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Opinion of the Court.

view of the subject would prevent citizens of other States from resorting to the federal courts for the enforcement of their claims against counties of the State, and limit them to the special mode of relief prescribed by the act of February 27, 1879. The jurisdiction of the federal courts is not to be defeated by such state legislation as this. In Hyde v. Stone, 20 How. 170, 175, it is said: "But this court has repeatedly decided that the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States over controversies between citizens of different States cannot be impaired by the laws of the States, which prescribe the modes of redress in their courts, or which regulate the distribution of their judicial power. In many cases state laws form a rule of decision for the courts of the United States, and the forms of proceeding in these courts have been assimilated to those of the States, either by legislative enactment or by their own rules. But the courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judgment and to afford redress to suitors before them in every case to which their jurisdiction extends. They cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction. Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Pet. 67; Union Bank v. Jolly's Administrators, 18 How. 503." This principle has been steadily adhered to by this court.

In the case under consideration the state statute relied on to defeat the jurisdiction of the United States Circuit Court was passed after the bonds sued on were issued and put in circulation, and if its requirement of presenting the bonds to the county court of Chicot County "for allowance or rejection" was binding upon citizens of other States holding such bonds, it would present a very grave question whether it was not such a substantial and material change in the remedy in force when the contract was made, as to impair its obligations. But it is not necessary to consider and determine that question, as the objection to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, for the reasons already stated, is not well taken.

The second assignment of error is to the action of the Circuit Court in sustaining the demurrer to the answer of the county. The answer, after setting out the constitutional and statutory provisions of the State, under which the county was authorized

Opinion of the Court.

to issue the bonds in question, and the proceedings of the county court in reference to the submission of the question of subscribing $100,000 to the capital stock of the railroad company, and the election had thereunder by the people of the county, together with the result of the vote, which, according to the returns, as ascertained and found by the county court, showed a majority of 320 votes in favor of the county making the subscription, proceeds to set forth a mass of irrelevant matter, such as the occurrence of a riot at a former election; the occupation of the county-seat by a force of state troops to protect life and property when the order for the election under which the subscription voted was made, and continued so occupied till after the election; and alleges "that a condition of affairs existed in the county that precluded a free and fair election, and the veriest sham of an election was held at some of the various precincts on February 17, 1872, (the day of the election,) as shown by papers filed with the county clerk, and which upon their face show that there was not a legal election at any precinct in the county of Chicot on said February 17, 1872, and that no poll-books were furnished to the several precincts as required by law"; together with various other recited irregularities, alleged to be shown by papers filed, but by whom filed is not averred; nor is it stated how, or in what way, as matter of fact, such irregularities affected the vote actually cast and counted, on which the subscription was carried. After a recital of these matters, which, it is said, appear "by reference to certified copies of the papers sent into the clerk's office from some of the various precincts in the county," numerous papers are marked as exhibits and made part of the answer, and from which is drawn the conclusion set up in the answer, as follows: "And so the county says that there was in fact no election held in said county on February 27, 1872, to determine whether or not the county would subscribe to the capital of said railroad company and issue bonds to pay the same."

It is further averred in the answer that the county court was not the proper tribunal to determine whether an election had been held in pursuance of the statute regulating the mat

Opinion of the Court.

ter; that the false recitals on the face of the bonds, to the contrary, did not estop the county; that the terms and conditions of the order submitting the question of subscription to a vote of the people were not complied with, so that the county was not legally bound to pay the bonds or any part thereof; and that the railroad company had delivered the stock to the county court before the election was held, and, after said election, had obtained the bonds illegally and fraudulently, etc. The answer also sets out proceedings had in the county court after the bonds were issued, and reports made to it in relation thereto, which are made exhibits to the answer, and which, it is claimed, show that the bonds were not issued in conformity to law.

To this answer there was interposed a demurrer, which was sustained, and the county electing to stand on its answer, and say nothing further in bar of the plaintiffs' right to recover, judgment was thereupon rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, for the amount of the bonds and coupons sued on, with interest and costs of suit.

