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ble with death;" &c. "every such offerder shall be deemed, taken, and adjudged to be a pirate and felon, U. States and being thereof convicte, shall suffer death," &c• The relative pronoun "which" does not relate back to the first specified offences of "murder or robbery" but refers only to its immediate antecedent, "any other offence." It is this last class of crimes only that must be punishable, by the laws of the United States, with death, if committed within the body of a county, in order to constitute them piracies, when committed on the high seas. It is a mistaken principle commonly applied to penal statutes, that they are to be construed strictly. Sir William Jones has lai down the true rule, that criminal laws are to be construed liberally as to the offence, and strictly as to the offender. A strong i'lustration of the good sense of this rule, is to be found in the construction which has been given in England to the Stabbing Act.b A contrary construction of the statute now under consideration, would render it wholly inoperative, until there shall be a law of the United States, for the punishment of robbery committed in the body of a county; which will never happen, as the United States have no constitutional authority to punish a robbery committed within the body of a county. Forts, arsenals, dockyards, &c. "under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States," cannot be said to be within the body of a county. It may be admitted that there is some degree of loosness in the phraseo

a Life of Sir W. Jones, p. 268.

h Fuster's Crown Law, 297.

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logy of this section, which was evidently copied from
the British statute of the 39 Geo. III. ch. 37. re-
lative to the same subject, without regarding the dif- U. States
ference between the constitutions of the two coun-
tries. On the construction of the British statute, it
would be perfectly immaterial whether the pronoun
"which" was carried back to the words "murder and
robbery," or whether it was confined to its immedi
ate antecedent; because, in England, murder and
robbery are punishable with death, when committed
in the body of a county, under the same laws which
constitute them piracies when committed on the
high seas. But such a construction of our statute
would render it wholly inoperative as to the great of
fences of murder and robbery, which are not, and can
not be made punishable under the laws of the United
States, when committel within the body of a county.
Nor can it be objecte:l, that by the construction now
contended for, the words "any other offence" would
be equally inoperative; because there are various of
fences which would still be reached by the statute, such
as treason, &c. for the punishment of which Congress
may provide, though committed within the body of a
county. It follows as a corollary, that the circuit
court has cognizance of these offences; for, by the ju
diciary act of 17S9, ch. 20. s 11. it has coguizance of
all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority
of the United States."-2. The crime of robbery men-
tioned in the 8th section of the act of 1790, is the
crime of robbery as understood at common law. A
piracy or felony on the high seas is sufficiently defin-
ed, by terming it a robbery committed on the high seas

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The import of the term "robbery," must be sought in the common law, in the same manner as the imU. States port of the terms murder, manslaughter, rescous, benefit of clergy, and many others that are used in Palmer. the criminal code of the United States.-3. If the

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robbery in question amount to piracy, by the law of nations, the words "any person, or persons," in the 8th section, will embrace the subjects of all nations, who may commit that offence on the high seas, whether on board a foreign vessel, or a vessel belonging to citizens of the United States. A felony, which is made a piracy by municipal statutes, and was not Such by the law of nations, cannot be tried by the courts of the United States, if committed by a foreigner on board a foreign vessel, on the high seas; cause the jurisdiction of the United States, beyond their own territorial limits, only extends to the punishment of crimes which are piracy by the law of nations. But it is the right and the duty of the United States, as a member of the community of nations, to punish offences committed on the high seas against the law of nations." By this statute, congress have exercised this power, which is also conferred on them by the constitution. The offence of piracy, which is imperfectly defined by the law of nations, is declared to be murder or robbery committed on the high seas, or in any river, &c. out of the jurisdiction of any particular state; and is made punishable with death. Congress cannot be presumed to have neglected so important a duty as that of defin ing and punishing the offence of general piracy.

a 4 Bl. Com. 71.

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1

Without this statute, there can be found no definition
and punishment of it; because the law of nations.
merely creates the offence, and the common law and U. States
statute 28 Henry VIII. ch. 15. may perhaps not be
considered as in force in the United States.-4. The
crime of robbery committed by a citizen of the
United States on the high seas, on board a foreign
vessel, or on the person of a foreigner, must be con-
sidered as a piracy, under the 8th section of the act;
because the jurisdiction of a nation extends to its cit-
izens, wheresoever they may be, except within the terri-
tory of a foreign sovereign. The jurisdiction of a na-
tion over its public ships is exclusive every where; but
it is not exclusive over merchant vessels belonging to
its subjects. It is there concurrent with the personal
jurisdiction of other nations over their citizens. Con-
sequently the personal jurisdiction of the United States
over their citizens extends to offences committed by
them on board of foreign merchant vessel on the high
seas.-5. The general principle applied by the writers
on the law of nations to the case of a civil war, consid-
ers the war, (as between the conflicting parties,) as just
on both sides, and that each is to treat the other as a
public enemy, according to the established usages of
war. So, also, it is the duty of other nations to re.
main neutral, and not to interfere with the exercise of
complete belligerent rights by both parties within the
erritory which is the scene of their hostilities.

a 2 Rutherfords's Inst. 180. Vattel, L. 2 ch. 6.

b Vattel, L. 3 ch. 18. s. 296.

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this does not imply a right on their part to push their wars on to the cean, and to annoy the rest of the U. States world on this common highway of nations. The generality of the expressions ured by Vattal on this subject may, indeed, seem to import such a right. But it should be remembered that, with all his merit, he is very deficient in precision, and on this question pe culiarly unsatisfactory. The maritime rights of a belligerent power must be perfect, or they cannot exist at all. They must, therefore, include the right of visitation and search, and of detaining for adjudication; and of punishing a resistance to the exercise of these rights by the appropriate penalty of confiscation. So that neutral nations may come to be affected in their most valuable interests by a mere domestic quarrel, which never ought to have been extended beyond the territory of the people where it originated. This renders it indispensable to inquire how far neutral nations are bound to submit to the exercise of these high prerogatives of sovereignty in a civil war, under colour of a commission from one of the belligerent parties, whose independence has not been acknowledged by any power. The right of an insurgent people to be treated by the parent state, against which it revclts, with all the humanity and moderation which are required in any other war, and the duty of neutral nations to abstain from interfering in the contest, are not denied. But the right of the new people to thrust themselves into the family of nations, and to make the ocean the theatre of their predatory hostilities, without the consent of other nations, is denied. Such a right can only be founded