vested title, enabling them to bring suit based thereon, unless their title has been divested by a subsequent levee tax sale under which de- fendants claim.-Board of Directors St. Francis Levee District v. Fleming (Ark.) 132.
As employers, see Master and Servant. Carriage of goods and passengers, see Carriers. Expert testimony as to sufficiency of railroad track, see Evidence, § 513.
Requests for instructions in action for injuries. to trespasser, see Trial, § 260.
claimed to have been driven from a moving § 282. In an action for injuries to a boy freight car by defendant's switchman, held, un- der the evidence, that the question whether the switchman was authorized to expel plain- tiff was for the jury.-Texas & N. Ó. R. Co.. v. Buch (Tex. Civ. App.) 316.
§ 282. In an action for injuries to a boy alleged to have been driven from a moving car by defendant's switchman, where defendant de- nied the authority of the switchman to so act,
V. RIGHT OF WAY AND OTHER IN- plaintiff was not required to plead the prac-
TERESTS IN LAND.
Acquisition of rights under power of eminent domain, see Eminent Domain. Obstruction of street, as element of compensa- tion for injuries to property, see Eminent Do- main, 106.
Parol evidence of separate agreement, see Evi- dence, § 441.
$72. Fact that a lumber company contract- ing for a right of way upon condition that it would incorporate and operate a railroad could not itself do so would not render the condition impossible of performance and, therefore, void, assuming it to be a condition subsequent.-Sul- livan-Sanford Lumber Co. v. Reeves (Tex. Civ. App.) 96.
§ 72. Landowner who had conveyed an ease- ment of right of way under conditions not per- formed held not required to tender back the money consideration before suing to recover the land. Sullivan-Sanford Lumber Co. v. Reeves (Tex. Civ. App.) 96.
§ 72. A contract for a right of way held an executory contract and a condition therein a condition precedent.-Sullivan-Sanford Lumber Co. v. Reeves (Tex. Civ. App.) 96.
VI. CONSTRUCTION, MAINTENANCE, AND EQUIPMENT.
tice of ejecting trespassers from trains to war- rant the submission of this issue to the jury. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Buch (Tex. Civ. App.) 316.
§ 282. In an action for injuries to a boy alleged to have been driven from a moving car by defendant's switchman, evidence held suffi- cient to take the question whether it was the practice of the switchmen to eject trespassers from trains to the jury.-Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Buch (Tex. Civ. App.) 316.
alleged to have been driven from a moving car § 282. In an action for injuries to a boy by defendant's switchman, evidence held to au- thorize a finding that it was the practice of the switchman to eject trespassers from trains.- Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Buch (Tex. Civ. App.). 316.
§ 282. In an action for injuries to a boy al- leged to have been driven from a moving car by defendant's switchman, evidence held to jus- tify a finding that defendant by nonenforcement had abrogated a certain rule in so far as it applied to switching crews.-Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Buch (Tex. Civ. App.) 316.
(F) Accidents at Crossings. Requests for instructions in action for injuries, see Trial, § 260.
$307. It would constitute negligence for a Splitting causes of action for injuries from railroad, at a place where gates were maintain- flowage, see Action, § 53..
VII. SALES, LEASES, TRAFFIC CON- TRACTS, AND CONSOLIDATION.
§ 134. A grantor of a right of way held to have a lien thereon for an unpaid consideration which may be enforced against the right of way if the grantee fails to pay the consideration. Hurley v. Big Sandy & C. Ry. Co. (Ky.) 302.
ed, to keep the gates up, whereby one drove an automobile on tracks, and was injured by a train.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Eckman (Ky.)
$327. In an action for death in a crossing accident, facts held to show that decedent was negligent as a matter of law.-Gumm v. Kansas City Belt Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 796.
§ 327. In an action against a railroad com- pany for injuries at a crossing, plaintiffs' fail- ure to look and listen held to constitute negli- Carriage of passengers, see Carriers, §§ 280-gence barring a recovery.-Texas & P. Ry. Co.
