forging, and adding a cypher 0 to the letter and figure 87., &c., was held good, though the words of the statute were, "if any person shall make, forge, or counterfeit," and the word alter was not used. Elsworth's case, 2 East, P. Č. 986, 988. So where an indictment, since the passing of the statute 11 Geo. 4 and 1 Wm. 4, c. 66, which uses only the word forge, stated that the prisoner "forged and counterfeited" a certain instrument, it was held not to be bad, and that the word "counterfeited" might be rejected. Brewer's case, 6 C. & P. 363."

Proof of the uttering.] The various statutes relating to the offence of uttering forged instruments, employ various words to designate the act. In the 1 Wm. 4, c. 66, the terms used to describe the offence, are "offer, utter, dispose of, or put off." The word offer was probably inserted to meet the case of an incomplete uttering, or putting off, as in Woolridge's case, 1 Leach, 307; 1 East, P. C. 179.

The averment of uttering will in general be proved by the same description of evidence, as is necessary to maintain an indictment for uttering counterfeit coin, the cases respecting which have been already detailed, ante, p. 392.

*Proof of uttering a forged acceptance will not support an indictment [ *503] charging the prisoner with uttering a forged bill. Horwell's case, 6 C. & P. 148; post, p. 513.

The addition of words not used by the statute 1 Wm. 4, c. 66, in describing the offence of uttering, as where the indictment stated that the prisoner uttered and "published as true," &c., will not vitiate the indictment. Brewer's case, 6 C. & P. 363; ante, p. 502.

Where the prisoner presented a bill for payment, with a forged indorsement upon it of a receipt by the payee, and on the person to whom it was presented objecting to a variance between the spelling of the payee's name in the bill and in the indorsement, altered the indorsement into a receipt by himself for the drawer, it was ruled that the presenting of the bill, before the objection, was a sufficient uttering of the forged indorsement. Arscott's case, 6 C. & P. 408.*

Where upon an indictment for uttering a forged acceptance to a bill of exchange, it appeared that the bill in question came in a letter inclosed in the prisoner's handwriting, and that the day before the bill became due, the prisoner wrote a letter acknowledging it was a forgery, it was held not to be necessary to prove any prior act of uttering either by the prisoner's putting the letter into the post himself, or commissioning any body else to do so. R. v. McQuin, 1 Cox, C. C. 34.

If an engraving of a forged note be given to a party as a pattern or specimen of skill, the person giving it not intending that the particular note should be put in circulation, it is not an uttering. Per Littledale, J. Harris's case, 7 C. & &. P. 428.

A conditional uttering of a forged instrument is as much a crime as any other uttering. Where a person gave a forged acceptanee, knowing it to be so, to the manager of a banking company with which he kept an account, saying that he hoped the bill would satisfy the bank as a security for the debt he owed, and the manager replied, that would depend on the result of inquiries respecting the acceptors; Patteson, J., held it to be a sufficient uttering. Cook's case, 8. C. & P. 582.

As to uttering by several, see ante, p. 392.

Eng. Com. Law Reps. xxv. 438.

y Id. xxxii. 570.

▾ Id. xxv. 325.

▾ Id. 438.

- Id. 461.

* Id. xxxiv. 535.

Proof of the disposing or putting off] Upon the words of the repealed statute of 15 Geo. 2, c. 13, s, 11, which were, "dispose of or put away," the following case was decided. The prisoners were indicted for disposing and putting away forged bank of England notes. It appeared that the prisoner, Palmer, had been in the habit of putting off forged bank notes, and had employed the other prisoner, Hudson in putting them off. The latter having offered a forged note in payment, in the evening of the same day, Palmer went with her to the person who had stopped it, and said, "This woman has been here to-day, and offered a two-pound note, which you have stopped, and I must either have the note or the change." It was contended for the prisoners that the evidence was of two distinct and separate offences, and not of a joint offence. The jury having found Palmer guilty of the offence of disposing and putting away the note, a case was reserved for the opinion of the judges, which was delivered by Mr. Justice Grose. He said that a difference of opinion had existed among the judges, some holding that until Hudson uttered the note, it was to be considered as virtually in [*504] Palmer's possession, and that when she did *utter it he was to be considered only as an accessary before the fact, and ought to have been so indicted. But a great majority of the judges were of opinion that the conviction was right. It clearly appeared that Palmer knowingly delivered the forged note into the hands of Hudson, for the fraudulent purpose of uttering it for his own use. He could not have recovered it back by any action at law. It was out of his legal power, and when it was actually uttered by her, the note was disposed of, and put away by him through her means. As delivering an instrument to another, was a step towards uttering it, it seemed most consonant to the intentions of the legislature to hold that the delivery to another for a fraudulent purpose, was an offence within the words "dispose of," or "put away." Palmer's case, 2 Leach, 978; 1 Bos. & P., N. R. 96; Russ & Ry. 72.a

