for the price and value of work then and there dɔne, and materials for the same provided by the plaintiff for the defendant, at his request: for money then and there lent by the plaintiff to the defend
ant, at his request: And in £
for money then and there paid by the plaintiff for the use of the defendant, at his request:
use of the plaintiff: And in £
for money then and there received by the defendant for the
for money found to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff, on an account then and there stated between them.
And whereas the defendant afterwards, on, &c., in consideration of the premises respectively, then and there promised to pay the said several moneys respectively to the plaintiff, on request; Yet he hath disregarded his promises and hath not paid any of the said moneys, or any part thereof, To the plaintiff's damage of £ and thereupon he brings suit, &c.
*Direction as to the General Conclusion.
If the declaration contains one or more counts against the maker of a note, or acceptor of a bill of exchange, it will be proper to place them first in the decla ration, and then in the general conclusion to say, promised to pay the said last mentioned several moneys respectively.
[Trinity Term, 1 Will. 4.]
WHEREAS, since the statute of the 7th & 8th Geo. 4, c. 71, instances have occurred in which, upon proceedings in the Court of Exchequer by way of subpoena and attachment, defendants have been arrested upon writs of attachment, notwithstanding the same have not issued for a bailable cause of action; and it is desirable that such practice shall be discontinued. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that, from henceforth, no arrest shall be made upon any such writ of attachment, unless the same shall be for a bailable *cause of action, and shall be duly marked and endorsed for bail.(a)
LYNDHURST, J. BAYLEY, W. GARROW,
J. VAUGHAN, W. BOLLAND.
(a) This general rule makes a most important alteration in the practice of the Court of Exchequer. Before the making of this rule, if a defendant did not appear within four days after the return of the subpoena, an attachment might have been issued against him, no matter how small the debt or demand. This, therefore, alters the practice as stated in Dax's Exch. Prac p. 16, in Price's Exch. Prac. p. 173, and in Carrington's Edit. of the Rules of that Court, p 24 n).
PRINCIPAL MATTERS.
Millaspie
ACCOUNT STATED.
See INFANT, 4.
1 An administratrix sued for a debt due to the intestate. It appeared that the debt accrued more than six years before the commence- ment of the action; but that, within six years, the defendant and the agent of the administratrix went through the account to- gether, and struck a balance, which the de- fendant promised to pay as soon as he could. -Held, that the administratrix was entitled to recover on a count upon an account stated with her, and that the statute of limitations was no bar. Smith v. Forty.
2. A party may recover the amount of an I. O. U. on a count upon an account stated. Payne v. Jenkins.
See Regula Generalis.
ADMINISTRATOR.
appear in the course of the defendant's case, that there was a written agreement relating to the matter, which cannot be read for the want of a stamp. Secus, if the fact come out in the course of the plaintiff's case. Fielder v. Ray.
2. A party published a prospectus for the pub- lication of a county map and gazetteer, stating that the map would contain "the exact limits of every parish and township in the county." The defendant agreed to take a copy of each. They were published, and there were lines on the map denoting the boundaries of townships, but no distinct lines to show the boundaries of those parishes which consisted of several town- ships-Held, that the map was not accord- ing to the prospectus, and that the defendant was not bound to take the map, although, by reference to the gazetteer, it could be as- certained what townships were in each parish. Teesdale v. Anderson. 198
3. A tradesman holding a situation in a public office, being indebted to several persons, they met together, and signed an agreement, in which they stated, that he, being unable to make immediate payment, they agreed to accept payment by his covenanting and agreeing to pay to a trustee of their nomi- nation, one third of his annual income, and executing a power of attorney as a collateral security. The debtor did not sign the agree ment, but attended the meeting, and express- ed his willingness to comply with its terms. Before anything had been done in execution of the agreement, one of the creditors, who had signed it, brought an action against the defendant for his original debt:-Held, that he could not recover. Good v. Cheeseman.
1. The Judge, at the trial, will not allow an amendment under the stat. 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, where there is a variance which would not have occurred if common care had been used in the drawing of the declaration. Jelf v. Oriel.
22 2. In a declaration on a bill of exchange, the date of the bill was stated to be the 26th of March; it really was the 29th. The cause was undefended, and the judge allowed the variance to be amended under the stat. 9 (677)
such a count, would not be safe; and the verdict, in consequence, was taken upon other counts, charging the setting fire to barn and a wheat-stack.
Ib. 3. An indictment, on the stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, s. 17, charged a party with setting fire to a "stack of barley, of the value of 1001. of R. P. W:"-Held good, although the words of the statute creating the offence are "any stack of corn or grain:"-Held also, that the words "of R. P. W." sufficiently stated the property:-Held also, that if the indict- ment state that the prisoner, on, &c., at, &c., feloniously, unlawfully, and malicious- ly did set fire to a certain stack of barley of the value of 1001. of R. P. W. then and there being," this is sufficient, without stating that the prisoner, on, &c., at, &c., feloniously, unlawfully, and maliciously did then and "there set fire to the stack. Rex v. Swatkins.
