subsequent deci, (which was first recorded) L. conveyed to B. all the right, title, and c'aime, which he, the said A. S., lad, and all the right, title and inte- rest, which the said L. holds as legatce and epicsentative to the said A. S. deceased, of all, land lying and being within the state, of Kentucky, which cannot, at this time, be particularly descri. bed, whether by deed, patent, mortgage, survey, location, con- tract, or otherwise," with a co- venant of warranty against all per- sons claiming under L., his heirs and assigns; it was held that the latter conveyance operated only upon lands. the right, title and in- terest of which was then in L., and which he derived from A. S.; and consequently, could not defeat the operation of the first deed, upon the land specifically con- veyed. Brown v. Jackson,, 449
See PRACTICE, 2, 3, 4, 6, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18.
1. B., a merchant in New-York, wrote to L., a merchant in New- Orleans, on the 9th January, 1806 mentioning that a ship, belonging to T. and S. of Portland, was ordered to New-Orleans for freight, and requesting L. to pro
cure a freight for her, and pur- chase and put on board of her 500 bales of cotton on the own- eis' account for the payment of all shipments on the owners' account, thy bills on T. & Son, of Portland, or me, sixty days. sight, shall meet due honour.” On the 13th February, B. again wrote to I.., reiterating the form- er request, and enclosing a let- ter from T. and Son to L., con- taining their instructions to L.,. with whom they afterwards con- tinued to correspond, adding, "thy bills on me for their account, for cotton they order shipped by the Mac, shall meet with due ho- nour." On the 34th July, 1806, B. again wrote L on the same subject, saying, "the Owners wish her loaded on their own ac- count, for the payment of which thy bills on me shall meet with due honour at sixty days sight L. proceeded to purchase and ship the cotton, and drew several bills, on B., which were paid. He afterwards drew two bills on T. and Son, payable in New- York, which were protested for non-payment, they having, in the mean time, failed; and about two- years afterwards, drew bills on B. for the balance due, including the two protested bills, damages and interest. Held, that the let- ters of the 13th February, and 24th July, contained no revoca- tion of the undertaking in the let- ter of the 9th January; that al- though the bills on T. and Son were not drawn according to B.'s assumption, this could only affect the right of L. to recover the damages paid by him on the 1e- turn of the bills, but that L. had still a right to recover on the ori- ginal guaranty of the debt. It was also held, that L. by mak
ing his election to dra upon T. and Son, in the first instance, did not, thereby, preclude himself from resorting to B., whose un- dertaking was, in effect, a pro- inise to furnish the funds neces- sary to carry into execution the adventure. Also, held, that L. had a right to recover from B. the commissions, disbursements and other charges of the transac- tion. Lanusse v. Barker, 101 2.The cases on the subject of guar- anty collected. Note a. 148
See BILLS OF EXCHANGE, &c. 5, 6.
1. Insurance on a vessel and freight "at and from Teneriffe to the Havanna, and at and from thence to New-York, with liberty to stop at Matanzas," with a rep- resentation that the vessel was to stop at Matanzas, to know if there were any men of war off the Ha tarna. The vessel sailed on the voyage insured, and put into Matanzas to avoid British crui- zers, who were then off the Ha- vanna, and were in the practice of capturing utral vessels trading from one Spanish port to another. While at Matanzas, she unloaded her cargo, under an order from the Spanish au- thorities; and afterwards pro- ceeded to the Havanna, whence she sailed on her voyage for New-York, and was afterwards lost by the perils of the seas. It was proved that the stopping and delay at the Havanna was necessary to avoid capture; that no delay was occasioned by dis- charging the cargo, and that the
risk was not increased, but di- minished. Held, that the order of the Spanish government was obtained under such circum- stanees, as took from it the cha- racter of a ris major imposed upon the master, and was, there fore, no excuse for discharging the cargo; but that the stopping and delay at Matanzas were per- mitted by the policy, and that the unloading the carge was not a deviation. This case distin- guished from that of the Mary- Jand Ins. Co. v. Le Roy, 7 Cranch. 26. Hughes v. The Union Ins. Co.
