shall publicly advertise a reward for the return of any pro-
perty whatsoever, which shall have been stolen or lost, and
shall in such advertisement use any words purporting that
no questions will be asked, or shall make use of any words
in any public advertisement purporting that a reward will be
given or paid for any property which shall have been stolen or
lost, without seizing or making any inquiry after the person
producing such property, or shall promise or offer in any such
public advertisement to return to any pawnbroker or other
person who may have bought or advanced money by way
of loan upon any property stolen or lost, the money so
paid or advanced, or any other sum of money or reward
for the return of such property, or shall print or publish
any such advertisement, shall forfeit the sum of fifty pounds
for every such offence to any person who will sue for the
same by action of debt, to be recovered with full costs of
suit.

This provision having given occasion to many vexatious
proceedings at the instance of common informers against
printers and publishers of newspapers, the Legislature inter-
vened in an Act of last year(a) to remedy the abuse.

The Act provides that no action shall be brought against the printer or publisher of a newspaper to recover the property under sect. 102 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, unless the assent in writing of the Attorney or Solicitor General for England, if the action is brought in England, or for Ireland, if the action is brought in Ireland, has been first obtained to the bringing of the action. (b)

It also limits the time for bringing the action to a period of six months after the forfeiture is incurred; (c) and contains a provision for staying proceedings in actions brought before the passing of the Act. (d)

The term "newspaper" for the purpose of this Act is to mean a newspaper as defined for the purposes of the Acts for the time being in force relating to the carriage of newspapers by post. (e)

(c) lb.

(a) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 65.
(d) Sect. 4.

(b) Sect. 3.

(e) Sect. 2.

Vide ante, pp. 261, 262.

PART 11

1

PART III.

Contracts in

general, between authors, publishers, &c.

Agreement not

within a year.

CONTRACTS BETWEEN AUTHORS, PUBLISHERS,
PRINTERS, &c.

THE foundation on which contracts between publishers,
authors, and others rest, is the same as that which forms
the basis of all ordinary contracts, and they may be enforced
either by action on the special contract, or, where a special
contract does not exist, by the usual action for work and
labour done. (a)

If the agreement is one "that is not to be performed to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof” no action can be brought upon it, "unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought or some memorandum or note thereof is in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith," (b) and the word "agreement" includes the consideration for the promise as well as the promise itself. (c)

The following memorandum was made between the plaintiff, a law bookseller and publisher, and the defendant, the author and proprietor of the copyright in a dictionary of the practice of the Courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas, and signed with their respective initials: "Dict. of Practice. 801. per annum for five years, commencing Mich. 1828; 601. per annum for the remainder of Mr. Lee's life, if he survive the five years; payable in either case quarterly; the first payment Michaelmas 1828. "T. L.

"S. S.

"Mr. Lee to separate the practices K. B. and C. P.” Parol evidence having been held admissible to explain the document, it was held that inasmuch as it appeared to be a memorandum of a contract that was not to be performed

(a) Planchè v. Colburn (8 Bing. 16).

(b) Sect. 4 of Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3).

(c) Wain v. Warlters (5 East, 10), Saunders v. Wakefield (4 B. & Ald. 595).

е

within a year, and no consideration was stated on the face
of it, it was not capable of being enforced by action. (a)
A contract which does not comply with the requirements
of the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds is not, however,
per se, void, though no action can be brought upon it.
Therefore it was held that the plaintiff in the case last
referred to, having paid the annuity for several years under
the above memorandum of agreement, could not recover
back the money so paid, as upon a failure of considera-
tion.(b)

PART IIL

be collected

It is not necessary that a contract, required by the Contract may Statute of Frauds to be in writing, should be contained in from a number one document. It may be collected from any number of of papers. papers, (c) provided they are, upon the face of them, sufficiently connected in sense, and do not require parol evidence to establish the connection, parol evidence being inadmissible for that purpose.

Thus, where a publisher proposed to publish by subscription an illustrated edition of Shakespeare, to appear in numbers, at the price of three guineas a number, two guineas to be paid at the time of subscribing, and the remaining guinea on the delivery of each successive number; the prospectus stating "that one number, at least, should be published annually," and that the proprietors were confident that they should be able "to produce two numbers within the course of every year;" and the defendant, wishing to become a subscriber, wrote his name in a book kept for the purpose in the plaintiff's shop, entitled, Shakspeare Subscribers, their Signatures; " printed copies of the prospectus lying at the same time in the plaintiff's shop, but neither prospectus nor book of subscribers containing any reference the one to the other, it was held that the contract of the defendant was not one to be performed within the space of a year from the making thereof, and therefore that, in order to be enforceable by action, it must be in writing. (d)

The defendant having refused to continue to take in the numbers of the book, an action was brought against him by the publisher; but it was held that the action could not be maintained for want of a written agreement or memorandum signed by the party to be charged therewith, as required by the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds.

