goods were taken from plaintiff, the property
was still in custodia legis, and action against
constable to recover it was prematurely com-
menced.-Id.

10 (Cal.App.) Possession of furniture by
defendant's tenant was sufficient to sustain
judgment in claim and delivery against defend-
ant, where he was resisting delivery of the
property to plaintiff owner.-Eastern Outfitting
Co. v. Myers, 180 P. 669.

(1) (Ariz.) In replevin for automobile, no
formal demand was necessary before suit, where
it appeared plaintiff had made repeated efforts
to obtain the car from defendant before suing.
-Yates v. Russell, 180 P. 910.

III. PROCEEDINGS FOR TAKING AND
REDELIVERY OF PROPERTY.

~~~39 (Okl.) An action to recover specific per-
sonal property may be maintained in the coun-
ty or district courts of state, although no order
is issued for delivery of such property before
judgment.-Thompson v. Grove, 180 P. 553.

IV. PLEADING AND EVIDENCE.

3 (Kan.) A private offer of reward for the
apprehension of an accused person differs from
an offer by virtue of a statute and becomes a
contract when accepted.-Taft v. Hyatt, 180 P.
213.

7 (Kan.) Where a claimant of a private of-
fer of reward for the apprehension of an ac-
cused person is not aware of it until after he
has acted, he is not entitled to claim the re-
ward.-Taft v. Hyatt, 180 P. 213.

8 (Kan.) Where an attorney was notified
that a person for whose apprehension a re-
ward had been offered desired to see him, but
could not agree upon a fee for defending him,
and thereupon arranged for his arrest, but
accused surrendered himself to the chief of
police before anything was done, the attorney
was not entitled to the reward.-Taft v. Hy-
att, 180 P. 213.

(Kan.) A chief of police is not entitled
to maintain an action to recover a reward of-
fered by private individuals for the apprehen-
sion of an accused person, since public policy
does not permit an officer to claim a reward
for merely doing his duty.-Taft v. Hyatt, 180

P. 213.

60 (Okl.) Petition, in action to recover per-
sonal property from constable, alleging that it
had been taken from plaintiff by officer under
writ of attachment issued by justice of the
peace, and that action was decided for defend-
ant, whereupon attachment was dissolved, and See Master and Servant, 204-217.
that plaintiff never perfected an appeal, was

not demurrable as showing that property was

taken by mesne or final process against plain-

tiff, in view of Rev. Laws 1910, §§ 4798, 4799. See Highways.
Thompson v. Grove, 180 P. 553.

69(2) (Okl.) Where petition in action to re-

cover specific personal property from constable

RISKS.

ROADS.

ROBBERY.

ROSEBERRY ACT.

alleged that after final judgment for defendant, See Homicide, 18.
dissolving an attachment, plaintiff served notice
of intention to appeal but never perfected the
appeal, and where defendant filed a general de-
nial, whether such appeal was perfected was a
material issue the burden of establishing which
was on plaintiff.-Thompson v. Grove. 180 P.
553.

69(4) (Okl.) Under a general denial in re-
plevin defendant may make any defense which
will defeat plaintiff's claim or right to posses-
sion against defendant, and under the Code
great liberality is allowed such defenses.-
Thompson v. Grove, 180 P. 553.

VII. LIABILITIES ON BONDS AND
UNDERTAKINGS.

123 (Or.) The execution of a supersedeas
bond by defendant in replevin action on appeal
from judgment for plaintiff does not operate to
release sureties upon his redelivery bond.—
Mishler v. Edmunson, 180 P. 934.

124(2) (Or.) Redelivery bond of defendant
in replevin action conditioned "for the payment
to said plaintiff of any such sum as may, for
any cause, be recovered against said defend-
ant," held to obligate sureties to pay costs taxed
against defendant in the trial court and also
on his appeal.-Mishler v. Edmunson, 180 P.

934.

See Master and Servant, 358.

SALES.

See Appeal and Error, 1033; Assignments
for Benefit of Creditors, 40; Bailment,

18; Bankruptcy, 165, 303; Banks and
Banking, 48, 315; Brokers, 40, 43,
54, 55; Chattel Mortgages, 89, 138; Con-
tracts, 10, 116; Corporations, 126,
211, 426, 619; Customs and Usages, 19;
Fraud, 13, 23, 25, 59, 66; Fraudulent
Conveyances, 147, 179, 181, 186; Gas,

13; Infants, 58; Injunction, 236,
238; Insurance, 329; Limitation of Ac-
tions, 155; Logs and Logging, ~3;
Marshaling Assets and Securities, 4; Me-
chanics' Liens, 50, 277, 281, 290; Mines
and Minerals, 93; Partnership, 218;
Payment, 65; Principal and Agent,
189; Set-Off and Counterclaim, 28, 41;
Taxation, 696-708; Tenancy in Common,
38; Vendor and Purchaser.

