7, the Congressional appropriations process begins when the Press the budget to Congress. It is at this time that the Congress ly exhibit much more responsibility. My bill, H.R. 4053, provides than 90 days after the President's budget has been received, the Appropriations is to review and study the budget-consult with he Committee on Ways and Means, the Senate Finance CommitJoint Economic Committee and submit to the House of Repreresolution containing its recommendations for a comprehensive appropriations. The House then has 30 days in which to adopt a › limit for that fiscal year. Once all appropriations bills have been Congress, prior to adjournment sine die, shall conform those apo such limit by reducing unobligated appropriations, I have proentage formula by which the total appropriations for such fiscal omatically be cut. In your deliberations, I urge you to review and anguage, which has been co-sonsored by Mr. Brown of California, 1, Mr. Leggett, Mr. Mann, Mr. McSpadden, Mr. Riegle, Mr. Thone, ey. nan, Members of the Committee, everyone recognizes Congress' eal with Federal spending in the past. I am now hopeful that of this Committee will lead to a much needed re-structuring of udget system. IT BY MURRAY L. WEIDENBAUM, MALLINCKRODT DISHED UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR AT WASHINGTON UNI7 AND ADJUNCT SCHOLAR AT THE AMERICAN ENTERNSTITUTE A BUDGET SCORECARD FOR THE CONGRESS he current discussion on improving the Congressional consideration et has focused on the need to relate congressional actions on individiations to the budget totals. Consolidated appropriation bills and expenditures appear to be the two approaches that have gained the rt. Although both of these suggestions have merit, they have been in ebates for a long period of time without becoming a permanent part etary process. In fact, both of them have been tried, the omnibus bill - 1950's and the expenditure ceiling in the late 1940's. nodest but desirable reform could be instituted fairly quickly and thout raising the objections that the existing proposals usually enhe Congress should utilize the device of a "Budgetary Scorecard" ld show currently the effect of individual budget decisions on the e of federal finances. roach differs from most of the other suggested budget reforms in that ot alter the existing organizational structure of the Congress or the ch actions are taken on individual bills. Rather, the scorecard would ytical tool which could be used by the existing committees of the s they follow existing procedures, as well as by individual members rticipate in debates on the floor of the Congress. ssence, this mechanism would enable each Congressional committee a given item to treat it as the incremental case. But it would merely rmational aid to the members, rather than any dictum from on high. contains such an illustrative budgetary scorecard. Several assumpbeen made in filling out the hypothetical scorecard: t some congressional committee or staff-a point to which I will resupplied the revisions from the original Presidential estimates. t the estimated deficit for the budget year (1974) has been increased ore liberal congressional action on previous items--the scorecard of ald work just as well if the case were the reverse. y, the type of information in Table 1 would show the congressional acting on the proposed appropriation for the procurement of aircraft Revenues are estimated to come in more slowly than projected in the 2) Congressional action to date has increased the prospective deficits liberal attitude on expenditures, and (3) the specific item under con sideration, if enacted at the currently recommended level, would raise the budget deficit for 1974 further still. Moreover, (4) the surplus that the Administration has targeted for the following year is not likely to be achieved. It is problematical whether the presentation of such data would, in fact, have any influence upon the deliberations of individual committees or the votes of individual members of the Congress. It would, nevertheless, provide a simple technique and substantiating figures for specific members of these and other committees who desired some analytical support for their positions. At the least, the scorecard would be a means of appraising the effects of each individual fiscal action on the total budget outcome. TABLE 1.-ILLUSTRATIVE BUDGETARY SCORECARD Note.-Increased deficit will require higher taxes or larger public debt. The scoreboard could be used in conjunction with actions on a variety of expenditure authorization, appropriation, and revenue bills. Hence, it would maintain constantly for the attention of the Congress a recording of the ebb and flow of the current status of the budget picture for the ensuing fiscal year. The trend of congressional actions toward a higher level of spending (and a resultant larger deficit) would be revealed during rather than after the completion of the decision-making process. The scorecard approach, by itself, would be politically neutral. It could be used at the present time by those concerned with minimizing the federal deficit and thus dampening down inflationary pressures. It also could be used by advocates of a larger public sector, particularly in a recessionary period where greater amounts of fiscal stimulus were desired. The current reporting of budgetary action should not be limited to pending action by the appropriations and tax-writing committees, but should also be utilized by the substantive committees considering basic program legislationagriculture, commerce, etc. Thus, the birthstage of government spending programs, now often relatively immune from budgetary considerations, would be exposed to the type of financial concerns currently shared mainly by the appropriations and revenue committees. The scorecard could be maintained by the staffs, possibly augmented, of the