Opinion of the Court.

not abutting upon land taken. Dodge v. County Commissioners, 3 Met. 380; Parker v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 3 Cush. 107; Marsden v. Cambridge, 114 Mass. 490.

"The respondent contends that it had the right of an owner of the land taken to make excavations in it, and thereby drain its neighbor's well; that its act without the authority and protection of the statute, was lawful, and invaded no right of the petitioner, and gave her no right of action; and that, in accordance with the decisions in England, the statute should be construed to intend only damages which, but for the protection of the statute, could be recovered by action. See New River Co. v. Johnson, 2 El. & El. 435; Metropolitan Board of Works v. McCarthy, L. R. 7 H. L. 243. But the respondent does not stand, in this respect, in the position of a purchaser of the land, taking the rights of its grantor. It is not the absolute owner of the land, but it took and holds the right to occupy the land for certain purposes, and to do upon it certain acts authorized by the statute. In exercising its rights, the town acts, not under the title of the owner, but by virtue of the authority given by the statute, and under the obligation imposed by the statute to pay all damages occasioned thereby. The petitioner had a right to collect and keep the water in her well; and depriving her of it, so as to injure her land, was a damage to her. It is no answer that other landowners had the same right in respect to their lands, and that, if the petitioner's damages had been in consequence of the exercise of those rights in his land by a landowner, she could not have recovered damages from him. The respondent's rights in the land, and its authority to do the act which caused the damage, are given by the same statute which gives a remedy to the petitioner to recover the damages.

"The precise question presented here was decided, in regard to a railroad, in Parker v. Boston & Maine Railroad, ubi supia. In that case, damages were alleged to have been occasioned, in the construction of a railroad, to land not within or adjoining the location of the road, by changing the grade of a highway and by draining a well. It is not suggested

Opinion of the Court.

Chief

that either would be a cause of action at common law. Justice Shaw says that the main question in the case is 'whether a party having land with buildings thereon, lying near the track of a railroad, but not crossed by it, can recover compensation for incidental damages caused to his land, by the construction of the railroad and the structures incident to and connected with it.' After discussing the question, he says: We are of opinion, therefore, that a party who sustains an actual and real damage, capable of being pointed out, described and appreciated, may sue a complaint for compensation for such damage.' In regard to the well he says: "The claim for damages on this ground does not depend on the relative rights of owners of land, each of whom has a right to make a proper use of his own estate, and sinking a well upon it is such proper use; and if the water, by its natural current, flows from one to the other, and a loss ensues, it is damnum absque injuria. But the respondents did not own land; they only acquired a special right to and usufruct in it, upon the condition of paying all damages which might be thereby occasioned to others.""

In Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Penn. St. 528, 533, the case of Parker v. Boston & Maine Railroad is cited with approval. We also regard our own case of Great Falls Manufacturing Company v. Attorney General, above cited, as, in effect, construing the statute as applicable to a claim like the present

one.

Upon the whole, we are of opinion that the judgment of the Court of Claims is sustainable on principle and authority, and it is accordingly

Affirmed.

Opinion of the Court.

UNITED STATES v. TRUESDELL.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

No. 552. Submitted January 9, 1893. Decided March 6, 1893.

This case is affirmed on the authority of United States v. Alexander, ante, 186.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Solicitor General Cotton for appellants.

Mr. Job Barnard and Mr. George A. King for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit was brought in the Court of Claims to recover damages for the loss of a well, occasioned by the construction of an extension of the Washington Aqueduct, and for compensation for a right of way across land of the complainant, taken for the purpose of constructing a tunnel, by virtue of an act of Congress of July 15, 1882, entitled "An act to increase the water supply of the city of Washington and for other purposes." 22 Stat. 168, c. 294.

So far as the recovery of the plaintiff below was based on the claim for compensation for land actually taken, the United States do not, in this appeal, complain. But they contend that the injury caused by the destruction of the well was damnum absque injuria. The liability of the United States, under the statute by virtue of which the work in question was done and the damages occasioned, has been declared in the opinion of this court in the case, just decided, of the United States v. Alexander, ante, 186, where the facts were similar, and we do not need to repeat what is therein said. The judgment of the court below is accordingly

Affirmed.

Statement of the Case.

PETTIBONE v. UNITED STATES.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO.

No. 1241. Argued February 1, 2, 1893. — Decided March 6, 1893.

In a prosecution for conspiracy, corruptly and by threats and force to obstruct the due administration of justice in a Circuit Court of the United States, the combination of minds for the unlawful purpose and the overt act in effectuation of that purpose must appear charged in the indictment.

A conspiracy is sufficiently described as a combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful by criminal or unlawful means.

When the criminality of a conspiracy consists in an unlawful agreement of two or more persons to compass or promote, some criminal or illegal purpose, that purpose must be fully and clearly stated in the indictment; while if the criminality of the offence consists in the agreement to accomplish a purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means, the means must be set out.

An indictment against a person for corruptly or by threats or force endeavoring to influence, intimidate, or impede a witness or officer in a court of the United States in the discharge of his duty, must charge knowledge or notice, or set out facts that show knowledge or notice, on the part of the accused that the witness or officer was such.

A person is not sufficiently charged in such case with obstructing or impeding the due administration of justice in a court, unless it appear that he knew or had notice that justice was being administered in such court.

PLAINTIFFS in error were indicted under sections 5399 and 5440 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, (the latter as amended by the act of May 17, 1879, 21. Stat. 4, c. 8,) which are as follows:

"SEC. 5399. Every person who corruptly, or by threats or force, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness, or officer in any court of the United States, in the discharge of his duty, or corruptly, or by threats or force, obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of justice therein, shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment not more than three months, or both."

Statement of the Case.

"SEC. 5440. If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offence against the United States or to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, all the parties to such conspiracy shall be liable to a penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars, or to imprisonment for not more than two years, or to both fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court."

The indictment alleged that on May 28, 1892, suit was commenced in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Idaho, wherein the Bunker Hill and Sullivan Mining and Concentrating Company was complainant, and the Miners' Union of Wardner and others were defendants; that a writ of injunction was duly and regularly issued therein by the court, directed to plaintiffs in error and many others as defendants, which writ of injunction was set out in full in the indictment, and ordered as follows:

"In the meantime and until the further order of this court herein, the said defendants and each of them, their aiders, attorneys, officers, agents, servants and employés be, and they are hereby, severally restrained and enjoined from in any manner interfering with the complainant herein in any of its work in and upon or about its said mining claims, to wit, the Bunker Hill, the Sullivan, and the Small Hopes Lode mining claims mentioned in the complaint herein, or in any part thereof, and from in any manner by force or threats or otherwise making any attempts to intimidate any employé of the complainant herein, or from attempting to prevent by any force or intimidation any employé of the said complainant from proceeding to work for the said complainant in a peaceful, quiet, and lawful manner in and upon any part of the aforesaid mines or mining claims, or in or upon any works of the said complainant therein or thereabouts or at all, and that they, the said parties aforesaid, be, and they are hereby, further enjoined from intimidating or threatening or by any force, threats, or any intimidation trying to prevent any employé of the complainant herein from working in or upon the aforesaid mines mentioned in the complaint herein, or at the