land, laws have been enacted, to prevent the best method of shipbuilding from being carried out of the kingdom. This caution is to be carried farther, with respect to nations more justly suspected. Thus, when the Turks were successfully pursuing their victorious career, and rapidly advancing to the zenith of power, all Christian nations ought, independent of every bigoted consideration, to have considered them as enemies; even the most distant of those nations, though not engaged in any contest with them, would have been justifiable in breaking off all commerce with a people who made it their profession to subdue by force of arms all who would not acknowledge the authority of their prophet. BOOK II. CHAP. I. cular limi. Let us further observe, with regard to the prince in particular, § 17. Partithat he ought not, in affairs of this nature, to obey without reserve tation with all the suggestions of a noble and generous heart impelling him to regard to sacrifice his own interests to the advantage of others, or to motives the prince. of generosity; because it is not his private interest that is in question, but that of the state-that of the nation who has committed herself to his care. Cicero says that a great and elevated soul despises pleasures, wealth, life itself, and makes no account of them, when the common utility lies at stake.* He is right, and such sentiments are to be admired in a private person, but generosity is not to be exerted at the expense of others. The head or conductor of a nation ought not to practise that virtue in public affairs without great circumspection, nor to a greater extent than will redound to the glory and real advantage of the state. As to the common good of human society, he ought to pay the same attention to it as the nation he represents would be obliged to pay were the government of her affairs in her own hand. ought to But, though the duties of a nation towards herself set bounds to § 18. No the obligation of performing the offices of humanity, they cannot nation in the least affect the prohibition of doing any harm to others, of injure causing them any prejudice,-in a word, of injuring them†. others. If every man is, by his very nature, obliged [ 142 ] to assist in promoting the perfection of others, much more cogent are the reasons which forbid him to increase their imperfection, and that of their condition. The same duties are incumbent on nations (Prelim. §§ 5, 6). No nation, therefore, ought to commit any actions tending to impair the perfection of other nations, and that of their condition, or to impede their progress,—in other words, to injure them (94). And, since the perfection of a nation consists in her aptitude to attain the end of civil society-and the perfection of her condition, in not wanting any of the things neces *De Offic. lib. iii. cap. v. + Lézer (professedly borrowed from the Latin lado) is the term used by the author, who, in order the better to explain his meaning, proceeds to inform us, that "nuire (to hurt), offenser (to offend), faire tort (to wrong), porter dommage (to cause detriment), porter prejudice (to prejudice), blesser (to wound, or hurt), are not of precisely the same import," and that, by the word lézer (which is here rendered injure) he means, "in general, causing imperfection in the injured party, or in his condi (94) This position however requires qua- CHAP. I. § 19. Of. fences. sary to that end (Book I. § 14)-no one nation ought to hinder another from attaining the end of civil society, or to render her incapable of attaining it. This general principle forbids nations to practise any evil manœuvres tending to create disturbances in another state, to foment disorder, to corrupt its citizens, to alienate its allies, to raise enemies against it, to tarnish its glory, and to deprive it of its natural advantages (95). However, it will be easily conceived that negligence in fulfilling the common duties of humanity, and even the refusal of these duties or offices, is not an injury. To neglect or refuse contributing to the perfection of a nation, is not impairing that perfection. It must be further observed, that, when we are making use of our right, when we are doing what we owe to ourselves or to others, if, from this action of ours, any prejudice results to the perfection of another, any detriment to her exterior condition,-we are not guilty of an injury: we are doing what is lawful, or even what we ought to do. The damage which accrues to the other, is no part of our intention: it is merely an accident, the imputability of which must be determined by the particular circumstances. For instance, in case of a lawful defence, the harm we do to the aggressor is not the object we aim at:-we act only with a view to our own safety; we make use of our right; and the aggressor alone is chargeable with the mischief which he brings on himself. Nothing is more opposite to the duties of humanity, nor more contrary to that society which should be cultivated by nations, than offences, or actions which give a just displeasure to others: every nation therefore should carefully avoid giving any other nation real offence: I say real; for, should others take offence at our behaviour when we are only using our rights or fulfilling our duties, the fault lies with them, not with us. Offences excite (95) An instance of this rule is, the illegality of any commercial intercourse with a revolted colony before its separate inde pendence has been acknowledged. A contract made between a revolted colony in that character between the subject of another state that has not as yet recognized such revolted colony as an independent state, is illegal and void, and will not be given effect to by the Court of Chancery, or any other Court in this country. City of Berne v. Bank of England, 9 Ves. 347; Jones v. Garcia del Rio, 1 Turner & Russ. 297; Thompson v Powles, 2 Sim. Rep. 202, 3; De Wutz v. Hendricks, 2 Bing. 314; Yrisarri v. Clement, 11 Moore, 308; 2 Car. & P. 223; 3 Bing. 432; for, such direct recognition of such a revolted colony must necessarily be offensive to the principal state to which it belonged; and, in the American war, Great