a Although contracts of guaranty are very familiar in the practice of the commercial world, comparatively few cases have been subjected to judicial decision in the English and American tribunals. It may not, however, be without use to the learned reader, to collect the principal adjudications on this subject, especially as no attempt has yet been made to bring them before the public in a connected view.

Contracts of guaranty, like all commercial contracts; have received a liberal interpretation in furtherance of the intention of the parties. But at the same time, they are not extended beyond the obvious import of the terms in their reasonable interpretation. Where, in a letter of introduction of a mercantile firm, the defendants used the following terms. "We do ourselves the pleasure of introducing

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them to your correspondence, as a house on whose integrity and punctuality, the utmost. dependence may be placed; they will write you the nature of their intentions, and you may be assured of their complying fully with any contract or engagements they may enter into with you," it was held that the letter did not import a guaranty of such et gagements; and that parol evidence was not admissible to explain the terms so as to affect their import, with regard to the supposed guaranty. Russel v. Clarke, 3 Dall. 415. S. C. 7 Cranch, 69. So where B. wrote to C. "as I. understand Messrs. A. & Co. hare. given you an order for rigging, &c. which will amount to 4,000l. I can assure you, from what I know of A.'s honour and probity, you will be per: fectly safe in crediting them to that amount; indeed I have no

objection to guaranty you against any loss, from giving them this credit," it was held that the writing did not import a perfect and conclusive guaranty, but only a proposition or overture tending to a guaranty; and that to make it a guaranty, B. ought to have had notice, that it was so regarded and meant to be accepted or there should have been a subsequent consent on his part to convert it into a conclusive guaranty. M'Iver V. Richardson 1 Maule and Selwyn, 557. But it is said that the words are to be taken as strongly against the party giving the guaranty, as the sense of them will admit of. Therefore, where tlic defendant wrote the plaintiff, "I hereby promise to be responsible to T. M. [the plaintiff, for any goods he hath or may supply my brother W. P. to the amount of 100," it was held that this was a standing or contiuing guaranty to the extent of 100l., which might at any time become due for goods supplied, until the credit was recalled. At the time the letter was written, goods had been supplied to the amount of 661., and afterwards, another parcel was delivered, amounting together with the former

to 1247., all which had been paid for, and the sum now in dispute, (and which by the judgment of the court, the plaintiff recovered,) was for a farther supply to W. P. Mason v. Prichard, 2 Camp. N. P. 436. S. C. 12 East. 227. So, where the defendant wrote to the plaintiff, "I have been applied to by my brother, W. W. to be bound to you for any debts he may contract, not to exceed 1001. (with you,) for goods necessary in his business as a jeweller; I have wrote to say by this declaration, I consider myself bound to you for

any debt he may contract for his business as a jeweller, not exceeding 100l.after this date." Lord Ellenborough said, that the defendant was answerable for any debt not exceeding 1001.,which W. W. might from time to time contract with the plaintiff in the way of business; that the guaranty was not confined to cre instance, but applied to debts successively renewed; and that if a party meant to be a surety only for a single dealing, he should say

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3001. for any tallow or soap supplied by Mr. B. [the plaintiff] to F. & B., provided they Barker. shall neglect to pay in due time;"Lord Ellenborough held it to be a continuing guaranty while the parties continued to deal on the footing established when it was given; but that goods supplied after new arrangements were made, were not within the scope of the guaranty; and he relied on the word "any," without which he thought it might perhaps be confined to one dealing to the amount of 3001. Baston v. Ben

nett, 3 Camp. N. P. 220. But in debt on a bond entered into by A. and B. with the plaintiffs, reciting, that it was to enable A. to carry on his trade, and conditioned for the payment of all such sum or sums of money not exceeding 3000l. with lawful interest, which should or might at any time or times thereafter be advanced, and lent by the plaintiffs to A. or paid to his use, by his order and direction," it was held, that it was a guaranty for the definite amount of 300Ɔ1., and when an advance was made to that amount, the guaranty became functus officio, and was not a continuing guaranty, Kirby v. Duke of Marlborough

