county jail or state's prison, at the discretion of the court: Provided, that the imprisonment in the state's prison shall in no case exceed a term of ten years: Provided further, that nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the mother, who may be guilty of the homicide of her child, from being prosecuted and punished for the same according to the principles of the common law. And any person aiding, counseling or abetting any woman in concealing the birth of her child, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

Code, s. 1004; R. C., c. 34, s. 28; 1818, c. 985; 1883, c. 390; 21 Jas. I., c. 27; 43 Geo. III., c. 58, s. 3; 9 Geo. IV., c. 31, s. 14.

INDICTMENT. An indictment for concealing the birth of a child "by then and there secretly placing and leaving the dead body of said child in a secret place," is sufficient. Stewart, 93-539.

FORMER CONVICTION.-A former conviction for concealing the birth of a bastard child is no defense to an indictment for the murder of such child. Morgan, 95-641.

FORMER CONVICTION MUST BF PLEADED.-Former conviction, or acquittal, must be pleaded to be available, it can not be considered on a motion in arrest of judgment. Morgan, 95–641.

THE CORPUS DELICTI.-The corpus delicti is concealing the death of a being upon whom the crime of murder could have been committed; and, therefore, if the child be born dead concealment is not an offense against the statute. Joiner, 11 (4 Hawks), 351.

BURDEN TO SHOW CHILD DEAD.-It is not incumbent on the state to show that the child was born alive, but the burden of showing that it was dead is on the accused. Joiner, 1 (4 Hawks), 351.

If the child is born dead the concealment is not an offense, but the burden is on the defendant to show that it was born dead. Joiner, 11 (4 Hawks), 350.

CONCEALED WEAPONS.

Sec. 130 (3708). Weapons, carrying concealed.

If any one, except when on his own premises, shall carry concealed about his person any pistol, bowie-knife, dirk, dagger, slungshot, loaded cane, brass, iron or metallic knuckles or razor or other deadly weapon of like kind, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and fined or imprisoned at the discretion of the court. And if any one, not being on his own lands, shall have about his person any such deadly weapon, such possession shall be prima facie evidence of the concealment thereof. This section shall not apply to the following persons: officers and soldiers of the United States army, civil officers of the United States while in the discharge of their official duties, officers and soldiers of the militia and the state guard when called into actual service, officers of the state, or of any coun

ty, city or town, charged with the execution of the laws of the state, when acting in the discharge of their official duties.

Code, s. 1005.

Note. Hampton's Detective Bureau exempt in Buncombe county.

STATUTE CONSTITUTIONAL.-This statute is not in conflict with Const. N. C., art. 1, s. 24, giving citizens the "right to keep and bear arms." Speller, 86-697.

BUTCHER'S KNIFE A DEADLY WEAPON.-A butcher's knife eleven inches long with a sharp pointed and sharp edged bladge six inches long, and one and one-fourth inches wide, is a deadly weapon within the meaning of the statute. Erwin, 91-545.

POSSESSION PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE.-The possession of a pistol off one's premises is prima facie evidence of concealment and of the criminal intent. McManus, 89-555.

WHO MAY BE CONVICTED THE INTENT.-The jury returned a special verdiet in which they find that defendant carried a pistol concealed in his pocket from a store where he had purchased it to another about three hundred yards distant for the purpose of having it packed with other goods, and that he had no criminal intent in doing so: Held, that defendant was not guilty. Gilbert, 87-527.

HUNTING. If one carry a pistol off his own premises concealed about his person, for the purpose of hunting, he is guilty. Woodfin, 87-526.

MINOR SON ON FATHER'S LAND.-A minor son living with his father, who carries a pistol concealed about his person, in the public road running over the lands of his father, without going off his father's land, is not guilty. Hewell, 90-705.

THREATS BY PROSECUTOR NO EXCUSE.-The fact that the prosecutor had made threats of violence against defendant and that he thought it necessary to carry the pistol for his own protection, is no excuse for violating the statute. Speller, 86–697.

PISTOL BUCKLED Around the BODY.-Carrying a pistol buckled around the body without a scabbard and naked on a belt is not a violation of the statute. Roten, 86-701.

MAIL CARRIER.-A mail carrier is indictable for carrying a concealed weapon. Boone, 132-1107.

NIGHT WATCHMAN.-A private night watchman is not guilty of carrying a concealed weapon while on duty upon the premises he is employed to watch. Anderson, 129-521.

