is look over the shoulder of the department of motor

hy it is easy to get the cooperation of the executive branch budget officer in the department of motor vehicles doesn't e an enemy of the legislative analyst.

n ULLMAN. I wonder if there would be any confusion on 1 level having a congressional analyst sitting in on the process?

s. I don't think he actually sits in when the head of the t is discussing with his own budget people his plan but ery closely with the budget person from the department. I budget person from the department finds out it is best to with the budget analyst.

n ULLMAN. A lot would depend on the caliber of the perthere. It is a rather powerful position wouldn't you agree? s. It is very powerful.

NEEBELI. What is he paid?

cs. I can't really say. I would say $38,000 or $40,000, which he State level.

an ULLMAN. Could you possibly get into a situation where n analyst who was oriented philosophically toward heavier res in the social security area, or roads, or some other area bias might show that in his report?

ES. You always get that: Everyone has some kind of prejt if he is too prejudiced he wouldn't be rehired as an analyst. alyst will get into policy matters, but the legislator has to final decision. I have known of some analysts who had very ejudices. I had to fight for 2 years to get fireplaces in the Institution in Corona. The legislative analyst said no; in he per-square-foot cost it runs it up too much.

now, we get into shouting matches. But again I would lay my 1 to protect that office to make sure it is a bipartisan office. to a lot of controversy, but I think this is needed if you going to get a good solid look at the budget.

HNEEBELI. What is his term of office?

ES. He has been there for 20 years.

nan ULLMAN. And he survived Democrats, RepublicansCES. Anybody who could survive California in the last 8 years vive anything.

or BENNETT. Who appoints him?

EES. Technically he is appointed by the Joint Budget Comve assemblymen and five senators. As I say, there was 1 year th Governor Reagan and the Democratic speaker both tried d of him-which shows he must be doing a pretty good job. nan ULLMAN. In other words, his strength lies in the fact is not in the legislative branch, but is an independent? EES. No, he is hired by the legislative branch. In fact, the ve analyst has an office here in Washington.

man ULLMAN. How would he compare with the Federal Res rd status here?

EES. No, any time the joint committee wanted to meet and fire y could do it.

or BENNETT. He is compared with Larry Woodworth?

Mr. REES. Yes, he would be a good example.

Chairman ULLMAN. We are proposing a joint staff for the Budg Committees and presumably this would be the director of the joi

staff.

All right. You have been extremely helpful, Tom. We apprecia it very much.

Chairman WHITTEN. The analyst, of course, would be appointe by and be responsible only to the Congress.

Chairman ULLMAN. Yes, absolutely.

Chairman WHITTEN. The selection might be by the two Budg Committees but he would serve in a joint-staff capacity.

Mr. REES. Yes. Larry Woodworth would be a good example. Senator BENNETT. His predecessor was here for 30 years or so wit the same reputation.

Mr. REES. Yes. I think that can be done here.

Chairman WHITTEN. Thank you very much. I don't want to tak more of your time, but I concur with my colleagues; it was quit interesting and informative.

Mr. REES. If you would like, I could bring the legislative analys out here or you could visit California and come to Sacramento.

Chairman WHITTEN. Fine. When you said you had $800 millio in the bank as a surplus, if was evident we could profit here from California's experience.

Mr. REES. Thank you very much.

Chairman WHITTEN. We next have Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia and it is with great pleasure the committee welcomes the Senator her today.

STATEMENT OF HON. SAM NUNN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF GEORGIA

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the com mittee, I have enjoyed very much hearing that dialog regarding the California budgetary process. We have some of the same things in the State of Georgia, although our analyst just came on board in the last couple of years and before I begin my statement, I would say it has done more for the independence of the legislative branch in reality as well as in theory as any single thing we have ever done.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity of appearing before this group today concerning the crucial question of budgetary reform in Congress.

Since I have taken the liberty of previously furnishing each member of the committee with copies of my fiscal proposals, I will not dwell upon them in this testimony today, but will instead submit them for the record, and discuss them today only in summary form.

[The document follows:]

By Mr. NUNN (for himself and Mr. TALMADGE):

S. 565. A bill to require the Congress to prescribe a ceiling on expenditures for each fiscal year and to establish procedures to effectuate such ceilings. Referred to the Committee on Government Operations.

