king grant the same thing in possession to one, which he or his progenitors have granted to another.1 On the same principle, the Crown cannot pardon an offence against a penal statute after information brought, for thereby the informer has acquired a private property in his part of the penalty. Nor can the king pardon a private nuisance, while it remains unredressed, or so as to prevent an abatement of *it, though afterwards he may remit the fine, [*46] and the reason is, that, though the prosecution is vested in the Crown, to avoid multiplicity of suits, yet (during its continuance) this offence savours more of the nature of a private injury to each individual in the neighbourhood, than of a public wrong. So, if the king grant lands, forfeited to him upon a conviction of treason, to a third person, he cannot afterwards, by his grant, devest the property so granted in favour of the original owner.

3

NULLUM TEMPUS OCCURRIT REGI.
(2 Inst. 273.)

Lapse of time does not bar the right of the Crown.

In pursuance of the principle already considered, of the sovereign's incapability of doing wrong, the law also determines that in the Crown there can be no negligence or laches; and, therefore, it was formerly held, that no delay in resorting to his remedy would bar the king's right; for the time and attention of the sovereign must be supposed to be occupied by the cares of government, nor is there any reason that he should suffer by the negligence of his officers, or by their fraudulent collusion with the adverse party: and although, as we shall hereafter see, the maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt is a rule for the subject, yet nullum tempus occurrit regi is, in general, the king's plea. From this doctrine it followed, not only that the civil claims of the Crown received *no prejudice by the lapse of time, but that criminal prosecutions for felonies or misdemeanours (which are always brought in the sove

[*47]

1 Per Cresswell, J., 1 C. B. 523; argument, Rex v. Amery, 2 T. R. 565; Chit. Pre. Crown, 125. But the grant of a mere license or authority from the Crown, or a grant during the king's will, is determined by the demise of the Crown. (Id. 400.) See n. 3, p. 80. 2 4 Bla. Com. 399.

34 Bla. Com. 398; Vaugh. R. 333.

41 Bla. Com. 247; 2 Steph. Com. 504.

5 Godb. 295; Hobart, 347; Bac. Abr. 7th ed. "Prerogative," (E. 6).

6 Hobart, 347.

reign's name) might be commenced at any distance of time from the commission of the offence; and all this is, to some extent, still law, though it has been largely qualified by the legislature in modern times; for, by stat. 9 Geo. 3, c. 16, in suits relating to landed property, the lapse of sixty years, and adverse possession for that period, operate as a bar even against the prerogative, in derogation of the above maxim, that is, provided the acts relied upon as showing adverse possession are acts of ownership done in the assertion of a right, and not mere acts of trespass, not acquiesced in on the part of the Crown.3 Again, the Statute of Limitations, 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3, does not bind the king; but, by 32 Geo. 3, c. 58, the Crown is barred, in informations for usurping corporate offices or franchises, by the lapse of six years; and by statute 7 Will. 3, c. 3, an indictment for treason (except for an attempt to assassinate the king) must be found within three years after the commission of the act of treason.

Another important instance of the application of the above general doctrine occurs where church preferment lapses to the Crown. Lapse is a species of forfeiture, whereby the right of presentation to a church accrues to the ordinary, by neglect of the patron to present, to the metropolitan, by neglect of the ordinary,—and to the Crown, by neglect of *the metropolitan: the term in which the [*48] title to present by lapse accrues from one of the above parties to the other is six calendar months, after the expiration of which period the right becomes forfeited by the person neglecting to exercise it. But no right of lapse can accrue when the original presentation is in the Crown; and, in pursuance of the above maxim, if the right of presentation lapses to the Crown, prerogative intervenes, and, in this case, the patron shall never recover his right till the Crown has presented; and if, during the delay of the Crown, the patron himself presents, and his clerk is instituted, the Crown, by presenting another, may turn out the patron's clerk, or, after induction, may remove him by quare impedit ; though, if neither of these

12 Steph. Com. 504.

23 Bla. Com. 307; 2 Dwarr. Stats. 976. See Doe d. Watt v. Morris, 2 Scott, 276; Goodtitle v. Baldwin, 11 East, 488.

3 Doe d. William IV. v. Roberts, 13 M. & W. 520.

Judgment, Lambert v. Taylor, 4 B. & C. 151, 152; Bac. Abr. 7th ed. "Prerogative," (E. 5).

5 See Bac. Abr. 7th ed. " 'Prerogative,” (E. 6), p. 467, and stat. 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 78, s. 23; R. v. Harris, 11 A. & E. 518.

6 6 Rep. 50.

courses is adopted, and the patron's clerk dies incumbent, or is canonically deprived, the right of presentation is lost to the Crown.1

Lastly, if a bill of exchange be seized under an extent before it has become due, the neglect of the officer of the Crown to give notice of dishonour, or to make presentment of the bill, will not discharge the drawer or endorsers; and this likewise results from the general principle above stated, that laches cannot be imputed to the Crown.2

*QUANDO JUS DOMINI REGIS ET SUBDITI CONCURRUNT, [*49]

JUS REGIS PRÆFERRI DEBET.

(9 Rep. 129.)

Where the title of the king and the title of a subject concur, the king's title shall be

preferred.3

In the above case, detur digniori is the rule, and accordingly the king's debt shall, in suing out execution, be preferred to that of every other creditor who had not obtained judgment before the king had commenced his suit."

The king's judgment also affects all lands which the king's debtor had at or after the time of contracting his debt, or which any of his officers, mentioned in the stat. 13 Eliz. c. 4, had at or after the time of his entering on the office; so that, if such officer of the Crown aliens for a valuable consideration, the land shall be liable to the king's debt, even in the hands of a bona fide purchaser, though the debt due to the king was contracted by the vendor many years after the alienation; whereas, between subject and subject, the general rule is, that a judgment has relation only to the day when signed.

