Again, although it is very true that the enacting words of an act of Parliament are not always to be limited by the words of the preamble, but must in many instances go beyond it, yet, on a sound construction of every act of Parliament, the words in the enacting part must be confined to that which is the plain object and general intention of the legislature in passing the act; and the preamble affords a good clue to discover what that object was.1 "The [*439]*only rule,” it has been said, "for the construction of acts of Parliament is, that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound the words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver. But if any doubt arises from the terms employed by the legislature, it has always been held a safe means of collecting the intention, to call in aid the ground and cause of making the statute, and to have recourse to the preamble, which, according to Chief Justice Dyer, is a key to open the minds of the makers of the act, and the mischiefs which they intended to redress.' "'3

2

6

As, on the one hand, a remedial statute shall be liberally construed, so as to include cases which are within the mischief which the statute was intended to remedy, so, on the other hand, where the intention of the legislature is doubtful, the inclination of the Court shall always be against that construction which imposes a burthen on the subject. The words of a penal statute shall be restrained for the benefit of him against whom the penalty is inflicted.

"The principle," remarked Lord Abinger, C. B., "adopted by

Per Lord Tenterden, C. J., Halton v. Cave, 1 B. & Ad. 538; E. C. L. R. 20; Co. Litt. 79, a; per Buller, J., Crespigny v. Wittenoom, 4 T. R. 793; argument, Skinner v. Lambert, 5 Scott, N. R. 206; and cases cited, Whitmore v. Robertson, 8 M. & W. 472; (*) 15 Johns. R. (U. S.) 390; Stockton and Darlington Railway Company v. Barrett, 11 Cl. & Fin. 590.

2 Plowd. 369.

3 Per Tindal, C. J., delivering the opinion of the Judges in the Sussex Peerage, 11 Cl. & Fin. 143.

4 Per Lord Brougham, Stockton and Darlington Railway Company v. Barrett, 11Cl. & Fin. 607. “All acts which restrain the common law ought themselves to be restrained by exposition ;" Ash v. Abdy, 3 Swanst. 664. Mere permissive words shall not abridge a common law right, ante, p. 28. Ex parte Clayton, 1 Russ. & My. 372.

Lord Tenterden,' that a penal law ought to be construed strictly, is not only a sound one, but the only one consistent [*440] with our free institutions. The interpretation of statutes has always in modern times been highly favourable to the personal liberty of the subject, and I hope will always remain so."2

This rule, however, which is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals, and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, and not in the judicial department, must not be so applied as to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of cases which those words in their ordinary acceptation, or in that sense in which the legislature has obviously used them, would comprehend.3

Another important rule applicable to the interpretation of statutes is, that one part of a statute must be so construed by another that the whole may, if possible, stand; and that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant; and it is a sound general principle in the exposition of statutes, that less regard is to be paid to the words used than to the policy which dictated the act; as, if land be vested in the King and his heirs by act of Parliament, saving the right of A., and A. has at that time a lease of it for three years, in this case A. shall hold it

for his term of three years, and *afterwards it shall go to the [*441]

King; for this interpretation furnishes matter for every clause to work and operate upon."

It is, also, an established rule of construction, that an act of Parliament shall be read according to the ordinary and grammatical sense of the words, unless, being so read, it would be absurd or

1 See Proctor v. Mainwaring, 3 B. & Ald. 145; E. C. L. R. 5.

2 Per Lord Abinger, C. B., Henderson v. Sherborn, 2 M. & W. 236 ; (*) judgment, Fletcher v. Calthrop, 6 Q. B. 887; E. C. L. R. 51; cited and adopted Murray v. Reg., 7 Q. B. 707; E. C. L. R. 53.

See the judgment, United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheaton, R. (U. S.) 95.

4 Where the proviso of an act of Parliament is directly repugnant to the purview, the proviso shall stand and be a repeal of the purview, as it speaks the last intention of the makers; Attorney-General v. Governors and Company of the Chelsea Water Works, Fitzgib. 195.

