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men do rarely put into their complex idea of any substance, all the simple ideas they do know to exist in it. Because endeavouring to make the signification of their names as clear, and as little cumbersome as they can, they make their specific ideas of the sorts of substance, for the most part, of a few of those simple ideas which are to be found in them: but these having no original precedency, or right to be put in, and make the specific idea, more than others that are left out, it is plain that both these ways our ideas of substances are deficient and inadequate. The simple ideas, whereof we make our complex ones of substances, are all of them (bating only the figure and bulk of some sorts) powers, which being relations to other substances, we can never be sure that we know all the powers that are in any one body, till we have tried what changes it is fitted to give to, or receive from other substances, in their several ways of application : which being impossible to be tried upon any one body, much less upon all, it is impossible we should have adequate ideas of any substance, made up of a collection of all its properties,
§. 9. Whosoever first lighted on a parcel of that sort of substance we denote by the word gold, could not sationally take the bulk and figure he observed in that lump to depend on its real essence or internal constitution. Therefore those never went into his idea of that species of body; but its peculiar colour, perhaps, and weight, were the first he abstracted from it, to make the complex idea of that species, Which both are but powers; the one to affect our eyes after such a manner, and to produce in us that idea we call yellow; and the other to force upwards any other body of equal bulk, they being put into a pair of equal scales, one against another. Another perhaps
Another perhaps added to these the ideas of fusibility and fixedness, two other passive powers, in relation to the operation of fire upon it; another
, its ductility and solubility in aq. regia, two other powers relating to the operation of other bodies, in changing its outward figure, or separation of it into ịnsensible parts. These, or part of these, put toge
ther, usually make the complex idea in men's minds of that sort of body we call gold.
$. 10. But no one, who hath considered the properties of bodies in general, or this sort in particular, can doubt that this called gold has infinite other properties, not contained in that complex idea. Some who have examined this species more accurately, could, I believe, enumerate ten times as many properties in gold, all of them as inseparable from its internal constitution, as its colour or weight: and it is probable, if any one knew all the properties that are by divers men known of this metal, there would be an hundred times as many ideas go to the complex idea of gold, as any one man yet has in his; and yet perhaps that not be the thousandth part of what is to be discovered in it. The changes which that one body is apt to receive, and make in other bodies, upon a due application, exceeding far not only what we know, but what we are apt to imagine. Which will not appear so much a paradox to any one, who will but consider how far men are yet from knowing all the properties of that one, no very compound figure, a triangle; though it be no small number that are already by mathematicians discovered of it.
§. 11. So that all our complex ideas of Ideas of sub
substances are imperfect and inadequate. stances, as collections of Which would be so also in mathematical their quali- figures, if we were to have our complex ties, are all ideas of them, only by collecting their proinadequate.
perties in reference to other figures. How uncertain and imperfect would our ideas be of an ellipsis, if we had no other idea of it, but some few of its properties? Whereas, having in our plain idea the whole essence of that figure, we from thence discover those properties, and demonstratively see how they flow, and are inseparable from it. Simple ideas, $. 12. Thus the mind has three sorts of έκτυπα, and
abstract ideas or nominal essences : adequate.
First, simple ideas, which are ¥x7utc, or copies ; but yet certainly adequate. Because being intended to express nothing but the power in things to
produce in the mind such a sensation, that sensation, when it is produced, cannot but be the effect of that power. So the paper I write on, having the power, in the light, (I speak according to the common notion of light) to produce in men the sensation which I call white, it cannot but be the effect of such a power, in something without the mind; since the mind has not the power to produce any such idea in itself, and being meant for nothing else but the effect of such a power, that simple idea is real and adequate; the sensation of white, in my mind, being the effect of that power, which is in the paper to produce it, is perfectly adequate to that power; or else, that power would produce a different idea.
