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do all year is look over the shoulder of the department of motor vehicles.
This is why it is easy to get the cooperation of the executive branch because the budget officer in the department of motor vehicles doesn't want to make an enemy of the legislative analyst.
Chairman ULLMAN. I wonder if there would be any confusion on the Federal level having a congressional analyst sitting in on the budgeting process ?
Mr. REES. I don't think he actually sits in when the head of the department is discussing with his own budget people his plan but he works very closely with the budget person from the department. I think the budget person from the department finds out it is best to cooperate with the budget analyst.
Chairman ULLMAN. A lot would depend on the caliber of the person put in there. It is a rather powerful position wouldn't you agree?
Mr. REES. It is very powerful.
Mr. REES. I can't really say. I would say $38,000 or $40,000, which is high at the State level.
Chairman ULLMAN. Could you possibly get into a situation where there is an analyst who was oriented philosophically toward heavier expenditures in the social security area, or roads, or some other area and that bias might show that in his report?
Mr. REES. You always get that: Everyone has some kind of prejudice. But if he is too prejudiced he wouldn't be rehired as an analyst.
The analyst will get into policy matters, but the legislator has to make the final decision. I have known of some analysts who had very tough prejudices. I had to fight for 2 years to get fireplaces in the Women's Institution in Corona. The legislative analyst said no; in terms of the per-square-foot cost it runs it up too much.
You know, we get into shouting matches. But again I would lay my life down to protect that office to make sure it is a bipartisan office. It gets into a lot of controversy, but I think this is needed if you are ever going to get a good solid look at the budget.
Mr. SCHNEEBELI. What is his term of office? Mr. REES. He has been there for 20 years. Chairman ULLMAN. And he survived Democrats, Republicans Mr. REES. Anybody who could survive California in the last 8 years could survive anything.
Senator BENNETT. Who appoints him?
Mr. Rees. Technically he is appointed by the Joint Budget Committee, five assemblymen and five senators. As I say, there was 1 year where both Governor Reagan and the Democratic speaker both tried to get rid of him—which shows he must be doing a pretty good job.
Chairman ULLMAN. In other words, his strength lies in the fact that he is not in the legislative branch, but is an independent ?
Mr. REES. No, he is hired by the legislative branch. In fact, the legislative analyst has an office here in Washington,
Chairman ULLMAN. How would he compare with the Federal Res erve Board status here?
Mr. Rees. No, any time the joint committee wanted to meet and fire him, they could do it.
Senator BENNETT. He is compared with Larry Woodworth?
Mr. Rees. Yes, he would be a good example.
Chairman ULLMAN. We are proposing a joint staff for the Budget Committees and presumably this would be the director of the joint staff.
All right. You have been extremely helpful, Tom. We appreciate it very much.
Chairman WHITTEN. The analyst, of course, would be appointed by and be responsible only to the Congress.
Chairman ŪLLMAN. Yes, absolutely.
Chairman WHITTEN. The selection might be by the two Budget Committees but he would serve in a joint-staff capacity. Mr. Rees. Yes. Larry Woodworth would be a good example.
Senator BENNETT. His predecessor was here for 30 years or so with the same reputation. Mr. REs. Yes. I think that can be done here.
Chairman WHITTEN. Thank you very much. I don't want to take more of your time, but I concur with my colleagues; it was quite interesting and informative.
Mr. Rees. If you would like, I could bring the legislative analyst out here or you could visit California and come to Sacramento.
Chairman WHITTEN. Fine. When you said you had $800 million in the bank as a surplus, if was evident we could profit here from California's experience. Mr. Rees. Thank you very much.
Chairman WHITTEN. We next have Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, and it is with great pleasure the committee welcomes the Senator here today. STATEMENT OF HON. SAM NUNN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF GEORGIA
Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, I have enjoyed very much hearing that dialog regarding the California budgetary process. We have some of the same things in the State of Georgia, although our analyst just came on board in the last couple of years and before I begin my statement, I would say it has done more for the independence of the legislative branch in reality as well as in theory as any single thing we have ever done.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity of appearing before this group today concerning the crucial question of budgetary reform in Congress.
Since I have taken the liberty of previously furnishing each member of the committee with copies of my fiscal proposals, I will not dwell upon them in this testimony today, but will instead submit them for the record, and discuss them today only in summary form.
[The document follows:]
S. 565. A bill to require the Congress to prescribe a ceiling on expenditures for each fiscal year and to establish procedures to effectuate such ceilings. Referred to the Committee on Government Operations.
BUDGET AND EXPENDITURES CEILINGS Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, the most crucial domestic problem facing our Nation today is the uncontrolled and seemingly uncontrollable Federal budget. The peo
ple of this Nation are fed up with wild Government spending and priorities which are determined many times by the pressures of the moment.
