v. Plummer, 308 V. Pearcy, 119 Welsh v. Nash, 320 Wennall v. Adney, 589, 598 Wentworth v. Cock, 704, 705 West v. Blakeway, 318, 683 v. Moore, 305 v. Steward. 115 Wetherell v. Jones, 574, 579 Wharton v. Walker, 358 Wheatley v. Lane, 706 v. Thomas, 524 Wheaton v. Peters, 273 Wheelright v. Depeyster, 630 Whitcher v. Hall, 107 White v. Beard, 108 v. Boulton, 671 v. British Museum (Trustees of), xix. v. Cuddon, 607 v. Hancock, 446 v. Hislop, 107 v. Sayer, 307 v. Sharp, 487, 666 v. Spettigue, 121, 160, 629, 631 v. Whitshire, 325, 326 Whitfield v. Brand, 216 v. Clemment, 500 v. Despenser (Lord), 671 Whitmore v. Black, 267 v. Gilmour, 663 v. Greene, 93, 267, 268 Whittington v. Boxall, 562 v. Hungerford Market Co., 156, 279 Wilkinson v. Johnston, 192 v. Chambers, 359, 663 v. Crossling, 10, 536 v. Currie, 82 Woodgate v. Knatchbull, 663 v. East India Company, 582, 731 Woodin v. Burford, 648 v. Grey, 707 v. Griffith, 639 Woodroffe v. Doe d. Daniel, 163 Worrall v. Jacob, 197 Worseley v. Demattos, 217 Worthington v. Grimsditch, 79, 699 Wright's case, 721 Wright v. Burrows, 359 Wright v. Crookes, 613, 620, 677 v. Laing, 641 v. Tallis, 577 v. Watts, 487 Wrightup v. Greenacre, 26 Wyatt v. Harrison, 150, 276, 294 Wylie v. Birch, 152, 153, 154 Wynne v. Edwards, 413, 487 Yates v. Lansing, 61 Y. Yearsley v. Heane, 152 Yeats v. Pym, 514, 515 Yonge v. Fisher, 142, 143 Youde v. Jones, 446 Winterbottom v. Wright, 151, 154, 619, 671 Young v. Hichens, 562 Winterbourne v. Morgan, 223 Wintle v. Crowther, 652 Wise v. Metcalf, 710 Withnell v. Gartham, 718 Witte v. Hague, 672 v. Hewitt, 312, 321 v. Rishworth, 30 v. Smith, 529 Younghusband v. Gisborne, 344 Z. Zichy Ferraris (Countess of) v. Hertford (Marquis of), 552 LEGAL MAXIMS. CHAPTER I. L-RULES FOUNDED ON PUBLIC POLICY. THE Maxims contained in this section are of such universal application, and result so directly and manifestly from motives of public policy and the simple and fundamental principles on which the social relations depend, that it has been thought better to place them first in this collection, as being in some measure, introductory to those more precise and technical rules which embody the elementary doctrines of English law, and are continually recurring to the notice of practitioners in our courts of justice. SALUS POPULI SUPREMA LEX. (Bacon Max., reg. 12.) That regard be had for the public welfare, is the highest law. There is an implied assent on the part of every member of society, that his own individual welfare shall, in cases of necessity, yield to that of the community;1 and that his property, liberty and life shall, under certain circumstances, be placed in jeopardy or even sacrificed for the public good. *"There are," says Buller, J., “many [*2] cases in which individuals sustain an injury for which the law 1 See 1 Bla. Com. 139. 2 Alibi diximus res subditorum sub eminenti dominio esse civitatis, ita ut civitas, aut qui civitatis vice fungitur, iis rebus uti, easque etiam perdere et alienare possit, non tantum ex summa necessitate, quæ privatus quoque jus aliquod in aliena concedit, sed ob publicam utilitatem, cui privatis cedere illi ipsi voluisse censendi sunt qui in civilem cætum coierunt. Grotius De Jure Belli et Pac. Bk. 3, c. 20, s. 7 § 1. -Le salut du peuple est la suprême loi. Mont. Esp. des Lois, L. XXVII. Ch. XXIII. In causa extrema necessitatis omnia sunt communia. Hale, P. C. 54. 3 Per Buller, J., Plate Glass Company v. Meredith, 4 T. R. 797; Noy, Max. 9th ed. p. 36; Dyer, 60 b; 12 Rep. 12, 13. gives no action; as, where private houses are pulled down, or bulwarks raised on private property, for the preservation and defence of the kingdom against the king's enemies." Commentators on the civil law, indeed, have said,' that in such cases, those who suffer have a right to resort to the public for satisfaction; but no one ever thought that our own common law gave an action against the individual who pulled down the house or raised the bulwark. On the same principle, viz., that a man may justify committing a private injury for the public good, the pulling down of a house when necessary, in order to arrest the progress of a fire, is permitted by the law.3 Likewise, in less stringent emergencies, the maxim is, that a private mischief shall be endured, rather than a public inconvenience; and, therefore, if a public highway be out of repair, and impassable, a passenger may lawfully go over the adjoining land, since it is for the public good *that there should be, at all times, free passage along the thoroughfares for the subjects of the realm." [*3] In the instances above given, an interference with private property is obviously dictated and justified summâ necessitate, by the immediate urgency of the occasion, and a due regard to the public safety or convenience. The general maxim, however, likewise applies to cases of more ordinary occurrence, in which the legislature, ob publicam utilitatem, disturbs the possession or restricts the enjoyment of the property of individuals. "The great end," it has been observed," "for which men entered into society was to secure their property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances, where it has not been taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of the whole. The cases where this right of property is set aside by positive law are various. Distresses, executions, forfeitures, taxes, &c., are all See Puff. de Jure Nat. Bk. 8, c. 5, s. 7; Grotius de Jur. Bell. et Pac. Bk. 3 c. 20, s. 7, 2; 2 Kent. Com., 4th ed. 339 (a). 2 Per Buller, J., 4 T. R. 797. 3 Noy, Max. 9th ed. p. 36; 12 Rep. 12; Dyer 36 b; Plowd. 322; Finch's Law, 39. 4 Absor v. French, 2 Show. 28. Per Pollock, C. B. Attorney-General v. Briant, 15 M. & W. 185; 2 Kent. Com. 4th ed. 338. 5 Per Lord Mansfield, C. J., Taylor v. Whitehead, Dougl. 749; per Lord Ellenborough, C. J., Bullard v. Harrison, 4 M. & S. 393; 1 Wms. Saund., 6th ed., 322, c. (3); and see the cases collected, Robertson v. Gantlett, 16 M. & W. 296 (a). Secus of a private right of way. Ib. • Per Lord Camden, Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1066. |