Sec. 7.-Bills and Resolutions Cl. 2.-When a Bill Becomes Law with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law. Clause 3.-VETO. Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill. When a Bill Becomes a Law A bill, containing no effective date, becomes a law at the time it is signed by the President, if so signed within ten days after proper presentation to him. At the expiration of ten days, if he has not returned it to the House in which it originated, it becomes a law without his signature. If returned within ten days with objections, it does not become a law until reenacted by twothirds of both Houses. Gardner v. The Collector (6 Wall. 506), in which the court said: The only duty required of the President by the Constitution in regard to a bill which he approves is, that he shall sign it. Nothing more. The simple signing his name at the appropriate place is the one act which the Sec. 7.-Bills and Resolutions Cl. 3.-Veto Constitution requires of him as the evidence of his approval, and upon his performance of this act the bill becomes a law. See also Lapeyre v. U. S., 17 Wall. 191. U. S. v. Green, 138 U. S. 293. U. S. v. Heth, 3 Cranch 399. U. S. v. Burr, 159 U. S. 78. Auffm'ordt v. Rasin, 102 U. S. 622. Jones v. U. S., 137 U. S. 216. Approval of Bills after Adjournment or During Recess A bill signed by the President while Congress is in recess for a fixed time is not invalid. La Abra Mining Co. v. U. S. (175 U. S. 453), in which the court said: As the Constitution, while authorizing the President to perform certain functions of a limited number that are legislative in their general nature, does not restrict the exercise of those functions to the particular days on which the two Houses of Congress are actually sitting in the transaction of public business, the court cannot impose such a restriction upon the Executive. Approval by the President of Constitutional Amendments It was held in Hollingsworth v. Virginia (3 Dall. 378) that an amendment to the Constitution need not be presented to the President for his approval. Of General Application As of general interest and application to Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution, see Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168. U. S. v. Hill, 123 U. S. 681. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316. Holy Trinity Church v. U. S., 143 U. S. 457. Lyons v. Woods, 153 U. S. 649. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U. S. 276. Levey v. Stockslager, 129 U. S. 470. Fourteen Diamond Rings v. U. S., 183 U. S. 176. Section 8.-POWERS OF CONGRESS. Clause 1.-TAXATION.1 The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. 1 See also Amendment 16, "Income tax," p. 715. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Leading Cases Cl. 1.-Taxation In what is considered one of the leading cases under this clause, the court said: Of all the powers conferred upon government that of taxation is most liable to abuse. Given a purpose or object for which taxation may be lawfully used, and the extent of its exercise is in its very nature unlimited. It is true that express limitation on the amount of tax to be levied or the things to be taxed may be imposed by constitution or statute, but in most instances for which taxes are levied, as the support of government, the prosecution of war, the national defense, any limitation is unsafe. The entire resources of the people should in some instances be at the disposal of the government. The power to tax is, therefore, the strongest, the most pervading of all the powers of government, reaching directly or indirectly to all classes of the people. Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 663. In McCulloch v. Maryland (4 Wheat. 316), involving the power of Congress to charter a bank, and the question of whether the legislature of Maryland could pass a law taxing a branch of the bank located within the State without violating the Federal Constitution, the court held that the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the General Government; that the States were not deprived of resources which they originally possessed; that they could lay a tax upon the real property of the bank, in common with other real property within the State; that they could also impose a tax on the interest which the citizens of Maryland might hold in the bank in common with other property of the same description throughout the State; but that a State has no power to tax an agency of the General Government, for "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." (For an exhaustive and philosophical discussion of the principle on which the right of taxation is founded, see President Monroe's message to Congress of May 4, 1822.) See also Osborn v. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall, 533. The Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113. Thompson v. Union Pac. R. Co., 9 Wall. 579. Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5 Bank v. Supervisors, 7 Wall. 26. Hibernia Soc. v. San Francisco, 200 U. S. 310. State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491. Savings & Loan Soc. v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421. U. S. v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322. California v. Central, etc., R. Co., 127 U. S. 1. Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 2 Black 620. Wisconsin, etc., R. Co. v. Price County, 133 U. S. 496. Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan, etc., Co., 157 U. S. 429; 158 U. S. 601. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 1.-Taxation To Lay and Collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises The general power is given to Congress to lay and collect taxes of every kind and nature without any restraint, except on exports; but two rules are prescribed for their government, namely, uniformity and apportionment-duties, imposts, and excises by the first rule and capitation or other direct taxes by the second rule. Hylton v. U. S., 3 Dall. 174. U. S. v. Singer, 15 Wall. 111. Construction of grant.-The words in a grant of power are to be taken in their natural and obvious sense, keeping always in view the objects for which the Constitution was made, and when the general purpose of the grant is ascertained, the language is to be construed, as far as possible, as subservient to that purpose. The powers granted to Congress are to be exercised with discretion, but the existence of a power can not be denied merely because it may be abused in its exercise; nor should it be presumed that abuses will take place, nor does the question of power depend upon the degree to which it may be exercised. The fact that compliance with the Constitution will lead to the abandonment of a certain recognized mode of taxation can not influence the determination of a question of power. Martin . Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 686. In re Rapier, 143 U. S. 135. Pollock v. Farmers Loan, etc., Co., 158 U. S. 633. See also I. C. C. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 486. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 50. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 135. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 413. Definition of Taxes A tax is a rate or sum of money assessed on the person or property of a citizen by the Government for the use of the Nation or State; a charge for the support of Government, to raise money for public purposes. The obligation to pay taxes rests, not upon the privileges enjoyed or the protection given to a citizen, but upon the necessity of money for the support of Government, but the citizen receives compensation therefor in privileges and protection. A tax is not a toll; a tax is a demand of sovereignty, while a toll is a demand of proprietorship. Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 664. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Decatur, 147 U. S. 198. U. S. v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 326. Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1. Dobbins v. Commissioners, 16 Pet. 445. Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 159. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 703. Case of State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 278. St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 97. Duties, Imposts, and Excises Cl. 1.-Taxation The Constitution uses "duties, imposts, and excises " in a nat- Pollock v. Farmers Loan, etc., Co., 158 U. S. 619. Hylton v. U. S., 3 Dall. 171. U. S. v. Tappan, 11 Wheat. 419. Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148. License Cases, 5 Wall. 462. Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 445. Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475. Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall. 73. Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S. 397. These two classes, "taxes," so called, and "duties, imposts, and excises," apparently embrace all forms of taxation contemplated by the Constitution. Thomas v. U. S., 192 U. S. 370. The grant is limited to two ways: The revenue must be collected for the public purposes, and all duties, imposts, and excises must be uniform throughout the United States. South Carolina v. U. S., 199 U. S. 450. See also Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107. Dooley v. U. S., 183 U. S. 151. Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317. Cooley v. Philadelphia, 12 How. 298. Hadden v. Collector, 5 Wall. 107. Binns v. U. S., 194 U. S. 486. Billings v. U. S., 232 U. S. 261. U. S. v. Bennett, 232 U. S. 299. Stanton v. Baltic Min. Co., 240 U. S. 103. High v. Coyne, 178 U. S. 111. Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 622. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 240 U. S. 1. U. S. v. Singer, 15 Wall. 111. The only rule of uniformity prescribed with respect to duties, imposts, and excises laid by Congress is the territorial uniformity required by Article I, section 8. LaBelle Iron Works v. U. S., 256 U. S. 392, |