348. Injuries to employés, see Master and Servant, §§ 85-296.
v. Johnson (Tex. Civ. App.) 933.
§ 331. A 10 year old boy, attempting to cross a railroad crossing despite warnings given by employés, held guilty of contributory negligence. Compensation for injuries to property from ob-Pittsburg, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Blum struction of street, see Eminent Domain, § (Ky.) 300. 106.
(B) Statutory, Municipal, and Official Regulations.
$226. Acts 29th Leg. c. 133, requiring rail- roads to provide toilet rooms at stations, and providing a penalty for a violation thereof was by implication repealed by Acts 31st Leg. c. 96, relating to the same subject.-State v. Tex- as & N. O. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 53.
(C) Companies and Persons Liable for In- juries.
Injuries to passengers, see Carriers, § 306.
(D) Injuries to Licensees or Trespassers
§ 335. The proximate cause of an accident at a railroad crossing, where the gates were left open, and contributory negligence interven- ed, stated.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Eckman (Ky.) 729.
$335. In an action against a railroad com- pany for injuries at a crossing, where plaintiffs. had knowledge that the train was approaching, held immaterial whether the whistle was blown or not.-Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Johnson (Tex. Civ. App.) 933.
$337. Proximate cause of an accident at a railroad crossing, caused by the gates being left open, stated.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Eck- man (Ky.) 729.
§ 337. While it is negligence as a matter of Liability over of express company to railroad law to fail to blow the whistle at a crossing as company, see Indemnity, § 13. required by Rev. St. 1895, art. 4507, such neg-
ligence is not actionable unless it was a proxi- mate cause of injury.-Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Hemphill (Tex. Civ. App.) 340.
§ 338. Under the last clear chance doctrine, the bare fact that a person started to walk toward a track on which an engine was approaching the crossing, of itself, will not support an in- ference that the engineer knew that the person was unconscious of the approach of the engine, and, if not warned, would walk into danger.- Gumm v. Kansas City Belt Ry. Co. (Mo. App.)
§ 338. What is necessary in order to convict a railroad of negligence, within the last clear chance doctrine, in running a person down at a crossing, stated.-Gumm v. Kansas City Belt Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 796.
$ 350. In a suit against a railroad company for injury to a pedestrian, evidence held to pre- sent a question for the jury as to the defend- ant's negligence.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Walker (Ark.) 135.
$350. In an action for injuries to an auto- mobile and driver at a railroad crossing, evi- dence held sufficient to take the question of a driver's negligence to the jury.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Eckman (Ky.) 729.
$ 351. In an action against a railroad for injuries to plaintiff through his mules becoming frightened by a train, defendant held entitled to an instruction that if the injury resulted solely from the mules becoming frightened by the steam, and not by defendant's failure to sig- nal at a crossing as alleged, defendant was not liable.-Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Hemphill (Tex. Civ. App.) 340.
(G) Injuries to Persons on or near Tracks. Injuries to persons on or near street railroad tracks, see Street Railroads, §§ 85-117. $356. Trainmen held required to moderate the speed of trains, give notice of their ap- proach and keep a lookout, where several hun- dred persons travel daily along the tracks. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Ball (Ky.) 246. $359. Where the engineer of the train exer- cised ordinary care to discover plaintiff while lying on the track, but failed to see him in time to avoid injury, the railroad company would not be responsible, though plaintiff was free from contributory negligence by reason of his want of mental capacity to appreciate his danger and avoid the same.-Epperson v. Inter- national & G. N. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 117. § 372. Liability of railroad company for in- juries to a person on its track stated.-Epperson v. International & G. N. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 117.
§ 382. A person suddenly stricken, and there- by rendered unconscious while on a railroad track, could not, on account thereof, be held guilty of contributory negligence, but the neg- ligence, if any, would consist of going on the track with the knowledge that he might likely be overtaken by some such mental disturbance. -Epperson v. International & G. N. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 117.
