1 Vid. pp. 374 et seq., 394.

Felså demonstratione legatum non peri

mi,

490, 500

. 500

Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus.
Favorabiliores rei potius, quam actores
habentur,

Fictio legis inequè operatur alicui dam

num vel injuriam

Filiatio non potest probari. (Co. Litt.

126, a.)

Fortior est custodia legis quam hominis.

(2 Rol. Rep. 325.)

562

92

Fortior et potentior est dispositio legis
quam hominis, .

Fractionem diei non recipit lex (L.

572.)

Frater fratri uterino non succedet in
hæreditate paternâ,

545

403

Fraus est celare fraudem. (1 Vern.

240.)

Fraus est odiosa et non præsumenda.
(Cro. Car. 550.)

Frequentia actus multum operatur. (4
Rep. 78.) (W. 192.)

Frustrà fit per plura, quod fieri potest

2 Argument, Attorney-General v. Cholmley, 2 Eden, 313.

"Every exception that can be accounted for is so much a confirmation of the rule, that it has be come a maxim, exceptio probat regulam," per Lord Kenyon, C. J., 3 T. R. 722. See also, Id., 38; 4 T. R. 793; 1 East, 647, n.

See 1 Phill. Ev., 9th ed., 18; 1 Stark. Ev., 3d ed., 94 et seq.; Wood, Civ. Law, 4th ed., 338. By stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 85, s. 1, no person shall be excluded from giving evidence by incapacity from crime. $ See p. 69.

This maxim may properly be applied in those cases only where a witness speaks to a fact with reference to which he cannot be presumed liable to mistake; see per Story, J., The Santissima Trinidad 7 Wheaton, R. (U. S.) 338, 339.

The law will not in general notice the fraction of a day, but it will do so if requisite for the ends of justice; post, pp. 106, 266.

1 In the various treatises upon the law of evidence will be found remarks as to the weight which should be attached to the confession of a party. Respecting the above maxim, Lord Stowell has observed, that, "What is taken pro confesso is taken as indubitable truth. The plea of guilty by the party accused shuts out all further inquiry. Habemus confitentem reum is demonstration, unless indirect motives can be assigned to it." Mortimer v. Mortimer, 2 Hagg. 315.

"The law," says Lord Bacon, "giveth that favour to lawful acts, that although they be executed by several authorities, yet the whole act is good;" if, therefore, tenant for life and remainderman join in granting a rent, "this is one solid rent out of both their estates, and no double rent, or rent by confirmation:" Bac. Max., reg. 24; and if tenant for life and reversioner join in a lease for life reserving rent, this shall enure to the tenant for life only during his life, and afterwards to the reversioner. So, if the reservation be to the lessor and to those to whom the reversion and inheritance may belong during the term, this is a good reservation to those in remainder, and the law will distribute the rent according to the several interests under the settlement. See 1 Crabb, Real Prop., 179.

2 A principal is civilly liable for those acts only which are strictly within the scope of the agent's authority, post, p. 648. But if a man incite another to do an unlawful act, he shall not, in the language of Lord Bacon, "excuse himself by circumstances not pursued;" as if he command his servant to rob I. D. on Shooter's Hill, and he doth it on Gad's Hill; or to kill him by poison, and he doth it by violence: Bac. Max., reg. 16.

In lay hands, a modus, or prescription for the non-payment of tithes is bad, see Com. Dig., "Dismes," (E. 5, 7); 2 Bla. Com. 31, 32; Hob. 297. Accordingly, it was held in a recent case, that mere non-payment of tithes is no answer to a claim of tithes by a lay impropriator, for, as against him, there can be no prescription in non decimando (Andrews v. Drever, 2 Bing., N. C., 5; S. C., 3 Cl. & Fin. 314.). As to the stat. 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 100, see Salkeld v. Johnson, 2 C. B. 749; Knight v. Marquis of Waterford, 15 M. & W. 419.

1 Reg. v. Greenaway, 7 Q. B. 126. "The proposition is clear, that no man can be compelled to answer what has any tendency to criminate him:" per Lord Eldon, C., Ex parte Symes, 11 Ves. 525. "A man is competent to prove his own crime, though not compellable:" per Alderson, B., Udal v. Walton, 14 M.

2 See Attorney-General v. Hitchcock, 1 Exch. 91, 92.

3 Cited, White v. Trustees of British Museum, 6 Bing. 319; Ilott v. Genge, 3 Curt. 175.

In Moore v. Durden, Exch., 12 Jur. 138, it was held that stat. 3 & 9 Vict. c. 109, has not a retrospec tive operation, so as to prevent a party from prosecuting an action for money won on a wager, such action having been commenced before the above statute was passed. In this case, Rolfe, B., observed, that the principle of the above maxim is one of such obvious convenience and justice, that it must always be adhered to in the construction of statutes, unless in cases where there is something on the face of the enactment putting it beyond doubt that the legislature meant it to operate retrospectively. See, also, per Parke, B., Id. 142.

2 Cited 2 Bla. Com. 162; Co. Litt. 3, a.; Argument, 1 M. & S. 172; per Buller, J., 3 T. R. 664. 3 By stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 62, deodands, were, however, abolished.