The same point arose, and was decided in the same way in Giles's case. The jury in that case found the prisoner had given the note to one Burr, and that he was ignorant of its being forged, and paid it away. The judges to whom the case was referred, thought that Burr knew it was forged; but were of opinion that the giving the note to him, that he might pass it, was a disposing of it to him, and that the conviction was right. 1 Moody, C. C. 166.b Had the prisoner been charged with uttering instead of disposing of the note, it seems that, according to the view of the case taken by the judges, Burr being cognizant of the forgery, the prisoner could not have been convicted on that indictment, as in that case his offence would have been that of an accessary before the fact. See Soares's case, Russ. & Ry. 25; 2 East, P. C. 974; Davis's case, Russ. & Ry. 113, ante, p. 393.

It seems that in the case of the forgery of an instrument which has effect only by its passing, the mere showing of such false instrument with intent thereby to gain credit, is not an offence within the statutes against forgery. The prisoner was indicted (under the 13 Geo. 3, c. 79,) for uttering and publishing a promissory note containing the words, &c. It appeared, that in order to persuade an inn-keeper that he was a man of substance, he one day after dinner pulled out a pocket-book, and showed him the note in question, and a 50%. note of the same kind. He said he did not like to carry so much property about him, and begged the inn-keeper to take charge of them, which he did. On opening the pocket-book some time afterwards, the notes were found to be forged. The prisoner being convicted, the judges held that this did not amount to an uttering. In order to

1 Eng. C C. 72

b Id. 166.

• Id. 25.

• Id. 113.

make it such, they seemed to be of opinion that it should be parted with, or tendered, or offered, or used in some way to get money or credit upon it. Shukard's 's case, Russ. & Ry. 200.

But if A. exhibit a forged receipt to B., a person with whom he is claiming credit for it, this is an uttering within the 1 Wm. 4, c. 66, s. 10, although A. refuse to part with the possession of the paper out of his hand. R. v. Radford, 1 C. & K. 707; S. C. 1 Dennison, C. C. 59. In this latter case, which was reserved for the consideration of the judges, Pollock, C. B., said, “In all these cases reference must be had to the subject. A purse is of no use except it be given. Not so a receipt, or turnpike ticket. A promissory note must be tendered to be taken. Not so a receipt, as the person who has it is to keep it."

The prisoner was indicted in London under the 44 Geo. 3, c. 98, for uttering forged medicine stamps. Having an order to supply medicines *to certain [*505] persons at Bath, he delivered them at his house in Middlesex to a porter, to carry them to Aldersgate-street, in London, to the Bath wagon. It was objected that this was not an uttering by the prisoner in the city of London, and upon the argument of the case before the judges, there was a difference of opinion upon the subject, although the majority held the offence complete in London. Collicott's case, 2 Leach, 1048; Russ. & Ry. 212;8 4 Taunt. 300, S. C.

It is not essential that the indictment should state the persons to whom the forged instrument is uttered, where the statute upon which the indictment is grounded, makes the uttering generally (without specifying to whom) an offence; and if the uttering be to a person employed to detect the offender, and who is not therefore deceived, the offence is complete. Both of these points arose in Holden's case. Upon the first, the judges said the statute made it felony to put away or dispose of generally, without saying "to any person," or "to any of the king's subjects,' and this form has been used in indictments for putting off, as well as in indictments for uttering, for a long course of years. As to the second objection, the offence was the same though the party for the purpose of detection caused the application to be made to the prisoners to sell the notes, if the prisoners put them off with the intent to defraud; the intent is the essence of the crime, which exists in the mind, though from circumstances which he is not apprised of, the prosecutor cannot be defrauded by the act of the prisoner. Holden's case, Russ. & Ry. 154;1 2 Leach, 1019; 2 Taunt. 334.

