dissent has been filed; but the wife, by herself, or by her husband, in her name, may file a dissent, and bring her action with her husband, and recover during coverture; or she may, within three years after the death of her husband file her dissent, and bring an action. Ibid.

Where the heirs of N., a native of Ireland, and living in Ireland, neglected to enter their dissent to the award of the Onondaga Commissioners, in relation to a lot of land of which N. died seised, within the two years limited by the act, they were held for ever barred and concluded by the award, except L., who was a feme covert, and within the saving of the act, there being Jackson ex no saving on account of absence from the state. dem. Folliard vs. Wright, 4 Johns. Rep, 75.

If a party, conceiving himself aggrieved by an award of the Onondaga Commissioners, has given them notice of his dissent, within two years, that is sufficient to prevent his being concluded by the award, whether the commissioners have entered such dissent in their book of awards or not; and whether the dissent was delivered to the commissioners or not, is a question for the jury. Jackson ex dem. Reiley vs. Livingston, 3 Johns. Rep. 455.

But as to filing his dissent, he must give notice to the commissioners to commence a suit within three years, &c. according to the third section of the act. Jackson ex dem. Boyd vs. Lewis,

13 Johns. Rep. 504.

It is not sufficient to bring an action within the three years, without having filed a dissent. Jackson ex dem. Cornelius vs. M' Kee, & Johns Rep. 429.

Whether the land was vacant or not, the dissent is equally necessary. Ibid. S. P. Jackson ex dem. Robicheau vs. Swartwout, 8 Johns. Rep. 490.

Where no dissent is filed, the title, under the award of the Jackson ex dem. Robicommissioners, is final and conclusive. cheau vs. Swartwout, 8 Johns. Rep. 490.

Where two successive conveyances of military lots were made by the patentee before the statute of January 8th, 1794, (1 R. L. 209,) neither of which were deposited in the clerk's office of Albany, pursuant to that act; held, that the deed last executed took preference. Held, also, that a conveyance by the patentee, for a valuable consideration, subsequent to the second, should take preference of that; but it appearing that it was executed pending an ejectment by those claiming under the second conveyance,

to a grantee who had notice of that conveyance, and actual knowledge of the first; held, that it lay with the defendant to show otherwise than by the last conveyance, that a valuable consideration was, in fact, paid. Jackson v. Harrington, 6 Cow. Rep. 135. Whether a subsequent conveyance for valuable consideration, with notice of a prior deed, comes within the protection of the statute, (1 R. L. 209,) or it must be bona fide in the full sense of the terms? Quere. Ibid.

To render the conveyance of a military lot, executed before January 8th, 1794, valid as against a subsequent purchaser; not only the immediate deed must have been deposited, pursuant to the act of 1794, (1 R. L. 209, 211,) but also the power of attorney under which it was executed. Jackson v. Bowen, 6 Cow. Rep.

141.

An award of the Onondaga Commissioners, was made in favour of the defendant, November 5th, 1800, to which the plaintiff filed a dissent, according to the act, in February, 1801, and it appeared that the defendant was in actual possession in June, 1801 held, that though the possession commenced after the award and dissent, but before the expiration of three years; yet the party filing the dissent was bound to take notice of the possession, and to bring his action against the party in possession within the three years, and prosecute the same to effect within three years; otherwise, the award was conclusive. Jackson ex dem. Bond vs. Root, 8 Johns. Rep. 60.

If the party in whose favour the award was made, is out of possession, and his adversary in possession, the party out of possession must bring his action and prosecute it to effect within three years; and if he does so, his title is established, and the recovery is conclusive on the right. Ibid.

And it is the same, if the party dissenting brings a suit against a tenant in possession claiming under the party in whose favour the award was made, if a verdict, after trial as to the right is found for the defendant; for the intention of the legislature in regard to these military lands was to make a single trial as to the right, in.an action of ejectment brought within the time limited, a conclusive bar to another suit; and if there is a trial on the merits, in a suit brought by either party, within the period prescribed, it is within the true meaning and intent of the act. Ibid.

