of God, on which these judicial proceedings depend, this is to be judged of by the execution thereof, as is evidently to be inferred from thence. And this is the sense in which we understand the doctrine of reprobation, as in the foregoing argument.

Thus we have endeavoured to prove the doctrine of election and reprobation, and defend it from the reproaches and misre presentations cast upon it by considering it, not only as agreeable to the divine perfections, but as founded on scripture. We shall therefore proceed,

VI. To enquire, whether the contrary doctrine as defended by some, be not derogatory to the divine perfections, and therefore does not contain greater absurdities; or, if expressions of detestation were a sufficient argument to set it aside, whether we have not as much reason to testify our dislike that way, as they have against the doctrine we are maintaining? As to that part of the charge brought against us, as though we represented God as severe and cruel to his creatures; or that it is inconsistent with his goodness to suppose that he leaves any to themselves in their fallen state, so as not to give them the means of grace, when he knew that being destitute thereof, they could not believe, and so would fall short of salvation, pursuant to his eternal purpose relating thereunto: can this be said to be inconsistent with his goodness. any more than all his other displays of vindictive justice? If they suppose that it is, we might easily retort the argument upon them since they will not assert, that the whole race of fallen man shall be saved; and, if so, must we not suppose that God certainly fore-knew this, otherwise where is his infinite understanding? And if he knew that this would be the consequence of their being born, and living in the world, where is his goodness in bringing them into it? If it be said that they have a free-will to choose what is good, and so had a power to attain salvation; therefore their not attaining it, is wholly owing to themselves. Suppose this were taken for granted, without entering on that subject at present; yet it must be farther enquired whether they will allow that God fore-know that they would abuse this freedom of will, or power to make themselves holy or happy; and, if so, could he not have prevented this? Did he make a will that he could not govern or restrain? Could he not have prevented the sin that he knew they would commit? And, if he could, why did he not do it, and thereby prevent their ruin, which he knew would be the consequence hereof? So that if men are disposed to find fault with the divine dispensation, it is no difficult matter to invent some methods of reasoning to give umbrage to it; and, indeed this objection is not so much against God's fore-ordaining what comes to pass, as it is a spurning at his judicial hand, and finding fault with the equity of his proceedings, when he

takes vengeance on sinners for their iniquities; or charging severity on God, because all mankind are not the objects of his goodness, and consequently not elected to eternal life.

But passing by this, we shall proceed to consider how, in several instances, the methods used to oppose the doctrine, which we are maintaining, are attended with many absurd consequences, derogatory to the divine perfections; which farther discovers the unreasonableness of their opposition to it; particularly,

1. It represents God as indeterminate, or unresolved what to do, which is the plain sense of their asserting that he has not fore-ordained whatever comes to pass. To suppose him destitute of any determination, is directly contrary to his wisdom and sovereignty, and it would argue that there are some excellencies and perfections belonging to intelligent creatures, which are to be denied to him, who is a God of infinite perfection: but if, on the other hand, they suppose that every thing, which comes to pass, is determined by him; nevertheless, that his determinations, as they respect the actions of intelligent creatures, are not certain and peremptory, but such as may be disannulled, or rendered ineffectual as taking his measures from the uncertain determinations of man's will; this is, in effect to say, that they are not determined by God; for an uncertain determination, or a conditional purpose, cannot properly be called a determination. Thus for God to determine, that he that believes shall be saved, without resolving to give that faith which is necessary to salvation, is, in effect, not to determine that any shall be saved; for, since they suppose that it is left to man's free-will to believe or not, and liberty is generally explained by them, as implying that a person might, had he pleased, have done the contrary to that which he is said to do freely; it follows that all mankind might not have believed, and repented, and consequently that they might have missed of salvation, and then the purpose of God, relating thereunto, is the same as though he had been indeterminate, as to that matter. But, if, on the other hand, they suppose that to prevent this disappointment, God over-rules the free actions of men, in order to the accomplishment of his own purpose, then they give up their own cause, and allow us all that we contend for; but this they are not disposed to do; therefore we cannot see how the independency of the divine will can be defended by them, consistently with their method of opposing this doctrine.

Again, if it be supposed, as an expedient to fence against this absurd consequence, that God fore-knew what his creatures would do, and that his determinations were the result thereof, and, consequently, that the event is as certain as the divine fore-knowledge, this is what is not universally allowed of by

them; for many are sensible that it is as hard to prove, that God fore-knew what must certainly come to pass, without inferring the inevitable necessity of things, as it is to assert that he willed or determined them, whereby they are rendered eventually necessary. And if they suppose that God fore-knew what his creatures would do, and, particularly, that they would convert themselves, and improve the liberty of their will, so as to render themselves objects fit for divine grace, without supposing that he determined to exert that power and grace, which was necessary thereunto; this is to exclude his providence from having a hand in the government of the world, or to assert that his determinations rather respect what others will do, than what he will enable them to do, which farther appears to be inconsistent with the divine perfections.

2. There are some things, in their method of reasoning, which seem to infer a mutability in God's purpose which is all one as to suppose, that he had no purpose at all relating to the event of things: Thus, in opposing the doctrine of election, they refer to such-like scriptures as these, namely, that God will have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth, 1 Tim. ii. 4. applying this act of the divine will to every individual, even to those who shall not be saved, or come to the knowledge of the truth; and they understand our Saviour's words, How often would I have gathered thy children together as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not? Behold your house is left unto you desolate, Mat. xxiii. 37, 38. as implying, that God purposed to save them, but was obliged afterwards, by the perverseness of their actions, to change his purpose. What is this, but to assert him to be dependent and mutable?

