V. RIGHT OF WAY AND OTHER IN- plaintiff was not required to plead the prac-

$307. It would constitute negligence for a
Splitting causes of action for injuries from railroad, at a place where gates were maintain-
flowage, see Action, § 53..

§ 327. In an action against a railroad com-
pany for injuries at a crossing, plaintiffs' fail-
ure to look and listen held to constitute negli-
Carriage of passengers, see Carriers, §§ 280-gence barring a recovery.-Texas & P. Ry. Co.

§ 331. A 10 year old boy, attempting to cross
a railroad crossing despite warnings given by
employés, held guilty of contributory negligence.
Compensation for injuries to property from ob-Pittsburg, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Blum
struction of street, see Eminent Domain, §
(Ky.) 300.
106.

§ 337. While it is negligence as a matter of
Liability over of express company to railroad law to fail to blow the whistle at a crossing as
company, see Indemnity, § 13.
required by Rev. St. 1895, art. 4507, such neg-

!

RAPE.

of the road or the public access thereto, under
Rev. St. 1899, § 2867 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 1649).
-Stout v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (Mo. I. OFFENSES_AND_RESPONSIBILITY
App.) 230.

$ 441. Where a horse was killed at a place
where a railroad was required to fence its track,
the place of killing will be presumed to have
been the place of entering.-Green y. Kansas
City Southern Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 865.

§ 443. In an action against a railroad com-
pany for killing a horse, evidence held insuffi-
cient to support a verdict for plaintiff.-Byrd v.
Central Kentucky Traction Co. (Ky.) 174.

§ 443. Where the uncontradicted and unim-
peached testimony of the company's servants,
operating a train or electric car, shows that
the killing of live stock could not have been
avoided by the exercise of ordinary care, it is
not proper for the jury to find otherwise.-Byrd
v. Central Kentucky Traction Co. (Ky.) 174.

§ 443. In an action against a railroad com-
pany for killing a horse, evidence of two wit-
nesses, who on a later night observed the pass-
ing of one of defendant's cars at the place of
collision, that the headlight enabled them to
see a tin can which they had placed on the
track at a distance of 300 feet, held without
substantial weight or effect.-Byrd v. Central
Kentucky Traction Co. (Ky.) 174.

§ 443. In an action against a railroad com-
pany for killing cattle at a crossing, evidence
held to establish a prima facie case of negli-
gence.-Wilkinson v. St. Louis Southwestern
Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 544.

§ 443. Evidence held sufficient to show that
a bull was killed by a locomotive, as claimed
by plaintiff, suing therefor, but insufficient to
show that a calf was so killed.-Lee v. St. Louis
Southwestern Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 780.

§ 443. In an action against a railroad for
injuring cattle, certain testimony held not to
prove actionable negligence.-Ft. Worth & D.
C. Ry. Co. v. Hodge & Speer (Tex. Civ. App.)
350.

THEREFOR.

inition of rape in Kirby's Dig. § 2005, mean
$9. The words "against her will," in the def-
the same as "without her consent."-State v.
Peyton (Ark.) 416.

II. PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT.
(A) Indictment and Information.
$25. The word "ravish," used in an indict-
ment for rape, means "to seize" or "to snatch by
force."-State v. Peyton (Ark.) 416.

$29. In view of Kirby's Dig. §§ 2229, 2241-
2243, held, that an indictment for rape was
not subject to objection because not alleging the
act was committed against the will of the fe-
male within section 2005, though it did not use
Peyton (Ark.) 416.
the express words of such section.-State v.

(B) Evidence.

Opinion evidence, see Criminal Law, § 448.
§ 38. In a prosecution for assault to rape,
held error to refuse to allow defendant to show
by the prosecuting witness that she was told by
a niece of defendant's wife, who, the testimony
showed, was very unfriendly toward defendant,
to swear to enough to put defendant in the peni-
tentiary.-Liles v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 921.

$51. Proof that the act of sexual inter-
course was committed without the female's con-
sent, as when she was unconscious, is sufficient
to sustain an allegation that it was done against
her will.-State v. Peyton (Ark.) 416.

$51. Evidence in a prosecution for rape
held to sustain a conviction.-Helton v. State
(Tex. Cr. App.) 21.

(C) Trial and Review.

$ 59. A charge in a rape case held sufficient
and to fully protect accused's rights.-Washing-
ton v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 917.

RATE.

§ 444. A railroad held not liable for double
damages for killing stock within an incorporat-
ed town or city through failure to fence its
track, under Rev St. 1899, § 1105 (Ann. St.
1906, p. 945).-Stout v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Transportation rates, see Carriers, §§ 188, 199.
Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 230.

§ 446. In an action against a railroad com-
pany for killing a horse, whether those in
charge of the locomotive were negligent held
for the jury.-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co.
v. Oliphint (Ark.) 121.

§ 446. Whether a horse killed by a train at
an unfenced part of the track was killed within
necessary switch limits of a station held for the
jury.-Green v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.
(Mo. App.) 865.