So, the rule of law is, that, where the sheriff seizes under a fi. fa., and, after such seizure, but before the sale' under such writ, a writ of extent is sued out and delivered to the sheriff, the Crown is entitled to the priority, and the sheriff must sell under the extent, and satisfy the Crown's debt, before he sells under the fi. fa. Nor does it make any difference whether the extent is in chief or in aid, i. e., whether it is directly against the king's debtor, or brought to recover

12 Bla. Com. 276, 277; Baskerville's case, 7 Rep. 111; Bac. Abr. 7th ed., “Prerogative" (E. 6); Hobart, 166; Finch Law, 90.

2 West on Extents, 28-30; Byles on Bills, 5th ed. 159, 160, 225.

3 Co. Litt. 30. b.

5 Stat. 33 Hen. 8, c. 39, s. 74; 3 Bla. Com. 420.

7 See R. v. Sloper, 6 Price, 114.

4 2 Ventr. 268.

6 3 Bla. Com. 420.

a debt due from some third party to such debtor; it *having [*50] been the practice in very ancient times, that, if the king's

debtor was unable to satisfy the king's debt out of his own chattels, the king would betake himself to any third person who was indebted to the king's debtor,' and would recover of such third person what he owed to the king's debtor, in order to get payment of the debt due from the latter to the Crown. And the same principle was held to apply where goods in the hands of the sheriff, under a fi. fa., and before sale, were seized by the officers of the customs under a warrant to levy a penalty incurred by the defendant for an offence against the revenue laws; the Court observing, that there was no sound distinction between a warrant issued to recover a debt to the Crown and an extent.3

ROY N'EST LIE PER ASCUN STATUTE, SI IL NE SOIT EXPRESSEMENT

NOSME.

(Jenk. Cent. 307.)

The king is not bound by any statute, if he be not expressly named to be so bound. The king is not bound by any statute, if he be not expressly named therein, unless there be equivalent words, or unless the prerogative be included by necessary implication; for it is inferred prima facie that the law made by the Crown, with the assent of Lords and Commons, is made for subjects, and not for the Crown ;' but this rule seems to apply only where the property or [*51] peculiar privileges of the Crown are affected; and this distinction is laid down, that where the king has any prerogative, estate, right, title, or interest, he shall not be barred of them by the general words of an act, if he be not named therein. Yet, if a

I See R. v. Larking, 8 Price, 683.

2 Giles v. Grover, 9 Bing. 128, 191, recognising Rex v. Cotton, Parker, R., 112. See Attorney-General v. Trueman, 11 M. & W. 694; Attorney-General v. Walmsley, 12 M. & W. 179; Reg. v. Austin, 10 M. & W. 693.

3 Grove v. Aldridge, 9 Bing. 428. As to the jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer since the stat. 5 Vict. c. 5, see Attorney-General v. Halling, 15 M. & W. 687.

4 Jenk. Cent. 307; Wing. Max. 1.

5 Per Alderson, B., Attorney-General v. Donaldson, 10 M. & W. 123, 124, citing Willion v. Berkley, Plowd. 236.

6 The case of Magdalen College, 11 Rep. 66, cited Bac. Abr. "Prerogative," (E. 5;) Com. Dig. "Parl.," R. 8. See the qualifications of this position laid down in 2 Dwarr. Stats. 668, 669.

statute be intended to give a remedy against a wrong, the king, though not named, shall be bound by it; and the king is impliedly bound by statutes passed for the public good, the relief of the poor, the general advancement of learning, religion, and justice, or for the prevention of fraud; and, though not named, he is bound by the general words of statutes which tend to perform the will of a founder or donor.3

The stat. 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 70, intituled, "An Act for the more effectual Administration of Justice in England and Wales," in the preamble declares its intention to be, to make more effectual provision for the administration of justice in England and Wales, and by the 8th section enacts, "that writs of error upon any judgment given by any of the said Courts (Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer) shall hereafter be made returnable only before the judges, or judges and barons, as the case may be, of the other two courts in the Exchequer Chamber." It was held, that this statute extends to a judgment given against a defendant on an indictment in the Queen's Bench; and it was observed, that, in the case of an act of Parliament *passed expressly for the further [*52] advancement of justice, and in its particular enactment using terms so comprehensive as to include all cases brought up by writ of error, there was not, in the opinion of the Court, either authority or principle for implying the exception of criminal cases, upon the ground that the king, as the public prosecutor, is not expressly mentioned in the act, and that, by such a construction of the act, its object and intent could best be attained.'

But, as above stated, acts of Parliament which would divest the king of any of his prerogatives do not, in general, extend to or bind the king, unless there be express words to that effect; therefore, the Statutes of Limitation, Bankruptcy, Insolvency, and Set-off are irrelevant in the case of the king, nor does the Statute of Frauds relate to him. Also, by mere indifferent statutes, directing that certain

' Willion v. Berkley, Plowd. 239, 244. See the authorities cited in the argument in Rex v. Wright, 1 A. & E. 436 et seq.

Chit. Pre. Crown, 382; 2 Dwarr. Stats. 668.

3 Vin. Abr. "Statutes," E. 10, pl. 11; 5 Rep. 146; Willion v. Berkley, Plowd, 236; 2 Dwarr. Stats. 669.

4 Judgment, Rex v. Wright, 1 A. & E. 447.

5 Chit. Pre. Crown, 366, 383; Rex v. Copland, Hughes, 204, 230; Vin. Abr. "Statutes," (E. 10); Flather's Arch. Bank. 9th ed. 179.