3. They, who suppose that salvation is not to be resolved into the power and will of God, must ascribe it to the will of man, by which we determine ourselves to perform those duties, which render us the objects of divine mercy; and then what the apostle says, It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy, Rom. ix. 16. would hardly be intelligible, or a defensible proposition; and when it is said, We love him, because he first loved us, 1 John iv. 19. the proposition ought to be inverted, and it should rather be said, He loved us, because we first loved him; and that hum-bling question, which the apostle proposes, Who maketh thee to differ, 1 Cor. iv. 7. should be answered, as one proudly did, I make myself to differ.

4. As to what concerns the doctrine of discriminating grace, which cannot well be maintained, without asserting a discrimination in God's purpose relating thereunto, which is what we call election; if this be denied, there would not be se

great a foundation for admiration, or thankfulness, as there is, or for any to say, as one of Christ's disciples did, speaking the sense of all the rest, Lord, how is it, that thou wilt manifest thyself unto us, and not unto the world, John xiv. 22. Nor is there so great an inducement to humility, as what will arise from the firm belief, that, when no eye pitied the poor helpless and miserable sinner, he was singled out of a ruined and undone world, among that remnant whom God first designed for, and then brought to glory.

VII. We shall now consider those methods of reasoning, by which the contrary doctrine is defended, and enquire into the sense of those scriptures, which are generally brought for that purpose; and shall endeavour to make it appear, that they may be explained, in a different way, more consistently with the divine perfections. It is plain that the main design of those, who oppose the doctrine of election, is to advance the goodness of God; and, since all mankind cannot be said to be equally partakers of the effects of this goodness, inasmuch as all shall not be saved, they suppose that God has put all mankind into a salvable state; and, accordingly, as the gospel-overture is universal, so God's purpose to save, includes all to whom it is made; but the event, and consequently the efficacy of the divine purpose relating hereunto, depends on the will of man; and, that there may be no obstruction which may hinder this design from taking effect, God has given him a power to yield obedience to his law, which, though it be not altogether so per fect as it was at first, but is somewhat weakened by the fall; yet it is sufficient to answer the end and design of the gospel, that is to bring him to salvation if he will, and the event of things is wholly put on this issue; so that, though there be not an universal salvation, there is a determination in God to save all upon this condition. How far this is inconsistent with the divine perfections has been already considered; and we are farther to enquire, whether there be any foundation for it in scripture, and what is the sense of some texts, which are often brought in defence thereof.

One text referred to, is, those words of the apostle, in 1 Tim. ii. 4. Who will have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth; and another scripture, to the same purpose, in 2 Pet. iii. 9. The Lord is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance; and several others, from whence they argue the universality of the divine purpose relating to the salvation of mankind, or that none are rejected, or excluded from it, by any act of God's will, and consequently that the doctrine of election and reprobation is to be exploded, as contrary hereunto.

That the sense of these scriptures cannot be, that God de

signed that all men should be eventually saved, or come to the knowledge of the truth, so that none of them should perish, is evident, from many other scriptures, that speak of the destruction of ungodly men, which, doubtless, will be allowed by all; therefore it follows, that the meaning of these two scriptures, is not that God purposed, or determined, what shall never come to pass, which is inconsistent with the glory of his wisdom and sovereignty, as has been before observed; but they are to be understood with those limitations, which the word all, which refers to the persons mentioned, as designed to be saved, is subject to in other scriptures; as will be more particularly considered, when we treat of universal and particular redemption, under a following answer. And therefore, at present, we need only observe, that these scriptures may be set in a true light, that the word all is oftentimes taken for all sorts of men, or things; as when it is said, that of every thing that creepeth upon the earth, there went in two and two unto Noah into the ark, Gen. vii. 8, 9. that is all the species of living creatures, not every individual; so, Acts x. 12. in the vision that Peter saw of the sheet let down from heaven, in which there were all manner of four-footed beasts †, &c. and it is said concerning our Saviour, that he went about, healing all manner of sickness, and all manner of diseases among the people ; and elsewhere God promises, that he will pour out his Spirit on all flesh, Acts ii. 17. that is, persons of all ages and conditions, young and old. There are many instances of the like nature in scripture, which justify this sense of the word all; and it seems plain, from the context, that it is to be so taken in the former of the scriptures, but now referred to, when it is said, God will have all men to be saved; for he exhorts, in ver. 1. that prayer and supplication should be made for all men, that is, for men of all characters and conditions in the world, and, in particular, for kings, and all that are in authority, and thereby he takes occasion to resolve a matter in dispute among them, whether those kings that were tyrants and oppressors, ought to be prayed for, when he tells them, that all sorts of men are to be prayed for; and the reason of this is assigned, namely, because God will have all men, that is, all sorts of men, to be saved.

Moreover, they whom God will save, are said to be such as shall come, that is, as he will bring to the knowledge of the truth. Now it is certain, that God never designed to bring every individual to the knowledge of the truth; for, if he did, his purpose is not fulfilled, or his providence runs counter to

*See Quest. xliv.

The words are, wala relpaneda, that is, all four-footed beasts.

Matt. iv. 23. The words are, Osawa wady vorov Kal Tasav paraxiv, every sickness, and every disease; and so the same words are translated, in Matt. ix. 35.