56 from the disease, where the disease was the cause of the accident, and the exception was as to death caused directly or indirectly by disease. Death resulting from sunstroke or heat prostration, in the usual course of the avocation of the insured person, is not an accident, but is death from disease;57 and so is death resulting from accidental contact with putrid animal matter containing poisonous bacteria. 58 And one who dies from an overdose of opium administered by himself for convulsions dies from medical treatment for disease, and not from accident.59 Where an accident causes disease, however, and the disease results in death, the death is regarded as accidental, and not as death by disease within the meaning of an exception in an accident insurance policy.60 And where death is produced by blood poisoning occasioned by inoculation into a wound of a poisonous substance at the time the wound was made, so that it was in fact a part of the accident, death is attributable to accident, and not to blood poisoning; and so is death resulting from a fall having been caused by a fit.62 Whether or not the accident in such cases was the proximate and direct cause 56 Sharpe V. Commercial Travelers' Mut. Acci. Asso. 139 Ind. 92, 37 N. E. 353; Manufacturers' Acci. Indemnity Co. v. Dorgan, 22 L. R. A. 620, 7 C. Č. A. 581, 16 U. S. App. 290, 58 Fed. 945. And evidence in an action upon an accident insurance policy covering injury, but not disease, as to the state of health of the deceased from his infancy to the time of his last sickness, and as to the health of his parents, is compe tent and important. McCarthy v. Traveler's Ins. Co. 8 Biss. 362, Fed. Cas. No. 8,682. "Dozier v. Fidelity & C. Ins. Co. 46 Fed. 446, 13 L. R. A. 114; Sinclair v. Maritime Passengers' Assur. Co. 3 El. & El. 478, 30 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 77, 7 Jur. N. S. 367, 4 L. T. N. S. 15, 9 Week. Rep. 342. 58 Bacon v. United States Mut. Acci. Asso. 123 N. Y. 304, 9 L. R. A. 617, 20 Am. St. Rep. 748, 25 N. E. 399. 5 Bayless v. Travellers' Ins. Co. 14 Blatchf. 143, Fed. Cas. No. 1,138. And death by drinking poison in mistake for medicine which the insured was in the habit of taking is death by medical treatment rendered necessary by disease, within the meaning of an application in an accident insurance policy, and not death by accident. Cole v. Accident Ins. Co. 61 L. T. N. S. 227. "North American Life & Acci. Ins. Co. v. Burroughs, 69 Pa. 43, 8 Atl. 212; Fitton v. Accidental Death Ins. Co. 17 C. B. N. S. 122, 34 L. J. C. P. N. S. 28. And where an insured person fell and dislocated his shoulder, and was taken home and put to bed, and died, without having left his bedroom or his bed except for necessary purposes, from pneumonia resulting from cold, he dies from the effect of the injury, within the meaning of a policy insuring against injury caused by accident, where he would not have died, as and when he did, if it had not been for the accident. Isitt v. Railway Passengers Assur. Co. L. R. 22 Q. B. Div. 504, 58 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 191, 60 L. T. N. S. 297, 37 Week. Rep. 477. "Martin v. Equitable Acci. Asso. 61 Hun, 467, 16 N. Y. Supp. 279; Western Commercial Travelers' Asso. v. Smith, 40 L. R. A. 653, 29 C. C. A. 223, 56 U. S. App. 393, 85 Fed. 401; Nax v. Trav elers' Ins. Co. 130 Fed. 985. Lawrence v. Accidental Ins. Co. L. R. 7 Q. B. Div. 216, 50 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 522, 45 L. T. N. S. 29, 29 Week. Rep. 802, 45 J. P. 781; Winspear v. Accident Ins. Co. L. R. 6 Q. B. Div. 42, 43 L. T. N. S. 459, 29 Week. Rep. 116. of death, or whether or not it was occasioned wholly or in part by disease, is a question of fact for the jury.63 535. Particular diseases.