interchange of district judges in such cases has proven wholly insufficient. Some of the judges regard the law as unconstitutional and not obligatory. Besides so many of the courts are in session at the same time that it would be very difficult and unsatisfactory to comply with this law even if there were no other objections to it.

It is often impossible to find a satisfactory judge. pro tem. in the county where the case is pending, and as there is no provision for the payment of these judges, no competent lawyer can afford to act as such judge. On this account numerous changes of venue are made necessary and a change of venue amounts in many cases to a denial of justice. Judges pro tem. should also be empowered to extend time for making and settling made cases same as the district judge.

Third. The second trial in ejectment as we now have it is an absurdity and a perpetual joke. This right was probably intended to compensate in part for the general and indefinite form of pleading allowed in such cases. We do not understand how either this lax form of pleading or the right to arbitrarily demand a second trial can be of any real benefit to either party. We think that both the form of pleading now provided for this class of cases and the right to demand a second trial should be repealed or some penalty should be attached to the right to the second trial which will cause a real first trial.

Fourth. A recent case serves to emphasize the necessity for a practice which many lawyers have long advocated, which is to require district judges, when they decide motions or demurrers to pleadings, to state in the record how they decide as to each ground of such motion or demurrer separately.

In the case referred to the defendant filed a motion in the district court to require the plaintiff to separately

state and number his different causes of action. This motion was overruled. The defendant then filed a demurrer to the petition upon two grounds, first that there was a misjoinder of different causes of action, and second that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court having practically already decided the first ground in its ruling on the motion, did not consider it on the demurrer but sustained the demurrer on the second ground. The plaintiff stood on his petition and filed a petition in the Supreme Court, where the district court was affirmed on the ground that there was a misjoinder of causes of action in the petition. By this proceeding the district court was affirmed by being reversed. Under the practice suggested this decision would not have occurred. There is nothing in the law to prevent the district courts from adopting this practice, but they have not done so and some of them refuse to follow it. It should be made uniform by statute.

In this connection we also suggest that the grounds for a motion for new trial should be made more specific. Asking for a new trial on the ground "of error of law occurring at the trial" is too general and indefinite. This is a very important matter, however, and this committee does not care to specify amendments without further time to consider it.

The large number of cases decided by the Supreme Court, upon propositions not mentioned or considered in the district court, very clearly indicate a necessity for closer rules of practice.

Fifth. The lawyers of Kansas have always regretted the necessity of openly exercising their peremptory challenges to jurors. They feel that some of the jurors are offended thereby, and in subsequent cases they for that reason repeat the challenge when otherwise the juror would be satisfactory.

The method of empanelling a jury in the state of Missouri relieves all parties from this embarassment. In that state enough men are placed in the box and passed for cause to cover the twelve required for the jury and also the number which may be peremptorily challenged by both parties. A list of the jurors thus accepted is then given to the parties, who alternately check the names on the list which they desire to challenge, and the clerk then calls the names of the twelve men whose names have not been checked, who serve as the jury and the other jurors retire. This method seems to be satisfactory in that state and many Kansas lawyers who have become familiar with its practical workings commend it very highly. There are some counties in this state where litigation is insufficient to justify the expense of this method, but in most counties it would add nothing to the present expenses, and it might be confined to such counties upon a population basis.

Sixth. Many lawyers, especially prosecuting attorneys and judges, have criticised our present law because it does not provide for the use of counter affidavits in applications for continuances in the district court. It is claimed that under the present law trials are of necessity postponed to the injury of the public and to no benefit to the defendant, except to simply delay and postpone the inevitable.

We recommend that a special committee be appointed to whom this report be referred with instructions to call the attention to the proper legislative committees to the amendments suggested, and if any bills are now pending covering any of such amendments that such committee do what they can to secure the passage thereof.

Respectfully submitted,

CHAS. B. GRAVES,
GEO. H. WHITCOMB.

After considerable discussion and on motion the report was considered section by section. Sections 1 and 2 were adopted without debate.

The 3rd section was discussed at length and several amendments suggested. Finally on motion to adopt R. B. Welch moved to amend by striking out the alternative recommendation, leaving the first to stand. S. H. Allen seconded the motion. C. C. Coleman moved to amend the amendment by making it read in substance, "This bar association thinks the law providing for a second trial in ejectment should be repealed. This motion carried unanimously and the section as amended was adopted.

The 4th section was read and adopted.

The 5th section was read, then discussed by Messrs. Milliken, Parker, Welch and others. Mr. Welch moved that the association recommend for passage a bill now before the legislature covering the same point. Carried. After which section 6 was favorably passed and the report as a whole adopted. The president appointed Messrs. E. F. Ware, S. H. Allen and W. A. S. Bird a committee to call the attention of the proper legislative committees to the recommendations contained in this report.

AMENDMENTS TO PROBATE LAWS.

The report of the committee on Amendments to Probate Laws was read by Chairman J. H. Stave y as follows:

To the President and Members of the Bar Association:

Your committee on the revision of the probate laws have had the subject under consideration for several months, and from the state at large there comes an urgent appeal for a revision of the procedure followed in our probate courts. We deemed it inadvisable to prepare an entire revision, because we were not

appointed for that purpose, and because there is no probability that it would receive the consideration from the present legislature that it would require and should receive. However, at a recent convention held by the probate judges of the state a committee was appointed to make a general revision of such laws.

Your committee prepared a bill to meet in a measure the condition of affairs arising in the case of Capel vs. Drew from Franklin county, where it was decided that no guardian could be appointed for feeble-minded persons. This bill was modelled after the provisions of the statute in reference to habitual drunkards, but the judiciary committee of the house in its wisdom reported it adversely, believing that there might be fraud practiced thereby on some innocent parties. Another bill prepared by the committee provided for an amendment to section 3008 of the General Statutes of 1901, so that where a probate judge became incapacitated for the discharge of his duties by reason of sickness the district judge of the county could appoint the probate judge of an adjoining county to act in his place. This bill is pending in the committee on judiciary of the house. A question of the constitutionality of such a law exists, but the need of such a statute is so apparent that it may be favorably considered with a recommendation of mercy to the Supreme Court.

Respectfully submitted, J. H. STAVELY, Ch. Com. On motion the report was adopted as read.

Following which it was on motion declared that it is the sense of this association that the legislature should pass a law appointing a commission to revise and codify the probate laws of the state, including if necessary the laws relating to the insane, imbeciles and feebleminded; and that the commission be allowed adequate compensation for so doing.

L. H. Perkins, secretary of the State Board of Law