The

(a) Sweet v. Lee (4 Scott's N. R. 77; 3 M. & Gr. 452). (b) Tb. (c) Jackson v. Lowe (1 Bing. 9); Phillimore v. Barry (1 Camp. 513); Saunderson v. Jackson (2 B. & P. 398); Johnson v. Dodgson (2 M. & 653); &c. (d) Boydell v. Drummond (11 East. 142).

PART III

Defective form of agreement.

Fixing price and choosing

prospectus contained the terms of the agreement, and if
it could be coupled with the book of subscribers in which
the defendant had signed his name, it would be a sufficient
memorandum of the agreement to satisfy the statute; but
as it contained no reference to the book, nor the book to it,
there was
no connection in sense between them which
would enable the court to couple them together, and treat
them as one document; and parol evidence to establish
such a connection was inadmissable. (a) "If," said Le
Blanc, J., "there had been anything in the book which had
referred to the particular prospectus, that would have been
sufficient if the title to the book had been the same with
that of the prospectus, it might perhaps have done: but as
the signature now stands, without reference of any sort to
the prospectus, there was nothing to prevent the plaintiff
from substituting any prospectus, and saying that it was
the prospectus exhibited in his shop at the time, to which
the signature related: the case therefore falls directly
within this branch of the Statute of Frauds." (b)

A difficulty in the interpretation of an agreement between an author and a publisher for the publication of the author's book, sometimes arises from the neglect to state distinctly in the agreement whether it is intended by the parties to operate as an assignment of the copyright, or merely as a licence to publish. The cases of Stevens v. Benning and Reade v. Bentley, already referred to (ante, pp. 160-162), exemplify the difficulty; in the latter of which cases the Vice-Chancellor (Wood) refused to allow costs to either party, considering each of them to blame for the defective form of the agreement.

Where the agreement is that the publisher shall take the embellishments, Whole charge and risk, and the whole duty of bringing out the work as he thinks best for the interest of both parties, it seems, according to Lord Hatherley, to be necessarily incident to the duty which the publisher has to perform, that he shall (c) also have the right of fixing the price at which the work is to be brought out.

His Lordship considered that it was further implied in the agreement in the case before him (vide ante, p. 161), that the publisher was to choose the embellishments and everything else connected with the publication, and that he was to do this for all editions which should be brought out during the subsistence of the agreement. (d) "Several difficulties," said his Lordship, " arising upon

(a) Boydell v. Drummond (11 East. 142).
(c) Reade v. Bentley (3 K. & J. 276).

(b) Ib. (d) Ib.

such a construction have been suggested. It was argued, can it be supposed that the plaintiff intended to give to the publisher the power, if he chooses, of bringing out the work with absurd embellishments beneath its character and injurious to the reputation of the author? The simple answer to that is, the author will take care of himself in that respect by going to a respectable publisher, who would not commit any such absurdity. If he employed a publisher who was in the habit of adding ridiculous illustrations to his works, he would not have reason to complain if the work were so published. The author would select a publisher who, he would presume, would bring out the work in a manner creditable and desirable. So again with regard to the price, it is suggested that the publisher might just so arrange the balance of prices as to enable himself, by an accurate calculation, to get his 101. per cent. commission, and leave nothing to pay the author. The answer is similar: it is not to be supposed that the author would deal with any publisher who was in the habit of so treating authors. If a publisher were to act in such a manner, although perhaps such conduct could not strictly be called a fraud, because it might not be a violation of the specific terms of the agreement, the result would be, that the author whom he so treated would never contract with him again."

In an agreement like the foregoing, where the work was to be brought out at the publisher's expense and the profits to be divided, the addition of a clause providing that the books sold should be "accounted for at the trade sale price, reckoning twenty-five copies as twenty-four, unless it be thought advisable to dispose of any copies, or of the remainder at a lower price, which is left to the judgment and discretion" of the publisher, does not justify an inference that the publisher has no discretion in fixing the price except in the particular case there mentioned. The meaning of such a clause is explained by Lord Hatherley, (when ViceChancellor) in Reade v. Bentley. (a) "It is quite obvious that this clause was introduced with no such view, but because Mr. Bentley is to bring out the work, and in bringing it out, he is to fix a certain price to the trade; he is aware that there are persons who are in the habit of purchasing all these works for re-sale; there is a certain quantity in the first instance offered to the trade, as it is called, who send in their orders, each buyer for a certain quantity of copies, and it is brought out to the trade at a price which (a) 3 K. & J. 277.

PART III.