Appropriations and expenditures now appear to have little or no relevancy to sound fiscal planning. If we are to curb inflation and control the national debt, Congress must fulfill its duty. We must begin to control the appropriations and the expenditures of the Government, in practice as well as theory.
I am convinced that the people of this Nation want a budget which is not inflationary and which requires no tax increase, and I am certain that my colleagues share that opinion. I am also convinced that the vast majority of Americans agree with the constitutional principle requiring that priorities of expenditure be set by the legislative branch. However, the people of this Nation recognize that Congress has in reality lost control of the budget, and I believe that most Americans prefer Executive control of expenditures rather than no control at all.
While this public mood may be dangerous from a constitutional point of view, I believe that it is a reality. Mr. President, the time has come for Congress to reassert its proper constitutional responsibility of controlling the budget and setting priorities of expenditures that will not be altered by Executive whim, which is the case today.
All of us have recently seen that the President has stepped forward and filled the vacuum left by our own inaction. The executive branch has impounded funds and set its own priorities, completely independent of legislative intent. America's budgetary affairs and priorities of expenditures are now being decided by faceless bureaucrats who are not elected or even known by the American people.
Most Members of the Senate agree that the tilt of power has shifted too far toward the executive branch. We hear every day many cries for Congress to again assert its constitutional powers. Mr. President. we have two clear choices, as I see them. We can place sole blame on the Executive and ignore our own failings, or we can reassert our own constitutional prerogatives by adopting methods and procedures leading to a rational budgetary process which will enjoy the confidence of the American people. The shift in the exercise of constitutional authority back to Congress can only take place with a renewed assertion by Congress of its constitutional responsibility over the budget.
Mr. President, toward these ends, I am today introducing a resolution which establishes a new rule of the Senate to make bills containing new obligational authority not in order until we in the Senate establish a limit on the amount of new obligational authority which the Senate will approve for the fiscal year. This resolution requires that the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Finance, acting jointly, report to the Senate for its approval a resolution setting forth an appropriation ceiling for the fiscal year.
We can by the adoption of this rule show to all concerned that the U.S. Senate will be responsible in the management of the fiscal affairs of our Nation. By taking this step, we will clearly demonstrate that we are capable of self-discipline, and the Senate will clearly require a ceiling on new obligational authority.
Recognizing that the Congress must also establish an expenditure ceiling if there is to be any meaningful attempt by the Congress to regulate Government spending, I have also introduced today a bill to be cited as the “Expenditure Control Act of 1973." This bill creates a rule in both Houses of Congress requiring Congress, after the submission of the budget by the President each fiscal year, to prescribe a limit on the total amount of outlays to be made by the Government during such fiscal year. The consideration of any bill or joint resolution providing new obligational authority would not be in order until the Congress has prescribed by law the limit on total outlays to be made in the fiscal year.
In order to regulate expenditures, the Expenditure Control Act of 1973 also requires the Preisdent to regulate outlays in accordance with congressional priorities. If any expenditures would exceed the limit set by Congress, the President, in carrying out the provisions of this act, would be required to reserve amounts proportionately in each functional category of the budget. This bill would assure that the legislative priorities be adhered to by preventing the arbitrary impoundment of funds by the President and by requiring pro rata reductions by the executive branch.
Mr. President, I submit that the resolution and bill being introduced today would have the following positive and practical results:
First. The people of this Nation will know how each and every Senator votes each year on the most crucial of all domestic legislative decisions—the total dollars to be spent by the U.S. Government in each fiscal year.
Second. More meaningful priorities will necessarily result from an overall limit on appropriations. The proponents of various appropriation measures will have
the burden not only of justifying the particular request for obligational authority, but also of presenting a case when weighed against other requests.
Third, The Appropriations Committee and the Finance Committee will each contribute their expertise in recommending the limit to the Senate.
Fourth. The overall appropriations measures will by necessity have to be presented together rather than piecemeal, which is now the case, because of practical considerations. We will have in effect one appropriation bill which will be presented to this body.
Fifth. The legislative branch, rather than the executive branch, will be setting priorities for obligational authority as well as the expenditure outlays, thus fulfilling the intent of the Constitution.
Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to favorably consider these two companion proposals which will result in a more responsible and responsive legislative branch.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I wish to congratulate the distinguished junior Senator from Georgia (Mr. Nunn) on the splendid speech he has just made. I think it reflects a great deal of consideration, thought, and preparation. I think that he has touched on a very important matter, one which is of great interest not only to those of us who serve here in the Senate, but also to all of the American people. I commend him for his foresight, vision, and for his constructive proposals.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a summary of the bill and the resolution, as well as the measures themselves, be printed in the RECORD immediately following my remarks.