BUDGET AND EXPENDITURES CEILINGS

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, the most crucial domestic problem facing our Nation

tion are fed up with wild Government spending and priorities which ed many times by the pressures of the moment.

tions and expenditures now appear to have little or no relevancy to planning. If we are to curb inflation and control the national debt, ist fulfill its duty. We must begin to control the appropriations and ures of the Government, in practice as well as theory.

inced that the people of this Nation want a budget which is not innd which requires no tax increase, and I am certain that my cole that opinion. I am also convinced that the vast majority of Amerivith the constitutional principle requiring that priorities of expendiy the legislative branch. However, the people of this Nation recognize ss has in reality lost control of the budget, and I believe that most refer Executive control of expenditures rather than no control at all. is public mood may be dangerous from a constitutional point of eve that it is a reality. Mr. President, the time has come for Congress its proper constitutional responsibility of controlling the budget and rities of expenditures that will not be altered by Executive whim, - case today.

have recently seen that the President has stepped forward and filled I left by our own inaction. The executive branch has impounded funds own priorities, completely independent of legislative intent. America's affairs and priorities of expenditures are now being decided by facecrats who are not elected or even known by the American people. mbers of the Senate agree that the tilt of power has shifted too far executive branch. We hear every day many cries for Congress to again constitutional powers. Mr. President. we have two clear choices, as I We can place sole blame on the Executive and ignore our own failings, reassert our own constitutional prerogatives by adopting methods and s leading to a rational budgetary process which will enjoy the confie American people. The shift in the exercise of constitutional authority ngress can only take place with a renewed assertion by Congress of its onal responsibility over the budget.

sident, toward these ends, I am today introducing a resolution which s a new rule of the Senate to make bills containing new obligational not in order until we in the Senate establish a limit on the amount ligational authority which the Senate will approve for the fiscal year. lution requires that the Committee on Appropriations and the ComFinance, acting jointly, report to the Senate for its approval a resolug forth an appropriation ceiling for the fiscal year.

by the adoption of this rule show to all concerned that the U.S. Senate sponsible in the management of the fiscal affairs of our Nation. By taking we will clearly demonstrate that we are capable of self-discipline, and e will clearly require a ceiling on new obligational authority. izing that the Congress must also establish an expenditure ceiling if o be any meaningful attempt by the Congress to regulate Government I have also introduced today a bill to be cited as the "Expenditure Act of 1973." This bill creates a rule in both Houses of Congress requiring . after the submission of the budget by the President each fiscal year, ibe a limit on the total amount of outlays to be made by the Governing such fiscal year. The consideration of any bill or joint resolution g new obligational authority would not be in order until the Congress ribed by law the limit on total outlays to be made in the fiscal year. er to regulate expenditures, the Expenditure Control Act of 1973 also the Preisdent to regulate outlays in accordance with congressional prioriny expenditures would exceed the limit set by Congress, the President, ing out the provisions of this act, would be required to reserve amounts onately in each functional category of the budget. This bill would assure legislative priorities be adhered to by preventing the arbitrary impoundfunds by the President and by requiring pro rata reductions by the e branch.

resident, I submit that the resolution and bill being introduced today ave the following positive and practical results:

The people of this Nation will know how each and every Senator votes ar on the most crucial of all domestic legislative decisions-the total to be spent by the U.S. Government in each fiscal year.

d. More meaningful priorities will necessarily result from an overall limit opriations. The proponents of various appropriation measures will have

the burden not only of justifying the particular request for obligational authorit but also of presenting a case when weighed against other requests.

Third. The Appropriations Committee and the Finance Committee will ear contribute their expertise in recommending the limit to the Senate.

Fourth. The overall appropriations measures will by necessity have to be pr sented together rather than piecemeal, which is now the case, because of practic considerations. We will have in effect one appropriation bill which will be pr sented to this body.

Fifth. The legislative branch, rather than the executive branch, will be settin priorities for obligational authority as well as the expenditure outlays, th fulfilling the intent of the Constitution.

Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to favorably consider these two companic proposals which will result in a more responsible and responsive legislativ branch.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I wish to congratulate the distinguishe junior Senator from Georgia (Mr. NUNN) on the splendid speech he has jus made. I think it reflects a great deal of consideration, thought, and preparation I think that he has touched on a very important matter, one which is of grea interest not only to those of us who serve here in the Senate, but also to all c the American people. I commend him for his foresight, vision, and for his co structive proposals.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a summary of th bill and the resolution, as well as the measures themselves, be printed in th RECORD immediately following my remarks.

(There being no objection, the bill and summary were ordered to be printe in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 565

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United State of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Expendi ture Control Act of 1973".

