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or, which is all one, be of that sort. Whereby it is evident, that the essences of the sorts, or (if the Latin word pleases better) species of things, are nothing else but these abstract ideas. For the having the essence of any species, being that which makes any thing to be of that species, and the conformity to the idea to which the name is annexed, being that which gives a right to that
grant the inference to be true; but must beg leave to deny that this proves, that the general idea the name is annexed to, is not made by the mind. I have said, and it agrees with what your lordship here says, * That 'the mind, in making its complex ideas of substances, only fol. lows nature, and puts no ideas together, which are not supposed to have an union in nature. Nobody joins the voice of a sheep with the shape
of an horse ; nor the colour of lead with the weight and fixedness of 'gold, to be the complex ideas of any real substances ; unless he has a mind
to fill his head with chimeras, and his discourses with unintelligible words. . Men observing certain qualities always joined and existing together, 'therein copied nature, and of ideas to united, made their complex ones of substance, &c.' Which is very little different from what your lordship here says, that it is from our observation of individuals, that we come to infer, that there is something common to them all. But I do not see how it will thence follow, that the general or specific idea is not made by the mere act of the mind. No, says your lordship, “There is something common to them all, which makes them of one kind; and if the difference of kinds be real, that which makes them all of one kind must not be nominal, but real essence.'
This may be some objection to the name of nominal essence; but is, as I humbly conceive, none to the thing designed by it. There is an internal constitution of things, on which their properties depend. This your lordship and I are agreed of, and this we call the real essence. There are also certain complex ideas, or combinations of these properties in men's minds, to which they commonly annex specific names, or names of sorts or kinds of things. This, I believe, your lordship does not deny. These complex ideas, for.want of a better name, I have called nominal essences; how properly, I will not dispute. But if any one will help me to a better name for them, I am ready to receive it; till then, I must, to express myself, use this. Now, my lord, body, life, and the power of reasoning, being not the real essence of a man, as I believe your lordship will agree,
will your lordship say, that they are not enough to make the thing wherein they are found, of the kind called man, and not of the kind called baboon, because the difference of these kinds is real? If this be not real enough to make the thing of one kind and not of another, I do not see how animal rationale can be enough really to distinguish a man from an horse; for that is but the nominal, not real essence of that kind, designed by the name
name; the having the essence, and the having that conformity, must needs be the same thing: since to be of any species, and to have a right to the name of that
species, is all one. As for example, to be a man, or of the species man, and to have right to the name man, is the same thing. Again, to be a man, or of the species man, and have the essence of a man, is the same thing.
suppose, every one thinks it real enough to make a real difference between that and other kinds. And if nothing will serve the turn, to make things of one kind and not of another (which, as I have showed, signifies no more but ranking of them under different specifi names) but their real unknown constitutions, which are the real essences we are speaking of, I fear it would be a long while before we should have really different kinds of substances, or distinct names for them, unless we could distinguish them by these differences, of which we have no distinct conceptions. For I think it would not be readily answered me, if I should demand, wherein lies the real difference in the internal con. stitution of a stag from that of a buck, which are each of them very well known to be of one kind, and not of the other; and nobody ques. tions but that the kinds, whereof each of them is, are really different.
Your lordship farther says, “And this difference doth not depend upon
the complex ideas of substances, whereby men arbitrarily join modes to. gether in their minds.' I confess, my lord, I know not what to say to. this, because I do not know what these complex ideas of substances are, whereby men arbitrarily join modes together in their minds. But I am apt to think there is a mistake in the matter, by the words that follow, which are these : "For let them mistake in their complication of ideas,
either in leaving out or putting in what doth not belong to them; and • let their ideas be what they please, the real essence of a man, and an " horse, and a tree, are just what they were.'
The mistake I spoke of, I humbly suppose, is this, that things are here taken to be distinguished by their real essences; when, by the very way of speaking of them, it is clear, that they are already distinguished by their nominal essences, and are so taken to be. For what, I beseech your lordship, does your lordship mean, when you say, “The real essence • of a man, and an horse, and a tree,' but that there are such kinds already set out by the signification of these names, man, horse, tree? And what, I beseech your lordship, is the signification of each of these specific names, but the complex idea it stands for? And that complex idea is the nomi, nal essence, and nothing else. So that taking man, as your lordship does here, to stand for a kind or sort of individuals, all which agree common complex idea, which that specific name stands for, it is certain that the real essence of all the individuals comprehended under the specific name man, in your use of it, would be just the same ; let others leave out or put into their complex idea of man what they please ; because
Now since nothing can be a man, or have a right to the name man, but what has a conformity to the abstract idea the name man stands for; nor any thing be a man, or have a right to the species man, but what has the essence of that species; it follows, that the abstract idea for which the name stands, and the essence of the species, is one and the same. From whence it is easy to observe, that the essences of the sorts of things, and consequently the sorting of this, is the workmanship of the understanding, that abstracts and makes those general ideas.
the real essence on which that unaltered complex idea, i. e. those properties depend, must necessarily be concluded to be the same.