-A representation or warranty in an application for insurance, of freedom from particular named diseases, is not falsified by a mere temporary ailment of a kind named.64 Such representations and warranties refer to the diseases named, when they are of a permanent constitutional nature, and indicate a vice in the constitution, and have some bearing upon the general health and continuance of life of the applicant.65 And a representation that the applicant had not been subject to open sores or swellings refers to such sores or swellings as result from disease or disorder, or from some fundamental derangement, and not such as result from wounds or accidents. And addiction to the use of chloral, within the meaning of such a representation, refers to the habitual, customary, or constant use of it.67 Nor will having a single epileptic fit caused by a sunstroke constitute being subject to fits. They must be of such a nature as to recur with some frequency.68 And a warranty or representation as to the nonexistence of insanity in certain named relatives, or other constitutional disease hereditary in its character, is not falsified by the existence of such insanity in such relatives, unless it was hereditary; though a question as to whether certain relatives of the appli 66 Martin v. Equitable Acci. Asso. 61 Hun, 467, 16 N. Y. Supp. 279; Preferred Mut. Acci. Asso. v. Beidelman, Monaghan (Pa.) 481. Rand v. Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc. 97 Tenn. 291, 37 S. W. 7. And see Fowkes v. Manchester & Life Ins. Co. 3 Fost. & F. 440; Life Asso. v. Foster, 11 Sc. Sess. Cas. 351, 4 Bigelow, Life & Acci. Ins. Rep. 520. An answer by an applicant for insurance, of "never sick," to a question as to whether he had had certain diseases, means not that he had never been sick of any disorder, but only that he never had any of the enumerated diseases so as to constitute sickness. Knickerbock er L. Ins. Co. v. Trefz, 104 U. S. 197, 26 L. ed. 708. "Woodward v. Iowa Ins. Co. 104 Tenn. 49, 56 S. W. 1020; World Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Schultz, 73 Ill. 586. Home Mut. Life Asso. v. Gillespie, 110 Pa. 84, 1 Atl 340. Rand v. Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc. 97 Tenn. 291, 37 S. W. 7. Chattock v. Shawe, 1 Moody & R. 498, 3 Bigelow, Life & Acci. Ins. Rep. And while vertigo is swimming in the head, the term as used in an interrogatory in an application for insurance refers to an ailment of such a character as renders the insurance more hazardous by affecting the general health of the insured, and does not include swimming or dizziness in the head caused by indigestion. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Daviess, 87 Ky. 541, 9 S. W. 812. Sinclair v. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. 9 Ins. L. J. 523; Peasley v. Safety Deposit L. Ins. Co. 15 Hun, 227. And a question in an application for insurance as to whether the applicant had any difficulty with his head or brain, following one as to the functions of the brain and nervous system, will be deemed to refer to mental unsoundness, or to some functional derangement of the head or brain, and not to include a temporary or occasional physical disturbance which is the result of accidental causes, such as periodical attacks of headache not originating in any unsoundness or derangement or permanent disease. Higbie v. Guardian Mut. L. Ins. Co. 53 N. Y. 603. evere ih is a repres ise in an a is ebaras wing each in cant had insanity signifies, when unexplained and unlimited, an and reader t So, a warranty that an applicant for insurance had r raising of blood is not a warranty that he never spit or. but only that he did not have it in such a form as to b order, or constitutional vice;" a single instance having significance only as an item of evidence ter presence of disease, the weight of which depends la cumstances of the occurrence;72 though a questio for insurance, as to whether the applicant had a d spitting or raising of blood, includes instances of they may not have amounted to a disease, since disorder. And a representation that the a Andere ralysis is falsified by proof of two previous a expressed apprehension that a third would b death in a third attack.74 And a defense tha with Bright's disease raises a question for t against the existence of disease of the kid ing and pain in the chest lasting many h ranty against severe protracted headach tacks of sick headache at irregular interv were tation Ivolve a vice in the constitution, or haaimains of re health or continuance of life.T TO Johnson v. Maine & N. B. Ins. Co. 83 Me. 182, 22 Atl. 107. And see Yer te ton v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. 