sis stating the facts of the case upon which an opinion is desired.“9 And a physician may properly give an opinion as to the cause of a change in condition between two different periods or examinations;70 or, as to whether there might have been an injury which would account for the change, besides the injury in question;" and a medical opinion as to whether a described cause would produce existing conditions is competent.72

A physician cannot be asked his opinion, however, as to what produced the condition of a patient as he observed it, where the facts of such condition are not stated." And an opinion that an injury resulted from a certain designated act, which is the one upon which the action is based, as distinguished from an opinion that certain causes would produce certain results, is improper as usurping the province of the jury. The examination of a medical expert in a personal injury case is always as to what was the condition of the patient after the injury; and he is not called upon to state whether that

"Filer v. New York C. R. Co. 49 N. Y. 42, 10 Am. Rep. 327; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Hawk, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 142, 69 S. W. 1037.

And when on appeal the hypothesis does not appear, the question asking for the opinion is not subject to objection that it calls upon the witness to determine a question belonging to the jury. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Hawk, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 142, 69 S. W. 1037.

10 Matteson v. New York C. R. Co. 35 N. Y. 487, 91 Am. Dec. 67.

"Friess v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 67 Hun, 205, 22 N. Y. Supp. 104.

And a physician testifying from personal observation as an expert may properly state that he did not discover any perceptible change in a person examined, from her condition at a previous examination. Know v. Wheelock, 56 Vt. 191.

Illinois C. R. Co. v. Treat, 75 Ill. App. 327; Dean v. Sharon, 72 Conn. 667, 45 Atl. 963; Baltimore City Pass. R. Co. v. Tanner, 90 Md. 315, 45 Atl. 188; Graves v. Battle Creek, 95 Mich. 266, 19 L. R. A. 641, 35 Am. St. Rep. 561, 54 N. W. 757; Bowe v. St. Paul, 70 Minn. 341, 73 N. W. 184; Anthony v. Smith, 4 Bosw. 503; Conrad v. El lington, 104 Wis. 367, 80 N. W. 456.

And a physician who had described the nature of an injury may give an opinion in a prosecution for the homicide as to whether the club with which

it was shown the accused struck the person killed could, by one blow, produce the result which he described as a witness. People v. Rogers, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 370.

13 Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90; Matteson v. New York C. R. Co. 62 Barb. 364.

"Jones v. Portland, 88 Mich. 598, 16 L. R. A. 437, 50 N. W. 731; Gregory v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. 55 Hun, 303, 8 N. Y. Supp. 525; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Smith, 208 Ill. 608, 70 N. E. 628; Brant v. Lyons, 60 Iowa, 172, 14 N. W. 227; Riser v. Southern R. Co 67 S. C. 419, 46 S. E. 47; Easler v. Southern R. Co. 59 S. C. 311, 37 S. E. 938; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 119 Ga. 455, 46 N. E. 678.

But the opinion of a physician in an action for the death of a child from heart disease, alleged to have seen produced by fright suffered from ejection from a railway train, as to whether fright would produce heart trouble, is competent, and not objectionable as usurping the functions of the jury. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Latimer, 128 Ill. 163, 21 N. E. 7.

And in Donnelly v. St. Paul City R. Co. 70 Minn. 278, 73 N. W. 157, the distinction between asking a medical expert whether in his opinion certain causes might produce certain results, and asking him whether in his opinion they did produce such results, was repudiated.

condition is the consequence of the injury.75 Nor is the opinion of an expert as to the seriousness or the triviality of an injury competent, when it is feasible to elicit the facts upon which the opinion is based.76

551. Cause of death.-The opinions of medical experts as to the cause of death are always admissible when such cause is involved in doubt, and there are no witnesses to the occurrence." And where death might have resulted from different causes, an expert may give his opinion as to which cause produced the result; 78 and he may also give an opinion as to how the injuries were inflicted;79 and as to whether or not they were inflicted before death;80 or that they could not have been inflicted in a designated way;81 or as to the length of time since death took place. 82 Such opinions are admissible when founded either on personal knowledge of the facts of the case, or upon a statement of the case as testified to by others;83 and they may

"Page v. New York, 57 Hun, 123, 10 N. Y. Supp. 826.