For I take it for granted, that in using the name man, in this place, your lordship uses it for that complex idea which is in your lordship's mind of that species. So that your lordship, by putting it for, or substi. tuting it in the place of that complex idea where you say the real essence of it is just as it was, or the very same as it was, does suppose the idea it stands for to be steadily the same. For, if I change the signification of the word man, whereby it may not comprehend just the same individuals which in your lordship’s sense it does, but shut out some of those that to your lordship are men in your signification of the word man, or take in others to which your lordship does not allow the name man; I do not think you will say,
that the real essence of man in both these senses is the same. And yet your lordship seems to say so, when you say, “Let men 'mistake in the complication of their ideas, either in leaving out or put:
ting in what doth not belong to them;' and let their ideas be what they please, the real essence of the individuals comprehended under the names annexed to these ideas, will be the same : for so, I humbly conceive, it must be put, to make out what your lordship aims at. For, as your lord. ship puts it by the name of man, or any other specific name, your lordship seems to me to suppose, that that name stands for, and not for the same idea, at the same time.
For example, my lord, let your lordship's idea, to which you annex the sign man, be a rational animal : let another man's idea be a rational animal of such a shape ; let a third man's idea be of an animal of such a size and shape, leaving out rationality ; let a fourth’s be an animal with a body of such a shape, and an immaterial substance, with a power of reasoning; let a fifth leave out of his idea an immaterial substance. It is plain every one of these will call his a man, as well as your lordship; and yet it is as plain that men, as standing for all these distinct complex ideas, cannot be supposed to have the same internal constitution, i.e. the same real essence.
The truth is, every distinct abstract idea with a name to it, makes a real distinct kind, whatever the real essence (which we know not of any of them) be.
They are the §. 13. I would not here be thought to workman. forget, much less to deny, that nature in ship of the
the production of things makes several of understand
them alike: there is nothing more obvious, ing, but have their founda especially in the races of animals, and all tion in the things propagated by seed. But yet, I think, similitude of
we may say the sorting of them under names things.
is the workmanship of the understanding, taking occasion from the similitude it observes amongst them to make abstract general ideas, and set them up in the mind, with names annexed to them as patterns or forms, (for in that sense the word form has a very proper signification) to which as particular things existing are found to agree, so they come to be of that species, have that denomination, or are put into that classis. For when we say, this is a man, that a horse; this justice, that cruelty; this a watch, that a jack ; what do we else but rank things under different specific names, as agreeing to those abstract ideas, of which we have made those names the signs? And what are the essences of those species set out and marked by names, but those abstract ideas in the mind; which are as it were the bonds between particular things that exist and the names they are to be ranked under? And when general names have any connexion with particular beings, these abstract ideas are the medium that unites them: so that the essences of species, as distinguished and denominated by us, neither are nor can be any thing but those precise abstract ideas we have in our minds. And therefore the supposed real essences of substances, if different froin our abstract ideas, cannot be the essences of the species we rank things into. For two species may be one as rationally, as two different essences be the essence of one species: and I demand what are the alterations may or may not be in a horse or lead, without making either of them to be of another species? In determining the species of things by our abstract ideas, this is easy to resolve; but if any one will regulate himself herein, by supposed real essences, he will, I suppose, be at a loss; and he will never be able to know when any thing precisely ceases to be of the species of a horse or lead. $. 14. Nor will any one wonder, that I
And therefore I grant it true what your lordship says in the next words, “And let the nominal essences differ never so much, the real com(mon essence or nature of the several kinds, are not at all altered by • them,' i. e. That our thoughts or ideas cannot alter the real constitutions that are in things that exist, there is nothing more certain. But yet it is true, that the change of ideas, to which we annex them, can and does alter the signification of their names, and thereby alter the kinds, which by these names we rank and sort them into. Your lord. ship farther adds, “And these real essences are unchangeable,' i.e. the internal constitutions are unchangeable. Of what, I beseech your fordship, are the internal constitutions unchangeable? Not of any thing that exists, but of God alone ; for they may be changed all as easily by that hand that made them, as the internal frame of a watch. What then is it that is unchangeable? The internal constitution, or real essence of a species; which, in plain English, is no more but this, whilst the same specific name, v.g. of man, horse, or tree, is annexed to, or made the sign of the same abstract complex idea, under which I rank several individuals ; it is impossible but the real constitution on which that unaltered, complex idea, or nominal essence depends, must be the same, i. e. in other words, where we find all the same properties, we have reason to conclude there is the same real, internal constitution from which those properties flow.
But your lordship proves the real essences to be unchangeable, because God makes them in these following words: For, however there may happen some variety in individuals by particular accidents, yet the essences of men, and horses, and trees, remain always the same ; because
they do not depend on the ideas of men, but on the will of the Creator, who hath made several sorts of beings.' It is true, the real constitutions or essences of particular
things, existing do not depend on the ideas of men, but on the will of the Creator; but their being ranked into sorts, under such and such names, does den pend, and wholly depend on the ideas of men.
Each distinct say these essences, or abstract ideas, (which abstract idea are the measures of name, and the bounda- is a distinct ries of species) are the workmanship of the understanding, who considers, that at least the complex ones are often, in several men, different collections of simple ideas : and therefore that is covetousness to one man, which is not so to another. Nay, even in substances, where their abstract ideas seem to be taken from the things themselves, they are not constantly the same; no not in that species which is most familiar to us, and with which we have the most intimate acquaintance: it having been more than once doubted, whether the fætus born of a woman were a man; even so far, as that it M 4