(There being no objection, the bill and summary were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
S. 565 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Expenditure Control Act of 1973".
SEC. 2. After the submission of the Budget of the United States Government by the President for each fiscal year (beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974), the Congress shall, by law, prescribe a limit on the total amount of outlays (including net lending) to be made by the United States Government during such fiscal year.
SEC. 3. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), it shall not be in order, in either the Senate or the House of Representatives, to consider any bill or joint resolution providing new obligational authority for any fiscal year (beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974) prior to the date of the enactment of a law prescribing, pursuant to section 2, a limit on the total amount of outlays to be made by the United States Government during such fiscal year.
(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to any new obligational authority requested by the President if, in submitting the request, the President certifies that a major disaster or other emergency requires the prompt enactment of legislation providing such new obligational authority.
(c) Subsection (a) shall not be construed to preclude the holding of hearing3 or other consideration by any committee of the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any Joint Committee of the two Houses, with respect to proposed new obligational authority, proposed outlays, and estimated revenues set forth in the Budget by the United States Government submitted by the President for any fiscal year.
(d) This section is enacted by the Congress
(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking powers of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such they shall be considered as part of the rules of each House, respectively, and such rules shall supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and
(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change such rules (so far as relating to the procedure in such House) at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of such House.
SEC. 4. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President shall, in accordance with subsection (b), reserve from expenditure, from new obligational authority or other obligational authority otherwise available, such amounts as may be necessary to keep outlays during a fiscal year within the limit on the total amount of outlays prescribed by law for that fiscal year pursuant to subsection 2.
(b) In carrying out the provisions of subsection (a) for any fiscal year, the President shall reserve amounts proportionately from new obligational authority and obligational authority available for such fiscal year for each functional category (as set forth in the Budget), except that obligational authority for outlays which, within the meaning of the Budget, are not controllable shall not be taken into account.
(c) In the administration of any program as to which
(1) the amount of expenditures for any fiscal year is limited pursuant to subsection (a), and
(2) the allocation, grant, apportionment, or other distribution of funds among recipients is required to be determined by application of a formula involving the amount appropriated or otherwise made available for distribution for such fiscal year, the amount available for expenditure (as determined by the President pursuant to this section) shall be substituted for the amount appropriated or otherwise made available in the application of the formula.
SUMMARY OF S. BILL 565 PRESCRIBING A CEILING ON EXPENDITURES
Section 1. Title.
Section 2. After the President submits his budget the Congress shall, by law, establish a limit on the amount of outlays (including net lending) to be made by the government,
Section 3(a) No bill or resolution providing for new obligational authority shall be in order until the limit is fixed by law, as above.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) the President may request new obligational authority if such additional funds are needed because of a major disaster or other emergency, and he so certifies the same to Congress.
(c) Subsection (a) shall not preclude any Senate or House committee or joint committee from holding hearings as to proposed outlays, proposed new obliga. tional authority, or estimated revenues.
(d) Subsection 3 as enacted pursuant to the rule making power of the Senate and House of Representatives and supercede any conflicting rules.
Section 4(a) Requires the President to establish a reserve from expenditures, new obligational authority or other obligational authority. The reserve is to prevent outlays from exceeding the ceiling established in Section 2.
(b) In establishing the above reserve the President shall reserve the same from each functional category on a pro rata basis (except that outlays which are not controllable shall not be considered.)
(c) Where a program requires that funds are to be distributed to recipients, according to a formula, the same formula ratio shall apply to the amount of funds available for distribution pursuant to the established limit.
SENATE RESOLUTION 36-SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION PRESCRIBING CERTAIN
PROCEDURES FOR THE SENATE (Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.) Mr. Nunn. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and my colleague, the senior Senator from Georgia (Mr. Talmadge) I submit a resolution prescribing proce dures for the Senate to establish a limit on the amount of new obligational authority which it will approve for each fiscal year. I ask unanimous consent that a summary of the resolution and the resolution be printed in the Record.
(There being no objection, the resolution and summary, were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:)
S. RES. 36
BESOLUTION PRESCRIBING PROCEDURES FOR THE SENATE TO ESTABLISH A LIMIT ON THE
AMOUNT OF NEW OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY WHICH IT WILL APPROVE FOR EACH FISCAL YEAR
Resolved, That (a) upon the submission of the Budget of the United States Government by the President for each fiscal year (beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974), the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Finance, acting jointly, shall promptly review the Budget, and, in particular, shall review requests for new obligational authority, taking into account proposed outlays and estimated revenues for that fiscal year. As soon