It is urged by the plaintiff in error that this action of the lower court was erroneous, for the reason that the answer set forth sufficient facts to invalidate the bonds within the rule laid down in Dixon County v. Field, 111 U. S. 83, 92, 93. We do not take this view of the answer. It abounds in recitals, in statements of what papers made exhibits thereto purport to show, and in conclusions of law, which are not admitted by the demurrer, the rule being well settled that only matters of fact well pleaded are admitted by a demurrer, while conclusions of law are not. United States v. Ames, 99 U. S. 35, 45; Interstate Land Co. v. Maxwell Land Grant Co., 139 U. S. 569, 578.

The answer was of such a character as to present no issuable questions of fact going to the merits of the suit, and was properly demurred to, and there was no error in sustaining the demurrer.

Our conclusion is, that the judgment should be

Affirmed.

Statement of the Case.

LASCELLES v. GEORGIA.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA.

No. 1262. Argued March 16, 1893. Decided April 3, 1893.

A fugitive from justice who has been surrendered by one State of the Union to another State, upon requisition charging him with the commission of a specific crime, has, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, no right, privilege or immunity to be exempt from indictment and trial, in the State to which he is returned, for any other or different offence from that designated in the requisition, without first having an opportunity to return to the State from which he was extradited.

THIS case was brought here by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia. The single federal question presented by the record, and relied on to confer upon this court the jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia, complained of by the plaintiff in error, was whether a fugitive from justice who has been surrendered by one State of the Union to another State thereof upon requisition, charging him with the commission of a specific crime, has, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, a right, privilege or immunity to be exempt from indictment. and trial in the State to which he is returned, for any other.or different offence than that designated and described in the requisition proceedings, under which he was demanded by and restored to such State, without first having an opportunity to return to the State from which he was extradited.

The facts of the case on which this question is raised were briefly these: In July, 1891, two indictments were regularly found by the grand jury of the county of Floyd, State of Georgia, against the plaintiff in error under the name of Walter S. Beresford, which respectively charged him with the offence "of being a common cheat and swindler," and with the crime of "larceny after trust delegated," both being criminal acts by the laws of Georgia, and alleged to have been committed in the county of Floyd. At the time these indict

Statement of the Case.

ments were found the plaintiff in error was residing in the State of New York. In September, 1891, the governor of the State of Georgia made a requisition on the governor of the State of New York for the arrest and surrender of the plaintiff in error to designated officials of the former State, naming him, as he was named in the indictment, Walter S. Beresford. In the requisition, as well as in the warrant for his arrest, the offences for which his rendition was demanded were stated and designated as charged in the indictment. After being arrested, in pursuance of the warrant, he was duly delivered to the agent of the State of Georgia, was brought to the county of Floyd in said State, and there delivered to the sheriff of the county, by whom he was detained in the county jail. While so held, and before trial upon either of the indictments on which the requisition proceedings were based, the grand jury of the county, on October 6, 1891, found a new indictment against him for the crime of forgery, naming him therein as Sidney Lascelles, which was his true and proper name. Thereafter he was put upon his trial in the Superior Court of the county of Floyd upon this last indictment. Before arraignment he moved the court to quash said indictment "on the ground that he was being tried for a separate and different offence from that for which he was extradited from the State of New York to the State of Georgia, without first being allowed a reasonable opportunity to return to the State of New York." This motion was overruled and he was put upon trial. Thereupon he filed a special plea setting forth the foregoing facts, and averring that he could not be lawfully tried for a separate and different crime from that for which he was extradited. This plea was overruled, and, having been put upon his trial under the indictment, he was found guilty of the offence charged. His motion for a new trial being overruled and refused, he filed a bill of exceptions, and carried the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia, the court of highest and last resort in that State, before which he again asserted his exemption from trial upon the indictment, upon the grounds stated in his motion to quash and in his special plea, but the Supreme Court of Georgia sustained the action of the lower

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