§ 390. In an action for injuries by being struck by a train, defendant switchmen held not negligent so as to authorize a recovery under the last clear chance rule.-Grayson v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. (Ark.) 1013.
§ 398. In an action for injuries by being struck by a train, plaintiff held guilty of con- tributory negligence.-Grayson v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. (Ark.) 1013.
$398. Evidence held to sustain a verdict for defendant, in an action against a railroad com- pany for injuries to a person while asleep on the track.-Epperson v. International & G. N. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 117.
§ 401. An instruction on contributory negli gence of a person who was injured while asleep on a railroad track held proper.-Epperson v. International & G. N. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 117.
§ 401. An instruction as to the liability of a railroad for injuries to a person asleep on the track held proper.-Epperson v. International & G. N. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 117.
(H) Injuries to Animals on or near Tracks. Opinion evidence in action for injuries, see Evi- dence, § 471.
§ 411. In an action against a railroad for killing a horse at an unfenced part of the track, evidence of the custom of railroads held inad missible.-Green v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 865.
$411. The exception to the statute requiring railroads to fence their tracks held to extend only to switch grounds at a station which are needed for the business connected with the sta-
tion.-Green v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 865.
§ 411. A railroad need not fence its tracks within its switch limits in a town.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Hodge & Speer (Tex. Civ. App.) 350.
$412. A railroad company held liable for killing an animal which has entered the right of way at a public highway over a defective cat- tle guard, and is killed while attempting to es- cape from the right of way over such cattle guard.-Stout v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 230.
§ 419. Where a railroad engineer by exercis- ing ordinary care could have seen plaintiff's animals on the track at a crossing, it was his duty to use the appliances at hand to avert a
collision.-Wilkinson v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 544.
§ 419. That Rev. St. 1899, § 1102 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 938), requires railroads to sound crossing signals, did not relieve a locomotive engineer from his duty on approaching a cross- ing to exercise ordinary care not to kill or in jure plaintiff's stock on the crossing.-Wilkin- son v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 544.
§ 440. In an action against a railroad com- pany for double damages for killing stock, there can be no recovery for single damages.— Stout v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 230.
§ 440. Where Rev. St. 1899, § 1102 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 938), was not relied on in an ac tion against a railroad company for killing stock at a crossing, it was material only as im- posing an obligation on defendant's engineer to be on the lookout.-Wilkinson v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 544.
§ 440. One suing a railroad for injuring cat- tle within its switch limits in a town must, to recover, prove negligence resulting in the in- jury.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Hodge & Speer (Tex. Civ. App.) 350.
§ 441. Where a horse is killed by a locomo- tive, a presumption of negligence on the part of the railroad company arises.-St. Louis South- western Ry. Co. v. Oliphint (Ark.) 121.
§ 441. Where stock is killed by a railroad train or electric interurban car, the statute rais- es a presumption of negligence; but this may be overcome by satisfactory and consistent proof that the killing could not have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care.-Byrd v. Central Kentucky Traction Co. (Ky.) 174.
§ 441. Single damages may be recovered from a railroad company for killing an animal on its track at a place which might have been fenced without inconvenience to the operation
of the road or the public access thereto, under Rev. St. 1899, § 2867 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 1649). -Stout v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (Mo. I. OFFENSES_AND_RESPONSIBILITY App.) 230.
$ 441. Where a horse was killed at a place where a railroad was required to fence its track, the place of killing will be presumed to have been the place of entering.-Green y. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 865.
§ 443. In an action against a railroad com- pany for killing a horse, evidence held insuffi- cient to support a verdict for plaintiff.-Byrd v. Central Kentucky Traction Co. (Ky.) 174.
§ 443. Where the uncontradicted and unim- peached testimony of the company's servants, operating a train or electric car, shows that the killing of live stock could not have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care, it is not proper for the jury to find otherwise.-Byrd v. Central Kentucky Traction Co. (Ky.) 174.
