appropriations. It does not control contract authority or authority t debt receipts. The Appropriations Committee does not control contr which accounts for a substantial amount of budget authority. Prog mass transit capital grants, water pollution control, and the highwa bypass the Appropriations Committee through contract authority large portion of appropriations controllable in any meaningful Appropriations Committee. The Committee cannot-and properly s security, unemployment insurance or other similar payments. It must sufficient funds to cover the amount of payment set by law for recipients who apply.

My proposal addresses this problem by requiring that all new budg excepting those for activities with permanent appropriations su security, unemployment insurance, payment of interest on the nation be made available only through appropriations bills. It also specif appropriations bill shall specify the amount of unobligated contra existing at the time of passage of my proposal (contract authority a vided but which the Executive branch has not yet obligated) wh obligated during the fiscal year. The same provision would apply v to unobligated budget authority already available through the Stat Financial Assistance Trust Fund (general revenue sharing).

Of greater importance, however, the present appropriations proces with budget authority rather than with budget outlays. Budget outl the most important measure for any fiscal year in terms of impact on th since outlays represent the actual amount of Federal dollars disburse Treasury into the economy that year. Budget outlays, of course, i obligations of budget authority (including appropriations), but the penditure may not come until several years hence.

My bill would strike directly at the heart of this problem by red appropriations bill to specify the amount of outlays each year for ea program and activity. The amount of outlays for many programs and will remain uncontrollable because legal obligations already entered be honored as will legal entitlements that have been created. Thus like the Executive-can properly do no more than project estimates for the fiscal year which will be necessary for social security, une insurance, civil service retirement and other such programs. These will, of course, be subject to later revision. But in many other cases Co achieve effective control of program outlays.

With the above reforms Congress as an institution will be on the sai as the President and his Office of Management and Budget in their con of the budget.

The Appropriations Committee would report out only one appropria and that bill would specify the amount of outlays for each Federal pro activity during the next fiscal year. The total of these outlays must i total set forth in the spending ceiling set previously.

The Appropriations Committee would follow any procedure it wished. two possibilities seem most obvious. It could begin its deliberations, aft full committee hearings, by assigning a target outlay level to each of its mittees, which, after their own hearings, would allocate that outlay targ the various programs and activities under the subcommittee purview, (i let the subcommittees submit their proposals first, without reference to a target and then, when all subcommittee proposals are submitted, let Committee determine which subcommittee proposals to cut or add to in equal the outlay ceiling. In either case, the full Committee could report bill to the floor. The bill could be in any form. Each subcommittee allocati constitute a separate title. It must also contain, as part of total outlays, gency allowance for unforeseen outlays. These funds would be available to future appropriations by Congress specifying the programs and activ which they could be spent.

The bill would have to be reported out of the House Appropriations Co by May 15 and out of the Senate Appropriations Committee within 15 da it had passed the House, though it is to be assumed that the Senate Co consideration of appropriations would begin far before formal receipt of th bill, as is presently the case. If portions of the bill were not ready at the ap times, those programs and activities for which specific appropriations and were not included would be reported out with outlays at the same level as vious fiscal year. This device would provide a strong incentive for approp

ubcommittees to be ready with their portions by the time the bill must be reorted out.

The reported bill would contain outlays at the same level as provided for in he outlay ceiling. Floor amendments to the omnibus appropriations bill would have to be "strike out and insert" and the amount inserted could not be greater han the amount struck out. Such an amendment could either specify the acivities and programs and the amounts for and by which outlays would be reduced, or it could mandate the Appropriations Committee to recommend the appropriate laces for cuts subject to floor amendment and approval. Congress could exceed he existing outlay ceiling only by passing an amendment increasing that ceiling. As I have already observed, it is necessary to build a degree of flexibility into the spending ceiling and priority setting process. The state of the economy may change, emergencies may occur, or projections of outlays for uncontrollable expenditures (such as social security or unemployment insurance) may prove inaccurate. At any time after signing of the omnibus appropriations legislation, the President could submit a request to Congress for a change in the outlay ceiling, or Congress could initiate such action itself. The President would specify the activities for which outlays would be increased or decreased to correspond with the change in the outlay ceiling, and he would have to state his reasons for both the change in the ceiling and the changes in specific outlays. The President could also recommend that outlays for specific activities be changed while keeping the total spending ceiling constant. Congress itself could, of course, initiate such changes in the ceiling or in specific outlays without a Presidential recommendation.

