of master and apprentice.54 And so must a master pay the medical expenses of his slave.55 And, under marine law, a sick or injured seaman has a right to be cured at the ship's expense; and the master is bound to furnish everything necessary to his recovery.56 An ordinary employer, however, is, as a general rule, under no legal obligation to furnish medical attendance to his employees, in the absence of a special agreement therefor;57 and while, if he sees fit to do so, he rests under a duty to exercise due care in the selection of the physician,58 if he uses due care in the selection of a skilled and competent physician, and makes proper arrangements to enable a sick or injured employee to avail himself of such services, his whole duty to the employee under the contract of employment is performed.59 And if an exigency making it the duty of an employer to employ medical or surgical assistance for an employee arises, the duty expires with the emergency.60 A contract by an employer with his employee whereby the employer is to furnish medical attendance to the employee in case of sickness or injury while engaged in the employer's business, however, is solely for the benefit of the employee, and only incidentally for the benefit of the physician employed, and does not authorize such

"Easley v. Craddock, 4 Rand. (Va.)

423.
Sweet Water Mfg. Co. v. Glover, 29
Ga. 399; Dunbar v. Williams, 10 Johns.
249; Bomford v. Grimes, 17 Ark. 567.

The hirer of a slave, however, and not the owner, is bound to pay a physician for his services when called to attend a slave in case of injury during the hiring, where the owner had not requested the services of a physician, or made a special agreement with the hirer as to such services. McGee v. Currie, 4 Tex. 217; Meeker v. Childress, Minor (Ala.) 109; Watkins v. Bailey, 21 Ark. 274.

And one of two persons hiring a slave is a competent witness in an action by a physician who attended the slave, against his owner for medical services rendered, to prove the understanding at the time of the hiring that the owner was to pay for medical attendance if needed. McGee v. Currie, 4 Tex. 217.

McBride v. Watts, 1 M'Cord, L. 384; Holt v. Cummings, 102 Pa. 212, 48 Am. Rep. 199; Sanders v. Stimson Mill Co. 32 Wash. 627, 73 Pac. 688.

for services rendered, though the seaman was removed at his own request from the boat to his own home. Hott v. Cummings, 102 Pa. 212, 48 Am. Rep. 199.

57 Malone v. Robinson (Miss.) 12 So. 709; Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. MoMurray, 98 Ind. 358, 49 Am. Rep. 752.

Big Stone Gap Iron Co. v. Ketron (Va.) 9 Va. Law Reg. 906, 45 S. E. 740. "Quinn v. Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. 94 Tenn. 713, 28 L. R. A. 552, 45 Am. St. Rep. 767, 30 S. W. 1036; South Florida R. Co. v. Price, 32 Fla. 46, 13 So. 638; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Sullivan, 141 Ind. 83, 27 L. R. A. 840, 50 Am. St. Rep. 313, 40 N. E. 138; Haggerty v. St. Louis, K. & N. W. R. Co. 100 Mo. App. 425, 74 S. W. 456; Poling v. San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 75 S. W. 69; Hanway v. Galveston, H. & 8. A. R. Co. 94 Tex. 76, 58 S. W. 724.

Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Early, 141 Ind. 73, 28 L. R. A. 546, 40 N. E. 257.

A physician employed pursuant to the authority conferred by the regulations of a relief and hospital department of And the liability of the owner of a several railroad companies to treat an tugboat for services of a physician ren- injured employee of one of the comdered to a seaman thereon, who, by panies in an emergency where its surthe maritime law, had a right to be geon could not be reached, who was cured at the ship's expense, continues employed for no definite period of time.

physician to maintain an action for services against the employer.61 The question whether an employer employed a physician to attend an injured employee is one for the jury, where the evidence is conflicting.

471. Agency in employment of physician for another.-The general rules as to agency apply to contracts for medical services made for the benefit of third persons.63 When a person is in extremis, incapable of acting for himself, from the necessity of the case anyone is authorized to call a physician for him. But where one with whom the contract is made owes no duty to the person to be benefited, who is competent to act, express authority should usually appear,65 though such contracts are subject to ratification.66 The question is one of scope