110 ARTICULO MORTIS, DECLARATION IN.
See MURDER, 1. ROBBERY, 1.
See APPREHENSION. PRIZE-FIGHT. SHIPPING, 6. THEATRE, 1. TRESPASS, 3.
4. A. had several of his children residing in a house distant from his own, in the charge of B., a servant :-Held, that if an accident happened to one of the children, A. was liable to pay for its cure, although he did not know the surgeon who was called in, and although the accident might have arisen from the carelessness of the servant:-Held, also, 1. that if B., the servant, becoming ill in con- sequence of the service, call in C., a surgeon, and after this A. send his own surgeon, and the wife of A. know of C.'s attendance, and expresses no disapprobation, A. is liable to pay C. for this attendance. Cooper v. Phillips.
5. A servant who hurt her foot in getting over a gate called in a surgeon, who was not the regular medical attendant of the family, without the knowledge of her master or mistress-Held, that the master was not liable to pay the surgeon's bill.
APPREHENSION.
See TRESPASS, 3.
If parish officers cut off the hair of a pau- per in the poor-house, by force, and against the will of such pauper, this is an assault; and if it be done as matter of degradation, and not with a view to cleanliness, that will be an aggravation, and go to increase the damages. Forde v. Skinner.
2. A. was advancing in a threatening attitude, with an intention to strike B., so that his blow would have almost immediately reached B., if he had not been stopt :-Held, that it was an assault in point of law, though, at the particular moment when A. was stopt, he was not near enough for his blow to take 349 effect. Stephens v. Meyers.
3. A police constable is not justified under the stat. 10 Geo. 4, c. 44, s. 7, in laying hold of, pushing along the highway, and ordering to be off, a person found by him conversing in a crowd with another, merely because the person with whom he happens to be con versing, is known to be a reputed thief. Stocken v. Carter.
3. A solicitor to a commission of bankrupt may maintain an action for the amount of his bill up to the choice of assignees, with- out having had his bill taxed by the com- missioners, under s. 14 of the bankrupt act, 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, that provision applying only cases between the assignees and the estate. Taylor v. M' Gaugan.
4. If an attorney sue out a writ against A., at the suit of B., without any authority, ex- press or implied, from B. for so doing, and A. pay the costs of such writ to the attorney, A. may recover back the amount of those costs, by bringing an action for money had and received against the attorney; but if the attorney had any authority, either express or implied, from B., to sue out the writ, such action for money had and received will not lie against the attorney, even though B. had no cause of action against A. Dupen v. Keeling. 102 5. A., an attorney, did business for B., another attorney, in a cause in which B. was a par- ty:-Held, that A. could not recover the amount of his charges, without proof of his having delivered his bill, under the stat. 3 Jac. 1, c. 7:-Held also, that, under such circumstances, A. might recover a sum of money lent on a distinct account, but not for disbursements made in the cause. Hem- 318 ming v. Wilton.
6. An agent to a country attorney need not deliver a bill under the stat. 3 Jac. 1, c. 7, s. 1, if the charges be for agency in causes in which the defendant was the attorney and in which the plaintiff acted as his agent. 520 Sandys v. Hornby.
so employing the attorney, and not the peti- tioning creditor, is the person liable to pay the attorney the costs of suing out the com- Pocock v. Russell.
If an action be brought against the assignees of a bankrupt, and, before the trial, the bankrupt obtains the signature of a sufficient number of creditors to his certificate, and be willing to release his surplus, but his cer- tificate has not been allowed by the Lord Chancellor; the Judge will not put off the trial to give time to obtain the allowance of the certificate by the Lord Chancellor, so as to make the bankrupt a competent witness for the assignees. Tennant v. Strachan, 31 If bills be paid in at a banker's as short bills (i. e, bills which the bankers are to pre- sent when due, and carry the proceeds to account), and after a commission of bank- rupt has issued against the bankers, but before the choice of assignees, a person, on behalf of the customer by whom they were paid in, calls at the banking-house to de- mand a return of these bills, the answer he receives is evidence in an action of trover, brought against the assignees for the reco- very of such bills: but if, before the choice of assignees, some of the bills were paid, the customer cannot recover the value of such bills as were so paid, in an action of trover against the assignees.
If the assignees, when called on to return the bills, claim a right to retain such as have not been paid, alleging that the bank. rupts had discounted them for the customer before the bankruptcy, this is presumptive evidence that these bills were the bills paid in by such customer.
If a customer pay into the hands of his banker certain bills, as short bills, and, after the bankruptcy and choice of assignees, the assignees present them for payment, and re- ceive the proceeds, and claim to hold the proceeds against the customer, they are lia- ble in trover.