Congress could disapprove the President's request completely or it could amend his proposals. However, if Congress did not act upon the President's request within 30 days, it would automatically became law. Provisions would be made for expedited consideration of the President's request through a mechanism similar to that provided for in considering executive reorganization proposals. The procedure I have just described provides the needed flexibility. Let me illustrate with an example. Suppose Congress had projected outlays of $4 billion for unemployment insurance in the omnibus appropriations bill, but the economic situation had deteriorated and it becomes apparent that outlays for unemployment insurance would be $6 billion. The President could request a $2 billion increase in the outlay ceiling to take account of the increased unemployment insurance outlays. Or he could ask for an increase in the ceiling of less than $2 billion and recommend a corresponding decrease for other controllable outlays. He could request no increase in the spending ceiling, but instead request a $2 billion decrease in controllable outlays to match the $2 billion uncontrollable increase in unemployment outlays.

If this legislation is enacted, Congress will have institutionalized a means of considering the budget in a fiscally responsible manner. The President will no longer be able to contend that he must impound funds, regardless of the legality of such an act, in order to assure economic stability. The bill would prohibit the President from reserving (impounding) funds except for technical reasons as provided for in the Anti-Deficiency Act. Under no circumstances could funds be reserved if it would result in impairing the efficient operation of the activity for which obligational authority had been provided or if it would result in not fully carrying out that activity.

Chairman WHITTEN. Mr. Stratton, it is a pleasure to have you before us.

STATEMENT OF HON. SAMUEL S. STRATTON, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. STRATTON. I appear here this morning, Mr. Chairman, primarily to express my strong support for the preliminary work already done by this Joint Committee as contained in House Report 93-13 and to urge you to continue your work with all possible speed.

Nothing, it seems to me, is more important today to the continued survival and vitality of the Congress as the people's branch of the Federal Government than that we should find the means to achieve absolute control over the Nation's budgetary practices.

As we are all well aware, we have been sharply challe in fact defied, on this very point by the President of the U He is, in effect, betting that we can't do the job.

As long ago as 1946, Congress recognized the need fo means of establishing congressional budgetary control, as in the reorganization act of that year. Yet though the need those Congresses were unable to develop the procedures to Today the need is far greater and more urgent. This tin Member of the House and Senate is aware, we simply can Having spent some time of my own since November 197: to devise procedures to meet this need, I am intimately aw how difficult and complex a job this is.

After some struggle, I submitted legislation of my own. which has been referred to the Rules Committee and wh has also been brought to the attention of the committee.

I am aware that it does not represent a complete answer t lem, but I believe it points at least in the general direction to be moving, and I am delighted to see that it does, in large cide with the tentative recommendations set forth in your ow Report.

As I see it, there are four basic parts of this problem. The agree, as you have pointed out, on some overall spending o the fiscal year very early in the congressional session.

The trouble with the 1946 act, and the reason it could ne plemented, was that it required agreement on a whole, det gressional budget, similar to the executive budget, early in th That, obviously is impossible.

It would require us to go through the whole complex appr process to get such agreement, and by then the legislative ves Obviously we can't get early agreement on all the details, b get agreement at least on the overall ceiling.

This has apparently been demonstrated very clearly in thi dramatic fiscal confrontation and showdown by the fact that h ator Mansfield and Speaker Albert have accepted President $269 billion spending ceiling for 1974. The quarrel is only ov we allocate the money within that ceiling, with the matter of p We would have moved a great step toward solving our pro both Houses today could agree formally and officially on a $20 ceiling.

We have something of this sort available today, if you kno to find it, but it is not really adequate for the job.

Thirdly, as you point out-and this is the toughest part of need some device at the end of the legislative year for bringing separate appropriation totals into line under the previously ceiling.

My bill offers one such device-holding up the final bill u total of them all fits the ceiling. Obviously we can make the in one bill, we can prorate them through the earlier bills, or even raise the ceiling if changed circumstances warrant it.

Fourth, and finally, and this is not touched on in your recom tions unless it is implied in recommendation No. 10, we will ob need more time to do this more complex and certainly contro job.

provide that we slip the fiscal year back to coincide with the ndar year, and thus we will have all 12 months to work out our vers rather than just 6 months plus the chaos of continuing lutions.

