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Oi KNOWLEDGE and Opinion,

CHAP. I.

Of knowledge in general.

SECT.

1. Our knowledge conver.

sant about our ideas.

2. Knowledge is the percep-

tion of the agreement,

or disagreement, of two

ideas.

3. This agreement fourfold.

4. First, of identity, or di.

versity.

5. Secondly, relation.

6. Thirdly, of co-existence.

7. Fourthly of real existence.

8. Knowledge actual or ha-

bitual.

9. Habitual knowledge, two.

fold,

CHAP. II,

Of the degrees of our knowledge.

ment.

3. Thirdly, intuitive know-

ledge extends itself not to

all the relations of all our

ideas.

4. Fourthly, not demonstra-

tive knowledge.

5. Fifthly, sensitive know.

ledge, narrower than ei.

ther.

6. Sixthly, our knowledge,

therefore, narrower than

our ideas.

7. How far our knowledge

reaches.

8. First, our knowledge of

identity and diversity, as

far as our ideas.

9. Secondly, of co-existence,

little

way.

10. Because the connexion be.

tween most simple ideas

is unknown.

11. Especially of secondary

qualities.

12-14. And farther, because all

connexion between any se-

condary and primary qua-

lities is undiscoverable,

a very

SECT.

1. Intuitive,

2. Demonstrative,

3. Depends on proofs.

4. But not so easy.

3. Not without precedent

doubt,

6. Not so clear.
7. Each step must have in-

tuitive evidence.
8. Hence the mistake ex præ-

cognitis & præconcessis.
9. Demonstration not limited

to quantity.

10-13. Why it has been so

thought.

14. Sensitive knowledge of

particular existence,

15. Of repugnancy to co-exist,

CHAP. IV.
larger.

16. Of the co-existence of

Of the reality of our knowledge.

powers,

very little SECT.

way.

1. Objection, knowledge

17. Of spirits yet narrower.

placed in ideas, may be

18. Thirdly, of other rela.

all bare vision.

tions, it is not easy to say

2, 3. Answer, not so where ideas

how far. Morality capa-

agree with things.

ble of demonstration..

4. As, first, all simple ideas

19. Two things have made

do.

moral ideas thought in. 5. Secondly, all complex ide-

capable of demonstration.

as, except of substances.
Their complexedness and 6. Hence the reality of ma.
want of sensible represen-

thematical knowledge.
tations.

7. And of moral.

20. Remedies of those difficul. 8. Existence not required to

ties.

make it real.

21. Fourthly, of real exist. 9. Nor will it be less true,

ence ; we have an intui.

or certain, because moral

tive knowledge of our

ideas are of our own mak.

own, demonstrative of

ing and naming

God's, sensitive of some 10. Mis-naming disturbs not

few other things.

the certainty of the know,

22. Our ignorance great,

ledge.

23. First, one cause of it, 11. Ideas of substances have

want of ideas, either such

their archetypes without

as we have no conception

of, or such as particularly 12. So far as they agree with

we have not.

these, so far our know.

24. Because of their remote.

ledge concerning them is

ness, or,

real.

25. Because of their minute- 13. In our inquiries about

substances, we must con.

26. Hence no science of bo-

sider ideas, and not confine

dies.

our thoughts to names, or

27. Much less of spirits.

species supposed set out

28. Secondly, want of a dis.

by names.

coverable connexion, be. 14, 15. Objection against a change.

tween ideas we have.

ling being something be.

29. Instances.

tween man and beast, an-

30. Thirdly, want of tracing

swered.

our ideas.

16. Monsters.

31. Extent in respect of uni. 17. Words and species.

yeşsality

18, Recapitulation.

OF

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OF

Human Understanding.

BOOK II.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of our complex Ideus of Substances.

$. 1. THEremind being as I have de Ideasof subnumber of the simple ideas, conveyed in made. by the senses, as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterward to talk of, and consider as one simple idea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas together : because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result : which therefore we call substance (1).

s. 2. So

(1) This section, which was intended only to show how the indivi. duals of distinct species of substances came to be looked upon as simple ideas, and so to have simple names, viz. from the supposed substratum or substance, which was looked upon as the thing itself in which inhered, VOL. II.

B

and

§. 2. So that if any one will examine Our idea of substance in

himself concerning his notion of pure subgeneral stance in general, he will find he has no

other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities, which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one should be asked, what is the subject wherein colour or

weight

and from which resulted that complication of ideas, by which it was re. presented to us, hath been mistaken for an account of the idea of substance in general ; and as such, hath been represented in these words ; But how comes the general idea of substance to be framed in our minds ? Is this by abstracting and enlarging simple ideas ? No: . But it is by • a complication of many simple ideas together : because, not imagining

how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from whence

they do result ; which therefore we call substance.' And is this all, indeed, that is to be said for the being of substance, That we accustom ourselves to suppose a substratum ? Is that custom grounded upon true reason, or not? If not, then accidents or modes must subsist of them. selves ; and these simple ideas need no tortoise to support them : for figures and colours, &c, would do well enough of themselves, but for some fancies men have accustomed themselves to.

To which objection of the bishop of Worcester, our author * answers thus : Herein your lordship seems to charge me with two faults : one, That I make the general idea of substance to be framed, not by ab. stracting and enlarging simple ideas, but by a complication of many simple ideas together : the other, as if I had said, the being of substance had no other foundation but the fancies of men.

As to the first of these, I beg leave to remind your lordship, that I say in more places than one, and particularly Book 3. Chap. 3. 4. 6. and Book 1. Chap. 11. $. 9. where, ex professo, I treat of abstraction and general ideas, that they are all made by abstracting, and therefore could not be understood to mean, that that of substance was made any

other way; however my pen might have slipt, or the negligence of expression, where I might have something else than the general idea of substance in view, might make me seem to say so.

That I was not speaking of the general idea of substance in the passage your lordship quotes, is manifest from the title of that chapter, which is, of the complex idea of substances : and the first section of it, which your lordship cites for those words you have set down.

In which words I do not observe any that deny the general idea of substance to be made by abstracting, nor any that say 'it is made by a

* In his first letter to the bishop of Worcester.

com.

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