby pro $$ 65, 66, and Act 1886, No. 109, authorizing hibited from estimating for expenditures to the surplus of any year to be applied to works of public improvement impair the obligation of
be derived from any uncertain or indefinite no contract right under the act of 1877 in favor source, cause cr circumstance; but the counof the holders of such claims. 44 Fed. 590, af cil shall, by the proper ordinances provides firmed.
for the receipt and disbursement of any sums In Error to the Circuit Court of the United of money, interest, rights or credits that may States for the Eastern District of Louisiana. accrue to the corporation by bequest, grant
The legislature of the state of Louisiana in or any cause whatever, and all such sums, 1877 passed an act which may be epitomized rights, interests or credits so received shall as follows: That no police jury of any par be, and are hereby, appropriated for the purish or municipal corporation in the state poses of public works and improvements, the should make appropriations or expenditures manner and details of such appropriations to of money in any year which should, sep be ordered by the council. arately or together with any appropriations “The council shall not under any pretext or expenditures of the same year, be in ac whatever appropriate any funds for the gov. tual excess of the actual revenue of the par ernment of the corporation to the full extent ish or municipality for that year; and that of the estimated revenues, but shall reserve all the revenues of the parishes and munici- 25 per cent. of said estimated revenues, which palities of each year should be devoted to the reserve and all sums, rights, interests and expenditures of that year, provided “that any credits received from miscellaneous or consurplus of said revenues may be applied to tingent sources shall be appropriated by the the payment of the indebtedness of former council for the purposes of public improveyears.” Extra Sess. Acts 1877, p. 47.
ments as herein provided for." Acts 1882, p. In 1879 (Act No. 38 of that year) it was 35, No. 20, 88 64-66. provided that it should be the duty of the In 1886 the act just quoted was amended board of administrators of the common coun by providing that the council “shall not uzcil of the city of New Orleans, in December der any pretext whatever appropriate any of each year, to propose a detailed statement funds for the government of the corporation exhibiting the amount of revenues for the en to the full extent of the revenues, but sball suing year expected to be derived by the reserve 20 per cent of said revenues; which city from taxes and licenses, and that, along reserve and all sums, rights, interests and with this estimate of receipts, it should be credits received from miscellaneous or conlikewise the duty of the city to prepare a tingent sources shall be appropriated by the detailed statement of the estimated expend. council for the purposes of permanent public itures, exhibiting the items of liability and improvements, as herein provided for." expenses for the year, including the requisite In March, 1883, the city of New Orleans amount for contingent expenses during that sanctioned the issue of transferable certifi. time. The act provided that the estimate of cates of ownership for unpaid appropria. liabilities and expenses should not exceed tions, which certificates entitled the creditor four-fifths of the estimated amount of rev. to receive a cash warrant for the claim in the enue. It made it the duty of the city to order of the promulgation of the ordinance adopt a budget of revenues and liabilities, by which the claim was authorized.
The orand to levy the taxes and collect the licenses dinance provided that the certificates thus is. provided in the estimate, in order to pay the sued should bear no interest same. It directed that the detailed esti Prior to May 21, 1890, the relator herein mate of receipts and expenses should be con brought three suits against the city of New sidered as an appropriation of the amounts Orleans in the circuit court of the United