Proof of the intent to defraud.] An intent to defraud is an essential ingredient to constitute the offence of forgery. The definition of the crime by Grose, J., on delivering the opinion of the judges, is, "the false making of a note or other instrument with intent to defraud." Parke's and Brown's case, 2 Leach, 775; 2 East, P. C. 853. So it was defined by Eyre, B., "the false making of an instrument, which purports on the face of it to be good and valid, for the purposes for which it was created with a design to defraud." Jones's case, 1 Leach, 367; 2 East, P. C. 853. The word deceive has been used by Buller, J., instead of the word defraud; but it has been observed, that the meaning of this word must doubtless be included in that of the word defraud. 2 East. P. C. 853.

Proof of the intent to defraud-mode of proof.] The intent to defraud must be stated in the indictment, and the proof must tally with the averment, otherwise the prisoner will be entitled to an acquittal. 2 East, P. C. 988. The intent is mostly evidenced by the act itself, which, from its nature, leaves in general no room • 1 Eng. C. C. 200. Eng. C. L. Reps. xlvii. 707. 1 Eng. C. C. 212. h Id. 154.

for doubt upon the point. The inference is frequently confirmed by the conduct and behaviour of the guilty party in the artifices and falsehoods which he employs for the purpose of effecting his object, or of avoiding detection. The subsequent uttering or publication of the forged instrument is admissible, and strong evidence to prove the original design of forging the instrument, and whether the making or uttering of a forged instrument be done with an intent to injure a particular person as alleged, is matter of evidence for a jury. 2 Stark. Ev. 336, 2d ed.; Barron's case, 2 East, P. C. 989.

[*506] *Proof of the intent to defraud-with regard to the party intended to be defrauded.] The averment of the intent to defraud must be pointed at the particular person or persons against whom it is meditated, and the proof must agree with such averment. 2 East, P. C. 988. It is sufficient to aver a general intent to defraud a certain person. Powell's case, 1 Leach, 77. In order to find the intent to defraud a particular person, it is not necessary that there should be evidence to show that the prisoner had that particular person in contemplation at the time of the forgery, it is sufficient if the forgery would have the effect of defrauding him, for the prisoner in the presumption of law, intends that which is the natural consequence of his acts. The prisoner was indicted for disposing of a forged bank note, with intent to defraud the governor and company of the bank of England. Bayley, J., desired the jury to say what their opinion was with regard to the prisoner's intention to defraud the bank. They stated that they thought the prisoner had the intention to defraud whoever might take the note; but that the intention of defrauding the bank in particular did not enter into his contemplation. The prisoner was found guilty, but a case was reserved for the opinion of the judges, who unanimously held that the prisoner, upon the evidence, must be taken to have intended to defraud the bank, and consequently that the conviction was right. Mazagora's case, Russ. & Ry. 291. So where the prosecutor swore that he did not believe that the prisoner had forged the instrument with intent to defraud him (as charged), yet the prisoner being convicted, the judges were of opinion that the conviction was right, the immediate effect of the act being the defrauding of the prosecutor. (1) Sheppard's case, Russ. & Ry. 169; see also Hill's case, ante, p. 21. Cooke's case, 8 C. & P. 582, 586;* Reg. v. Todd, 1 Cox, C. C. 57.

