1818.

Robinson

V.

xfate courts, but according to the principles of common law and equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from which we derive our knowledge of those principles. Consistently with this construction, it may Campbeli. be admitted, that where by the statutes of a state, a title, which would otherwise be deemed merely equitable, is recognised as a legal title, or a title which would be good at law, is under circumstances of an equitable nature declared by such statutes to be void, the rights of the parties, in such case, may be as fully considered in a suit at law in the courts of the United States, as they would be in any state court.

In either view of this first point, the court is of opinion that the circuit court decided right in rejecting the evidence offered by the original defendant. It was matter proper for the cognisance of a court of equity, and not admissible in a suit at law.

The next question is, whether the circuit court decided correctly in rejecting the deed of conveyance from the plaintiff's lessor to Arthur L. Campbell, for the land in controversy, made during the pendency of the suit. The answer that was given at the bar is deemed decisive; although an action of ejectment is founded in fictions, yet to certain purposes it is considered in the same manner as if the whole proceedings were real; for all the purposes of the suit the lease is to be deemed a real passessory title. If it expire during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff cannot recover his term at law, without procuring it to be enlarged by the court, and camproceed only for antecedent damages. In the present case the lease is to be deemed as a good subsisting

1818.

Robinson

V.

lease, and the conveyance by the plaintiff's lessor during the pendency of the suit could not operate upon his reversionary interest, and, consequently, could not exCampbell. tinguish the prior lease. The existence of such a lease is a fiction; but it is upheld for the purposes of justice, end there is no pretencethat it works any injustice in this case.

Statute of limi

tations of Ten

case.

The last question is, whether the statute of limitanessee not ap- tion of Tennessee was a good bar to the action. It is plicable to this admitted, that it would be a good bar only upon the supposition that the lands in controversy were always within the original limits of Tennessee; but there is no such proof in the cause. The compact of the states does not affirm it, and the present boundary was an amicable adjustment by that compact. It cannot, the efore, be affirmed by any court of law, that the land was within the reach of the statute of limitations of Tennessee until after the compact of 1802. The statute could not begin to run until it was ascertained that the land was within the jurisdictional limits of the state of Ten

nessee.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed, with

costs.a

a In Buller's Nisi Prius, 110, it is laid down, that in ejectment, "if the defendant prove a title out of the lessor, it is sufficient, although he have no title himself; but he ought to prove a subsisting title out of the lessor, for pro

ducing an ancient lease for 1000 years will not be sufficient unless he likewise prove possession under such lease within twenty years." The same doctrine is stated in Runnington on Ejectments, 343. and the case of England v.

Slade, 4 T. R, 682. is relied
on to support it.
But this
case only shows, that the te-
nant may prove that the les
sor's title has expired, and,
therefore, that he ought not to
turn him out of possession.

1818.

Robinson

fendant he is not entitled to
recover, if the defendant can
show a superior title in a third V.
person, with whom the de- Campbell.
fendant does not claim any
privity.

It is the purpose of this note
to show, that the authorities.
do not justify the doctrine to
this extent; and if it be true
in any case, (which may be
doubted,) it is liable to a great
many exceptions, which des-
troy its general applicability.
Speaking upon this subject
Lord Mansfield is reported to
have said, "there, is another
distinction to be taken, whether
supposing a title superior to
that of the lessor of the plain-
tiff exists in a third person,
who might recover the pos-
session, it lies in the mouth of
the defendant to say so, in an-
swer to an ejectment brought
against himself, by a party
having a better title than his
own. I found this point set-
tled before I came into this
court, that the court never suf-
fers a morgagor to set up the
title of a third person against
his morgagee." Doe v. Peg-
ge, 1 T. R: 758. note. The
point as to a morgage, has been
long established. In Lindsey
v. Lindsey, Bull. N. P. 110.
on an ejectment by a second
30

It is unquestionable law, that in ejectment "the plaintiff cannot recover but upon the, strength of his own title. He cannot found his claim upon the weakness of the defendant's title; for possession gives the defendant a right against every man who cannot show a good title." Haldam v. Harvey, 4 Burr. 2484. S. P. Martin v. Troyonell, 5 T. R. 107, note. But this doctrine was asserted in a case where the plaintiff sought to recover upon a title which, she had conveyed away to a third person; and nothing can be clearer than that the plaintiff cannot recover without showing a subsisting title in himself. If the position in Buller's Nisi Prius were confined to cases of this sort, there could not be the slightest ground to question its validity But it is supposed to establish the doctrine, that if the plaintiff has a title which is not an indefeasible possessory title, but is, in fact, better than that of the deVOL. III.