Once we get it, we have hearings in the Appropriations Committee d obviously people get a chance to be heard. But the very impact this budget coming here is so powerful, it is such a major document id it carries the President's budget message, it commands the atntion of the news. It is 95 percent passed by the time it gets here. seems to me we have to open it up a little bit ahead of time and one the purposes of our Office of Budget is to work with the Office of udget and Management even in the preliminary preparation of the udget before it gets down here. And also to open up these hearings the OMB level where you have departmental budgets being prented so that somebody can come on in and make their presentation r at least notify Governors.

We want to notify the Governors that there is a budget 6 months rior to the presentation of the budget, that they can be heard from and at the OMB would be willing to listen to what they have to say. That part of opening up the process.

I don't think that is the most significant thing here, but it lends a ttle something more meaningful.

I see my good friend, Senator Young, here. I venture to say not a ingle farm or commodity group has ever had a chance to present their iews as to what ought to go into an agriculture budget before we et it.

I believe also it would not be a bad idea for this Office of Budget and Evaluation to be able to have some signed recommendations itself beore the federal budget comes down here. I am not saying it is a curell. I think it makes some sense.

Senator YOUNG. I think if they consult us, we could help them accomplish the same thing in a less painful way.

Mr. JAMES BROYHILL. So what happens if you get a Presidential veto on this? Do we start over?

Senator HUMPHREY. You mean on the budget ceiling?

Mr. JAMES BROYHILL. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. Your point is well raised, I think, Congressman. I think we could establish the congressional budget ceiling for our own satisfaction without a Presidential signature.

I see your point and it might be very well if we modify it accordingly.

Chairman WHITTEN. Mr. Schneebeli.

Mr. SCHNEEBELI. I think it is obvious how important our study is, especially in view of our first eight witnesses, from Chairman Burns to the Senator from Minnesota and my friend from Pennsylvania.

I don't think any of us wants to write our constituency and say we don't know how to control the budget. I think we have to come up with something responsible.

I think all of the witnesses have made valuable contributions to our effort to solve the problems we face.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Let me say I commend all of you on this joint committee for taking this extremely difficult subject and starting to wrestle with it.

Mr. SCHNEEBELI. Congress has put itself on a spot and had better do something about it.

Chairman WHITTEN. Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. I was interested, Senator, in your colloquy y man Mahon.

I gather from some of the things he has indicated that he self philosophically opposed to the impoundments of fund think he recognizes that we have had some problems with tions up here on the Hill that sort of made that a necessit

I think we in the legislative branch do find ourselves difficult position on this issue, from trying to raise it as a co matter as far as the power of the Executive, and I notice th a position that with some congressional guidelines that nothing inherently wrong with the idea of an Executive cei results in the impoundment of funds, but I think the difficu ourselves in in attempting to raise this as a constitutional whole history of this issue, both in our mother country and been an Executive that wanted to spend more money and a branch that was reluctant to provide those funds.

Now we find ourselves on sort of the opposite side of the You suggested Presidential impoundment within a guid Senator HUMPHREY. No; not just a guideline. I do not sup idential impoundment simply because it may be sound fiscal that is not to be constitutional.

I think that if we had impoundment, if the Congress as it end of the year sees that its appropriations or its spending a greater than its spending ceiling, it has two choices, either to spending ceiling-three choices to revise the spending make reductions across the board, or wherever it wishes to appropriations, or thirdly, to authorize the President by sional act, under certain terms and guidelines to make a cuts. That then fits within the power of the purse, within th balance of powers.

I have to say most respectfully that as I see it and I ar picking on this President because people have asked me a times “did you have any argument with President Johnso haven't tried to spend my time trying to talk about any dif might have had with that very good and fine friend and g But we did have one difference. And that was over impoundi that was known by members of the administration at that cause I felt that this was beyond what we ought to be doi executive level and you may know at least the President di with the leaders of Congress and later on came back and authority on impoundment.

That is just my own personal position.

Congressman Davis, I just feel Congress has to be fiscall sible and if it isn't, if it gets out of hand anyplace, it eithe No. 1, raise the spending ceiling so it is honest with the publi cut its own appropriations to the spending ceiling: or third. the President under guidelines which would not permit an ite reduce the spending.

Mr. DAVIS. Let's take a historical precedent that we have about.

I think they referred to President Jefferson impounding f had been appropriated for some gunboats. He didn't spend th because the need for the gunboats had passed.

If we attempt to set any guidelines like a percentage of or something of this kind, we would then be saying to President Jefferson, whether hose gunboats are needed or not, you can't cut more than 10 percent out of the funds for those gunboats. How do we get around that problem?

Senator HUMPHREY. We have taken care of that and we have already, may I say, set guidelines in the Anti-Deficiency Acts of 1905 and 1906 as amended in 1950 and there is some authorization for Presidential impoundments.

There are several reasons for it. For example, Presidential impoundment for a more systematic apportionment of the funds through a fiscal year, where efficiencies can be obtained and the purposes of the program fulfilled without the full expenditure of the funds.

And there are two or three other things. So we could set those guidelines. I grant you that the Jeffersonian one certainly clouded this issue. and I think many of us argue around here what we think is constitutional.