Britain declared war against France and other countries on the ground of their improper interference between her and her colonies. Thompson v. Powles, 2 Sim. Rep. 203, 212, 3, and in Biré v. Thompson, cited id. and id. 222, Lord Eldon refused to take notice of the Republic of Colombia; and it seems that, if a bill in equity falsely state that the colony had been recognized as an indepen. dent state, the Court may take judicial notice of the contrary, and decree or proceed accordingly; and the mere fact of this country having for commercial purposes sent a consul to a revolted colony, is not equivalent to a state recognition of its independence; Taylor v. Barclay, 2 Sim. 213, and Yrisarri v. Clement, 11 Moore, 308; 2 Carr. & P. 223; 3 Bing. 432, cited id. 219. To supply such a revolted colony (or even any independent state) with money, without leave of the government to which a subject belongs, is illegal, because that would be assisting such colony against the parent country to which it belongs; and also because it would create objects and interests on the part of the subject that might in case of war be injurious to his own government. Observations in Thompson v. Powles, 2 Sim. Rep. 203, and Hennings v. Rothschild, 12 Moore, 559: 4 Bing. 315, 335; 9 Bar. & Cres. 470; Yri. sarri v. Clement, 11 Moore, 308; 2 Car. & P. 223; 3 Bing. 432. such asperity and rancour between nations that we should avoid giving any room even for ill-grounded picques, when it can be done without any inconveniency, or failure in our duty. It is said that certain medals and dull jests irritated Lewis XIV. against the United Provinces to such a degree as to induce him, in 1672, to undertake the destruction of that republic (96). BOOK II. CHAP. I. the an cients. The maxims laid down in this chapter,-those sacred precepts § 20. Bad of nature,—were for a long time unknown to nations. The an- custom of cients had no notion of any duty they owed to nations with whom they were not united by treaties of friendship.* The Jews especially placed a great part of their zeal in hating all nations; and, as a natural consequence, they were detested and despised by them in turn. At length the voice of nature came to be heard among civilized nations; they perceived that all men are brethren.† When will the happy time come that they shall behave as such? CHAP. II. OF THE MUTUAL COMMERCE BETWEEN NATIONS. CHAP. II. tual com merce. ALL men ought to find on earth the things they stand in need $21. General obligaof. In the primitive state of communion, they took them wher- tion of naever they happened to meet with them, if another had not before tions to carappropriated them to his own use. The introduction of dominion ry on mu and property could not deprive men of so essential a right; and, consequently, it cannot take place without leaving them, in general, some means of procuring what is useful or necessary to them. This means is commerce; by it every man may still supply his wants. Things being now become property, there is no obtaining them without the owner's consent, nor are they usually to be had for nothing; but they may be bought, or exchanged for other things of equal value. Men are, therefore, under an obligation to carry on that commerce with each other, if they wish not to deviate from the views of nature; and this obligation extends also to whole nations or states (Prelim. § 5). It is seldom that nature is seen in one (96) On this ground it was held that the publication in England of a libel upon Buonaparte, then first consul of the French republic, was an indictable offence, as calculated to stir up animosity between him and the citizens of the republic, and to create disorder between our king and people and said Buonaparte and said republic. Information against Peltier filed in Crown Office, K. B., in Michaelmas Term, 43 Geo. 3-1 Camp. 352. So Lord Hawkesbury laid it down to be clear "that a foreign power has a right to apply to foreign courts of judicature and obtain redress for defamation or calumny," 6 Russell's Modern Europe, 20, and see post, page 173, end of BOOK II. CHAP. II. [ 144 ] place to produce every thing necessary for the use of man; one country abounds in corn, another in pastures and cattle, a third in timber and metals, &c. If all those countries trade together, as is agreeable to human nature, no one of them will be without such things as are useful and necessary; and the views of nature, our common mother, will be fulfilled. Further, one country is fitter for some kind of products than another, as, for instance, fitter for the vine than for tillage. If trade and barter take place, every nation, on the certainty of procuring what it wants, will employ its lands and its industry in the most advantageous manner, and mankind in general prove gainers by it. Such are the foundations of the general obligation incumbent on nations reciprocally to cultivate commerce (97). (97) The restrictions on trade, which have been enforced absolutely or conditionally, by almost all the powerful nations of the world, have been the cause of a thou. sand wars, and the ground-work of innumerable treaties; and therefore, it is important that we should give them full consideration. With respect to the freedom of trade, it has been laid down by the wisest of politicians and best of men, that every nation ought not only to countenance trade as far as it reasonably can, but even to protect and favour it; and that, freedom being very favourable to commerce, is implied in the duties of nations that they should support it as far as possible, instead of cramping it by unnecessary burdens or restrictions; and this position is supported by the reasons thus urged by Vattel, (supra, § 21). It was this feeling that influenced that celebrated statesman, Mr. Pitt, in conclud. ing the commercial treaty with France, in 1786. Great Britain and France had, for centuries before, contrary to every sound principle of policy, acted as rival enemies,* and their commercial policy was dictated by the same spirit which prompted their unhappy wars; insomuch, that, though they possessed the materials of a most extensive commerce-the one abounding in all