§ 446. What are necessary station grounds
where stock is not killed immediately adjacent
to a station held for the jury.-Green v. Kan-
sas City Southern Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 865.

(I) Fires.

RATIFICATION.

Of acts of agent, see Principal and Agent, §
169.

Of acts of infant, see Infants, § 57.
Of acts of others as ground of estoppel in pais,
see Estoppel, § 90.

READING.

Medical books by counsel in argument to jury,
see Trial, § 117.

REAL ACTIONS.

See Ejectment; Trespass to Try Title.
REAL ESTATE AGENTS.

§ 474. Under Civ. Code Prac. $$ 62, 73, an
action against a railroad for injury to land by
fire must be brought in the county where the
land is situated.-Gillen v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. See Brokers.
(Ky.) 1047.

§ 482. In an action for injuries from fire set
by defendant's locomotive, evidence held to au-
thorize a finding that the fire was caused by de-
fendant's negligence.-St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co.
of Texas v. Starks (Tex. Civ. App.) 70.

§ 485. In an action for injuries from fire set
by defendant's locomotive, an instruction held
not erroneous as imposing too great a burden
on defendant.-St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. of Tex-
as v. Starks (Tex. Civ. App.) 70.

REAL PROPERTY.

See Property.

Accrual of right of action respecting title to or
possession of real property, see Limitation of
Actions, § 44.

Act regulating sales by agents, as infringing
liberty to choose occupation, see Constitution-
al Law, § 88.

Annexation of chattels to real property, see
Fixtures.

Assets of estate of decedent, see Executors and

Administrators, § 152.

REDEMPTION.

Conclusiveness of judgment in actions relating From mortgage sale, see Mortgages, 88 608,
to real property, see Judgment, § 747.
Conveyances, see Deeds; Vendor and Pur-

chaser.

Description in deed, see Deeds, § 119.

610.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION.

Effect of statute of frauds on agreements relat- See Witnesses, § 290.
ing to real property, see Frauds, Statute of,
$ 72.

Leasehold, see Landlord and Tenant, § 70.
Liens for improvements, see Mechanics Liens.
Mortgage, see Mortgages.

Remedies involving or affecting, see Ejectment;
Trespass to Try Title.

Sales by executors or administrators, see Exec-
utors and Administrators, §§ 329-383.
Trespass to, see Trespass.

REASONABLE DOUBT.

Instructions as to reasonable doubt, see Crim-
inal Law, § 789.

REBUTTAL.

REFERENCE.

See Arbitration and Award.

Effect of reference in assignment of errors, to
record, see Appeal and Error, § 743.

III. REPORT AND FINDINGS.
Presumptions on appeal or writ of error, see
Appeal and Error, § 931.

Review of findings and report as dependent on
prejudicial nature of error, see Appeal and
Error, 1071.

REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS.
See Cancellation of Instruments.

Of evidence of inconsistent statements by wit- Application of maxims of equity, see Equity, §
ness, see Witnesses, § 394.

RECEIPTS.

For payment, see Payment, § 74.

Parol evidence, see Evidence, §§ 408, 433, 434.

RECEIVERS.

65.

REGISTERS OF DEEDS.

§ 5. Under the statutes, the county clerk is
not required to make marginal notations on the
records of the description of the land conveyed
by the instrument recorded.-Tarrant County v.
Rogers (Tex. Civ. App.) 592.

In proceedings to wind up corporation, see Cor-
porations, § 621.
Of banks, see Banks and Banking, §§ 17, 77 See New Trial.
II. APPOINTMENT, QUALIFICATION,
AND TENURE.

Appointment after appeal in divorce suit, see
Divorce, 182.

In proceedings to wind up corporation, see Cor-
porations, § 621.

Necessity of record of instrument to constitute
color of title, see Adverse Possession, § 82.

Of particular facts, acts, instruments, or pro-
ceedings not judicial.

See Mortgages, § 174.
Local option election, see Intoxicating Liquors,
$ 39.

Of judicial proceedings.

Abstracts or record on appeal, see Appeal and
Error, §§ 580-592.

Court records in general, see Courts, § 117.
Judgment, see Judgment, § 273.

Judgment in criminal prosecution, see Criminal
Law, § 996.

Transcript on appeal or writ of error, see Ap-
peal and Error, §§ 493-714; Criminal Law,
§§ 1086-1122.

Records as evidence, and evidence relating to
matters of record.

In civil actions, see Evidence, §§ 325, 331.
Records as notice, and as affecting priorities.
See Chattel Mortgages, § 152; Mortgages, §
174; Vendor and Purchaser, § 231.

REHEARING.

REINSTATEMENT.

Of action after dismissal, see Dismissal and
Nonsuit, § 43.

RELATIONSHIP.

Declarations or family records and reputation
as to relationship, see Evidence, § 291.
Disqualification of witness by relationship, to
party, see Witnesses, § 58.

Implied contract to pay for services rendered
between persons in family relation, see Work
and Labor, § 7.

RELEASE.

See Accord and Satisfaction; Compromise and
Settlement; Payment.

From arrest, see Bail.

Of liability as surety, see Principal and Surety,
§§ 99, 100.