51 Bla. Com. 89; Bac. Abr., "Statute," (I. 2); argument, Hine v. Reynolds, 2 Scott, N. R. 419.

6"It is a good rule in the construction of Acts of Parliament, that the judges are not to make the law what they may think reasonable, but to expound it according to the common sense of its words," per Cresswell, J., Biffin v. Yorke, 6 Scott, N. R.

inconsistent with the declared intention of the legislature, to be collected from the rest of the act,' or unless an uniform series of decisions has already established a particular construction, or unless terms of art are used, which have a fixed technical signification; as, for instance, the expression "heirs of the body," which conveys to lawyers a precise idea, as comprising, in a legal sense, only certain lineal descendants; and this expression shall, therefore, be construed according to its known meaning.3

Lastly, it is a rule of the civil law adopted by Lord Bacon, which was evidently dictated by common sense, and is in accordance with the spirit of the maxim which we have been considering, that, where obscurities, ambiguities, or faults of expression render the meaning of an enactment doubtful, that interpretation shall be preferred which is *most consonant to equity, especially where it is in confor

[*442] mity with the general design of the legislature. In ambiguâ voce legis ea potius accipienda est significatio quæ vitio caret, præsertim cum etiam voluntas legis ex hoc colligi possit.*

EX ANTECEDENTIBUS ET CONSEQUENTIBUS FIT OPTIMA

INTERPRETATIO.
(2 Inst. 173.)

A passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes and follows it. It is a true and important rule of construction, that the sense and meaning of the parties to any particular instrument should be collected ex antecedentibus et consequentibus; that is to say, every part of it should be brought into action, in order to collect from the whole one uniform and consistent sense, if that may be done ; or, in other words, the construction must be made upon the entire instrument,

235. See, also, judgment, Rex v. Hall, 1 B. & C. 123; E. C. L. R. 8; cited 2 C. B. 66; E. C. L. R. 52; Stracey v. Nelson, 12 M. & W. 541;(*) U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, R. (U. S.) 286; cited 7 Wheaton, R. (U. S.) 169.

1 Judgment, Smith v. Bell, 10 M. & W. 389;(*) Turner v. Sheffield Railway Company, Id. 434; judgment, Steward v. Greaves, 10 M. & W. 719;(*) per Alderson, B., Attorney-General v. Lockwood, 9 M. & W. 398; (*) judgment, Hyde v. Johnson, 2 Bing. N. C. 780; E. C. L. R. 29.

2 Per Parke, B., Doe d. Ellis v. Owens, 10 M. & W. 521;(*) per Lord Brougham, C., The Earle of Waterford's Peerage, 6 Cl. & Fin. 172.

32 Dwarr. Stats. 702; Poole v. Poole, 3 B. & P. 620.

4 D. 1, 3, 19; Bac. Max., reg. 3.

5 Per Ld. Ellenborough, C. J., Barton v. Fitzgerald, 15 East, 541; Shep. Touch. 87; per Hobart, C. J., Winch, 93.

and not merely upon disjointed parts of it; the whole context must be considered, in endeavouring to collect the intention of the parties, although the immediate object of inquiry be the meaning of an isolated clause. In short, the law will judge of a deed, or other instrument, consisting of divers parts or clauses, by looking at the whole; and will give to each part its proper office, so as to ascertain and carry out the intention of the parties.3

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Thus, in the case of a bond with a condition, the latter may be read and taken into consideration, in order to correct and explain the obligatory part of the instrument. So, in construing an agreement in the form of a bond in which a surety became liable for the due fulfilment of an agent's duties therein particularly enumerated, a general clause in the obligatory part of the bond must be interpreted strictly, and controlled by reference to the prior clauses specifying the extent of the agency. On the same principle, the recital in a deed or agreement may be looked at, in order to ascertain the meaning of the parties, and is often highly important for that purpose; and the general words of a subsequent distinct clause or stipulation, may often be explained or qualified by the matter recited." So, covenants are to be construed according to the obvious intention. of the parties, as collected from the whole context of the instrument containing them, and according to the reasonable sense of the words; and, in conformity with the rule above laid down, a covenant in large

12 Bla. Com. 379; Lord North v. The Bishop of Ely, cited 1 Bulstr. 101; and judgment, Doe d. Meyrick v. Meyrick, 2 Cr. & J. 230. A court of equity also looks to the general intent of a deed, and will give it such a construction as supports that general intent, although a particular expression in the deed may be inconsistent with it; Arundell v. Arundell, 1 My. & K. 316.