Stoothoff v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. 50 App. Div. 585, 64 N. Y. Supp. 243.

"Simon v. State, 108 Ala. 27, 18 So. 731; Supreme Tent, K. of M. v. Stensland, 206 Ill. 126, 68 N. E. 1098; State v. Tippet, 94 Iowa, 646, 63 N. W. 445; State v. Crenshaw, 32 La. Ann. 406; People v. Foley, 64 Mich. 148, 31 N. W. 94; Donnelly v. St. Paul C. R. Co. 70 Minn. 278, 73 N. W. 157; People v. Benham, 160 N. Y. 402, 55 N. E. 11; Com. v. Crossmire, 156 Pa. 304, 27 Atl. 40; Powell v. State, 13 Tex. App. 244; Shelton v. State, 34 Tex. 663; Wright v. Hardy, 22 Wis. 348; Boyle v. State, 61 Wis. 440, 21 N. W. 289.

And a description of a wound caused by a blow, and the opinion of a surgeon as to whether it was sufficient to cause death, is proper testimony in a prosecution for the killing. Perkins v. State, 5 Ohio C. C. 597, 3 Ohio C. D. 292.

People v. Hare, 57 Mich. 505, 24 N. W. 845; State v. Pike, 65 Me. 111; State v. Harris, 63 N. C. 1; Supreme Tent, K. of M. v. Stensland, 206 11. 124, 68 N. E. 1098; State v. Wilcox, 132 N. C. 1120, 44 S. E. 625.

cept that she was found in the water. Erickson v. Smith, 2 Abb. App. Dec. 64.

"Com. v. Crossmire, 156 Pa. 304, 27 Atl. 40; Ebos v. State, 34 Ark. 520. 80 People v. Foley, 64 Mich. 148, 31 N. W. 94.

And a duly qualified physician is competent to give an opinion as to whether or not the body of a deceased person had been moved after death. State v. Merriman, 34 S. C. 16, 12 S. E. 619. State v. Johnson, 66 S. C. 23, 44 S. E. 58.

But whether the death of a person whose body shows only certain described bruises and injuries could have been caused by collision with a railway train is a matter of common observation, and not a subject of expert testimony. Hellyer v. People, 186 Ill. 550, 58 N. E. 245.

82 State v. Mortensen, 26 Utah, 312, 73 Pac. 562, 633.

83 Donnelly v. St. Paul City R. Co. 70 Minn. 278, 73 N. W. 157; Page v. State, 61 Ala. 16.

In State v. Bowman, 78 N. C. 509, however, it was held that the opinion of a physician as to the cause of death was not competent in a prosecution for And a physician, called as a witness murder, where it was based upon the in an action for damages for injuries statements of other witnesses as to cirreceived through the explosion of a cumstances immediately preceding steamboat boiler, is competent to testify as to what would have been the indications if a person were suffocated and afterwards fell overboard, though there was no evidence of the person in question having fallen overboard, ex

death, and the appearance of the deceased after death, as distinguished from a hypothetical case, or knowledge possessed by the witness himself to which he testified.

be based on the previous condition of the person and the subsequent condition of the body,84 or upon the condition and position of the body, and the pathological condition of its internal organs after death as ascertained by examination.85