2 Maule and Selugn, 18. And, where the defendants wrote to the plaintiff "If W. & B., our sons, wish to take goods of you on credit, we are willing to lend our names as security for any amount they may wish," the court held, that it was not a continuing guaranty, but was confined to the first parcel of goods sold to W. & B.; that it gave an unlimited credit as to amourl, but was silent as to the continuance of the credit to future sales, and expressio unius, est exclusio allerius. Rogers v. Warner, 8 Johns. Rep 119. and in a very recent case, where the defendants wrote to the plaintiff, "our friends and connexions S. & II. H. contemplate under certain circumstances, making a considerable purchase of goods on the continent, and for that purpose, are about to send an agent to Europe. They wished a letter of credit from us to increase their means, and to be used or not as circumstances may require. As we are now indebted to you, and have no funds on the continent of Europe, we told them we could not give a positive letter of credit for any sum, but that we had no doubt you would

be disposed to furnish them with funds under our guaranty. The object of the present let ter, is therefore, to request you, if convenient, to furnish them with any sum they may want, as far as $50,000, say 50,000 dollars. They will reimburse you the amount they receive, together with interest, as soon as arrangements can be made to do it. We shall hold ourselves answerable to you for the amount;" it was held, that was a guaranty for a single advance to the amount of 50,000 dollars, and not a continuing guaranty, toties quoties, to that amount, and that as soon as 50,000 dollars were once advanced, the guaranty ceased to operate upon future advances, although by intermediate payments the sum due at the time of such new advances, were below 50,000 dollars. Cremer v. Higginson, circuit court U. S. Mass. Oct. T. 1817. MSS. Where A. requested B. to give C. any assistance in the purchase of goods, by letter, or otherwise, adding, "you may consider me accountable with him to you, for any contract he may make; it was held, that A. was to be considered as

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guarantee, and not a joint debtor, and that a contract by C. with B. to pay him a premium for guaranteeing a contract of C. with a third person was within A's promise. Meade v. M'Dowell, 5 Binney, 195.

A guaranty to the plaintiffs "that if they will credit D. a sum not exceeding $500 in case he shall not pay it in twelve months, the guarantee will pay it," does not imply a condition that the plaintiff may not advance more than $500, if the additional advance be on the general credit of D.-Sturges v. Robins, 7 Mass. R, 301.

A guaranty, "we jointly and severally promise to guaranty a payment of 500l. at 5 per cent. say, by a bill drawn on G. H. by D. and F. for 500l. dated 10th of January, 1808," is to be construed as a general guaranty of the bill, not(as usual) a guaranty that the acceptor should pay, but a contract that either the drawer or the ассерtor should pay. Philips v. Astling, 2 Taunt. Rep. 206. But upon such a guaranty (if it is to be construed as limiting the bill to the specific sum of 500%) the guarantee would not be liable to the extent even of the 5001. if the bill be drawn for a

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larger sum; for the terms of the contract must be strictly complied with. Ib. And a guaBarker. ranty to A. for goods to b sold by him on credit to B. will not enure to the benefit of a third person, who shall actually furnish the goods to B. although at the request of A., for a surety is not to be held beyond the scope of his own engagement. Robbins v. Bingham, 4 Johns. Rep. 476. Walsh v. Bailie, 10 Johns. Rep. 180. And see I Maule & Selv. 557. So if a letter of credit be addressed to A., and part of the goods are delivered by A., and part by C. and D., the latter cannot recover on the guaranty. Robbins y. Bingham, 4 Johns. Rep. 476. S›, a letter of guaranty, addressed to J. & A. N. by mistake, for J. & J. N. will not cover advances made by the latter on the faith of the letter. Grant v. Naylor, 4 Cranch, 224. Many cases analogous to this have been decided. As where A. became surety by bond that B. should truly account to C. for all sums of money received by B. for C.'s use, and afterwards B. took a partner with C.'s knowledge, it was ruled that the guaranty ad not extend to sums received by B. and his

partner, for C.'s use, after

the formation of the partner ship. Bellairs v. Elsworth, 3 Camp. N. P. 53. So a bond conditioned to repay all sums advanced by fire persons, or any of them, was held not to extend to sums advanced after the decease of one of them by the four survivors, the four then acting as bankers. Weston v. Barton, 4 Taunt. 674. And to the same effect will be found the following cases; Arlington v. Merritt, 2 Saund, 44. Wright v. Russel, 2 W. Bl. 934. S. C. 3 Wils. 539, Barker v. Parker, T. R. 287. Myers v. Ede, 7 T. R. 254. Strange v. Lee, 3 East, 484. But if a bond be given to trus tees conditioned for the faithful service of a person during his continuance in the service of a fluctuating or successive body of persons, not incorpora ted, as the Globe Insurance Company, it will extend to the whole time the party is in the service of such company, although the members may be continually changing. Metcalf v. Pruin, 12 East. 400. An agent in England for merchants the vendors of goods in Russia who guaranties "that the shipment shall be in conformity with the revenue laws of Great Britain, so that no impediment