And trespass to persons must be brought within four years of the trespass committed. But when the trespass has been continued many years, and the statute of limitations pleaded, the jury gives damages only for the time within the statute.

In an action(a) for an assault, and imprisoning plaintiff from 10th August, 24 Car. II. until 2d October, 1 Jac. II. the time of exhibiting the bill, to which the statute of limitations was pleaded, and found for the plaintiff, with entire damages: two exceptions were moved in arrest of judgment; first, that a verdict cannot help what appears to be othererwise upon the face of the record. Now, here the plaintiff declared, that he was imprisoned the tenth of August, 24 Car. II. which was thirteen years before; and being one entire trespass, the issue is found as laid in the declaration; which cannot be for so many years between the cause of action and bringing of the writ; for if a trespass be continued several years, the plaintiff must sue only for the last six years, (b) for which he hath a complete cause of action; but when those are expired, he is barred by the statute. Secondly, when the plaintiff has any cause of action, then the statute of limitations *begins; as in an action [*112] on the case for words, if they be actionable in themselves, without alleging special damages, the plaintiff will recover damages from the time of the speaking, and not according to what loss may follow. So in trover and conversion,

(a) 3 Mod. 111.

(b) The plea in this case was bad, being "Not guilty within six years," whereas it should have beep, "Not guilty within four years.”

"of Limitations is pleaded--and most clearly that act is a bar to the action; for it must be founded upon the first tortious entry; "not upon any continuance of possession afterwards, and within "three years. Before an action of trespass can be maintained for "continuing in possession after the first entry there must be a regain"ing of the possession by the party expelled. Then the Law deemst "the possession to have been his all along; and of course that the "defendant was a violator of it every moment he continued his "possession." Upon this opinion the plaintiff was nonsuited.

when there is a cause of action vested, and the goods continue in the same possession for seven years afterwards; in such case it is the first conversion which entitles the plaintiff to an action. So in the case at bar, though this be a continued imprisonment, yet so much as was before the writ brought is barred by the statute.(a).

On the other side it was contended, that the verdict is good, for the jury reject the beginning of the trespass, and give damages only for that which falls within the six years; and this may be done, because it is laid usque exhibitionem billæ. If the defendant had pleaded not guilty generally, then damages must be for the thirteen years, though the plaintiff, on his own showing, had brought his action for a thing done beyond the time limited by the statute; but having pleaded "Not guilty at any time within six years," if the verdict find him guilty within that time, it is against him. Secondly, as to the objection, that the cause of action arises beyond six years, though it do appear so in the declaration, yet that doth not exclude the plaintiff, for there might have been process out before, or he might be disabled by an outlawry, which may now be reversed; or he might be in prison, and newly discharged; from which time he hath six years to begin his action; for being under any of these circumstances, the statute does not hurt him.

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*Curia.-If an action of false imprisonment be brought for seven years, and the jury find the defendant guilty but for two days, it is a trespass within the declaration. This statute relates to a distinct,(b) and not to a continued act, for after six years it will be difficult to prove a trespass: many accidents may happen within that time, as the death or removal of witnesses, &c. Judgment was given for the plaintiff.

And trespass, with consequential damages, is within the statute, though it has not yet been settled whether the limita(a) 3 Kab. 613.

(b) S Kéb. 6f3

tion be six or four years; but either way is well enough on general demurrer.

The plaintiff complained of a plea of trespass,(a) and stated that the defendant on 1st January, 1792, and on divers other days, &c. at, &c. with force and arms made an assault upon G. the plaintiff's wife, and then and there seduced her, &c. whereby the plaintiff, during all the time aforesaid, lost and was deprived of the comfort, society, and fellowship of his said wife, and of her aid and assistance, &c. and other wrongs to the plaintiff the defendant did, against the peace, &c. and to the damage of the plaintiff of 20,000l. Pleas: first, not guilty of the premises; second, not guilty of the premises at any time within six years next before the exhibiting of the plaintiff's bill. Replication joining issue on the first plea, and demurring generally to the second; joinder in demurrer.

