1824. COOMBS v. INGRAM. thority of Smith v. Kendal(a), and many other cases, a good promissory note within the statute of Anne. But the note, as proved, is not so clearly within that statute, and the defendant might, if it had been truly set out, have been advised to demur to a count calling it a promissory note. Here is an instrument, not negotiable upon the face of it, promising to pay the debt of another, and expressing no consideration (b). The case of Poplewell v. Wilson (c) can hardly be considered as an authority; the point now objected did not come in question; and from reading the report, which is very short, it is probable that the words "or order," were in the note, because it is called a negotiable note. But if this note be a good one, it will be very easy to evade the decisions on the statute of frauds and the stamp acts, by drawing up every promise to pay the debt of another in the shape of a note which is not negotiable. ABBOTT, C. J.-I think there is nothing in the objection. The general rule is, that the pleader must set out so much of the substance of the note as is necessary to presume a promise to pay. The whole note need not be set out. BAYLEY, J.-The defendant would have been at liberty to impeach the note if it was given without consideration; but if it imports that it was given for consideration, the plaintiff is under no obligation to set out the consideration in the declaration. A promise to pay another such a sum of money is within the statute. Suppose a note is given for value received" in cochineal," is it necessary to state in the declaration that it is for value received" in cochineal?" clearly not. If this was not the note which the defendant had given to the plaintiffs, she might easily have proved the fact at the trial; and that would have been a good defence. HOLROYD, J. Concurred. (a) 6 T. R. 123. (b) Waine v. Warlters, 5 East, 10. Rule refused (d). (c) 1 Stra. 263. 1824. PARKER V. BAILEY. THIS was an action against the defendant for seducing the plaintiff's daughter, per quod, &c. At the trial before Hullock, B. at the last assizes for Lincolnshire, the plaintiff had a verdict, and 3007. damages. Saturday, May 8. Where a de claration for seducing plaintiff's daughter was framed in tres pass, but omitted the words" with arms:" Reader now moved to arrest the judgment, on the ground that the declaration appeared to be framed in case, instead force and of trespass (a), inasmuch as it omitted the words "with Held, that the force and arms." ABBOTT, C. J.-We are not called upon to decide whether trespass or case is the proper form of action for an injury of this description; it is sufficient for us to say, that this objection is cured by the verdict. Indeed, the words of the declaration, "debauched and carnally knew," import an assault. The whole language of the declaration is applicable to an action in trespass, though the words "with force and arms," are omitted. It is enough for the present to say, that the objection is cured by the verdict. BAYLEY, J.—I am of the same opinion. It would be very singular if we were to arrest the judgment on the ground that the declaration is framed in case, and not in trespass, when all the circumstances stated in the declaration shew, that the action is in substance trespass, and not case. HOLROYD, J.-There is a case in Salkeld (b) where the master of a ship brought case for seizing and detaining his vessel, whereby his voyage was obstructed, and it was objected that trespass was the proper form of action; but the (a) Woodward v. Walton, 2 New Rep. 476. verdict cured the objection. 1824. PARKER v. BAILEY. court held, that although trespass might have lain, yet that the plaintiff might waive the trespass and bring case for the special damage. It may be a question, whether case would not equally lie here, the special damage being the gist of the action. In the Register, and in Townshend's and Cornwall's Tables, this species of injury has always been treated as a trespass; but undoubtedly the action is founded upon the special interest which the father is supposed to have in his daughter as a servant. This was the principle upon which the case of Bennett v. Allcott (a) was decided. However, there is nothing stated in this declaration but what is properly applicable to an action of trespass. Treating it, however, as an action on the case, it might possibly be considered as coming within the principle of the case in Salkeld. Where goods are wrongfully seized, you may waive trespass and bring trover; either action will lie. Littledale, J. was gone to chambers. Rule refused. (b) (a) 2 T. R. 167. (b) Vide 2 M. & S. 436. 6 East, 387, 388. 391. Wills. 332. 