I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY OF
CONTRACT.

22(1) (Kan.) A letter, written by one of
three partners at the dictation of his associate,
inquiring whether addressee wished to buy cat-
tle, describing, locating, and pricing them, and
concluding, "Phone me at Wichita," held not
an offer to sell subject to acceptance, but
merely an inquiry that might lead to prelimi-
nary negotiations and eventual bargain.-Cox v.
Denton, 180 P. 261.

23(3) (Mont.) Where sales contract pre-
pared by seller provided that contract should
not take effect until seller's acceptance, evi-
denced by signature of seller's manager, such
mode of acceptance was prescribed for seller's
benefit and could be waived by seller and the
contract accepted by any other mode.-Stein-
Public brenner v. Minot Auto Co., 180 P. 729.

For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

effect upon acceptance evidenced by signature | 359(2) (Cal.App.) In action for the price of
of seller's manager, was not in fact so signed, a gasoline marine engine sold to a fisherman,
but seller recognized the contract by corre- evidence held sufficient to sustain the trial
spondence showing intent to be bound thereby, court's finding that the engine was so defective
the contract was binding, notwithstanding lack as to be wholly valueless for any purpose.-Im-
of such signature; such requirement of con- perial Gas Engine Co. v. Auteri, 180 P. 946.
tract having been waived.--Id.

38(1) (Kan.) Where sale of chattel was
made for mutual benefit of seller and another,
and was procured by false representations of
one of them, active co-operation of the other,
by statements inducing buyer to accept and
rely on representations, constituted collusion.
-Bice v. Nelson, 180 P. 206.

43(4) (Cal.) Purchaser of lease, good will,
and furniture, etc., of fashionable hotel, fur-
nished from various quarters and all sorts of

dealers with rare articles, was entitled to rely

on seller's representations as to identity and
value of property, and was not bound to in-
form herself, on consummation of sale, that ar-
ticles she had bargained for were intact on
premises.-Fay v. Mathewson, 180 P. 939.

52(7) (Kan.) In action for purchase price
of automobile, sale of which was alleged by
defendant to have been induced by false repre
sentations by seller and another, evidence held
sufficient to sustain finding that such repre-
sentations were made.-Bice v. Nelson, 180 P.
206.

IX. CONDITIONAL SALES.
480 (1) (Cal.App.) Where furniture was
sold conditionally by an outfitting company to
the lessee of a hotel, title remained in the out-
fitting company, and on default by the lessee it
became entitled on demand to a return of the
it.-Eastern Outfitting Co. v. Myers, 180 P.
property, whosoever might have possession of

669.

II. PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

(C) Government, Officers, and District
Meetings.

55 (Ariz.) Under Civ. Code, 1913, par. 2733,
and paragraph 5552, subd. 2, any two of the
three members of a board of school trustees
transact business.-Hermance
v. Public
School Dist. No. 2 of Maricopa County, 180 P.
442.

can

(D) District Property, Contracts, and
Liabilities.

II. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT.
66 (Utah) Where plaintiff brokerage com-
pany offered to buy peaches of defendant, who
offered to sell at price per basket, and plaintiff
replied that if peaches were No. 1's defend-82(2) (Ariz.) The rule that an irregular
ant could book another company 20 cars, con-
tract of sale between parties resulted, it being
immaterial to whom peaches were delivered,
and by whom actually paid for, so that plain-
tiff could not recover commissions as on
brokerage transaction.-J. L. Price Brokerage
Co. v. Dixon, 180 P. 174.

a

IV. PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT.
(C) Delivery and Acceptance of Goods.

1682(8) (Cal.App.) Where the seller of a
gasoline marine engine to a fisherman never
furnished and installed equipment as required
by the contract, and the buyer's efforts in re-
taining the engine and using it were directed
merely toward enforcing the proper fulfillment
of the agreement, he was not precluded from
defending an action for the price on the ground
of total failure of consideration.-Imperial Gas
Engine Co. v. Auteri, 180 P. 946.

