should speak first what makes against the adversary's speech, doing it away, and drawing opposite inferences, and particularly should his arguments have been well received. For just as one's mind does not cordially receive a person on whom a slur has been previously cast, in the same way neither does it favorably listen to a speech, if the opposite speaker appear to have spoken truly. It is necessary, then, to gain a footing in the hearer's mind for the intended speech; and it will be gained if you sweep away objections: wherefore a speaker, having combated either all, or the most important, or the most approved arguments of his adversary, or those which readily admit a contrary inference, is in this way to substantiate his own In this she first lays hold of the most silly point. Thus much, then, of proof. But as to the effect of character, since the saying some things respecting oneself either is invidious, or involves prolixity, or a liability to contradiction; and respecting another, either slander or rusticity; it behooves one to introduce another as speaking: the thing which Isocrates does in the speech respecting Philip, and in the "Antidosis »; and as Archilochus conveys reproof, for he introduces the father saying in an iambic line respecting his daughter, "There is not anything which may not be expected, nothing which may be affirmed impossible on oath"; and Charon, the mechanic, in that iambic whose beginning is, "I regard not the wealth of Gyges »; and as Sophocles introduces Hæmon pleading in behalf of Antigone to his father, as though another character were speaking. But it is necessary sometimes to alter the form of our enthymemes, and to make them into maxims: for example, "It behooves men of sense to come to reconciliation while yet successful; for thus will they be the greatest gainers." But, in enthymematic form, it is thus: "If persons ought then to be reconciled when the reconciliation will be most to their advantage and profit, they should be reconciled while yet they are successful.» THE OF THE PERORATION HE peroration is composed of four things: of getting the hearer favorable to oneself, and ill-disposed towards the adversary; and of amplification and extenuation; and of placing the hearer under the influence of the passions; and of awakening his recollection. For after showing yourself to be on the right side, and your adversary on the wrong, it naturally follows to praise and blame, and to give the last finish. And one of two things the speaker ought to aim at, either to show that he is good relatively to them [the audience], or is so absolutely; and that the other party is bad, either relatively to them, or absolutely. And the elements, out of which one ought to get up persons as of such characters, have been stated; both whence one should establish them as bad, and whence as good. Next to this, these points having been already shown, it follows naturally to amplify or diminish: for the facts must needs be acknowledged, if one be about to state their quantity; for the increase of bodies is from substances previously existing. But the elements, out of which one must amplify and diminish, are above set forth. Next to this, the facts being clear, both as to their nature and degree, it follows that we excite the hearer to passion; such as are, pity, terror, anger, hatred, envy, emulation, and contentiousness: the elements of these also have been stated above. So that it merely remains to awaken a recollection of what has been before stated. And this we are to do here, in the way in which some erroneous teachers say we should in the exordium: for in order that the facts may be readily perceived, they bid us state them frequently. Now there [in the exordium], indeed, we ought to state the case at full, in order that it may not be unknown to the hearer upon what the trial turns; here, however [in the peroration], merely the means by which it has been proved, and that summarily. The commencement of the peroration will be that one has made good what he undertook; so that it will be to be stated, as well what one has adduced, as for what reasons. And it is expressed either by means of a juxtaposition with the adversary's statements; and draw the comparison either between every point whatsoever, which both have stated relative to the same thing; or else not by a direct opposition. «He, indeed, on this subject said so and so; but I so and so, and for such reasons.» Or, by a kind of bantering: thus, "He said so and so, and I so and so." And, "What would he do, had he proved this, and not the other point!" Or by interrogation: - "What has not been fully proved on my side?” or, “What has this man established?» Either in this way, then, must the speaker conclude, or he must, in natural order, so state his reasoning as it was originally stated; and, again, if he please, he may state distinctly that of the adversary's speech. And, for the close, the style without connectives is becoming, in order that it may be a peroration, not an oration: "I have spoken,-you have heard, the case is in your hands,-pronounce your decision.» All the foregoing are from the translation of Buckley in the Bohn Library. |