The right of entry in an elder outstanding patentee, is not tolled by an adverse possession of more than 20 years of a part of the land covered by such elder patent, except so far as the adverse possession extended. Voorhies vs. Bridgeford, 3 Marsh. Rep. (Ky.) 27.

If an entry be made on a demarked survey, but before patent issues thereon, the possessor is in possession to the extent of the lands, and the limitation runs from the entry, and is not confined to the date of the patent. Roberts & Al. vs. Sanders, 3 Marsh. Rep. (Ky.) 29.

The holder of a descriptive warrant without survey, who has ascertained the limits of his claim by marked boundaries, taken up his residence on the land, cleared a large quantity and cultivated and improved it, is in possession of the whole tract; and if a third person enters on a part of it, nothing short of 21 years adverse possession, will bar the entry of the warrant holder. Such a case is not within the meaning of the 5th Section of the Act of Limitations of 26th March, 1785. Gonzalus & Al. vs. Hoover & Al. 6 Serg. & R. Rep. 118.

But in the case of Miller & others vs. Shaw, (7 Serg. & R. Rep. 143.) DUNCAN, J. said; "A wrongful possession cannot be "extended by construction; constructive possession always ac"companies the right. It is a contradiction in terms, that a man by wrong, should have any right, and that this right, by wrong "should be extended by construction. There cannot be two conflicting constructive possessions, one in the owner and the other "in the trespasser. The right always draws to it the possession, "and it there remains, until seised by the wrong doer, whose pos"session is strictly possessio pedis; who must necessarily be con"fined to what he has grasped, his real and actual possession. "Beyond that, no length of time will protect him; because beyond

66

that, the owners possession has never been changed; it always "is in contemplation of law, continued in him. These are the "dictates of common sense, of common justice, and of the common "law. Did they need authority to support them, authorities "abound in the decisions of the Courts of the several states, and "of the Supreme Court of the United States." & Vide Roycr & Al. vs. Benlow, 10 Serg & R. Rep. 305.

Where a man enters on a tract of appropriated land, without title, or colour of title, the Act of Limitations will not protect him beyond his actual enclosures. Farley & Al. vs. Lenox, 8 Serg. & R. Rep. 392.-Davidson's Lessee vs. Beatty, 3 Har. & M Hen. Rep. 621.

An improver who enters upon land held by another by warrant

and survey, is protected after 21 years, by the Statute of Limitations as to all he encloses or cultivates without enclosure, but not as to those parts which remain in wood, and uninclosed; "though he uses them for fuel, fences, &c. This is the general rule, but it seems there may be exceptions; such as the owners confessing himself out of possession of the woodland uninclosed suffering the improver to pay the taxes for it or perhaps the case of a piece of uninclosed woodland lying between two neighbouring cultivated parcels, might be left to the jury. There may perhaps be other cases of exceptions. Royer & Al. vs. Benlow, 10 Serg. & R. Rep. 303.

But where a large tract of land is divided into lots, the possession of one lot adversely will not create a constructive adverse possession of the other parts of the tract although claimed by the defendant under the same paper title.

In Jackson ex dem. Ten Eyck & wife vs. Richards, (6 Cow. Rep. 623.) The Opinion of the Court was delivered by SUTHERLAND, J., he said; "The judge decided correctly upon the sub"ject of adverse possession: that the tract H. being a large tract of land subdivided into different lots, the occupancy of any one "of the lots would not give a constructive possession, or create an adverse possession of other parts of the tract. (Jackson vs. "Woodruff, 1 Cowen. 276,) and as lot number 12, the premises "in question, was not actually possessed at the time of the mar"riage of the lessors of the plaintiff, there was no adverse pos"session to bar the right of the lessor Ann Ten Eyck. This "question has been repeatedly decided by this Court. Indeed, "the point was abandoned by the defendant's counsel upon the ar"gument."

An alienee entering on his lands (which were bounded) gains a possession only to the extent of his limits, and that possession does not enure to the benefit of his alienor, or give him the possession of lands outside of the alienee's bounds. Mauray & Al. vs. Waugh, 1 Marsh. Rep. (Ky.) 452.

A patentee extending shelter to an occupant, whose possession is meted and bounded, acquires possession only to the extent of the occupant's claim. Lee vs. M'Daniel, 1 Marsh. Rep. (Ky.) 234.

But, a landlord settling a tenant on his patent, with an intent to gain possession, (giving his tenant no bounds) is ipso facto in possession to the limits of his patent. Ibid. 234.

Lands not susceptible of alienation cannot be acquired by prescription. Mayor, &c. vs. Magnon, 4 Martin's Rep. 2.

Adverse possession to be effectual must be continued for the space of time required by Statute.

In the case of Hall vs. Gittings, Lessee (2 Har. & Johns. Rep. 112, 126.) CHASE, CH. J. said; "Holland's park having been "legally granted to George Holland, nothing can defeat his title, "and the title of his heirs, to the said land under his grant, but "twenty years adversary possession."

The Act of Limitations runs in equity in favour of an adverse possession, where it would at law. Harrison vs. Harrison & Al., 1 Call's. Rep 419. Bell vs. Beemen & Al., 3 Murph. Rep. 273.

A bill in Chancery cannot be sustained to recover land from one who has been 20 years in possession prior to the commencement of the suit, and under a title from an adverse grant. Wilson's heirs vs. Bodley, 2 Littell's Rep. 55, 59.

The shortest period which a court of equity is bound to consider an absolute bar to a suit respecting real estate, in analogy to the limitation of actions at law, is twenty years. Hawley vs. Cramer, 4 Cowen's Rep. 718.