Appropriations Committees of each chamber. Alternatively, the task could be assigned to a new Joint Committee on the Budget, should the Congress decide to establish one. Another possibility would be to build on the Scorekeeping Report now issued by the Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures and the revenue estimates of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation. Also, the considerable capabilities of the General Accounting Office could be drawn upon. T ON IMPROVING CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETARY CON- al Chamber appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Interim ent, that since the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of dividually, the recommendations of the committee could effect subcedural reform in the budgetary process. But viewed in toto, the overould be far less beneficial. This is because of basic inconsistencies e of the specific proposals, as set forth in House Report 93-13. with recommendation number one that the Congress should appros within a framework encompassing not only program needs but also cal and monetary policies. We feel that the procedure outlined in duced by Senator William Brock (R.-Tenn.) and in the House bills 1.R. 2406 and H.R. 2407, sponsored by Representative Kenneth Robin.), H.R. 5388 sponsored by Representative Charles Bennett (D.-Fla.) , constitutes an adequate basis for a legislative budget and would comprehensive framework for implementation of a "budget policy" in tive branch. Having a budget policy would place Congress in the posiermining priorities within the limit of a federal expenditure ceiling. c deficits that the federal government has incurred over the last two sulted directly from failure to identify program costs and to finance creases through tax increases. Through chronic deficits, the governconcealed the connection between increased taxes and a proliferation ent programs. endorse the spirit of recommendation number two which seeks to · present system of "backdoor spending" that circumvents the approprocess by obligating public funds via legislative rather than approbills. It is an essential element of good budgeting that all program appropriated and that all appropriations be considered as part of a onomic policy. r, after proposing stringent controls on expenditures in recommendaand two, the Committee waters down these controls by calling for expenditure ceiling in the third recommendation. Under the flexible ceillure, a system of exclusions could be set up whereby a ceiling arrived h careful consideration of all economic factors would be negated by onal whim. This indeed has been the case with earlier budget ceilings. irth recommendation which calls "for allocating the appropriate porxpenditure and budget authority ceilings to various committees . . ." ult in a rigid system of priority determination. In fact, such a pro conomist, Chamber of Commerce of the United States. cedure might even limit the flexibility that Congress has shown in redirecting major part of new government expenditures from defense to human resources i a mere five years. For example, between 1968 and 1973 defense expenditure declined from 45 to 30 per cent of a growing budget while human resource ex penditures rose from 32 to 47 per cent. If Congress were to set up a syster whereby authorization of expenditures was parceled out among several commit tees after agreement on a ceiling, the relative distribution of expenditures amon the various functions would tend to be rigid, thereby inhibiting large functiona shifts in short periods of time. The fifth recommendation-to develop procedures "to assure compliance wit expenditure and budget authority ceilings" is of utmost importance. For example it would be in order for Congress to require a two-thirds vote, rather than a sim ple majority, to rescind the budget limit for any year. As another example, unde the present budgetary procedure, committees originally intended to develop technical budgetary expertise have become bastions of advocacy for specia programs and special interests. If meaningful budgetary reform is to be achieved the present must give way to procedures which place greater emphasis on tota programs and which weigh national priorities rather than individual committed preferences. It is clear that this can be done only if Congress is willing to show the courage that the President must show each year, that is, come up with a budget total consistent with stable economic growth, allocate expenditures or the basis of that total, and take a stand on an overall national program rather than continue the present piecemeal approach to formulating the budget. Implementing this recommendation will not be easy. Sometimes it will mean supporting budget cuts, sometimes it will mean confronting the voters with the choice the President has laid before us in his fiscal 1974 budget either accept specific program cuts or accept a 15 per cent income tax increase. The sixth recommendation calling for "procedures. . . to present to Congress the effect of expenditures of existing and proposed legislation, not only in the current year but also for three to five years ahead" is especially important when one considers the fact that, during the first five years after enactment, the cost of federal programs increase at an average rate of 100 per cent per year. Programs are enacted with little regard for, or knowledge of, their ultimate costs to the taxpayer. This longer range perspective on the federal budget and program expenditures is essential for proper economic planning and is accepted budgetary practice in large business corporations. Title II of S. 40, and its counterpart bills in the House, constitutes a sensible set of guidelines for presenting five-year projections. As is pointed out in Title II, in addition to these cost projections there should also