The fact that the prisoner has given guarantees to his bankers to a larger amount than a forged note, paid to them by him, does not so completely negative an intent to defraud them, as to withdraw the case from the consideration of the jury. Per Patteson, J., James's case, 7 C. & P. 553.1

So where a prisoner knowingly utters a forged bill to a person meaning that he should believe it to be genuine, is sufficient, the jury is bound to infer an intent to defraud that person, although the prisoner may have, in fact, intended to take up the bill when at maturity. R. v. Hill, 2 Moo. C. C. 30. So where the offence is once complete, payment of the forged bill before prosecution is immaterial. R. v. Geach, 9 C. & P. 499.TM

Where a forged request for the delivery of goods was addressed in her maiden

(1) U. States v. Moses, 4 Wash. C. C. Rep. 726. If the indictment lay the intent to defraud A., proof of an intent to defraud A. and B. will sustain the indictment. Veazie's Case, 7 Greenl. 131.

i1 Eng. C. C. 291.

J Id. 169.

1Id. xxxii. 628.

Eng. Com. Law Reps. xxxiv. 535, 538.
Id. xxxviii. 195.

name to a female, who, previous to the date of it had married, and the goods were delivered to the prisoner by her husband; it was held, that the prisoner might be convicted on an indictment charging the intent to defraud the husband. R. v. Carter, 7 C. & P. 134."

A prisoner asked his employer to give him 47. to buy "settledated striking acid," to be used in the employer's tanning business, which the prisoner superintended, and the employer gave him the money, and about four days after the prisoner delivered to his employer a forged receipt for the 47., which purported to come from a firm of whom the acid had been bought. It was objected that at the time of uttering such receipt there could be no intention to defraud, as the money had been already paid to the prisoner; but it was held by the *judges, [ *507 ] that there was sufficient evidence of uttering the receipt with intent to defraud the employer. Martin's case, 7 C. & P. 549; see also Boardman's case, 2 Lew. C. C. 181.

Where the intent is laid to be to defraud a corporation, it must be proved that it was to defraud them in their corporate capacity; if it is stated as an intent to defraud them in their individual capacities, and it should appear in evidence that it was to defraud them in their corporate capacity, the variance would, it seems, be fatal. 2 Stark. Ev. 337, 2nd ed., Jones and Palmer's case, 1 Leach, 366; 2 East, P. C. 991. Where the prisoner was indicted for forging a deed, with intent to defraud A. B. C. D., &c., the stewards of the Feasts of the Sons of the Clergy, and it appeared that the individuals named were the trustees (not incorporated) of a charitable institution, and it was objected that property of this description was not intended to be protected by the statutes against forgery, the court overruled the objection. They said that the stewards were the absolute owners of the money; it was their property; it was put into their hands upon trust; and as between them and the subscribers, if they were to convert the money to their own use, they would be personally liable. That there was no difference between this case and that of a corporation, excepting that the money is the property of the whole corporation, and must be so alleged, but where the parties are not incorporated, it is the property of the several individuals. Jones and Palmer's case, 1 Leach, 366; 2 East, P. C. 291; see also Sherrington's case, 1 Leach, 513; Beacall's case, 1 Moo. C. C. 15,P post, title Larceny.

The jury may find that the prisoner intended to defraud one partner where the forged instrument is uttered to him in the absence of another partner. R. v. Hanson, Carr. & M. 334; 2 Moo. C. C. 245.

If bankers authorized to pay a sum of money to three persons, pay it to one of them and to two strangers who personate the other two individuals, their liability continues, and the false instrument on which the money was obtained may be charged to have been made with intent to defraud them. Dixon's case, 2 Lew. C. C. 178.

Where, in an indictment for a forgery on a joint stock bank, the intent was laid to defraud "W. S. and others," and it was objected that the act relating to joint stock banks, 7 Geo. 4, c. 46, is imperative in requiring that forgeries upon them must be laid to defraud one of their registered officers; Patteson, J., seemed to think that the indictment was good, and that the prosecutor might adopt either mode. R. v. James, 7 C. & P. 553. S. P. ruled by Coleridge, J., in R. v. Beard, 8 C. & P. 143. The returns made to the stamp office under the 7 Geo. 4, c. 46, are not the only evidence to prove the existence of a banking company under P2 Eng. C. C. 15.

Eng. C. L. Reps. xxxii. 467.
Eng. C. L. Reps. vol. xli. 185.

• Id. xxxii. 626.
Id. xxxii. 628.

Id. xxxiv. 328.