§ 443. In an action against a railroad com- pany for killing a horse, evidence of two wit- nesses, who on a later night observed the pass- ing of one of defendant's cars at the place of collision, that the headlight enabled them to see a tin can which they had placed on the track at a distance of 300 feet, held without substantial weight or effect.-Byrd v. Central Kentucky Traction Co. (Ky.) 174.
§ 443. In an action against a railroad com- pany for killing cattle at a crossing, evidence held to establish a prima facie case of negli- gence.-Wilkinson v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 544.
§ 443. Evidence held sufficient to show that a bull was killed by a locomotive, as claimed by plaintiff, suing therefor, but insufficient to show that a calf was so killed.-Lee v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 780.
§ 443. In an action against a railroad for injuring cattle, certain testimony held not to prove actionable negligence.-Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Hodge & Speer (Tex. Civ. App.) 350.
inition of rape in Kirby's Dig. § 2005, mean $9. The words "against her will," in the def- the same as "without her consent."-State v. Peyton (Ark.) 416.
II. PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT. (A) Indictment and Information. $25. The word "ravish," used in an indict- ment for rape, means "to seize" or "to snatch by force."-State v. Peyton (Ark.) 416.
$29. In view of Kirby's Dig. §§ 2229, 2241- 2243, held, that an indictment for rape was not subject to objection because not alleging the act was committed against the will of the fe- male within section 2005, though it did not use Peyton (Ark.) 416. the express words of such section.-State v.
Opinion evidence, see Criminal Law, § 448. § 38. In a prosecution for assault to rape, held error to refuse to allow defendant to show by the prosecuting witness that she was told by a niece of defendant's wife, who, the testimony showed, was very unfriendly toward defendant, to swear to enough to put defendant in the peni- tentiary.-Liles v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 921.
$51. Proof that the act of sexual inter- course was committed without the female's con- sent, as when she was unconscious, is sufficient to sustain an allegation that it was done against her will.-State v. Peyton (Ark.) 416.
$51. Evidence in a prosecution for rape held to sustain a conviction.-Helton v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 21.
(C) Trial and Review.
$ 59. A charge in a rape case held sufficient and to fully protect accused's rights.-Washing- ton v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 917.
§ 444. A railroad held not liable for double damages for killing stock within an incorporat- ed town or city through failure to fence its track, under Rev St. 1899, § 1105 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 945).-Stout v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Transportation rates, see Carriers, §§ 188, 199. Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 230.
§ 446. In an action against a railroad com- pany for killing a horse, whether those in charge of the locomotive were negligent held for the jury.-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Oliphint (Ark.) 121.
§ 446. Whether a horse killed by a train at an unfenced part of the track was killed within necessary switch limits of a station held for the jury.-Green v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 865.
§ 446. What are necessary station grounds where stock is not killed immediately adjacent to a station held for the jury.-Green v. Kan- sas City Southern Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 865.
Of acts of agent, see Principal and Agent, § 169.
Of acts of infant, see Infants, § 57. Of acts of others as ground of estoppel in pais, see Estoppel, § 90.
Medical books by counsel in argument to jury, see Trial, § 117.
REAL ACTIONS.
See Ejectment; Trespass to Try Title. REAL ESTATE AGENTS.
§ 474. Under Civ. Code Prac. $$ 62, 73, an action against a railroad for injury to land by fire must be brought in the county where the land is situated.-Gillen v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. See Brokers. (Ky.) 1047.
§ 482. In an action for injuries from fire set by defendant's locomotive, evidence held to au- thorize a finding that the fire was caused by de- fendant's negligence.-St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Starks (Tex. Civ. App.) 70.
§ 485. In an action for injuries from fire set by defendant's locomotive, an instruction held not erroneous as imposing too great a burden on defendant.-St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. of Tex- as v. Starks (Tex. Civ. App.) 70.