SEC. 2. After the submission of the Budget of the United States Governmen by the President for each fiscal year (beginning with the fiscal year endin June 30, 1974), the Congress shall, by law, prescribe a limit on the total amoun of outlays (including net lending) to be made by the United States Governmen during such fiscal year.

SEC. 3. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), it shall not be in order, i either the Senate or the House of Representatives, to consider any bill or join resolution providing new obligational authority for any fiscal year (beginnin with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974) prior to the date of the enactment o a law prescribing, pursuant to section 2, a limit on the total amount of outlay to be made by the United States Government during such fiscal year.

(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to any new obligationa authority requested by the President if, in submitting the request, the Presiden certifies that a major disaster or other emergency requires the prompt enact ment of legislation providing such new obligational authority.

(c) Subsection (a) shall not be construed to preclude the holding of hearing or other consideration by any committee of the Senate or the House of Repre sentatives, or any Joint Committee of the two Houses, with respect to propose new obligational authority, proposed outlays, and estimated revenues set fort in the Budget by the United States Government submitted by the President fo any fiscal year.

(d) This section is enacted by the Congress—

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking powers of the Senate and the House o Representatives, respectively, and as such they shall be considered as part o the rules of each House, respectively, and such rules shall supersede othe rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to chang such rules (so far as relating to the procedure in such House) at any time, i the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of suc House.

SEC. 4. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Presiden shall, in accordance with subsection (b), reserve from expenditure, from new obligational authority or other obligational authority otherwise available, suc amounts as may be necessary to keep outlays during a fiscal year within th limit on the total amount of outlays prescribed by law for that fiscal year pur suant to subsection 2.

rrying out the provisions of subsection (a) for any fiscal year, the all reserve amounts proportionately from new obligational authorgational authority available for such fiscal year for each functional s set forth in the Budget), except that obligational authority for ch, within the meaning of the Budget, are not controllable shall into account.

è administration of any program as to which—

amount of expenditures for any fiscal year is limited pursuant to (a), and

Allocation, grant, apportionment, or other distribution of funds among s required to be determined by application of a formula involving : appropriated or otherwise made available for distribution for such

t available for expenditure (as determined by the President pursuant tion) shall be substituted for the amount appropriated or otherwise able in the application of the formula.

MARY OF S. BILL 565 PRESCRIBING A CEILING ON EXPENDITURES

1. Title.

2. After the President submits his budget the Congress shall, by law, a limit on the amount of outlays (including net lending) to be made ernment.

3(a) No bill or resolution providing for new obligational authority order until the limit is fixed by law, as above.

twithstanding subsection (a) the President may request new obligahority if such additional funds are needed because of a major disaster mergency, and he so certifies the same to Congress.

section (a) shall not preclude any Senate or House committee or joint › from holding hearings as to proposed outlays, proposed new obligahority, or estimated revenues.

bsection 3 as enacted pursuant to the rule making power of the Senate e of Representatives and supercede any conflicting rules.

4(a) Requires the President to establish a reserve from expenditures, gational authority or other obligational authority. The reserve is to utlays from exceeding the ceiling established in Section 2.

establishing the above reserve the President shall reserve the same from ctional category on a pro rata basis (except that outlays which are not ble shall not be considered.)

here a program requires that funds are to be distributed to recipients, g to a formula, the same formula ratio shall apply to the amount of ailable for distribution pursuant to the established limit.

RESOLUTION 36-SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION PRESCRIBING CERTAIN PROCEDURES FOR THE SENATE

red to the Committee on Rules and Administration.)

UNN. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and my colleague, the senior from Georgia (Mr. Talmadge) I submit a resolution prescribing procer the Senate to establish a limit on the amount of new obligational auwhich it will approve for each fiscal year. I ask unanimous consent that ary of the resolution and the resolution be printed in the Record.

e being no objection, the resolution and summary, were ordered to be in the Record, as follows:)

S. RES. 36

ION PRESCRIBING PROCEDURES FOR THE SENATE TO ESTABLISH A LIMIT ON THE NT OF NEW OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY WHICH IT WILL APPROVE FOR EACH YEAR

ved, That (a) upon the submission of the Budget of the United States nent by the President for each fiscal year (beginning with the fiscal ding June 30, 1974), the Committee on Appropriations and the CommitFinance, acting jointly, shall promptly review the Budget, and, in ar, shall review requests for new obligational authority, taking into proposed outlays and estimated revenues for that fiscal year. As soon