"Meyer v. Supreme Lodge, K. of P. (N. Y.) 64 L. R. A. 839, 70 N. E. 111. Where an overwhelming calamity occurs to a child of an absent parent, rendering medical aid instantly necessary, and a person, comprehending the situa The action of a bridge company in tion, secures the services of a physician, paying one physician for services renthe physician not having reasonable dered to a foreman who was injured cause to believe he was engaging his while in charge of its work, and of

of the agent's authority. A general business manager or superintendent of a manufacturing company has no general authority to contract for medical services for an injured employee,67 nor has the manager of a plantation.68 But a general manager of a railroad company has authority to bind the company for medical services rendered to an employee injured by an accident on the road;69 and so has the general superintendent of a railroad.70 And the division superintendent will be presumed to have such authority;71 but he is not presumed to be authorized to contract for surgical attendance on passengers whose injuries were not caused by the negligence of the company.72 And a conductor, roadmaster, or station agent cannot bind the company for services of a surgeon in attending an injured employee, without au

thority;73 nor can an attorney," an engineer,75 or a surgeon.76 employment of a surgeon by a conductor, however, is valid and binding, where the conductor is the highest representative of the company on the ground, and there is an emergency requiring immediate action.77 And employment by a conductor is ratified, where the superintendent, after notice, permits the physician to go on and render services.78 And generally, failure on the part of an employer, upon notice, to repudiate an unauthorized employment of a physician or surgeon for the benefit of an employee injured in his service, is deemed a ratification.79 So, a servant left in charge of children of the master may bind him for necessary medical attendance upon them,80 but not for attendance upon her not made necessary by the performance of her duties.81

And a wife, in the absence of her husband, has not implied authority to bind him for medical services rendered to an employee, or other person for whom he is not legally bound to supply such service.82

472. Regular physician calling counsel or assistance.-A physician called by the regular physician of a patient for consultation or to assist him may recover from the party employing the regular physician for such services, where they were received without objection, the law in such case implying a promise to pay therefor.83 And such recovery is not prevented by an agreement between the regular physician and the patient, unknown to the consulting physician, that the attending physician should pay the consulting one.84 But a contract by the regular physician for payment for the nursing of an injured person is not binding upon the physician's employer unless authority is shown.85 And a regularly employed physician has no power by virtue of his employment to contract with another physician to look after his patients at the expense of his employer.se And though a railway conductor may employ a physician in an emergency, and bind his company, he cannot delegate his authority, and authorize the physician to employ assistants, though their employment may be necessary. The right of a physician employed by the relief department of a railroad company to employ another physician is a question for the jury, where the evidence is conflicting.88

87

"Baker v. Witten, 1 Okla. 160, 30 Pac.

491.

Shelton v. Johnson, 40 Iowa, 84; Garrey v. Stadler, 67 Wis. 512, 58 Am. Rep. 877, 30 N. W. 787. And see Guerard v. Jenkins, 1 Strobh. L. 171.

But a physician cannot recover from a patient for medical services upon the theory that he was called for consultation with the regular physician, in the absence of either allegation or proof that he rendered services at the request of any other person, except by way of inference from the fact of his visiting the patient in company with the attending physician. Schrader v. Hoover, 87 lowa, 654, 54 N. W. 463.

And evidence of a custom prevailing among physicians and surgeons in the vicinity that, unless there was a special agreement to the contrary, a physician called to assist must look to the patient, and not the principal physician, for his pay, is inadmissible in an action against a principal physician for services, where it does not appear that the usage was known to the plaintiff, or so well settled and uniformly acted upon as to

raise a presumption that it was known, and that the parties contracted with reference to it. Fitzgerald v. Hanson, 16 Mont. 474, 41 Pac. 230.

"Garrey v. Stadler, 67 Wis. 512, 58 Am. Rep. 877, 30 N. W. 787.

Mayberry v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 75 Mo. 492; Bushnell v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 69 Iowa, 620, 29 N. W. 753.

em

But a nurse may recover for services rendered to an injured employee of a railroad company, where he was ployed by the surgeon of the company who was authorized to contract, or where he had general authority to employ nurses. Bigham v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 79 Iowa, 534, 44 N. W. 805.

Evansville & I. R. Co. v. Spellbring, 1 Ind. App. 167, 27 N. E. 239. STTerre Haute & 1. R. Co. v. Brown, 107 Ind. 336, 8 N. E. 218.

Haggerty v. St. Louis. K. & N. W. R. Co. 100 Mo. App. 424, 74 S. W. 456.

Where a member of a relief department of a railroad sustained a frac tured leg, and was given temporary treatment by a physician pending the arrival of the physician of the relief