2 New Rep. 476. Saturday, Where a de- vent act, had been adjudged EDWARDS v. TUCKER. OSBORNE moved for a rule to shew cause why the bailbond given by the defendant, in this case, should not be delivered up to be cancelled, under the following circumstances:-The defendant having petitioned the Insolvent Debtor's Court for relief under the Insolvent Act, the plaintiff attended on the hearing of his petition, as an opposing creditor, for the debt in question. On that occasion the commissioners, after hearing the merits of the opposition, adjudged that the defendant should remain in custody for an arresting or nine months, at the suit of the plaintiff; but the plaintiff detaining cre to remain in custody for nine months, at the suit of his opposing creditor A. who was not ditor, and the Marshal discharged the defendant before the nine months were out:Held, that he was liable to be arrested and held to bail at the suit of A. for the same debt. being neither an arresting nor detaining creditor, the Marshal discharged the defendant; whereupon the plaintiff, finding the defendant at large, arrested him, and he gave a bailbond. The question was, whether, under these circumstances, the bail-bond ought to be delivered up to be cancelled, and The COURT said that it ought not. The defendant was ordered to be detained, at the suit of the plaintiff, for nine months, and therefore he was bound to remain in custody until that period had expired. Being at large before the nine months were out, he was liable to be arrested again. 1824. EDWARDS v. TUCKER. Rule refused. H. WILLIAMS, Gent. one, &c. v. J. R. GLENISTER. Saturday, May 8. of assault and and irreve rently made a disturbance in THIS was an action of assault and false imprisonment. To an action The declaration alleged that on, &c. at Tring, in the county of Hertford, defendant assaulted plaintiff, and forced him out of a certain church into a certain highway, and compelled him to go into a certain inn, and there imprisoned him, without any reasonable or probable cause, for the space of two hours. The defendant pleaded, first, not guilty; and, second, that on, &c. divine service had been, and was, celebrating in the church in the declaration mentioned, and that during the time that divine service was so celebrating, and divine service whilst the congregation was assembled and attending such was interruptservice, plaintiff, being in the said church, illegally, inten- turbed; wheretionally, and irreverently, made and continued a noise and upon defendant gently laid disturbance therein, whereby the performance of the said hands upon divine service was interrupted and disturbed; whereupon out of church, him, took him defendant, then being a constable of the township in which and detained him in custody church, whereby the performance of ed and dis until the service was over; and it appearing in evidence that the alleged disturbance was in the plaintiff (an unauthorised person) having read aloud in church, between the Communion Service and the sermon, a notice of a vestry meeting. Held, that the plea was no answer to the action under the 1 W. and M. c. 18. s. 18.; for though the constable might turn the plaintiff out of church, yet he had no right to detain him in custody. 1824. WILLIAMS 0. GLENISTER. the said church was situate, in order to prevent plaintiff from further interrupting and disturbing the performance of divine service, gently laid his hands upon him, in order to remove him out of the said church, and did gently remove him thereout, and in so doing assaulted, seized, and laid hold of him, and compelled him to go out of the church into the said highway, and also into the said inn, being a reasonable and convenient distance from the church; and in order to prevent him from returning into the church during the continuance of divine service therein, and disturbing and interrupting the performance thereof, defendant imprisoned him in the said inn, and detained him there for a reasonable time, to wit, until the celebration of the service in the said church was finished, doing no unnecessary damage or violence to plaintiff, on that occasion, which, &c. Replication to the first plea, a similiter; and to the second, de injuriâ suâ propriâ; with a new assignment, that defendant had kept and detained plaintiff for one hour and a half after the celebration of the service in the said church was finished, without any reasonable or probable cause. Rejoinder took issue on the second replication. Plea, not guilty to the new assignment, and issue thereon. At the trial, before Alexander, C. B. at the last assizes for the county of Hertford, it appeared in evidence, that a short time previous to the transaction in question, the churchwardens of the parish of Tring had expended a sum of money in cleansing and decorating the parish church, preparatory to an annual sermon about to be preached in the church for the benefit of the Society for promoting Christian Knowledge. The expence so incurred gave dissatisfaction to some of the inhabitants, and a notice was prepared and signed by some of them, that a vestry meeting would be held in the church on a day mentioned, to chuse new churchwardens in the place of those then in office. This notice was delivered to the parish clerk, for the purpose of being read in the church at the usual time; but, under the direction of his superiors, he declined doing so. Several applications were made to the same |