179(4) (Cal.App.) Where machinery is
bought for a particular purpose, and proves by
trial not to be adapted, but the purchaser re-
tains it, an action for the price cannot be de-
feated on the plea of failure of consideration
unless the evidence shows the machinery was
valueless for any purpose.-Imperial Gas
gine Co. v. Auteri, 180 P. 946.

V. OPERATION AND EFFECT.

contract cannot be ratified, except with full
knowledge of the iregularities by party ratify-
ing, does not apply to officers of school dis-
trict, since such officers are bound to know the
facts relating to the irregularities.-Hermance
V. Public School Dist. No. 2 of Maricopa Coun-

ty, 180 P. 442.

135(1) (Ariz.) In absence of statutory re-
quirement that employment of teachers shall
be done only at meetings of board of trustees,
or that the board shall transact official busi-
larly convened, it is not necessary that formal
ness only at a general or special meeting regu-
En-meeting be held for purpose of employing teach-
er.-Hermance v. Public School Dist. No. 2
of Maricopa County, 180 P. 442.

(D) Bona Fide Purchasers.
234(6) (Ariz.) Whether the act of depriving
the owner of his property be straight larceny,
or conspiracy and larceny compounded, it would
be as futile in one case as the other to pass
title from the owner.-Yates v. Russell, 180
P. 910.

The good faith or honesty of purpose of one
purchasing a stolen automobile is immaterial.
-Id.

VII. REMEDIES OF SELLER.

(E) Actions for Price or Value.
354(6) (Kan.) In action for purchase price
of automobile truck, answer held sufficient to
charge collusion of seller in inducing sale to
defendant by fraud.-Bice v. Nelson, 180 P.
206.

It is the duty of officers of school district to
provide teachers, and to make contracts with
them, and to know under what conditions a
teacher, whom they know to be teaching, claims
to act.-Id.

135(5) (Ariz.) Where teacher's contract, re-
quired to be signed by two trustees, was sign-
ed by only one of them, but trustee not signing
knew that the teacher was teaching, without
objecting thereto, and concurred in paying
teacher's salary, the school district ratified the
contract.-Hermance v. Public School Dist. No.
2 of Maricopa County, 180 P. 442.

141 (3) (Ariz.) Provision of teacher's con-
tract that, in case the teacher "proves unsatis-
factory as instructor, the board, upon the sanc
tion of a competent judge, reserves the right
to dismiss upon 15 days' notice," does not pre-
vent discharge of teacher for good cause; the
term "upon the sanction of a competent judge"
applying only to the particular manner of dis

II. SUBJECT-MATTER.
28(1) (Wash.) Where owner leased farm
upon lessee's agreement to give him one-half
of the crop, and lessee thereafter delivered
his own hay in performance of the owner's
agreement to sell hay to third party, the price
received for such hay by owner was properly
offset against items claimed by owner in his ac-
tion against lessee for breach of farm lease,
being a part of the dealings between the parties
in regard to crop, and hence arising out of
original contract of lease.-Gentry v. Krause,
180 P. 474.

33 (1) (Kan.) Under Code Civ. Proc. § 100
(Gen. St. 1915, 6992), a set-off for libel may
be pleaded and proved in an action for libel.-
Kozel v. Kozel, 180 P. 278.

33(1) (Kan.) Where oil dealer paid inspec-
tion fees imposed by state and collected from
customer, and after statute had been declared
invalid collected fees from state, customer could
set up his claim as against an indebtedness in
the form of an open account owing by him to the
dealer. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Rosier, 180 P.
807.

34(1) (Colo.) In suit to enjoin obstruction of
a road, cross-complaint, seeking relief for al-
leged acts of plaintiff in fencing up another,
different road was rightly stricken, not being
a proper cross-complaint or counterclaim under
the Code.-Dunbar v. Kohler, 180 P. 739.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

See Trusts, 359, 365.

II. CONTRACTS ENFORCEABLE.

33 (Kan.) A contract that a young man
should work and care for an older man and
his wife during their lives, and that he should
be treated by them as their child and be given
a certain share of their property at their
death, is not invalid because the young man
had reached majority when the contract was
made.-Taylor v. Holyfield, 180 P. 208.

45 (Kan.) The statute of frauds will not be
enforced against one who has performed a
contract whereby he should work and care
for an older man and his wife during their
lives, and that he should be treated by them
as their child and be given a certain share of
their property at their death, where he can-
not be restored to his original situation or
adequately compensated in damages.-Taylor
v. Holyfield, 180 P. 208.