In support of the demurrer it was contended, by Wood, that the statute of limitations could not be pleaded to an *action of trespass for an assault and consequential [*114] damage, but that it was confined to trespass quare

clausum fregit, or trespass for taking goods, which must be brought within six years after the cause of action, or to trespass for an assault and battery, &c. which must be brought within four years, and is confined to such actions brought by the party personally injured. That according to a MS. case of Cook v. Sayer, (b) with which he had been furnished, the court, in deciding the demurrer to the plea of the statute of limitations, considered the action as an action on the case, and not of trespass, which was a mistake, and was so noted to be in Batchelor v. Biggs.(c) He then read the following note:-" Cooke v. Sayer was an action brought by the husband against the defendant for criminal conversation with his wife. Plea, not guilty within six years, to which there was a demurrer. The question was, if the action were trespass and assault, or case? If the former,

(a) 6. East, 389.

(b) 2 Wils. 85.

(c) 2 Bl. Rep. 855.

the plea was bad, because it ought to be brought within four years; if the latter, it was good. Curia, without hearing any argument, this was an action on the case. If it were trespass and assault, the wife must have joined judgment for the defendant." Secondly, he contended, that supposing the statute of limitations was pleadable to such an action, the plea ought not to be, "Not guilty of the premises, &c. within six years;" but that the cause of action did not accrue within six years, the gist of the action being the consequential damage, namely, the deprivation of comfort, &c.; as, if assumpsit be brought upon a promise to do an act at a future day, which was not then done, the plea cannot be non assumpsit infra sex annos, but actio non accredit infra sex annoș. Gould v. Johnson. (a)

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Scarlett, contra, was stopped by the court.

Lord Ellenborough, Ch. J. The cause of action in these cases, arises from the time of the injury done by the defendant by the corruption of the body and mind of the wife: for from that time she is less qualified to perform the duties of the marriage state. Then the question is, whether this be an action on the case, or an action of trespass and assault? And it is said, that, the latter description only applies to personal assaults on the body of the plaintiff who sues: but nothing of that sort is said in the statute. No doubt that an action of trespass and assault may be maintained by a master for the battery of his servant, per quod servitium amisit ; and so by a husband for a trespass and assault of this kind upon his wife, per quod consortium amisit. Then it is said, that the case of Cooke v. Sayer was decided on the supposition that it was an action on the case. It might be material to consider that point, if the question now were, whether the limitation of six, or of four years only, applied to this case: but if the defendant take the longer period, and plead not guilty within six years, that, of course, must include that he is not guilty within four years, and the plea not having been specially

(a) Salk. 422.

demurred to, is therefore good in either way of considering it. I do not know what my opinion would have been if the point had now first arisen, whether to have considered this as an action on the case or trespass: but it having been considered in Cooke v. Sayer as an action on the case, I should be inclined so to consider it. But, whichever it be taken to be, the bar equally applies to it.

*Lawrence, J. At any rate, it would be going too [*116] far to say, that there is no limitation whatever to such

an action as the present; and if there be a limitation of it, it must either be of four or of six years: and then the objection to the plea is resolved into a mere matter of form, which cannot be taken advantage of on general demurrer. But upon the question, whether an action of this kind be trespass or case, besides the case of Cooke y. Sayer, and where, it is to be observed, that the plea was in the same form as the present, there was another case of Parker v. Ironfield, in this court, in Hil. term, 19 Geo. III. in which the declaration charged, that the defendant, on the 1st day of November, 1777, and on divers days and times between that day and the exhibiting of the plaintiff's bill, made an assault upon Mary Parker, the daughter and servant of the plaintiff, and debauched the said Mary, and carnally knew her, whereby he was deprived of her service. And Mr. Justice Buller has written on the back of his paper book, "This is an action on the case, and not of trespass, and therefore divers days,' &c. proper." And then there is this further endorsement on the paper book, "Declaration for de-' bauching daughter, that defendant on divers times, &c. assaulted, &c. good; for this is an action on the case: aliter, in trespass for assault." He therefore certainly considered it as an action on the case, and not an action of trespass and assault. But leave was then given to withdraw the demurrer, on payment of costs.

Le Blanc, J. I had doubted whether the case just mentioned