In the case of Ward vs. Van Bokkelen (1 Paige's Rep. 101.) WALWORTH, Ch. said; "If the conveyance was fraudulent, no pe"riod of time, short of twenty years, will prevent the persons in"tended to be defrauded thereby from pursuing their remedy "against the land in the hands of the fraudulent grantee, or her heirs or devisees. Twenty years is the shortest limitation of "actions at law respecting real property in this state, and by anal"ogy to the Statute of Limitations, that is the shortest period. "which can bar a proceeding in this court to set aside conveyan"ces of real property, on the ground of fraud."

Twenty years at least are required to bar the equity of redemption in cases of mortgages of a legal or equitable interest in real estate. Slee vs. The Manhattan Company, 1 Paige's Rep. 80.

Possession for more than twenty years under an adverse title, bars relief in equity, except where the complainants laboured under some disability. Floyd's heirs vs. Johnson & Al., 2 Littell's Rep. 109, 112.

The Maryland Statute of Limitations of three years is a good bar to an action of assumpsit for money had and received brought to try a title to lands in the city of Washington, under the 5th section of the Act of Maryland of November, 1791, ch. 45. Beatty's Adm'rs. vs. Burnes' Adm'rs. 8 Cranch's Rep. 98.

In the case of conflicting grants, twenty years possession will not avail the defendant in chancery, unless he shews that he has obtained the elder grant for twenty years previous to the institution of the suit. BOYLE, CH. J. delivering the Opinion of the Court, said; "It is certainly a general rule, that a Court of Equity will "not relieve against a possession with right after the lapse of "twenty years. Whether this rule is applicable to controversies like the present, growing out of original adverse claims, does "not seem necessary to be decided in this case. For we are of opinion, that admitting it to be so, the case made out by the de"fendants does not entitle them to avail themselves of it; for they "have not exhibited the grant under which they claim; nor does "the date of it appear from any part of the pleadings. It is in"deed alleged by the complainant that it is elder than that under "which he derives title: but his bears date only about nine years "before the commencement of this suit. So that the grant under "which the defendants claim, though elder than that of the com"plainants, may have been issued much less than twenty years "prior to the commencement of this suit; and it is plain that pre"vious to the emanation of their grant, the complainant could not "maintain his suit: for it is that circumstance alone which gives "to a Court of Equity jurisdiction of the cause; and until the 66 cause of action arose, and the jurisdiction of the court attached, "laches cannot be ascribed to the complainant." Briscoe, &e. vs. Prewet, 4 Bibb's Rep. 370.

Twenty years' possession of an easement or use of a water course is a conclusive presumption of right, if unexplained. Hazard vs. Robinson, 3 Mason's Rep. 272. Hurlbut vs. Leonard, Brayt. 201.

An absolute right to a water course, may be acquired, by 15 years' uninterrupted possession, use, and occupation, claiming right thereto adverse to all others. Rogers vs. Page & Al., Brayt. Rep. 201. & Vide Hurlbut vs. Leonard, Ibid. 202.

A right to a privilege appurtenant to land may be gained by an exclusive enjoyment for a sufficient length of time, in analogy to the Statute of Limitations; but no period short of that required by such Statute to gain a title to land will be sufficient for this purpose. Sherwood vs. Burr, 4 Day's Rep. 244.

If the grantor reserve to himself and his representatives, &c. a servitude or right of passage through the lands conveyed, non user, for twenty years, of such right or servitude, will entitle the grantee, or his representatives, to prescribe against it. Powers vs. Foucher, 12 Mart. Rep. 70.

Twenty years' adverse possession of a diverted water course are

indispensably necessary to defeat the proprietor of the ancient channel, and to repel his reclamation of his right. Campbell vs. Smiths, 3 Halstead's Rep. 139. S. P. Coalter vs. Hunter, 4

Rand. Rep. 64.

And if the use of the water" was originally applied for as a "loan" "granted without consideration as a loan; and its subse"quent enjoyment never claimed otherwise than as a loan; more "than twenty years' posssession will not be adverse." Coalter vs. Hunter, 4 Rand. Rep. 64.

More than twenty years' adverse possession and exclusive use of the lands over which a party claims a right of way, cannot be a bar to an action by him for obstructing such right of way. Wright vs. Freeman, (On Appeal) 5 Harr. & Johns. Rep.

468.

In the case of Davis' Lessee vs. Davis' Heirs, (2 Harr. & Johns. Rep. 295, 299.) where the question was whether a person under whom the plaintiff claimed title, died seised of the land for which the ejectment was brought; CHASE, CH. J. said; "The "facts and circumstances disclosed in evidence are not sufficient "for the jury to presume a title in the heirs of Parnell, or a deed "to Parnell, against the defendant, with sixty years' possession. The entries on the rent roll should show a correspondent title. The strongest presumption in this case of a good title, is in fa"vour of the defendant.

"The court are of opinion, that the facts stated by the plain"tiff, although the jury should find them to be true, are not sufficient and legal evidence to warrant the jury in finding that Dan"iel Payne and Mary Payne were seized of the lands, and died "seized thereof, in opposition to the facts stated by the defend"ant, if the jury should find them to be true."

"The mere possession of Land without any claim of right gives "no title, however long it may continue; and the true owner "may lawfully enter upon such occupier at any distance of time, "because he does no wrong to the occupant, who claims no right. "It is the claim of title that makes the possession of the "holder of the land adverse to all others." La Frombois vs. Jackson ex dem Smith & Al., 8 Cow. Rep. 603. (Per JONES, CH.)

Adverse possession cannot be sustained against the State, unless the state has expressly restricted its own rights by Statute.

In the case of Hall vs. Gitting's Lessee (2 Harr. & Johns. Rep. 112,114.) CHASE, Ch. J. (with whom the other Judges, DUVAL & DONE Concurred) said; "The court are of opinion, that there