2 Coles v. Hulme, 8 B. & C. 568; E. C. L. R. 15; Hobart, 275; cited, Gale v. Reed, 8 East, 79; Chit. Contr. 3d ed. 84.

3 See Hobart, 275; Doe d. Marquis of Bute v. Guest, 15 M. & W. 160.(*)

4 Coles v. Hulme, 8 B. & C. 568; E. C. L. R. 15; and cases cited, Id. 574, n. (a). 5 Napier v. Bruce, 8 Cl. & Fin. 470.

6 Shep. Touch. 76; The Marquis of Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton, 2 B. & Ald. 625; S. C., 4 Bligh, 1, where it was held (Bayley, J., diss.) that it was not competent to go into the intention of the settlor, apparent from the recital of a conveyance to uses, in order to explain the words of a particular limitation; such words being of plain and well-known import.

7 Payler v. Homersham, 4 M. & S. 423; E. C. L. R. 30; recognised, Simons v. Johnson, 3 B. & Ad. 180; E. C. L. R. 23; Solly v. Forbes, 2 B. & B. 38; E. C. L. R. 6; Charleton v. Spencer, 3 Q. B. 693; E. C. L. R. 43; Sampson v. Easterby, 9 B. & C. 505; E. C. L. R. 17; affirmed in error, 1 Cr. & J. 105.

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and general terms has frequently been narrowed and *restrained,' where there has appeared something to connect it with a restrictive covenant, or where there have been words in the covenant itself amounting to a qualification: and it has, indeed, been said, in accordance with the above rule, that, "however general the words of a covenant may be, if standing alone, yet, if from other covenants in the same deed, it is plainly and irresistibly to be inferred that the party could not have intended to use the words in the general sense which they import, the Court will limit the operation of the general words."3

We have also already observed, that covenants are to be construed as independent or restrictive of each other, according to the apparent intention of the parties, upon an attentive consideration of the whole deed; every particular case, therefore, must depend upon the precise words used in the instrument before the Court, and the distinctions will be found to be very nice and difficult.*

It is, moreover, as a general proposition, immaterial in what part of a deed any particular covenant is inserted. For instance, in the indenture of lease of a colliery, two lessees covenanted "jointly and severally, in manner following;" and then followed a number of covenants as to working the colliery; after which was a covenant, that the moneys appearing to be due should be accounted for, and paid by the lessees, their executors, &c., not saying, “and each of them;" it was held, that the general words at the *beginning [*445] of the covenants by the lessees extended to all the subsequent covenants throughout the deed on the part of the lessees, there not being anything in the nature of the subject to restrain the operation of those words to the former part only of the lease."

Again, words may be transposed, if it be necessary to do so in order to give effect to the evident intent of the parties :7 as, if a lease

1 Per Lord Ellenborough, C. J., Iggulden v. May, 7 East, 241; Plowd. 329; Cage v. Paxton, 1 Leon. 116; Broughton v. Conway, Moor, 58; Gale v. Reed, 8 East, 89; Sicklemore v. Thistleton, 6 M. & S. 9, cited Jowett v. Spencer, 15 M. & W. 662;(*) Hesse v. Stevenson, 3 B. & P. 365. See Doe v. Godwin, 4 M. & S. 265; E. C. L. R. 30.

2 Judgment, Smith v. Compton, 3 B. & Ad. 200; E. C. L. R. 23.

3 Judgment, Hesse v. Stevenson, 3 B. & P. 574.

41 Wms. Saund. 6th ed. 60, n. (1), ante, p. 419.

5 Per Buller, J., 5 T. R. 526; 1 Wms. Saund. 60, n. (l).

6 Duke of Northumberland v. Errington, 5 T. R. 522; Copland v. Laporte, 3 Ad. & E. 517; E. C. L. R. 30.

7 Parkhurst v. Smith, Willes, R. 332; S. C. 3 Atk. 135.