his person is under such protection; and in respect of the public, the imputing corruption and the perversion of justice to him, in an order made by him at his chambers, is attended with much more mischievous consequences than a blow; and, therefore, the reason of proceeding in this summary manner applies with equal, if not superior, force to one case as well as the other. There is no greater obstruction to the execution of justice from the striking a judge, than from the abusing him, because his order lies open to be enforced or discharged, whether the judge is struck or abused for making it or not. It may, perhaps, merit a less punishment to libel a single judge in court or out of court, than to libel the whole court; but the question of the offense does not vary the mode of prosecuting it; it is an offense ejusdem generis, although inferioris gradus; and I cannot explore a single reason which can be urged to cover the judges in court against calumny and detraction for what they do there, which does not hold equally true, though in a less degree, when applied to what they do in their judicial capacities out of court."

106. III. Any publication pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the officers of the court, or the counsel, with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is a contempt of court, and punishable by attachment.1

A slur or innuendo cast upon a court by means of written matter, will be contemptuous. Thus, where an attorney wrote on the court docket, opposite the entry of a cause in which he was engaged, the words following:

1

1 Hollingsworth v. Duane, Wallace R. 77.

* People v. Freer, 1 Caines, 485, 518; Bayard v. Passmore,

Having become satisfied that we cannot get the law administered, by direction of the plaintiff I hereby dismiss this action, without prejudice to the plaintiff. Jos. SMITH,

For Plaintiff.

"March 6th, 1867.” It was held that the foreign and unnecessary matter, introduced into the order dismissing the suit, could only be regarded as a direct reflection on the integrity of the court. So in the matter of the high sheriff of Surrey, where a judge of assize ordered part of the court to be cleared on account of the noise made by the persons assembled there, and the high sheriff of the county caused a placard, signed by him, to be posted up in the town opposite the court, in which he recorded his protest against "this unlawful proceeding" of the learned judge, and said, "I have given directions that the court shall be opened again to the public according to the custom and the law. All persons, so long as they conduct themselves with decorum, have a lawful right to be present in court; and I hereby prohibit my officers from aiding and abetting any attempt to bar out the public from free access to the court": it was held to be a contempt of

court.

Threatening letters written to persons concerned in a trial, either as judge, parties, witnesses, solicitors, or jurymen, are alike contemptuous of the court, and there is no difference in the degree of the crime, whether it be to the officer or the person summoned."

3 Yeates, 439; Morrison v. Moor, 3 Edw. Ch. 25. In Passmore's Case, the matter was written with chalk on a blackboard.

1

2 F. & F. 237.

* Smith v. Lakeman, 26 L. J. 305, ch. -; Shaw v. Shaw, 31 L. J. Prob. 35; 6 L. T. N. S. 477; 2 S. & T. 515; re Mulock, 33 L. J. Prob. 205; 10 Jur. N. S. 1188.

107. And so any one sitting in the place or stead of a judge, will likewise be entitled to protection. Where a barrister and member of parliament who wrote a letter in threatening and insulting terms to a master in chancery, before whom he had appeared in support of a petition presented by himself and others, the tendency of the letter being to induce the master to alter the opinion he was supposed to have formed upon the case, he was committed by the Lord Chancellor (Cottenham) to the Fleet during pleas

ure.

His lordship saying: "the power of committal is given to courts of justice for the purpose of securing the better and more secure administration of justice. Every writing, letter, or publication which has for its object to divert the course of justice is a contempt of the court. It would be strange, indeed, if the judges of the court were the only persons not protected from libels, writings, and proceedings, the direct object of which is to pervert the cause of justice. Every insult offered to a judge in the exercise of the duties of his office is a contempt; but when the writing or publication proceeds further, and whennot by inference, but by plain and direct language-a threat is used, the object of which is to induce a judicial officer to depart from the course of his judicial duty, and to adopt a course he would not otherwise pursue, it is a contempt of the very highest order.'

1 Mr. Lechmere Charlton's Case, 2 My. & Cr. 316. Lord Abinger, C.B., and Alderson, B., seem to have taken a different view of the mode of dealing with insulting letters addressed to a judge, touching a matter under consideration. "I can only say," said Lord Abinger, "that if I received such a letter I should not consider myself at liberty to commit the writer." To which Alderson, B., added: "There would be a great many committals if such a course were pursued by the judges." "Do you mean to say," asked Lord Abinger of counsel, "that one of the judges has the power to fine a man

"The principle upon which attachments issue for libels upon courts,” said Wilmot, J., "is of a more enlarged and important nature (than that upon which attachments are granted in certain other cases)-it is to keep a blaze of glory around them, and to deter people from attempting to render them contemptible in the eyes of the public." The law cannot be understood as a respecter of persons, but she will very zealously respect her own instru

ments.

108. As to matters disrespectful to the court: It has been very recently held to be a contempt of court for counsel in a case to hand up to the court a written paper protesting against his hearing a certain case on the ground of his personal prejudice against the prisoner. And we think that the ruling is grounded in good sense. The statutes of the various states appear to enumerate the cases in which a judge shall be disqualified from sitting; but it does not appear to be just that counsel should be at liberty to conclude, from their own opinions, or from hearsay, or from matters not upon the record, that a certain judge is unfitted to preside at a trial. Though possibly the distinction might arise just here: that it would not be contemptuous for counsel to object to the judge's sitting, in the course of their argument, if they believed it for their client's interest so to do; but only when they went so far-upon such objection being overruled or ignored-to write out a paper in the form of a protest, and hand it to the judge, personally, upon the bench.1

for sending him a silly letter, or an impudent letter about any matter that he has decided? I can only say I should be very much afraid of exercising it" (See Rex v. Faulkner, 2 Mont. & Ayr. 321, 322).

1

1 People v. Tweed, Matter of Contempt, N. Y. S. C. 1874.

1

So, again, to write a letter to a judge, before whom a proceeding is depending, attempting to influence his decision therein; or to the foreman of a grand jury which has before it the case of one accused of an indictable offense.2

Where a barrister and attorney, not in his professional capacity, but in his private capacity as a suitor, in respect of a supposed grievance and injury done him as a suitor, wrote a letter to the chief justice of Nova Scotia, reflecting on the judges and the administration of justice generally in the court, the privy council held that an order suspending the writer from practicing in the court was not an appropriate punishment for the offense, and on that ground advised her Majesty to discharge the order.

3

"The letter," said Lord Westbury, in delivering the judgment of the privy council in that case, “was a contempt of court, which it was hardly possible for the court to omit taking cognizance of. It was an offense, however, committed by an individual in his capacity of a suitor in respect of his supposed rights as a suitor, and of an imaginary injury done to him as a suitor, and it had no connection whatever with his professional character, or anything done by him professionally either as an advocate or an attorney. It was a contempt of court committed by an individual in his personal character only. To offenses of that kind there has been attached by law and by long practice a definite kind of punishment, viz., fine and imprisonment. It must not, however, be supposed that 1 Ex parte McGill, 2 Fowl. 474; Eagleton v. Duchess of Kingston, 8 Ves. 467; Gould v. Hulme, 3 C. & P. 625.

2

3

Bergh's Case, Abb. Pr. N. S. See post, this chapter.

Re Wallace, L. R. 1 P. C. App. 283; 14 L. T. N. S. 286; 36 L. J. 9 P. C. C.; 14 W. R. 609. See also re Downie, 3 Moore's P. C. C. 414.