87

Physicians and surgeons may likewise, upon facts testified to either by themselves or by others, give their opinions as to whether a particular blow or injury would be adequate to cause death;88 or even whether such injury was the actual cause of death in the particular case. And physicians who had examined a person's wounds before and after death may give an opinion as to whether an instrument identified as the one used was such as to produce death when used in the manner described. 88 And a physician may properly testify that he knows no disease which would produce death with certain described symptoms.89 But a physician cannot be asked whether the testimony and described autopsy were such as to enable a physician to tell the cause of death with any certainty; the question should recite the scope and character of the autopsy. 90 And whether a deceased person might have killed himself by falling on his own knife is not a question of medical science, but an ordinary question of fact.91

552. Future effect of injury or disease.-Physicians and surgeons may testify as to the probable result of known injuries upon the health and life of the person injured,92 and as to the probable duration of the

"People v. Foley, 64 Mich. 148, 31 N. W. 94; Simon v. State, 108 Ala. 27, 18 So. 731.

Boyle v. State, 61 Wis. 440, 21 N. W. 289; State v. Tippet, 94 Iowa, 646, 63 N. W. 445.

Livingston v. Com. 14 Gratt. 592; Lovelady v. State, 14 Tex. App. 545.

Livingston v. Com. 14 Gratt. 592. And physicians who had made a postmortem examination of a deceased person may testify as to whether a clot of blood which they found could have existed a designated number of hours without causing death. State v. Pike, 65 Me. 111.

Waite v. State, 13 Tex. App. 169. People v. Foley, 64 Mich. 148, 31 N. W. 94.

"Manufacturers' Acoi. Indemnity Co. v. Dorgan, 22 L. R. A. 620, 7 C. C. A. 581, 16 U. S. App. 290, 58 Fed. 945. "State v. Bradley, 34 S. C. 136, 13 S. E. 315.

"Barr v. Kansas, 121 Mo. 22, 25 S. W. 562; Robinson v. St. Louis & S. R. Co. 103 Mo. App. 110, 77 S. W. 493; Evansville & T. H. R. Co. v. Crist, 116

Ind. 446, 2 L. R. A. 450, 9 Am. St. Rep. 865, 19 N. E. 310; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 544, 14 N. E. 572, 16 N. E. 197; Pennsylvania Co. v. Frund, 4 Ind. App. 469, 30 N. E. 1116; Williams v. State, 64 Md. 384, 1 Atl. 887; Langworthy v. Green Twp. 88 Mich. 207, 50 N. W. 130; People v. Hare, 57 Mich. 505, 24 N. W. 843; Clegg v. Metropolitan Street R. Co. 1 App. Div. 207, 37 N. Y. Supp. 130; Magee v. Troy, 48 Hun, 383, I N. Y. Supp. 24; Stever v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 7 App. Div. 392, 39 N. Y. Supp. 944; Jones v. Utica & B. River R. Co. 40 Hun, 349; Filer v. New York C. R. Co. 49 N. Y. 42, 10 Am. Rep. 327; Wendell v. Troy, 39 Barb. 329; Maher v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 20 App. Div. 161, 46 N. Y. Supp. 847; Walden v. Jamestown, 79 App. Div. 433, 80 N. Y. Supp. 65; Lincoln v. Saratoga & 8. R. Co. 23 Wend. 425; Rosenblatt v. Cohen House Wrecking Co. 91 App. Div. 413, 86 N. Y. Supp. 801; McCue v. Knoxville Burrough, 146 Pa. 580, 23 Atl. 439; Stembridge v. Southern R. Co. 65 S. C. 440, 43 S. E. 968; Oliver v.

injuries, and as to the probability that the injury will cause future pain and suffering, as well as the effect of the injury upon the future ability to work or attend to other affairs of life of the person injured, and as to ultimate curability, or probable recovery, or

permanency of the effects of the injury,97 and as to the liability that the injured person will be subject to other dangers resulting from the injury; 98 such opinions not being objectionable as speculative, since that which happens in the natural and ordinary course of events may be assumed to happen with reasonable certainty.99

Likewise the question whether a described accident was capable of producing certain physical results is a proper one for a medical expert; and a physician may give his opinion as to the probability of