51 (Kan.) An oral contract that a young
man should work and care for an older man
and his wife during their lives, that he should
be treated by them as their child and be giv-
en a certain share of their property at their
death, held not so unreasonable or inequitable,
as to be unenforceable.-Taylor v. Holyfield,
180 P. 208.

41 (Cal.App.) Where the partnership be-
III. GOOD FAITH AND DILIGENCE.
tween plaintiff and defendant ceased when they 89 (Kan.) Where a buyer contracted with
organized a corporation to carry on their agent for the sale of land, which became the per-
business, and the transaction whereby plain-sonal contract of the agent, and thereafter the
tiff got entirely out of the business was one for buyer attempted to buy the land through other
the purchase by defendant of plaintiff's inter-agents, who brought an action against the own-
est in the company as represented by his stock, er for specific performance of a contract obtain-
plaintiff's violation of the clause of the agree-ed from him by fraud in which an injunction
ment whereby he bound himself not to compete
with the company was a matter which could not
be made the subject of a cross-complaint by
defendant when sued by plaintiff on the notes
given for his stock.-Cavasso v. Downey, 180
P. 950.

44(2) (Kan.) In an action on a verified ac-
count against two partners for an indebtedness
of the partnership, a cross-demand by one of
the partners individually for damages to her
caused by an unrelated tort of the plaintiff
cannot be used as a set-off or counterclaim
against plaintiff's action.-Omaha Crockery Co.
v. Cleaver, 180 P. 273.

In a suit against partners on a verified ac-
count, a cross-demand by one of the partners
for damages to her individually because of being
poisoned by the wrapping of a former shipment
of goods received from plaintiff could not serve
as a set-off or counterclaim, the cross-demand
not being a mutual defense to her and her
partner, in view of Code Civ. Proc. §§ 88, 97-

was granted forbidding the transfer of the land.
it was such a violation of the buyer's obligation
to the agent with whom he made the original
contract as to defeat his action against the
agent for specific performance.-McMichael v.
Crawford, 180 P. 777.

STATES.

See Constitutional Law, 139; Counties,
142; Waters and Water Courses, 128;
Witnesses, 294.

III. PROPERTY, CONTRACTS, AND

LIABILITIES.

1082 (Wash.) A complaint alleging con
struction contract between the contractor and
the state and that the materials for which plain-
tiff demanded payment were furnished and deliv-
ered to contractor for carrying out the construc-
tion of the building described in the complaint

For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am,Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

against the contractor's surety.-Holly-Mason
Hardware Co. v. National Surety Co., 180 P.
901.

VI. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA-

TION.

(A) General Rules of Construction.

To warrant recovery by a materialman against
state contractor's surety upon a bond given un-181(1) (Okl.) In construction of statutes, the
der Rem. Code 1915, §§ 1159 to 1161-1, it is intention of lawmakers, when ascertained, must
necessary that plaintiff show either that the ma- govern.-In re Cleveland's Claim, 180 P. 852.
terial was used in the prosecution of the con-
struction work, or that it was delivered on the
ground for use therein.-Id.

VI. ACTIONS.

191(1) (Colo.) A state by statute may con-
sent to being sued.-Board of Com'rs of El
Paso County v. City of Colorado Springs, 180
P. 301.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

See Frauds, Statute of.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

See Limitation of Actions.

STATUTES.

184 (Okl.) When a strict construction of a
particular statute would defeat legislative intent,
as shown by other enactments on the same sub-
ject in pursuance of a general purpose in accom-
plishing a particular result, such construction
should not be adopted. In re Cleveland's Claim,
180 P. 852.

185 (Ariz.) Where no exception in a stat-
ute is made in terms, none will be made by
mere implication or construction.-Greenlee
County v. Laine, 180 P. 151.

188 (Ariz.) Words used in a statute must
be taken in their common and ordinary sense,
unless from the context it is evident some oth-
er meaning was intended.-Arizona Eastern R.
Co. v. Matthews, 180 P. 159.

206 (Ariz.) Effect is to be given, if pos-
sible, to every paragraph and section of a leg-
islative act.-Arizona Eastern R. Co. v. Mat-

For statutes relating to particular subjects, see thews, 180 P. 159.
the various specific topics.