TO DELIVER TO OWNER-INTENT.-A special verdict finding that defendant carried a pistol concealed about his person when off his own premises for the purpose of delivering it to its owner, without finding that he had no intent to conceal it, makes the defendant guilty. Brown, 125-704.

PURPOSE IMMATERIAL.-The purpose makes no difference, but it is the manner of carrying a concealed weapon that determines the question of guilt. Brown, 125–706.

THE INTENT.-Even though a pistol should be carried concealed, if the jury find there was no intent to conceal it, the presumption arising from concealment would be rebutted, and the weapon would then be conveyed simply as merchandise. Brown, 125–706.

An instruction that if defendant had the pistol about his person, and was off his own premises, such possession was prima facie evidence of its concealment, and the burden was on defendant to rebut the presumption, was proper. Hamby, 126-1066.

INTENTION IMMATERIAL.-The intention of the defendant to conceal a weapon on his person is immaterial, if from his own testimony it appears that he necessarily knew that he was carrying it concealed. Simmons, 143-613.

ADVICE NO EXCUSE.-A person acting in ignorance of the law in good faith and upon advice of the clerk of the court or of an attorney, but in violation of the statute prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons, is not excused. Simmons, 143-613.

ACTUAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTY.-In order to come within the exception of the statute (Revisal, 1905, section 3708), prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons, the defendant otherwise having the authority, must have been in the actual performance of his duties at the time. Simmons, 143— 613.

TENANTS SERVANTS.-One who is in the occupation of land as a tenant, or agent, or overseer, can not be convicted of the offense of carrying concealed weapons, but a mere servant or hireling can. Terry, 93-585.

CARRYING PISTOL FOR PURPOSE OF TRADING.-One who carries a pistol concealed in his pocket a distance of six miles, off his own premises, for the purpose of trading it off, is not guilty, if the jury believe that such was his only purpose. Harrison, 93-605.

TO DELIVER TO OWNER.-One who carries a pistol off his own premises in his pocket for the purpose of delivering it to the owner who had sent him for it, is not guilty. Brodnax, 91-543.

OFFICERS. Neither a deputy marshal of the United States, nor any other civil officer, has a right to carry a concealed weapon about his person while off his own premises unless he is actually engaged in the discharge of his official duty; and the burden is on him to show that fact. Hayne, 88-625.

DEFENDANT TESTIFYING IN HIS OWN BEHALF.-Where defendant testifies in his own behalf, he may be compelled to answer whether he has carried a concealed weapon about his person while off his own premises within two years preceding the indictment, since by offering himself as a witness he waives his constitutional right not to answer questions tending to criminate him. Allen, 107-805.

SERVANT OR HIRELING.-A mere servant or hireling who carries a concealed weapon on the premises of his employer is indictable. Deyton, 119–

880.

PRESUMPTION OF INTENT.-An admission by the defendant that he carried a pistol home in his pocket raises the presumption that he carried it with the intent to conceal it, and the question as to whether such presumption is rebutted by the evidence is one for the jury. Hinnant, 120-572.

The question as to whether the presumption of guilty intent is rebutted by the mode of carrying the weapon is one for the jury. Reams, 121

556.

The evidence was that defendant, while off his own premises, had a pistol on his person under his overcoat, but it was not shown whether the overcoat was worn open or buttoned, and there was also evidence that the pistol could be seen: Held, that it was error to instruct the jury that if they believed the evidence the defendant was guilty, since it was for the jury, and not the judge, to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to rebut the presumption of concealment raised by the statute, and whether or not the weapon was in fact concealed. Lilly, 116—1049.

If

PARTLY EXPOSED WEAPON.-It is error to charge that if the jury believe beyond a reasonable doubt that any part of the weapon was concealed, that is, could not be seen from the outside, the defendant would be guilty. the weapon is partly exposed to the public view, it would be difficult and unreasonable to say, as a legal conclusion, that it was concealed. Reams, 121-556.

GIST OF THE OFFENSE.-The gist of the offense of carrying a concealed weapon about one's person and off his own premises consists in the guilty intent to carry it concealed and not in the intent to use it. Reams, 121

556.

The gist of the offense of carrying a concealed weapon is the manner of carrying it. Lilly, 116-1049.

The offense of carrying a concealed weapon consists in the guilty intent to carry it concealed, and does not depend on the intent to use it. Dixon, 114-850.

OFFICERS OF CORPORATIONS.-The exception in the statute does not apply to the officials of corporations, such as turnpikes, railroads and others, which invite the public to use their lines of travel. Perry, 120-580.