be provided "a list of existing and proposed federal programs which provide or would provide financial assistance for the objectives of the program or programs authorized..." The provisions of Title II are particularly important in keeping track of duplicative programs and in avoiding further duplication. Emphasis must also be shifted from agency budgeting to program budgeting in order to provide the greatest degree of flexibility in meeting national goals. The seventh recommendation is that "an organization to implement the control procedures . . . should encompass the formation of permanent legislative committees on the budget." Implementation of this recommendation would center responsibility for fiscal and economic policy, as it relates to the budget, on a single committee in each House. This means that some committees will be giving up a portion of their control over the budget, a shift in power that will be partially compensated for by representation, on that single committee, from the tax writing and appropriations committees in that House. Presumably the two legislative committees would meet in conference to settle any differences they might have in their budgetary decisions. The eighth recommendation calling for adequate professional staffing is essential if Congress wishes to make sure its decisions are based on analysis by expert professionals comparable to those currently employed in the executive branch. It might be possible to avoid some duplication of staff if the Office of Management and Budget were to make available for analytical purposes some of it's resources, such as access to a common computer and access to its own specialized staff. It is difficult to quarrel with the ninth recommendation calling for periodic Congressional review of the different ways in which budget authority and expenditures are authorized or incurred. The tenth recommendation-generally to require authorizations at least one year in advance for expenditures-would allow Congress to conduct proper hear gh alternatives prior to committing itself to programs. If Congress r the budget within the context of comprehensive economic, fiscal, y policy as it should, authorizations should be completed prior to the each fiscal year. n to the recommendations set forth in the report, the following rebudgetary process, included in S. 40, H.R. 975 and H.R. 5388, should d by the Committee not only to insure an efficient public expenditure also to economize on the use of all public funds: ion of zero-based budgeting.-Under the zero-based budgeting concept Title III of the above-mentioned bills, Congress would be required to expenditure programs in their entirety at least once every three years. this procedure could reverse the trend toward more numerous and ive public programs regardless of their relative effectiveness. Under system, new programs are added without proper attention to existing hose effectiveness has not been adequately evaluated. Zero-based when combined with substantive program review, could result in of duplication, elimination of programs that have accomplished their als and elimination of ineffective programs. esting of new programs.-Pilot testing is provided for in Title IV of entioned bills. Prior to implementation on a national scale, programs lot tested in several geographic locations. The results would be audited d would be evaluated in terms of cost effectiveness and suitability of ng the program nationally. If the new program embodies a different o old problems already the subject of some other government program, cost-effectiveness comparison of both the current and proposed methods with such problems would be made. Pilot testing would give Congress ea of eventual program costs prior to implementation. It would also modification or elimination of ineffective proposed programs before op a large constituency. Frequently, sizeable supporting constituencies, n proof of effectiveness, cause program confirmation. s has final responsibility for the budget. No fiscal activity can be a without Congressional approval. But Congress has failed to equip the necessary internal organization and the increasingly complex nt tools necessary to effectively manage federal finances. The Comrogram of procedural reform would go far toward redressing this between Congressional power and Congressional performance in the ea. Therefore, the National Chamber generally endorses the recoms in the Joint Committee's report but urges that the inconsistencies emoved and that serious consideration be given to adding recommendazero-based budgeting and pilot testing contained in S. 40, H.R. 975, and H.R. 5388. MENT OF LAWRENCE D. PRATT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE UNION erican Conservation Union is greatly concerned by the size of the udget and the uncontrollable method by which it is drawn up. nterim Report on "Improving Congressional Control over Budgetary and Receipt Totals" addresses an important aspect of congressional f the budget. It is crucial that Congress effectively carry out this con1 delegation of authority. ssional control of the federal budget, although a substantive procedural uld not be considered in merely technical terms. The overriding issue oper size of the national income of a free society that should be congovernment. Congress cannot control the budget if it refuses to control f the federal bureaucracy. have already reached a level where talk of "tax rebellion" is beginning è air. If this trend continues much longer it is all too likely that even e functions of government could lose the support of the governed in an d revolt against true grievances. Certainly it is a just complaint of the jority of taxpaying Americans that a large portion of the time they work. instead of producing income for the support of their families, in costly government programs that either do not work or cause actual |