76 N. Y. ■ 426, 32 Am. Rep. 335. "Dreier v. Continental L. Fr. On 24 Fed. 670; Peterson v. Des Moines Life Asso. 115 Iowa, 668, 87 S. W. $97. In Geach v. Ingall, 14 Mees. & T. 95, 15 L. J. Exch. 37, 9 Jur. 691. however it was held that, while the expressio "spitting of blood" used as an inte - rogatory would probably mean the dhe MOT SITA order of blood spitting, whether ceeding from the lungs, the stomach any other part of the body, still, single act of spitting of blood wod sufficient to put the insurers on in as to the cause of it, and ought fore to be stated. "Dreier v. Continental L. Is.. Fed. 670; Campbell v. New Mut. L. Ins. Co. 98 Mass. 381. 12.1 INSURANCE. PLOT burial, without the ground 536. Serious or severe illness.-The use as a prefix of the words ons or severe" in a representation or warranty against the exa fness or disease in an application for insurance we ET effect upon its character; the term "erions or age,... case meaning such illness as is likely to impact per stitution, and render the risk more hazardo Ey disturbances, unless presenting matter of n ere, will not affect a policy issued upon a megreenran mi had not had any severe or wrira w mestion in such case is wieder de inima yah, wah apon the beaith, longevity, on an A. *urs" however, aa was with www.ca I e mende matere on us. w***** noddse, bet raeter & you or a& an apple cant had insanity signifies, when unexplained and unlimited, any derangement of the mind which deprives it of the power to reason or will intelligently, and is not confined to such forms of insanity as affect the physical health and tend to shorten life, but includes a case of chronic dementia in which the patient is quiet and harmless and in good health, 70 73 71 So, a warranty that an applicant for insurance had no spitting or raising of blood is not a warranty that he never spit or raised blood, but only that he did not have it in such a form as to be a disease, disorder, or constitutional vice; a single instance of blood raising having significance only as an item of evidence tending to show the presence of disease, the weight of which depends largely upon the circumstances of the occurrence;72 though a question in an application for insurance, as to whether the applicant had a disease or disorder of spitting or raising of blood, includes instances of spitting blood though they may not have amounted to a disease, since it would be at least a disorder. And a representation that the applicant never had paralysis is falsified by proof of two previous attacks, and that he had expressed apprehension that a third would be fatal, and of his final death in a third attack.74 And a defense that the insured was afflicted with Bright's disease raises a question for the jury, under a warranty against the existence of disease of the kidneys.75 And frequent attacks of sick headache at irregular intervals, accompanied by vomiting and pain in the chest lasting many hours, is a violation of a warranty against severe protracted headaches, though they did not involve a vice in the constitution, or have any bearing upon general health or continuance of life.76 TO Johnson v. Maine & N. B. Ins. Co. 83 Me. 182, 22 Atl. 107. And see Newton v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. 76 N. Y. 426, 32 Am. Rep. 335. "Dreier v. Continental L. Ins. Co. 24 Fed. 670; Peterson v. Des Moines Life Asso. 115 Iowa, 668, 87 S. W. 397. In Geach v. Ingall, 14 Mees. & W. 95, 15 L. J. Exch. 37, 9 Jur. 691, however, it was held that, while the expression "spitting of blood" used as an interrogatory would probably mean the disorder of blood spitting, whether proceeding from the lungs, the stomach, or any other part of the body, still, one single act of spitting of blood would be sufficient to put the insurers on inquiry as to the cause of it, and ought therefore to be stated. T2Dreier v. Continental L. Ins. Co. 24 Fed. 670; Campbell v. New England Mut. L. Ins. Co. 98 Mass. 381. Evidence as to the sense in which the term "spitting of blood" was used in a warranty of freedom therefrom, in aut application for insurance, is admissible in an action upon the policy. Singleton v. St. Louis Mut. Ins. Co. 66 Mo. 63, 27 Am. Rep. 321. Smith v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. "Barteau v. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. 3 Thomp. & C. 576. "Continental L. Ins. Co. v. Yung, 113 Ind. 159, 3 Am. St. Rep. 630, 15 N. E. 220. Te Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 88 Tex. 333, 28 L. R. A. 765, 53 Am. St. Rep. 757, 31 S. W. 501. |