I. ENACTMENT, REQUISITES, AND
VALIDITY IN GENERAL.

207 (Ariz.) Effect is to be given, if pos-
sible, to every paragraph and section of a
legislative act, and, if they seem to be in con-
flict, they must be harmonized, if possible.-
Arizona Eastern R. Co. v. Matthews, 180 P.
159.

225 (Okl.) To ascertain the intent of Legis-
lature, all the legislative enactments upon the
particular subject, including subsequent en-
actments, should be construed together and giv-
en effect as a whole.-In re Cleveland's Claim,
180 P. 852.

351⁄2 (Or.) Neither House Joint Resolution
No. 1, ratifying proposed "National Prohibition
Amendment," nor any other resolution of the
Legislature, is subject to referendum by Const.
art. 4, §§ 1, 1a; such sections applying only to
proposed laws.-Herbring v. Brown, 180 P. 328.
To ascertain what is meant by the term "bill"
and "act" in Const. art. 4, §§ 1, 1a (amended),
as to initiative and referendum, reference must 226 (Utah) The construction of a statute in
be made to the sense in which the words were the state from which it is adopted, subsequent
used before such amendments were passed, and, to adoption, is no more binding, so far as the
when reference is so made, it is found that, the rule of construction is concerned, than the de-
first term means a proposed law (article 4, § 1cision of a court from any other state.-Grieve
[original], and sections 18, 19; article 5, § v. Howard, 180 P. 423.
15), while the second means a bill which has
been enacted by the Legislature into a law
(article 4, §§ 20, 21, 22, 28); a "joint resolu-
tion" being neither a bill nor an act.-Id.

The subject-matter upon which the powers
given by Const. art. 4, §§ 1, 1a, may be exercis-
ed, namely, initiative laws, constitutional amend-
ments, and acts of the Legislature referred to
the people. are referred to collectively as
"measures" merely as a matter of convenience
and not with intent to include other and dif-
ferent powers.-Id.

(D) Retroactive Operation.

277 (N.M.) A case in which final judgment
has been entered is not a "pending case," with-
in Const. art. 4, § 34, providing that "no act
of the Legislature shall affect the right or rem-
edy of either party, or change the rules of evi-
dence or procedure, in any pending case";
"pending" meaning depending; remaining un-
decided; not terminated.-Stockard v. Hamil-
ton, 180 P. 294.

SURETYSHIP.

was proximately caused by the negligence of
the truck driver in failing to yield the right of
way to the motorman, as required by ordinance, See Principal and Surety.
yet this fact would not relieve the street rail-
way from liability if the motorman's negligence
prevented the truck driver from yielding.-Colo-
rado Springs & I. Ry. Co. v. Cohun, 180 P. 307.

TAXATION.

See Appeal and Error, 161; Constitutional
Law, 139; Corporations, 619; Coun-
ties, 16, 112; Mandamus. 187; Mu-
nicipal Corporations,297, 323, 406, 426,
519, 528, 533, 566-568; Parties, 76; Par-
tition, 87; Pleading, 291, 406, 418;
Schools and School Districts, 103; Ven-
dor and Purchaser, 17, 110. 152.
NATURE AND EXTENT OF POWER

12(1) (Cal.App.) In action for injuries to
plaintiff pedestrian, when crossing track behind
trolley car, due to her being struck and caught
by a trolley rope swinging from defendant's car,
proof that defendant knew that the rope was
dangling, or that the officials knew it, was not
required to make a prima facie case for plain-
tiff.-Sallee v. United Railroads of San Fran-I.
cisco, 180 P. 74.

112(2) (Cal.App.) Operating a trolley car
upon and across a crowded thoroughfare with
the trolley rope at its rear end swinging in a
loop, which rendered it liable to strike, catch,
and cast down pedestrians passing behind such
car, was in and of itself a negligent act.-Sallee
v. United Railroads of San Francisco, 180 P. 74.
In action for injuries to plaintiff pedestrian,
when crossing track behind trolley car, due to
her being struck and caught by a trolley rope
swinging from defendant's car, plaintiff was en-
titled to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
to make out a prima facie case.-Id.

114(4) (Cal.App.) In action for injuries to
plaintiff pedestrian, when crossing track behind
trolley car, due to her being struck and caught
by a trolley rope swinging from defendant's
car, facts held to afford sufficient evidence, in
the absence of explanation that the accident
occurred through the want of proper care on
the part of defendant or its employés.-Sallee
v. United Railroads of San Francisco, 180 P.