Accrual of right of action respecting title to or possession of real property, see Limitation of Actions, § 44.
Act regulating sales by agents, as infringing liberty to choose occupation, see Constitution- al Law, § 88.
Annexation of chattels to real property, see Fixtures.
Assets of estate of decedent, see Executors and
Conclusiveness of judgment in actions relating From mortgage sale, see Mortgages, 88 608, to real property, see Judgment, § 747. Conveyances, see Deeds; Vendor and Pur-
Description in deed, see Deeds, § 119.
Effect of statute of frauds on agreements relat- See Witnesses, § 290. ing to real property, see Frauds, Statute of, $ 72.
Leasehold, see Landlord and Tenant, § 70. Liens for improvements, see Mechanics Liens. Mortgage, see Mortgages.
Remedies involving or affecting, see Ejectment; Trespass to Try Title.
Sales by executors or administrators, see Exec- utors and Administrators, §§ 329-383. Trespass to, see Trespass.
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Instructions as to reasonable doubt, see Crim- inal Law, § 789.
REFERENCE.
See Arbitration and Award.
Effect of reference in assignment of errors, to record, see Appeal and Error, § 743.
III. REPORT AND FINDINGS. Presumptions on appeal or writ of error, see Appeal and Error, § 931.
Review of findings and report as dependent on prejudicial nature of error, see Appeal and Error, 1071.
REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS. See Cancellation of Instruments.
Of evidence of inconsistent statements by wit- Application of maxims of equity, see Equity, § ness, see Witnesses, § 394.
For payment, see Payment, § 74.
Parol evidence, see Evidence, §§ 408, 433, 434.
REGISTERS OF DEEDS.
§ 5. Under the statutes, the county clerk is not required to make marginal notations on the records of the description of the land conveyed by the instrument recorded.-Tarrant County v. Rogers (Tex. Civ. App.) 592.
In proceedings to wind up corporation, see Cor- porations, § 621. Of banks, see Banks and Banking, §§ 17, 77 See New Trial. II. APPOINTMENT, QUALIFICATION, AND TENURE.
Appointment after appeal in divorce suit, see Divorce, 182.
In proceedings to wind up corporation, see Cor- porations, § 621.
Necessity of record of instrument to constitute color of title, see Adverse Possession, § 82.
Of particular facts, acts, instruments, or pro- ceedings not judicial.
See Mortgages, § 174. Local option election, see Intoxicating Liquors, $ 39.
Of judicial proceedings.
Abstracts or record on appeal, see Appeal and Error, §§ 580-592.
Court records in general, see Courts, § 117. Judgment, see Judgment, § 273.
Judgment in criminal prosecution, see Criminal Law, § 996.
Transcript on appeal or writ of error, see Ap- peal and Error, §§ 493-714; Criminal Law, §§ 1086-1122.
Records as evidence, and evidence relating to matters of record.
In civil actions, see Evidence, §§ 325, 331. Records as notice, and as affecting priorities. See Chattel Mortgages, § 152; Mortgages, § 174; Vendor and Purchaser, § 231.
Of action after dismissal, see Dismissal and Nonsuit, § 43.
Declarations or family records and reputation as to relationship, see Evidence, § 291. Disqualification of witness by relationship, to party, see Witnesses, § 58.
Implied contract to pay for services rendered between persons in family relation, see Work and Labor, § 7.
See Accord and Satisfaction; Compromise and Settlement; Payment.
Of liability as surety, see Principal and Surety, §§ 99, 100.
Of liability of carrier in respect to goods, see Carriers, §§ 147-165.
I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY.
§ 16. The mistake, if any, in the execution of a release, held to result from failure of the claimant to read the instrument.-Thompson v. Kansas City Western Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 1190.
II. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION. Right of beneficiary to open settlement of claim by administrator, see Executors and Adminis- trators, 87.
