an objection to its jurisdiction, and wrongly We seem also to have heard, that consent of parties cannot invest any court with juris- LAW-ADMISSIBILITY EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMINAL ACTS.- English law journals are much exercised over the recent decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Rex v. Ball (Weekly Notes 1910, p. This case came before the Court of Criminal Appeal as an appeal from the conviction of a brother and sister for an offense under the recent Punishment of Incest Act, 1908. The dates of the unlawful carnal knowledge were laid as "on a date between the 1st and 14th of July, 1910, and on the 20th of September, 1910." Evidence was given of the appellants having lived together at these dates and hav- ing with them a child of about two and a half Further evidence was then ten- dered, and after objection admitted, to the effect that in November, 1907, the appellants had moved to a house and lived there as a married couple for sixteen months, and that in March, 1908, a child was born and was registered as their child. The appellants were convicted, and now appealed on the ground that the evidence objected to was in- admissible. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that the evidence was not admissible and The decisions of our own courts have been equally confusing, and we believe the recent declarations of the two well considered cases cited above will greatly assist the courts of our own country in arriving at a right conclu. The question in every case is not-Does the evidence of other crimes go to show that the defendant committed the crime charged. If that is all it tends to prove, it is inadmissible. If, however, the evidence of the commission of other criminal acts tends to prove a collateral fact, which fact being established tends to prove the commission of the crime charged, then the proof of such other offense is admis- that the prisoner has committed another of- Thus, if the proof of other offenses tends to prove malice, criminal intent, a conspiracy or Thus in a trial for murder, it could not be proven that the defendant killed another man some time before, merely to show that he was free with his gun. But suppose the deceased was a negro and the prosecution desired to show that defendant belonged to a gang that had pledged themselves "to kill every negro in the county," in proof of such a system of crime, the state could prove the killing of The question, if a difficult one, should be turned around and viewed negatively. Does If, however, the evidence of other crimes from his criminal conduct or character, to have committed the offense for which he is being tried. On the other hand, the mere fact that the evidence adduced tends to show the com- mission of other crimes does not render it inadmis ible, if it be relevant to an issue be- fore the jury, and it may be so relevant, if it bears upon the question whether the acts al- leged to constitute the crime charged in the indictment were designed or accidental, or to rebut a defense which would otherwise be open to the accused." In Rex v. Fisher, the judgment of Channell, J., (to which Lord Al- verstone was a party), contains the following offenses does go to prove that he did commit the offense charged, it is admissible because it is relevant to the issue, and it is admissible, not because, but notwithstanding that, it The Solicitors' Journal (London) speaking CONTRACT-VALIDITY OF AGREEMENT UNIONS THAT THE FORMER WILL NOT EMPLOY NON-UNION LABOR.-The right of labor to organize for its own benefit has, in gen- general expression, been recognized. How far, however, it, as organized, or employers with it, may validly contract in the securing of pref- erential employment for union labor came, to the extent at least of what was involved in particular contract, before the New York Court of Appeals in the case of Kissam v. United States Printing Co. et al., 92 N. E. There it was held that a contract between employer and trades unions prohibiting the em- employment of non-union workmen is not in- valid as to such workmen, where it results in great benefit to the employer, disposes of dif- ferences between him and labor unions, is not entered into with malice against the non-union workmen nor with intent to injure them and where it is not sought to compel them to join This ruling was based upon findings of facts showing the presence of all of the above con- sufficed may be only surmised. Generally in a contract one's undisclosed animus towards third parties should not affect its validity, pro- vided the contract does not partake of conspir- acy against the third parties, or, rather, where such is not its aim. If contracts of the char- acter passed upon have the necessary tendency to injure non-union men or compel them to join the union, it might be said that specific intent as to such effect may be conclusively Therefore, if we take it that the negative findings were unimportant, the question arises, whether in the case decided by New York Court of Appeals freedom of contract would be unlawfully infringed in saying that employers and trades unions shall not contract as they did, where each is merely concerned in seek- It is admissible, in the strife of competition, for purchasers and sellers of commodities to urge their advantages in arrangements to steadily dispose of, or supply without friction or mischance articles of contract. This is often often a controlling consideration in the mak- ing of contracts. The guarantee that a pur- chaser will take, or that a seller will supply, the commodity in a series of sales is looked at from many angles-chiefly the probable abil- ity arising out of what is collateral to such a contract to comply with its terms. Labor is One guilty of criminal contempt of a federal court may be removed for the pur- pose of trial and punishment