Ir. Chairman, I am well aware that many additional aspects of overall budgetary problem of which your committee is well aware e not been touched on in my own bill-the attention to revenues, example, and debt limits; and the problem of backdoor spending pipeline spending.

hese do need thought and I have simply not had the time to work n into my procedural suggestions. But this, of course, is now narily the job of your committee, and I am confident you have an ellent grasp of what is required.

am well aware, of course, that the job is not an easy one. Like irselves, I have for that very reason recommended that this Joint mmittee be continued on a permanent basis.

One final point. In the current confrontation between Congress and White House, the Executive is pictured as clear, precise, exact, I prudent when it comes to budgetary matters.

Congress, on the other hand, is pictured as profilgate, bumbling, xact, sloppy, and devoid of any capacity for tight management trol. Obviously it is the easiest thing in the world for one man draw up a budget and decide on his priorities. It is quite another tter for 535 men and women, all with firm convictions of their own, erating in two separate bodies, and through involved and complex rliamentary procedures, to agree on a specific budget and a precise of priorities of their own.

The lean, hard, fast boxer can often outpoint the slow, heavy, ponders slugger. This is the problem we face in dealing with the Executive day and it is a problem not unknown in other parliamentary bodies er the past few decades.

The answer, I believe, is that we must find a way for 535 men and omen to make a clearcut, precise decision with reasonable speed. he way to do it probably will be for us to delegate a fairly large share the responsibility to a relatively small group.

Possibly this approach will fly in the face of a new current reformist ressure for open rules and participatory caucus democracy. But the bility of the legislature to act with force and speed is what is at stake re. If parliamentary government goes down, we all go down. Congress can and Congress must solve this problem. And if it reires that all of us yield a little bit in making it possible this will a very small price indeed to pay for winning the victory we all seek the current constitutional crises.

Chairman WHITTEN. Thank you, Mr. Stratton. We appreciate your resentation.

As I pointed out earlier, about 56 percent of the total expenditures o not flow through the annual appropriations process.

If you have a chance to work that out, the committee would be terested in a solution for the 56 percent.

Mr. STRATTON. I recognize that I have not touched on that part f the problem.

Chairman WHITTEN. We appreciate your statement.
Mr. STRATTON. Thank you very much.

Chairman WHITTEN. NOW, we have with us Senator F to express our regrets at being caught in a situation your appearance here.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES H. PERCY, A U.S. SE THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Mr. PERCY I Would like to say at the outset I followed ings of this committee with great interest.

I originally asked Senator Scott to be assigned to the because I was on a trip in Asia I yielded to Senator R begin work immediately.

I have, however, participated as a ranking Republica ernment Operations Committee of the Senate in the new subcommittee for the first time this year, a Sub Budgeting, Management, and Expenditures. That comm the chairmanship of Senator Metcalf and ranking Repub Saxbe, the subcommittee on which I serve.

We held our organizational meeting this morning and to report to you. Mr. Chairman, that the first order of bi committee which will have jurisdiction over any legis field for the Senate, the first order of business was unanin to be to implement the recommendations and reports tha this very important committee. We have assigned stat been requested to study immediately all of the hearings t been conducting and will be anxiously awaiting your mendations and, of course, we have already gone over v the preliminary recommendations.

I have a prepared statement and I would ask that the entirety be incorporated in the record.

I would like to say that we hear a great deal about t We sit here as sort of a helpless giant.

We have seen over a period of years, I have over fewe you have, Mr. Chairman, the erosion of power and a erosion is due, I think, to our own fault.

We have the business of running a great Government not conducted ourselves in the Congress, certainly not in as a great business should.

I reminded my own colleagues one night in a late se Senate that we sometimes remind me of a family with members in it all sitting there with a family checkbook wr not looking to see how much is in the bank account and not other how much we are writing out.

We don't face up responsibly to the fact that we have to outgoing with our incoming to know ahead what we are with that difference.

It has an impact on the economy. We have been mistak this Joint Committee is one of the most important things seen in my relatively brief experience here, to take a good at our procedures now.

I was delighted that Elmer Staats, a man we all resp in his testimony this morning seemed to concur with many ciples of the legislation that I have introduced and have o with Senator Cranston and Senator Harry Byrd.