APPEAL from the district court of Louisiana. This cause was argued by the Attorney-General for the United States, and Mr. D. B. Ogden for the claim ant. 1818. Unit. States V. 150 Crates. Feb. 19th Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion Feb. 24th. of the court In this case the libel alleges that the goods in question were exported from Bordeaux in Fiance, and entered at the office of the collector of the customs at New Orleans, and that they were invoiced at a less sum than the actual cost thereof at the place of exportation, with design to evade the duties thereon, contrary to the provisions of the 66th section of the collection law of 1799, ch. 128. It appears in the case, that the goods were originally shipped from Liverpool, and were landed at Bordeaux. All question as to continuity of voyage, and as to whether Liverpool or Bordeaux ought to be deemed the place of exportation, is out of the case, because the information charges the goods to have been exported from Bordeaux. Upon the evidence, it appears that the goods were invoiced at sixty or seventy per cent. below the price in NewOrleans; which it is supposed was at least as high as the price would have been in Liverpool: But it also appears that goods of this kind, at the time of their exportation from Bordeaux, were depreciated in value to an equal degree: And it is proved that the same goods. were offered to a witness at 50 per cent. below their cost at Liverpool. The court is, therefore, not satisfi ed that the goods were invoiced below their true value at Bordeaux, with a design to evade the lawful duties; VOL. III. 31 1818. and the inquiry as to their value in the port from which Hampton they were originally shipped is excluded by the V. form in which the libel is drawn. The decree of the M'Connel. district court, restoring the goods to the claimant, is, therefore. affirmed. Decrce affirmed. Feb. 14th. (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.) HAMPTON V. M'CONNEL. A judgment of a state court has the same credit, validity, and effect in every other court within the United States, which it had in the state where it was rendered; and whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in such state, and none others, can be pleaded in any other court within the United States. ERROR to the circuit court of the district of South Carolina. The defendant in error declared against the plaintiff in error, in debt, on a judgment of the supreme court of the State of New York, to which the defendant below plead nil debet, and the plaintiff below demurred. The circuit court rendered a judgment for the plaintiff below, and thereupon the cause was brought by writ of error to this court. Mr. Hopkinson, for the plaintiff in error, suggested, that if, under any possible circumstances, the plea of nil debet could be a good bar to the action, a general demurrer was insufficient. He cited Mills v. Dur 1818. Hampton yee, and stated that the present case, might, perhaps, be distinguished from that, as it would seem that in Mills v. Duryee the defendant had actually appeared to V. the suit upon which the original judgment was recover- M'Connel. ed; but that in the present case there was no averment in the declaration to that effect, and the proceeding in the former suit might have been by attachment in rem, without notice to the party. Mr. Law, for the defendant in error, relied upon the authority of Mills v. Duryee, as conclusive to show that nul tiel record ought to have been pleaded. He also cited Armstrong v. Carson's executors.b Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion Feb. 24th. of the court. This is precisely the same case as that of Mills v. Duryee. The court cannot distinguish the two cases. The doctrine there held was that the judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity and effect, in every other court of the United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced, and that whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in such state, and none others, could be pleaed in any other court in the United States. a 7 Crauch, 481. b 2 Dall. 302. e In Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481. the following points were adjudged: 1st, That the act of 1790, ch. 38, prescribing the mode in which Judgment affirmed.c the public acts, records, and 1818. The Fortuna. credit as it has in the state court from whence it was taken; if in such court it has the effect of record evidence, it must have the same effect in every other court within the United States. 2d. That in every case arising under the act, the only inquiry is, what is the effect of the judgment in the state where it was rendered. 3d. That whatever might be the effect of a plea of nil debet to an action on a state judgment, after verdict, it could not be sustained on demurrer. 4th. That on such a plea the original record need not be produced for inspection, but that an exemplification thereof is sufficient. 5th. That the act applies to the courts of the district of Colombia, and to every other court within the United States. In the argument of Bordon in the supreme court of NewYork, it seems to have been supposed that this court had decided in Mills v. Duryee, that nul tiel record was the only proper plea to an action upon a state judgment. But it is conceived that as to the pleadings, it only decided that nil debet was not a proper plea; and that the court would hold that any plea (as well as nul tiel record, that would avoid the judgment, if technically pleaded, would be good. However this may be, it may safely be affirmed, that the question is still open in this court whether a special plea of fraud might not be pleaded, or a plea to the jurisdiction of the court in which the judg ment was obtained; for these might, in some cases, be pleaded in the state court to avoid the judgment. (PRIZE.) THE FORTUNA,-Krause et al. Claimants. A question of proprietary interest and concealment of papers. Farther proof ordered, open to both parties. On the production of farther proof by the claimant, condemnation pronounced. Where a neutral ship owner lends his name to cover a fraud with regard to the cargo, this circumstance will subject the ship to condamnation. It is a relaxation of the rules of the prize court, to allow time for farther proof in a case where there has been concealment of material papers. THIS is the same cause which is reported ante, vol, 2. p. 161. and which was ordered to farther proof at the last term. It was submitted without argument, upon the farther proof, at the present term. 、 Mr. Justice JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the court. Both vessel and cargo, in this case, are claimed in behalf of M. & J. Krause, Russian merchants, resident at Riga. The documents and evidence exhibited Martin Krause as the proprietor of the ship, but the captain swears that he considered her as the property of the house of M. & J. Krause, from their having exercised the ordinary acts of ownership over ́her; and in this belief he is supported by the fact that his contract is made with John Krause, by whom he appears to have been put in command of the ship." Mar a Translation af Exhibit,287. A: "On the following conditions have I given to Captain Henry Behrens, the command of the ship Fortuna, under Russian colours, lying at present in Riga. 1. Captain Behrens shall have 25 Alberts dollars monthly wages. 2. The whole cabin freight has been allowed him. 3. He is to receive 5 per cent. primage. 4. Travelling expenses for the benefit of the vessel, as, likewise, victualling expenses for the use of the ship in port, consistent with moderation, have been allowed to the captain. Captain Behrens, on his part,' promises to watch the interest of his owner in every re 1818. The Fortuna. Feb. 26th. |