There has been quite a little argument up and down the years and I have to look at it from my point of view and this is such a pressing power that we have on the one hand and so vital, this power of the purse, that it is my judgment that no matter what has happened in the past, when we get up to budgets of $300 billion, which is, as we look ahead with inflation and with our growing population, et cetera, it is such a vast amount of total gross national product that we must not permit that kind of power to be used without very careful controls and understandings and standards between the Congress and the President. It is just my view of it. You know, somebody once said, the way you stand is the way you sit. I suppose when the President gets over in the White House-I kind of manoeuvered that way myself. I kept missing the boat, however. I suppose I might have looked at it a little differently right there-but from where I sit, I am not for giving the President impoundment powers without express congressional authority.

Mr. MOORHEAD. May I say, Mr. Chairman, I hope that this special Joint Committee will do everything it can to preserve and strengthen the powers of the Congress, the legislative branch, which has been declining over the years.

I hope that you consider that as your No. 1 priority.

Mr. DAVIS. I am just as jealous of the powers of Congress as anybody, but I am also gravely concerned for the lack of responsibility on the part of Congress which has made this impoundment a necessity. I don't know how to get around it. I don't think that setting percentage guidelines is going to get around it.

Maybe if we exercise our power in a responsible fashion, then the President wouldn't need to use that power.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think that is basically true, but again I say I do not want to give the power to the President willy-nilly to cancel out any program he wants to simply in the name of what he calls fiscal integrity.

We haven't got any fiscal integrity from the executive branch. They keep sending down deficit budgets. We call them full employment budgets now. Isn't it interesting that we get scolded because we appropriate more than the President asks for and the President asks

for more than there is money to pay for. Who is lacking in call integrity or responsibility?

We appropriate more than the President asks for but dent asks for more than the country is paying for.

Mr. SCHNEEBELI. Then we are worse than the President. Senator HUMPHREY. It is a question of degree. It seems to is very little evidence that indicates we have been very wil Mr. SCHNEEBELI. We have both been wrong. I would cons gress has gone beyond the President.

Chairman WHITTEN. I would like to recommend the gener of this committee which passed unanimously.

From the argument we are hearing now, you can see achievement that was.

Mr. JAMES BROYHILL. Could I ask one more question along We had a short discussion this morning as to whether or not v advocate item veto. I wonder if the Senator would have any on that, that maybe we would have a constitutional amen provide for item veto.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am opposed to it.

Mr. MOORHEAD. May I say to my friend from North Ca and I agree completely-I think this would increase the I the Executive way out of proportion.

Mr. JAMES BROYHILL. This would be better than impoundi least it would give the Congress the right to debate and hav on it.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes. I suppose diarrhea is better tha fever, but I prefer not to have either one.

Mr. JAMES BROYHILL. I just wonder, since the subject came you felt about it.

Senator HUMPHREY. I have felt that way since long bet discussion.

Mr. JAMES BROYHILL. One of the problems we have around these bigger and bigger bills come up. We have apples and ora in the same package. It sometimes makes it difficult to assess ju programs are in the bill.

Chairman WHITTEN. This committee, I repeat, is a stud mittee to come up with ways and means to get a firmer grasp gress of the budget process, and I believe we can.

You have contributed to it. Others will contribute to it, and t we know, the better can be our deliberations.

When we get through we will be trying to recommend a pla majority can agree on because only by its adoption will i helpful.

I think our report made it quite evident that our problem is ited to the appropriations process and the annual appropriatic When you realize only 44 percent of the outlays in the 1974 bus volve new appropriations to be reviewed by the Appropriation mittee, you can see the control problem also involves other ares Thank you for your contribution.

We will stand adjourned now until 10 a.m. tomorrow morn [Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to convened at 10 a.m., Wednesday, March 7, 1973.]

IMPROVING CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET CONTROL

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 7, 1973

U.S. CONGRESS,

JOINT STUDY COMMITTEE ON BUDGET CONTROL,

Washington, D.C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 1114 Dirksen Building, Hon. Jamie L. Whitten and Hon. Al Ullman, presiding.

Present: Representatives Whitten (presiding), Ullman (presiding), Schneebeli, James Broyhill, Rhodes, Davis, Mahon, and Senator Roth.

Chairman WHITTEN. Gentlemen, the committee will come to order. We have with us today a very distinguished official of the United States, and a long-time friend and acquaintance of most of us on the committee, Mr. Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General.

Mr. Staats, we on this committee are all familiar with your very excellent background and your capacity to discuss the problem that is before us.

I don't feel that we need to go into any detail about what the problem is preliminary to your presentation.

We are glad to have you here and we are glad that you accepted our invitation to come down and give us the benefit of your views. We will be glad to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF HON. ELMER STAATS, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. STAATS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am very happy to be here and talk on the subject which I have been interested in for a long time.

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss our thoughts on improving congressional control over the Federal budget.

We have reviewed the Interim Report of February 7, 1973, of the Joint Study Committee on Budget Control and we agree that if the Congress can devise workable procedures along the lines of the committee's 10 recommendations, congressional control over the Federal budget will be greatly strengthened.

As you will recognize, however, devising effective and acceptable new procedures will not be easy. My purpose here today is to provide our views on the preliminary report, to describe some of our operations that are directly pertinent to congressional budgetary control, and to suggest other ways in which we may improve our assistance.

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