Of liability of carrier in respect to goods, see
Carriers, §§ 147-165.

I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY.

§ 16. The mistake, if any, in the execution of
a release, held to result from failure of the
claimant to read the instrument.-Thompson v.
Kansas City Western Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 1190.

II. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION.
Right of beneficiary to open settlement of claim
by administrator, see Executors and Adminis-
trators, 87.

§ 39. An action for a personal injury held
properly dismissed on sustaining a plea in bar
setting up a release.-Thompson v. Kansas City
Western Ry. Co. (Mo. App.) 1190.

RELEVANCY.

Of evidence, see Criminal Law, §§ 351, 363;
Evidence, § 113.

VI. PROCEEDINGS TO PROCURE AND
EFFECT OF REMOVAL.

§ 86. An objection that a removal petition
was sworn to on Sunday was trivial.-Bilby
v. Hancock (Tex. Civ. App.) 370.

$86. A removal petition need not be verified.
-Bilby v. Hancock (Tex. Civ. App.) 370.

895. In a proper case, where the petition
and bond are filed for the removal of a cause to
a federal court, the jurisdiction of the state
court ends.-Chastain v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry.
Co. (Mo.) 1099.

$97. On a removal petition and bond being

Of cause by appellate court, see Appeal and filed showing a proper case for removal, it is the
Error, § 1195-1216.

See Action.

REMEDIES.

REMEDY AT LAW.

Effect on jurisdiction of equity, see Execution,
§ 171; Nuisance, § 23.

REMEDY OVER.

Against person primarily liable in general, see
Indemnity, § 13.

Contribution among sureties, see Principal and
Surety, 194, 200.

REMISSION.

Of debt see Release.

REMITTITUR.

Of cause by appellate court, see Appeal and
Error, $$ 1195-1216.

REMOVAL.

Of health officer, see Health.

Of sewer commissioners, see Municipal Corpo-
rations, § 204.

Of trustee, see Trusts, § 166.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

Transfer of causes from one state court to an-
other, see Courts, § 488.

II. ORIGIN, NATURE, AND SUBJECT
OF CONTROVERSY.

district court's duty to accept the petition_and
bond and proceed no further.-Bilby v. Han-
cock (Tex. Civ. App.) 370.

REMOVAL OF CLOUD.

See Quieting Title.

RENDITION.

Of judgment, see Judgment, §§ 232, 233, 251-
256.

RENEWAL.

Of cause of action barred, or against which lim-
itation has commenced to run, see Limitation
of Actions, § 142.

Of insurance, see Insurance, § 145.

RENT.

See Landlord and Tenant, §§ 188-262.
Under mining leases, see Mines and Minerals,
§ 70.

REOPENING CASE.

For further evidence, see Criminal Law, § 687.

REPAIRS.

Of demised premises, see Landlord and Tenant,
$152.

Of streets, contracts for future repairs, see
Municipal Corporations, § 328.

Of streets, delegation of power, see Municipal
Corporations, § 284.

REPEAL.

Of statute, see Statutes, §§ 159, 275.

REPETITION.

§ 19. Where an action is brought in a state Of instructions, see Trial, §§ 229, 260.

court for injury or death, under the federal
employer's liability act (Act April 22, 1908. c.
149, 35 Stat. 65 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909,

REPLEVIN.

p. 11711), defendant may remove cause to the I. RIGHT OF ACTION AND DEFENSES.
federal court.-Lemon's Adm'r v. Louisville &
N. R. Co. (Ky.) 701.

§ 25. An action for a death occurring in
Tennessee held to have been brought under the
employer's liability act of Congress (Act April
22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65 [U. S. Comp. St.
Supp. 1909, p. 1171]), and not under the Ten-
nessee statute.-Lemon's Adm'r v. Louisville &
N. R. Co. (Ky.) 701.

§ 4. Even if articles on the person of defend-
ant cannot be taken from his person on a writ
tained.-Sibeck v. McTiernan (Ark.) 136.
of replevin, action for the article can be main-

$ 6. An owner of an animal unlawfully im-
pounded, under Kirby's Dig. §§ 5450, 5451,
giving cities power to impound animals in cer-
tain cases, may recover the possession of the
animal from the person in whose possession it

III. CITIZENSHIP OR ALIENAGE OF is found.--Gregg v. Hatcher (Ark.) 1007.

PARTIES.

(A) Diverse Citizenship or Alienage in
General.

$32. The personal representative of a non-
resident deceased, having qualified as such in
the state, was a citizen for purposes of the ac-
tion, and as bearing on the question of removal
of the cause.-Lemon's Adm'r v. Louisville & N.
R. Co. (Ky.) 701.

$ 10. Defendant in replevin, by giving bond,
held estopped to deny he was in possession
when the action was brought.-Sibeck v. Me-
Tiernan (Ark.) 136.

§ 10. Judgment in replevin may be against
one who had possession of the article and refus-
ed to deliver it, though he parted with possession
before the action was brought.-Sibeck v. Me-
Tiernan (Ark.) 136.