§ 39. An action for a personal injury held properly dismissed on sustaining a plea in bar setting up a release.-Thompson v. Kansas City Western Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 1190.
Of evidence, see Criminal Law, §§ 351, 363; Evidence, § 113.
VI. PROCEEDINGS TO PROCURE AND EFFECT OF REMOVAL.
§ 86. An objection that a removal petition was sworn to on Sunday was trivial.-Bilby v. Hancock (Tex. Civ. App.) 370.
$86. A removal petition need not be verified. -Bilby v. Hancock (Tex. Civ. App.) 370.
895. In a proper case, where the petition and bond are filed for the removal of a cause to a federal court, the jurisdiction of the state court ends.-Chastain v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (Mo.) 1099.
$97. On a removal petition and bond being
Of cause by appellate court, see Appeal and filed showing a proper case for removal, it is the Error, § 1195-1216.
REMEDY AT LAW.
Effect on jurisdiction of equity, see Execution, § 171; Nuisance, § 23.
Against person primarily liable in general, see Indemnity, § 13.
Contribution among sureties, see Principal and Surety, 194, 200.
Of cause by appellate court, see Appeal and Error, $$ 1195-1216.
Of health officer, see Health.
Of sewer commissioners, see Municipal Corpo- rations, § 204.
Of trustee, see Trusts, § 166.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
Transfer of causes from one state court to an- other, see Courts, § 488.
II. ORIGIN, NATURE, AND SUBJECT OF CONTROVERSY.
district court's duty to accept the petition_and bond and proceed no further.-Bilby v. Han- cock (Tex. Civ. App.) 370.
REMOVAL OF CLOUD.
Of judgment, see Judgment, §§ 232, 233, 251- 256.
Of cause of action barred, or against which lim- itation has commenced to run, see Limitation of Actions, § 142.
Of insurance, see Insurance, § 145.
See Landlord and Tenant, §§ 188-262. Under mining leases, see Mines and Minerals, § 70.
REOPENING CASE.
For further evidence, see Criminal Law, § 687.
Of demised premises, see Landlord and Tenant, $152.
Of streets, contracts for future repairs, see Municipal Corporations, § 328.
Of streets, delegation of power, see Municipal Corporations, § 284.
Of statute, see Statutes, §§ 159, 275.
§ 19. Where an action is brought in a state Of instructions, see Trial, §§ 229, 260.
court for injury or death, under the federal employer's liability act (Act April 22, 1908. c. 149, 35 Stat. 65 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909,
p. 11711), defendant may remove cause to the I. RIGHT OF ACTION AND DEFENSES. federal court.-Lemon's Adm'r v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.) 701.
§ 25. An action for a death occurring in Tennessee held to have been brought under the employer's liability act of Congress (Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 1171]), and not under the Ten- nessee statute.-Lemon's Adm'r v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.) 701.
§ 4. Even if articles on the person of defend- ant cannot be taken from his person on a writ tained.-Sibeck v. McTiernan (Ark.) 136. of replevin, action for the article can be main-
$ 6. An owner of an animal unlawfully im- pounded, under Kirby's Dig. §§ 5450, 5451, giving cities power to impound animals in cer- tain cases, may recover the possession of the animal from the person in whose possession it
III. CITIZENSHIP OR ALIENAGE OF is found.--Gregg v. Hatcher (Ark.) 1007.
(A) Diverse Citizenship or Alienage in General.
$32. The personal representative of a non- resident deceased, having qualified as such in the state, was a citizen for purposes of the ac- tion, and as bearing on the question of removal of the cause.-Lemon's Adm'r v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.) 701.
$ 10. Defendant in replevin, by giving bond, held estopped to deny he was in possession when the action was brought.-Sibeck v. Me- Tiernan (Ark.) 136.
§ 10. Judgment in replevin may be against one who had possession of the article and refus- ed to deliver it, though he parted with possession before the action was brought.-Sibeck v. Me- Tiernan (Ark.) 136.
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