that art and industry can supply, and the other in the productions of a more favoured soil and climate-the exchange of their peculiar produce was discouraged by a complicated system of restraint and heavy duties. The object of the commercial treaty alluded to was, to abolish those pernicious restraints, and, by connecting the two countries in the bonds of a reciprocal trade, to pledge them, by their mutual interest, to an oblivion of their ancient animosities. The view in which that treaty originated was explained by Mr. Pitt, when it was submitted to Parliament; and the sentiments which he expressed gave to this measure a remarkable character of moderation and wisdom. In reply to an argument inculcating constant jealousy of France,t he inquired "whether, in using the word jealousy, it was meant to recommend to this country such a species of jealousy as should be either mad or blind, such a species of jealousy as should induce her either madly to throw away what was to make her happy, or blindly grasp at that which must end in her ruin? Was the necessity of a perpetual animosity with France so evident and so pressing that for it we were to sacrifice every cominercial advantage we might expect from a friendly intercourse with that country? or, was a pacific connection between the two kingdoms so highly offensive that even an extension of commerce could not counterpoise it?" Towards the close of the same speech, he observes, "The quarrels between France and Britain had too long continued to harass not only those two great nations themselves, but had frequently embroiled the peace of Europe; nay, had disturbed the tranquillity of the most remote parts of the world. They had by their past conduct, acted as if they were intended for the destruction of each other; but he hoped the time was now come when they should justify the order of the universe, and shew that they were better calculated for the more amiable purposes of friendly intercourse and mutual benevo lence." "Considering the treaty," he continued, "in a political view, he should not hesitate to contend against the too frequent. ly advanced doctrine, that France was and must be the unalterable enemy of Britain; his mind revolted from this position as monstrous and impossible. To suppose that any nation was unalterably the enemy of another, was weak and childish: it had neither its foundation in the experience of nations nor in the history of man. It was a libel on the constitution of political societies, and supposed diabolical malice in the original frame of man.”—C. *2 Smith's Wealth of Nations, pp. 226-7, 252-3; Tucker's Pamphlet, Cui Bono. + Sce Smith's Wealth of Nations, Vol. 4, p. 169, per Buchanan; and sec Anderson's Hist, Com. Vol. 4, pp. 634 to 639. BOOK II. CHAP. II. Every nation ought, therefore, not only to countenance trade, as far as it reasonably can, but even to protect and favour it. The care of the public roads, the safety of travellers, the establishment § 22. They of ports, of places of sale, of well regulated fairs, all contribute to should fathis end. And, where these are attended with expense, the nation, as we have already observed (Book I. § 103), may, by tolls and other duties equitably proportioned, indemnify itself for its disbursements. vour trade. dom of trade. Freedom being very favourable to commerce, it is implied, in § 23. Freethe duties of nations, that they should support it as far as possible, instead of cramping it by unnecessary burdens or restrictions. Wherefore, those private privileges and tolls, which obtain in many places, and press so heavily on commerce, are deservedly to be reprobated, unless founded on very important reasons arising from the public good. Every nation, in virtue of her natural liberty, has a right to 24. Right of trading, trade with those who are willing to correspond with such intenbelonging tions; and, to molest her in the exercise of her right, is doing her to nations. an injury (98). The Portugese, at the time of their great power in the East Indies, were for excluding all other European nations from any commerce with the Indians; but such a pretension, no less iniquitous than chimercial, was treated with contempt; and the other nations agreed to consider any acts of violence in support of it, as just grounds for making war against the Portuguese. This common right of all nations is, at present, generally acknowledged under the appellation of freedom of trade. on her own part (99). But, although it be in general the duty of a nation to carry on § 25. Each commerce with others, and, though each nation has a right to nation is trade with those countries that are willing to encourage her-on of the prosole judge the other hand, a nation ought to decline a commerce which is dis- priety of advantageous or dangerous (Book I. § 98); and since, in case of commerce collision, her duties to herself are paramount to her duties to others, she has a full and clear right to regulate her conduct, in this respect, by the consideration of what her advantage or safety requires. We have already seen (Book I. § 92), that each nation is, on her own part, the sole judge whether or not it be convenient for her to cultivate such or such branch of commerce. She may, therefore, either embrace or reject any commercial proposals from foreign nations, without affording them any just grounds to accuse her of injustice, or to demand a reason for such refusal, much less to make use of compulsion. She is free in the administration of [ 145 ] her affairs, without being accountable to any other. The obligation of trading with other nations is in itself an imperfect obligation (Prelim. § 17), and gives them only an imperfect right; so (98) It is a general rule of the law of nations, that, in time of peace, no nation is entitled to limit or impose regulations upon the commerce which any other independent state may think fit to carry on, either externally, with the natives of other independent states, or internally amongst its own subjects. Puffend. b. 4, c. 5, s. 10, p. 168; Marten's L. N. 152-3; where see the different authorities in support of this po (99) See further, 1 Chit. Com. L. 80, n. |