from any district in which he may be found, to the district in which he has committed the con- tempt; but there can be no such removal for the purpose of merely enforcing obedi- ence to the court's order in a civil proceed- It is indeed remarkable that at this late day there should still be doubt and obscur- The first thing to be considered in deal- Contempts are of two kinds, criminal and It may be further said that all contempts The power of the national courts to pun- Article 3, of the Constitution, which pro- It is axiomatic and is a canon of the Perhaps nothing in federal procedure is bailed "for trial before such court of the to execute, a warrant for his removal to That a criminal contempt is an offense The first proposition with regard to re- (5) Aaron v. U. S., 155 Fed. 833; in re Chris- (6) In re Ellerbe, 13 Fed. 530; in re Acker, (7) In re Graves, 29 Fed. 60; in re Christian, (8) 4 Biss. 497, Fed. Cas. No. 4643. him, had been ordered arrested by the The only other decision holding directly. In the above authorities the question of (10) 44 Fed. 275. 29 Fed. 60. A judgment in personam in a court of a foreign country, while constituting a good cause of action in a domestic court, does not merge the original cause of action or extinguish the original contract debt, and is therefore no bar to an action thereon in a domestic court, unless it has been paid or satisfied. In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the Western District of Washington. Action by Lester W. David against Edward F. Swift and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error. Affirmed. Before GILBERT and ROSS, Circuit Judges, and WOLVERTON, District Judge. GILBERT, Circuit Judge: In September, 1908, the defendant in error brought an action in a state court of the state of Washington against the plaintiffs in error to recover the sum of $77,500 on a contract of sale of certain shares of stock in a corporation of British Columbia. The cause was removed to the United States Circuit Court for the Western District of Washington on the ground of diversity of citizenship. In that court a supplemental complaint was filed, to which an answer was made, in which the plaintiffs in error set up a counterclaim for $244,291.79, and on September 27, 1909, a reply was filed. After the issues had been made up and the cause assigned for trial, the plaintiffs in error filed a motion to dismiss their counterclaim without prejudice. The motion was allowed, and on the same day the plaintiffs in error asked leave of the court to file a proposed supplemental answer, in which they alleged that prior to the commencement of that action they, as plaintiffs, had commenced an action against the defendant in error in the Supreme Court of the Province of British Columbia, Dominion of Canada, a court of record of common-law jurisdiction in which they had alleged a cause of action which was identical with their counterclaim in the present action, and that the defendant, in answer thereto, had alleged as a counterclaim thereto his demand for $77,500 on which he sued in the present action, and that upon issues so framed in that court the cause had been tried and judgment had been rendered on December 4, 1909, in favor of the said defendant in error herein for $77,500, and dismissing the complaint of the plaintiffs in that action; that thereafter, on December 6, 1909, the plaintiffs in said action took their appeal to the Court of Appeal of British Columbia from so much of said judgment as dismissed their complaint, but that no appeal was taken from the judgment so rendered in favor of the defendant in error on his counterclaim therein; and that subsequently, on the demand of said defendant in error, they gave security to the satisfaction of the registrar for the payment of said judgment in all respects, which security was approved and accepted by the defendant in error, and is now in full force and effect, and in said proposed supplemental answer, the plaintiffs in error prayed that no further proceedings be had or taken in the action, and that the complaint be dismissed. The court denied the application for leave to file the supplemental answer, and thereafter the cause was tried on January 6, 1910, and judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant in error and against the plaintiffs in error for the sum of $86,798.62. The plaintiffs in error rely upon the assignment that the trial court erred in denying their application for leave to file the supplemental answer, and they contend that the judg ment of the court of Canada, which the defendant in error secured upon the same cause of action which he alleged in the present case, should have been held a bar to the further prosecution of the latter action, and that the undertaking given to secure the judgment of the Canadian court should be held equivalent to the payment and satisfaction thereof. A judgment in personam in a court of a foreign country, while it constitutes a good cause of action in a domestic court, does not merge the original cause of action or extinguish the original contract debt, and it is no bar to an action thereon in a domestic court unless it has been paid or satisfied. Australasia Bank v. Nias, 16 Q. B. 717; Trevelyan v. Myers, 26 Ont. 430; New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. v. McHenry (C. C.) 17 Fed. 414; Wood v. Gamble, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 8, 59 Am. Dec. 135; Eastern Townships Bank v. Beebe, 53 Vt. 177, 38 Am. Rep. 665; The Propeller East, 9 Ben. 76, Fed. Cas. No. 4,251; Lyman v. Brown, 2 Curt. 559, Fed. Cas. No. 8,627. In the case last cited Judge Curtis, after referring to the fact that there is some uncertainty concerning some of the ef fects and force of a foreign judgment, said: "But there is none as to this particular. It does not operate as a merger of the original |