The superintendent of a turnpike company owning a turnpike nine miles long and open to public travel, when on such turnpike, is not "on his own premises" or "on his own lands" within the meaning of the exception in the statute, although he has absolute control of all the property of the company. Perry, 120-580.

The use of the words "on his own premises" and not being "on his own lands" shows an intention to restrict the right to carry concealed weapons to those who are in the privacy of their own premises and not likely to be thrown into contact with the public, nor tempted on a sudden quarrel to use the advantage a concealed weapon gives. Perry, 120-580.

PERSON ARRESTED ON HIS OWN PREMISES.-The fact that defendant was arrested on his own premises and taken immediately before a justice who committed him to jail, and that the jailer in searching him found a pistol concealed on his person, sufficiently establishes his guilt; though if he had asked, when arrested on his own premises, to be allowed to leave it at home and the officer had refused, he would have had some defense, but even then it would have been incumbent on him to explain why he did not carry the pistol openly after leaving his premises. Pigford, 117–748.

CARRYING FOR PURPOSE OF SELLING.—Where one carries a pistol simply for the purpose of selling it, having no engagement to sell it to any particular person, he is guilty. Overruling State v. Harrison, 93-605. Dixon, 114—

850.

CONCENTRATED FEEDING STUFFS.

Sec. 131 (3807). Concentrated feeding stuffs, taxes not paid.

If any manufacturer, importer, jobber, agent or seller shall sell, offer or expose for sale, or for distribution in this state, any concentrated commercial feeding stuffs as defined by law without complying with the requirements of the law as to branding the same, and as to filing samples with the commissioner of agriculture, or tagging the same, and paying the tax thereon, or in any other way shall sell or offer or expose for sale or distribution any concentrated commercial feeding stuff which contains substantially a smaller percentage of constituents than are certified to be contained, or who shall adulterate any feeding stuff with foreign, mineral, or other substance or substances, or with substances injurious to the health of domestic animals, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,

130

CONCENTRATED FEEDING STUFFS-CONSPIRACY.

and shall be fined not exceeding fifty dollars for each offense, or imprisoned not exceeding thirty days, and the lot of feeding stuffs in question shall, in addition, be subject to seizure, condemnation and sale by the commissioner of agriculture, as prescribed for the seizure, condemnation and sale of commercial fertilizers in this state. The proceeds from sales under seizure shall be covered into the state treasury for the use of the department of agriculture in executing the provisions of this section.

1903, c. 325, s. 6.

Sec. 132 (3808). Commercial feeding stuffs.

If any person shall violate any regulation adopted by the board of agriculture for the enforcement of the law in reference to sale of concentrated commercial feeding stuffs, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

1903, c. 325, s. 5.

Sec. 133 (3827). Obstructing inspector of concentrated feeding stuffs in duties.

If any person shall impede, obstruct, hinder or otherwise prevent or attempt to prevent any inspector or other person in the performance of his duty in collecting samples, or otherwise in connection with the inspection or sale of concentrated feed stuffs, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and be fined not more than fifty dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days.

1903, c. 325, s. 8.

CONSPIRACY.

INDICTMENT TO CHEAT AND DEFRAUD.-On indictment for a conspiracy to cheat and defraud, the means to be used need not be charged. Brady, 107

822.

CONSPIRACY TO MAKE DRUNK AND PLAY FALSELY AT CARDS.-A combination of two to cheat a third person by making him drunk and playing falsely with him at cards is indictable at common law. Younger, 14 (3 Dev.), 357.

EVIDENCE-PROOF OF GUILT MAY PRECEDE PROOF OF CONSPIRACY, WHEN.— Where a conspiracy is charged, proof of the conspiracy should precede proof of guilt, but the trial judge, in his discretion, may reverse this order when thereby the case can be more conveniently developed. Jackson, 82-565.

DECLARATIONS OF ONE NOT COMPETENT AGAINST HIS CO-CONSPIRATOR.-The declarations of an alleged conspirator made in the absence of his co-conspirators, are not competent against any one except himself. Earwood, 75-210.

THERE MUST BE EVIDENCE OF COMMON DESIGN.-Where an indictment for conspiracy contains three counts, the first for conspiring to commit rape on F; the second, the like intent on E; and the third the same upon “certain female persons to the jurors unknown," and there is no evidence of a common design, defendants must be acquitted. Trice, 88-627.