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Secondly, adequate or inadequate.
First, by real ideas, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their archetypes. Fantastical or chimerical I call such as have no founda-' tion in nature, nor have any conformity with that reality of being to which they are tacitly referred as to their archetypes. If we examine the several sorts of ideas before-mentioned, we shall find, that, $. 2. First, our simple ideas are all real
, Simple ideas all
agree to the reality of things, not that all real. they are all of them the images or representations of what does exist; the contrary whereof, in all but the primary qualities of bodies, hath been already shown.
But though whiteness and coldness are no more in snow than pain is; yet those ideas of whiteness and coldness, pain, &c. being in us the effects of powers in things without us, ordained by our Maker to produce in us such sensations; they are real ideas in us, whereby we distinguish the qualities that are really in things themselves. For these several appearances being designed to be the mark, whereby we are to know and distinguish things which we have to do with, our ideas do as well serve us to that purpose, and are as real distinguishing characters, whether they be only constant effects, or else exact resemblances of something in the things themselves ; the reality lying in that steady correspondence they have with the distinct constitutions of real beings. But whether they answer to those constitutions, as to causes or patterns, it matters not; it suffices that they are constantly produced by them. And thus our simple ideas are all real and true, because they answer and agree to those powers of things which produce them in our minds; that being all that is requisite to inake them real, and not fictions at pleasure. For in simple ideas (as has been shown) the miud is wholly confined to the operation of things upon it, and can make to itself no simple idea, more than what it has received. VOL. II.
Complex §. 3. Though the mind be wholly pasideas are svo. sive in respect of its simple ideas; yet I luntary com
think, we may say, it is not so in respect binations.
of its complex ideas: for those being combinations of simple ideas put together, and united under one general name; it is plain that the mind of man uses some kind of liberty, in forming those complex ideas: how else comes it to pass that one man's idea of gold, or justice, is different from another's ? but because he has put in, or left out of his, some simple idea, which the other has not. The question then is, which of these are real, and which barely imaginary combinations ? What collections agree to the reality of things, and what not? And to this I say, That, Mixed
g. 4. Secondly, mixed modes and rela
tions having no other reality but what they of consistent have in the minds of men, there is nothing ideas, are more required to this kind of ideas to
make them real, but that they be so framed, that there be a possibility of existing conformable to them. These ideas themselves, being archetypes, caulnot differ from their archetypes, and so cannot be chimerical, unless any one will jumble together in them inconsistent ideas. Indeed, as any of them have the names of a known language assigned to them, by which he that has them in his mind would signify them to others, so bare possibility of existing is not enough; they must have a conformity to the ordinary signification of the name that is given them, that they may not be thought fantastical: as if a man would give the name of justice to that idea, which common use calls liberality. But this fantasticalness relates more to propriety of speech, than reality of ideas : for a man to be undisturbed in danger, sedately to consider what is fittest to be done, and to execute it steadily, is a mixed mode, or a complex idea of an action which may exist. But to be undisturbed in danger, without using one's reason or industry, is what is also possible to be; and so is as real an idea as the other. Though the first of
these, having the name courage given to it, may, in respect of that name, be a right or wrong idea : but the other, whilst it has not a common received name of any known language assigned to it, is not capable of any deformity, being made with no reference to any thing but itself. §. 5. Thirdly, our complex ideas of sub
Ideas of sub. stances being made all of them in reference to things existing without us, and intended real, when to be representations of substances, as they they agree really are; are no farther real, than as they with the ex
istence of are such combinations of simple ideas, as
things. are really united, and co-exist in things without us. On the contrary, those are fantastical which are made up of such collections of simple ideas as as were really never united, never were found together in
any substance; v. g. a rational creature, consisting of a horse's head, joined to a body of human shape, or such as the centaurs are described : or, a body yellow, very malleable, fusible, and fixed; but lighter than common water: or an uniform, unorganized body, consisting, as to sense, all of similar parts, with perception and voluntary motion joined to it. Whether such substances as these can possibly exist or no, it is probable we do not know: but be that as it will, these ideas of substances being made conformable to no pattern existing that we know, and consisting of such collections of ideas, as no substance ever showed us united together, they ought to pass with us for barely imaginary: but much more are those complex ideas so, which contain in them any inconsistency or contradiction of
CH A P. XXXI.
such as pes
Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas. Adequate $. 1.
F our real ideas, some are adeideas are
quate, and some are inadequate. Those I call adequate, which perfectly refectly represent their present those archetypes which the mind archetypes. supposes them taken from; which it in
tends them to stand for, and to which it refers them. Inadequate ideas are such, which are but a partial or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which they are referred. Upon which account it is plain. Simple ideas §. 2. Fir. t, that all our simple ideas are all adequate. adequate. Because being nothing but the
effects of certain powers in things, fitted and ordained by God to produce such sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to those powers: and we are sure they agree to the reality of things. For if sugar produce in us the ideas which we call whiteness and sweetness, we are sure there is a power in sugar to produce those ideas in our minds, or else they could not have been produced by it. And so each sensation answering the power that operates on any of our senses, the idea so produced is a real idea, (and not a fiction of the mind, which has no power to produce any simple idea ;) and cannot but be adequate, since it ought only to answer that power : and so all simple ideas are adequate. It is true, the things producing in us these simple ideas are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only the causes of them; but as if those ideas were real beings in them. For though fire be called painful to the touch, whereby, is signified the power of producing in us the idea of pain, yet it is denominated also light and hot; as if light and heat were really something in the fire more than a power to excite these ideas in us; and therefore are called qualities in, or of the fire. But these being
nothing, in truth, but powers to excite such ideas in us, I must in that sense be understood, when I speak of secondary qualities, as being in things; or of their ideas, as being the objects that excite them in us. Such ways of speaking, though accommodated to the vulgar notions, without which one cannot be well understood, yet truly signify nothing but those powers which are in things to excite certain sensations or ideas in us: since were there no fit organs to receive the impressions fire makes on the sight and touch, nor a mind joined to those organs to receive the ideas of light and heat by those impressions from the fire or sun, there would yet be no more light or heat in the world, than there would be pain, if there were no sensible creature to feel it, though the sun should continuè just as it is now, and mount Ætna flame higher than ever it did. Solidity and extension, and the termination of it, figure, with motion and rest, whereof we have the ideas, would be really in the world as they are, whether there were any sensible being to perceive them or no; and therefore we have reason to look on those as the real modifications of matter, and such are the exciting causes of all our various sensations from bodies. But this being an inquiry not belonging to this place, I shall enter no farther into it, but proceed to show what complex ideas are adequate, and what not.
9. 3. Secondly, Our complex ideas of modes, being voluntary collections of sim- adequate. ple ideas which the mind puts together without reference to any real [archetypes of standing patterns existing any-where, are and cannot but be adequate ideas. Because they not being intended for copies of things really existing, but for archetypes made by the mind to rank and denominate things by, cannot want any thing; they having each of them that combination of ideas, and thereby that perfection which the mind intended they should: so that the mind acquiesces in them, and can find nothing wanting. Thus by having the idea of a figure, with three sides meeting at three angles, I have a complete idea, wherein I require nothing else to make it perfect
. That the I 3