74.

|

IN GENERAL.

(Wash.) Power to levy special assess-
ments is referable to the taxing power.-Ever-
ett v. Adamson, 180 P. 144.

2 (Wash.) Power to tax includes the power
to retax and impose other burdens of taxation
on same subjects of taxation at will of supreme
taxing power.-Everett v. Adamson, 180 P. 144.

V. LEVY AND ASSESSMENT.
(C) Mòde of Assessment in General.
348 (Cal.App.) In valuing land used as
stock ranch, all the capabilities or uses to
which the land is adopted should be considered.
and not merely rental being received for use of
land as stock ranch.-H. & W. Pierce, Inc., v.
Santa Barbara County, 180 P. 641.

(E) Assessment Rolls or Books.
428 (Cal.App.) Omission of dollar marks
and punctuation in their proper places on the
assessment roll was not misleading to taxpayer,
where it had knowledge of the exact amount, as
evidenced by proceedings under Pol. Code, §
3819, in which it asked for the exact amount
which it claims was paid in excess to that which
contends should have been paid.-H. & W.
Pierce, Inc., v. Santa Barbara County, 180 P.
641.

14(21) (Cal.App.) Evidence held sufficient
to show that the striking of plaintiff pedestrian
by a swinging loop of trolley rope attached to
defendant's car, and not plaintiff's contributory
negligence, was the proximate cause of plain-it
tiff's injuries.-Sallee v. United Railroads of
San Francisco, 180 P. 74.

117(29) (Colo.) Whether a woman riding
with her husband in his motortruck across a
street car track exercised ordinary care as to
looking and listening and warning her husband
is ordinarily for the jury.-Colorado Springs &
I. Ry. Co. v. Cohun. 180 P. 307.

(G) Review, Correction, or Setting Aside

of Assessment.

453 (Kan.) Gen. St. 1915, § 11342, pro-
vides remedy to which a taxpayer for certain
grievances may resort, but such remedy is cu-
mulative and does not prevent property owner
from paying taxes under protest and suing to
recover them on ground that levy was invalid.
not-Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Board of Com'rs of
Greenwood County, 180 P. 785.

It cannot be said as a matter of law that a
woman riding with her husband in his motor-
truck across street car tracks was negligent in
not looking for an approaching car and in
warning her husband.-Id.

SUBROGATION.

See Insurance, 606, 668.

2 (Kan.) Subrogation is indulged only in
favor of one who pays the debt of another or of
one who pays to protect his own rights, and not
in favor of one who discharges a debt for which
he was himself originally and primarily liable.
-Spire v. Spire, 180 P. 209.

31(4) (Kan.) Maker of note, who was in
fact surety for his comaker, on paying note
was not entitled to be subrogated to payee's
chattel security to prejudice of other liens on
the chattel to secure other obligations of co-
maker, in view of Negotiable Instruments Act,
§ 126 (Gen. St. 1915, § 6647).-Spire v. Spire,

180 P. 209.

See Evidence,

Trial, 191, 234.

469 (Cal.App.) Board of equalization's or-
der, increasing assessor's valuation, is not void
because of board's refusal to restrict itself in
valuing property to the consideration of rental
received for land; such refusal, if error, being
committed in the exercise of the jurisdiction of
the board to hear and determine matter before
it.-H. & W. Pierce, Inc., v. Santa Barbara
County, 180 P. 641.

der, raising the assessment on parcels of real
488 (Cal.App.) Board of equalization's or-
estate to certain sum, after notice to owner un-
der Pol. Code, § 3673, without designating in
figures the exact amount of increase for each
parcel, is sufficient, in view of Civ. Code, $
being' simply a matter of calculation.-H. & W.
3538; the amount of increase of each parcel
Pierce, Inc., v. Santa Barbara County, 180 P.
641.

SUICIDE.
489 (Cal.App.) Upon proceedings by board
568; Insurance, 646, 665; of equalization to increase assessor's valuation
of property, there being no requirement as to
taking down the evidence at the hearing or of
bill of exceptions to rulings of the board, a
court will determine the board's action by in-
spection of the record, in absence of fraud or
abuse of power.-H. & W. Pierce, Inc., v. San-
ta Barbara County, 180 P. 641.

SUPERSEDEAS.

See Appeal and Error, 422; Replevin,
123.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEEDINGS.

490 (Cal.App.) Order of board of equaliza-