If a person, after notice of an act of bank- ruptcy, sets up a claim of lien upon certain deeds, and the bankrupt pay the sum he de- mands to get possession of the deeds, the assignees cannot question the amount of this lien, unless there be a count for money had and received to the use of the assignees; but if the person had really no just claim at all, the assignees may recover back the sum in an action for money had and received to the use of the bankrupt; however, if it appear that the defendant never received any money, but that A., who was to have conveyed a house to the bankrupt, at his desire mort- gaged it to the defendant, an action for mo- ney had and received will not lie. Noble v. Kersey. 90 Commissioners of bankrupt committed a witness for refusing to read the entries in an account:-Held, that they were liable to an action for false imprisonment for so doing, because this was not a question:-Held, also, that the circumstance of the witness speak- ing of it as a question at the time of his re- fusal made no difference. Isaac v. Impey. 113 8. A defendant, in a suit by assignees of a bankrupt, was told, at an interview with the attorney for the assignees (which was ar- ranged by his own attorney, but which he thought proper to attend alone), that his at- torney had proposed that he should admit
every fact, except the merits, provided the plaintiffs would waive their right of holding him to bail; and he was asked, whether that proposal was made with his authority. He replied, that it was; and that he was ready to carry it into effect, as the only ques- tion he wished to try was, whether he was li- able on the undertaking he had given:- Held, that this amounted to an admission of the right of the assignees to sue, although no mention was made of it in the conversa- tion. Semble, that it would have been oth- erwise, if, without further explanation, he had only said that he wished to try upon the merits. Held, also, that having received advantage from the admission in the waiver of the right to hold to bail, he could not af- terwards withdraw it, and insist upon proof of the bankruptcy. Davies v. Burton, 166 9. A bankrupt assigned all his property to two trustees, one of whom was the petition- ing creditor, who was present at the execution of the assignment by the bankrupt, and exe- cuted it himself, but not in the presence of any attorney or solicitor :-Held, that this was not such an assignment, as, being communi- cated to a creditor of the bankrupt, before the receipt by him of money from the bank rupt, would enable the assignees to recover such money as money received after and with notice of an act of bankruptcy. Bur- bidge v. Watson.
10. A bankrupt, who was in prison for debt, did not surrender to his commission, nor did he apply to have the time for his surrender enlarged, nor did he apply to be brought up to surrender under sect. 119 of the bankrupt act, 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, nor did he give notice to the commissioners that he was in prison: -Held, that under these circumstances he was not indictable under s. 112 of the stat. 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, for not surrendering to his com- mission, even though the imprisonment could be shown to have been collusive. Rex v. Mitchell. 251
11. If, in an action by the assignees of a bank- rupt, notice of disputing the trading, &c., has been given; and it appear that part of the amount claimed could not have been re- covered by the bankrupt; the proceedings under the commission are not sufficient proof of the trading, &c., to entitle the assignees to go for their whole claim, and they will, on such evidence, be restricted to that part of their claim which the bankrupt could have recovered. Gibson v. Oldfield. 313
12. If a trader buy goods and sell them again on the same day at more than thirty per cent. less than he bought them for, this may be an act of bankruptcy under sect. 3 of the bank. rupt act; but, to make it an act of bankrupt. cy, the Jury must be satisfied that the per- son to whom the trader sold the goods must have been led to suppose that the trader was a person going to become bankrupt, who wished to get money into his hands to cheat his creditors. Cook v. Caldecot.
BILL OF EXCHANGE AND PROMIS SORY NOTE.
See AMENDMENT, 1, 2. INSOLVENT, 1, 3, 6, 8. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 1, 2. PART- NERS, 1.
1. A foreign bill of exchange was drawn by A. upon C. & Co., who resided at Liverpool, in favour of L. R. & Co., and by A. endorsed to the plaintiffs. The bill was drawn, “Sixty days after sight, pay to L. R. & Co. in Lon don," &c. It was refused acceptance by the drawee, but accepted under protest for ho nour of the drawer by the defendants as fol- lows:-"Accepted under protest for honour of L. R. & Co., and will be paid for their account if regularly protested and refused when due." This bill was presented for payment at the residence of the drawees in Liverpool, and protested at Liverpool for non-payment; but it was not presented for payment, or protested, in London. where the drawees had not any house of business:- Held, that the holders were entitled to reco- ver against the acceptors for honour; and that, under these circumstances, a present- ment in London and protest there were not necessary. Mitchell v. Baring.
If A. authorize B. to draw bills upon him, and B. do so, A. is not liable to be sued as the drawer of those bills. Therefore, where, by a resolution of the directors of a mining com. pany, four directors were necessary for the doing of any act; and three of the directors were called trustees, and those three gave a power of attorney to the agent of the com. pany to draw bills:-Held, that the other directors were not liable on those bills, as the power of attorney was not executed by four directors. Ducarry v. Gill.
3. The plaintiff had accepted a bill for 148, for the accommodation of T., who gave it to N. for a particular purpose; N. borrowed 101. of the defendant, and gave him this bill as a security. This sum of 101. was repaid by N., but the bill was not given up and the defendant endorsed it for value to R., who, when it was dishonoured, caused both the plaintiff and T. to be arrested, and the plain- tiff paid the amount of the bill, and the costs of both arrests:-Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount of the bill from the defendant, but not the costs of the two arrests. Roach v. Thompson. 194
4. A banker in London, corresponding with a banker abroad, has the same right, with re-
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