ing." The injunction was continued, by the lord chancellor, only as to those letters in the book which were written by Pope, and not as to those which were written to him.

This ruling, however, militates against Lord Ellenborough's declaration in Du Bost v. Beresford,1 that, upon an application, he would have granted an injunction to restrain the exhibition of a libelous painting. A note to Horne's Case,' says that this declaration "excited great astonishment in the minds of all the practitioners in the courts of equity."

Subsequent to Pope v. Curl, the next leading case in this branch of the law is that of Thompson v. Stanhope, wherein the executors of Lord Chesterfield, in 1774, brought suit against Stanhope,-his natural son, -to restrain the publication, by him, of his lordship's. famous "letters."

These letters were written, as is well known, to Lord Chesterfield's natural son, Philip Stanhope, who lived abroad, and was "a public character." On the latter's death, his widow came to England, where she was affectionately received by Lord Chesterfield, to whom she delivered certain of the letters in which his lordship had drawn the characters of different living persons (first keeping copies of the same), but retaining the others which treated of politics, education, and manners. After his lordship's death, the widow agreed with one Dodsley, a publisher, to deliver to him the letters treating of education, manners, &c., for publication; and accordingly these were, from time to time announced. Lord Chesterfield's executors, upon seeing the announcements, brought suit to restrain the publi

cation of the letters. The widow Stanhope, in her answer, stated that, being frequently in conversation with his lordship, she had one day mentioned to him that she thought the letters he had written her late husband would form a fine system of education if published, to which he had answered: "Why, that is true, but there is too much Latin in them;" but did not express any disapprobation of the plan, only stating that he wished to destroy the letters in which he had sketched the characters of persons then living; that these letters had thereupon been restored to him, but that he had given her permission to keep the others. But the court seemed to hold that permission to keep the letters did not imply permission to publish them— and granted the injunction sought.

202. There are, however, it is to be noticed, circumstances under which the law will not allow a writer of private letters to insist on his special property in them, and to hinder their publication by others. He may, by his own acts, disentitle himself to prevent the publication of his letters to another person, and justify that other person in giving them to the world. A false accusation, brought by the writer against the recipient of the letters, which may be disproved by their publication, for example, will justify such publication; and courts of equity have refused to aid, by injunction, the writer of the letters in such a case. Sir Thomas Plumer, V. C.,1 refused an injunction to prevent the publication of the letters, under such circumstances, where the receiver was forced to the publication, in his own justification, against charges of dishonesty and a circulation of false news.

'Lord & Lady Perceval v. Phipps, 2 V. & B. 19. Vid. also Gee v. Pritchard, 3 Swanst. 416, 419, and Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 100-III.

2

"The distinction in that case," says Shortt,1" between the publication of private letters without the writer's consent, for the purpose of profit or gain, and publication for a different purpose, is treated by Lord Eldon, in Gee v. Pritchard, as of no moment. His lordship considered the previous cases to have decided that, ultra the purposes for which the letter was sent, the property was in the sender. If that is the principle,' he observes, it is immaterial whether the publication is for the purpose of profit or not. If for profit, the party is then selling; if not for profit, he is giving that, a portion of which belongs to the writer.' The defendant in this case was the illegitimate son of the plaintiff's deceased husband, and had received many letters from the plaintiff during her husband's lifetime. After her husband's death, the plaintiff ceased to be on terms of friendship with the defendant, and denied the truth of statements made by him as to the expectations which he had been led to entertain from the plaintiff and her husband. The defendant returned to the plaintiff the original letters which she had written to him, but took copies of the letters before returning them, without the plaintiff's knowledge, and advertised his intention to publish the letters, but, as he stated in his answer, for private circulation only. This he did, as he alleged, in order to clear his character from the charge of want of veracity which the plaintiff had brought against it. In this case the defendant, by returning the originals, had abandoned whatever property he had—for if he had any right of property it was in the originals-and Lord Eldon restrained the threatened publication. In giving judgment he observed, 'I do not say there may not be a

1 1 L. Lit. 16.
22 Swanst. 415.

case, such as the vice-chancellor (Sir T. Plumer) thought the case before him, where the acts of the parties supply reasons for not interfering; but that differs most materially from this case. In April last, the defendant having so much of property in these letters. as belongs to the receiver, and of interest in them as possessor, thinks proper to return them to the person who has in them, as Lord Hardwicke says, a joint. property, keeping copies of them without apprising her, and assigning such a reason as he assigns for the return [his "being unworthy of the sentiments and expressions of kindness contained in them "]. Now I say, that if, in the case before the vice-chancellor, Lady Percival had given to Phipps a right to publish her letters, this case is the converse of that; and that the defendant, if he previously had it, has renounced the right of publication.'

"Lord Eldon was careful to rest his decision in this case on the ground of the plaintiff's property in the letters (as determined by previous cases), and not on any considerations as to wounded feelings. When reference was made to such considerations by the defendant's counsel, his lordship interposed: 'I will relieve you from that argument. The question will be, whether the bill has stated facts of which the court can take notice, as a case of civil property, which it is bound to protect. The injunction cannot be maintained on any principle of this sort, that if a letter has been written in the way of friendship, either the continuance or the discontinuance of that friendship affords a reason for the interference of the

court.'

1

203.

We have seen that by what has been

5 T. R. 245. Vid. also Wetmore v. Scoville, 3 Ed. Ch. 527; Woolsey v Judd, 4 Duer, 382.

called the law of literary accession-if the literary composition is the result of labor performed by one in the employ of another, the literary property therein belongs to the employer.

So, if the writer of a letter be employed by a principal, and write a letter in the course of the employment, and concerning its subject-matter: that peculiar property in letters which we have ascertained to remain in the writer, would, by the same rule, inhere in the principal. And if the principal be also the recipient of the letter, the principal would own not only the paper and material part of the letter, but also the property of the writer thereof. So, if the agent or servant of a company write a letter, apparently on behalf of the company, to a shareholder, it is the property of the company, and the agent or servant cannot prevent the company from publishing the letter.1 Where the solicitor of an insurance company established in London, wrote a letter not marked "private" or "confidential," to one of the shareholders. in the country, in reference to certain shares allotted to the country shareholder, he was held not entitled to restrain the publication of this letter in a pamphlet, published after the winding up of the company by its late manager, to whom a copy of it had been sent by the shareholder. "If the solicitor of an insurance company established in London," said the master of the rolls, in this case, "by the direction of the directors, wrote a letter to one of the shareholders in the country, it is clear that such letter is not the property of the solicitor, and that he cannot say that the company have not a right to publish it. Take it a step further, and assume that the solicitor wrote a letter, but not by the direction or on behalf of the directors, though

1 Howard v. Gunn, 32 Beav. 465.