13. Secondly, the complex ideas of Ideas of subsubstances are ectypes, copies too; but not perfect ones, not adequate : which is very
JUTUTA, ina. evident to the mind, in that it plainly per
adequate. ceives that whatever collection of simple ideas it makes of any substance that exists, it cannot be sure that it exactly answers all that are in that substance : since not having tried all the operations of all other substances upon it, and found all the alterations it would receive from, or cause in, other substances, it cannot have an exact adequate collection of all its active and passive capacities; and so not have an adequate complex idea of the powers of any substance existing, and its relations, which is that sort of complex idea of substances we have. And after all, if we would have, and actually had, in our complex idea, an exact collection of all the secondary qualities or powers of any substance, we should not yet thereby have an idea of the essence of that thing
For since the powers or qualities that are observable by us, are not the real essence of that substance, but depend on it, and flow from it, any collection whatsoever of these qualities cannot be the real essence of that thing. Whereby it is plain, that our ideas of substances are not adequate; are not what the mind intends them to be. Besides, a man has no idea of substance in general, nor knows what substance is in itself.
Ideas of 9. 14. Thirdly, complex ideas of modes and modes and relations are originals, and archetypes, are relations are not copies, nor made after the pattern of archetypes,
any real existence, to which the mind inbut be ade- tends them to be conformable, and exactly quate. to answer.
These being such collections of simple ideas, that the mind itself puts together, and such collections, that each of them contains in it precisely all that the mind intends that it should, they are archetypes and essences of modes that may exist; and so are designed only for, and belong only to, such modes as, when they do exist, have an exact conformity with those complex ideas. The ideas therefore of modes and relations cannot but be adequate.
§. 1. HOUGH truth and falshood falshood pro
belong, in propriety of speech, perly belong only to propositions; yet ideas are oftento proposi.
times termed true or false (as what words tions.
are there that are not used with great latitude, and with some deviation from their strict and proper significations?) Though, I think, that, when ideas themselves are termed true or false, there is still some secret or tacit proposition, which is the foundation of that denomination: as we shall see, if we examine the particular occasions wherein they come to be called true or false. In all which, we shall find some kind of affirmation or negation, which is the reason of that denomination. For our ideas, being nothing but bare appearances or perceptions in our minds, cannot properly and simply in themselves be said to be true or false, no more than a single name of any thing can be said to be true or false.
$. 2. Indeed both ideas and words may. Metaphysical be said to be true in a metaphysical sense of truth conthe word truth, as all other things, that tains a tacit any way exist, are said to be true; i. e. proposition. really to be such as they exist. Though in things called true, even in that sense, there is perhaps a secret reference to our ideas, looked upon as the standards of that truth, which amounts to a mental proposition, though it be usually not taken notice of.
g. 3. But it is not in that metaphysical No idea, as sense of truth which we inquire here, when
an appearwe examine whether our ideas are capable ance in the of being true or false; but in the more or
mind, true or
false. dinary acceptation of those words: and so I say
that the ideas in our minds being only so many perceptions, or appearances there, none of them are false: the idea of a centaur having no more falshood in it, when it appears in our minds, than the name centaur, has falsehood in it, when it is pronounced by our mouths or written on paper.
For truth or falshood lying always in some attirmation, or negation, mental or verbal, our ideas are not capable, any of them, of being false, till the mind passes some judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies something of them. §. 4. Whenever the mind refers any of
Ideas refer its ideas to any thing extraneous to them, they are then capable to be called true or
thing may false. Because the mind in such a reference be true or
false. makes a tacit supposition of their conformity to that thing: which supposition, as it happens to be true or false, so the ideas themselves come to be denominated. The most usual cases wherein this happens, are these following:
§. 5. First, when the mind supposes any Other men's idea it has conformable to that in other ideas, real men's minds, called by the same common
and supposed name; v. g. when the mind intends or
real essences, judges its ideas of justice, temperance, re- are what men ligion, to be the same with what other men usually refer
their ideasto. give those names to.
red to any