A. having title to a lot of land in the county of Onondaga, directed B. to take charge of the lot, and sell it, and B. went on the lot occasionally to show it. C. also claimed the lot, and the claims of the parties were litigated before the commissioners, who, on the 20th January, 1802, made an award in favour of C.; and, in July, 1802, about half an acre of the lot was cleared and fenced by the order of A., and logs cut and laid as the foundation

for a house, which was not, however, built or occupied. In March, 1802, A. filed his dissent to the award, and brought an action in 1807; Held, that the acts of A. did not constitute an actual possession of the lot within the meaning of the act, so as to oblige C. to bring his action within three years; and that the land being vacant, A. was not bound to bring his action within the three years, the act not extending to the case of a vacant possession; and that, therefore, neither party being barred, they must stand on the strength of their respective titles. Jackson ex dem. Scott vs. Huntley, 5 Johns. Rep. 59,

Dunbar, an infant, in 1784, conveyed a lot of land in the military tract, to Macey, who conveyed the same, in 1794, to Platt, who conveyed it to Thorn. Dunbar came of full age in 1785, and, afterwards, in 1791, without having made any entry on the land, or done any act to avoid the deed to Macey, executed another deed, for the same lot, to Brooks; and the executors of Brooks, afterwards, in 1794, conveyed the same lot to Isaacs, who contracted to convey the same to Cady, who assigned the contract to Todd, who entered into possession in 1795, and afterwards, in 1797, received a deed from Isaacs. On the 18th of November, 1802, the Onondaga Commissioners awarded the lot to Thorn; and Todd, in May, 1802, filed his dissent, pursuant to the statute. In an action of ejectment, brought on the demise of Dunbar, Macey, Platt, and Thorn, against Todd, to recover the lot; held, that though the deed from Dunbar to Macey was voidable, Todd could not avail himself of the subsequent deed from Dunbar to Brooks, to avoid it; and that, though the dissent of Todd would enure to the benefit of those from whom he derived his estate, yet as it did not appear that the executors of Brooks had any authority to convey, no privity of estate was shown between him and Todd; and that as, by the award in favour of Thorn, the deed to Brooks was rendered inoperative, no dissent having been filed by the heirs of Brooks, the award was conclusive against them, and so Todd could not avail himself of the deed to Brooks, as a subsisting outstanding title; and that though the deed to Thorn, on account of the adverse possession of Todd, was void; yet the award of the commissioners on the title, and being in favour of Thorn, it must extend and enure to the benefit of all those from whom he derived title, and confirmed the deeds to Macey and Platt, who were not bound to enter any dissent, as the award was in favour of their alienee. Jackson ex dem. Dunbar vs. Todd, 6 Johns. Rep. 257.

NORTH CAROLINA.

An action of debt on a Promissory Note not under Seal, is not within the Statute of Limitations of North Carolina. Johnston vs. Green, 1 Nor. Car. Law Rep. 516.

An action against Executors for money received by their testator in his life time as County Ranger, is limited by the Act of 1715. Alexander, County Trustee vs. The Executors of Alexander, 1 Nor. Car. Law Rep. 273.

The limitation of suits against executors or administrators, does not apply to suits against heirs or devisees. Hollowell vs. The devisees of Pope, 1 Nor. Car. Law Rep. 222.

PENNSYLVANIA.

Suits against sureties in a Constable's official Bond are limited, to seven years from the time at which the cause of action arose ; by the Act of 4th April, 1798. Owen & Al. vs. The Commonwealth, 8 Serg. & R. Rep. 530.

Act of Limitations applies to a general Indebitatus Assumpsit, for monies under a settlement by two administrators in the Orphan's Court. Gemberleng vs. Myers & Al. Admr. &c. 2 Yeates' Rep. 341.

VERMONT..

Where a demand is barred by the existing laws of a foreign country, where the contract was made, it cannot be revived by transferring it to an inhabitant of this State. [Vermont.] Woodbridge vs. Austin, 2 Ty. Rep. 364.

A declaration, describing a note without any consideration expressed in the note, but describing a consideration, distinct from the note itself, sets forth a note within the Statute of Limitations. Leonard vs. Walker, Brayt. Rep. 203.

The clause in the Statute of Limitations, limiting the time for bringing an action of debt, or Scire Facias on judgment to eight years, does not extend to a Scire Facias provided by the 9th Section of the Act, directing the serving and levying executions, in a case where an execution has been levied on property, which did not belong to the debtor. Baxter vs. Tucker, 1 Chip., Rep. 353.

A note payable in specific or collateral articles, is a promissory note, under the Statute of Limitations, and is not, (if witnessed,) barred, till fourteen years. Meed vs. Ellis, Brayt. Rep. 203.

VIRGINIA.

In an action brought in Virginia, on a judgment obtained in North Carolina, the Act of Limitations of North Carolina, cannot be pleaded in bar, but the law of the former must prevail; the

Act of Limitations affecting the remedy and not the right. Nor, as it seems, does the Act of Limitations of Virginia apply to such a Jones, Admr. vs. Hook's Admr., 2 Rand. Rep. 303.

case.

Where the characters of administrator and distributee unite in the same person, who holds possession of personal property, in the former character, for more than five years, his rights as distributee will not be barred by the Statute of Limitations. Vaiden, &c. vs. Bell, 3 Rand. Rep. 448.