159 2. To entitle the plaintiff to recover in an action on a policy of insu- rance, the loss must be occasioned by one of the perils insured against. The insured cannot re- cover for a loss by barratry, un- less the barratry produced the loss: but it is immaterial whe- ther the loss so produced oc- curred during the continuance of the barratry or afterwards. Swann v. The Union Insurance Company,
168 3. Cases on the subject of barratry. Note a. 171 4. A vessel within a port, blockaded after the commencement of her voyage, and prevented from pro- ceeding on it, sustains a loss by a peril within that clause of the policy insuring against the "arrests, restraints, and detain- ments of kings," &c. for which the insurers are liable; and if the vessel so prevented be a neutral, having on board a neutral cargo laden before the in-titution of the blockade, the restraint is unlaw- ful. Olivera v. The Union Insu rance Company. 183 5. A blockade does not, according to modern usage, extend to a neutral vessel found in port, nor
prevent her coming out with the cargo which was on board when the blockade was instituted. Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 3,
PRACTICE, 14.
Prize, 10, 11, 12, 15, 14. L
6. A technical total loss must con- tinue to the time of abandonment. Quare, as to the application of this principle to a case where the loss was by a restraint on a block- ade and proof made of the com- mencement of the blockade, but no proof that it continued to the time of abandonment? Id. 183 See PRACTICE, 11.
1. MR. a citizen of Kentucky, brought a suit in equity, in the circuit court of Kentucky, against C. C. stated to be a cit- zen of Virginia, and E. J. and S. E without any designation of citizenship; all the defendants 2. appeared and answered; and a decree was pronounced for the plaintiff; it was held, that if a joint interest vested in C. C. and
1. One citizen of the United States has no right to purchase of, or sell to, another, a license or pass from the public enemy, to be used on board an American ves- sel. Patton v. Nicholson, 204 Cases on the subject of Licenses collected. Note a,
the other defendants, the court The terms "beyond seas," in the had no jurisdiction over the
cause. But that if a distinct in. terest vested in C. C. so that substantial justice, (so far as he was concernod,) could be done, without affecting the. other de- fendants, the jurisdiction of the court might be exercised as to him alone. Cameron v. M'Ro- berts,
proviso or saving clause of a sta- tute of limitations, are equiva- lent to without the limits of the State where the statute is enact-
ed; and a party, who is without tho e limits, is entitled to the benefit of the exception, Mur- 541 ray v. Baker.
591 See STATUTES OF TENNESSEE, 4.
the governors warrant, and agreeably to the royal procla- ination of 1763, is sufficient evi- dence that the warrant was in his possession at that time. Craig v. Radford, 694, 597 3 The Gth sec. of the act of Vir- ginia of 1748, entitled, "An act directing the duty of surveyors 2. of lands is merely directory to the officer, and does not make the validity of the survey depend upon his conforming to its re- quisitions. Ib.
be on different machines can comprehended in the same pa- tent, so as to give a right to the exclusive use of the several ma- chines separately, as well as a right to the exclusive use of those machines in combination? Evans v. Eaton, 444. 506 However this may be, the act of the 21st of January, 1808. ch. 117. "for the relief of Oliver Evans," authorizes the issuing to him of a patent for his invention, discovery, and improvements, in the art of manufacturing flour, and in the several machines ap- plicable to that purpose. Id.
506 Quare, Whether congress can constitutionally decide the fact that a particular individual is an author or inventor of a certain writing or invention, so as to pre- clude judicial inquiry into the originality of the authorship or invention? Id. 513 4. The act of 21st of January, 1808, ch. 117. for the relief of Oliver Evans, does not decide the fact of the originality of his in- vention, but leaves the question open to investigation under the general patent law. Id. 513. 5. Under the 6th section of the pa- tent law, ch. 156. if the thing secured by patent had been in use. br had been described in a public work anterior to the sup- posed discovery, the patent is void whether the patentee had a knowledge of this previous use or description, or not. Id. 514 6. Oliver Evans may claim, under his patent, the exclusive use of his inventions and improvements in the art of manufacturing flour and meal, and in the several ma- chines which he has invented, and in his improvement on ma- chines previously discovered.
But where his claim is for an improvement on a machine, he Bust show the extent of his im- provement, so that a person un- derstanding the subject may com- prehend distinctly in what it consists. Id. 514.518 7. The act for the relief of O. Evans is grafted on the general patent law, so as to give him a right to sue in the circuit court, for an in- fringement of his patent rights, although the defendant may be a citizen of the same state with himself. I. 8. Note on the patent laws, APPEN- DIX, note II.
1. A robbery committed on the high seas, although such robbery, if committed on land, would not, by the laws of the United States, be punishable with death, is pi- rary, under the 8th section of the act of 1790, ch. 36. (IX,) for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States; and the circuit courts have juri-dic- tion thereof. The United States v. Palmer, 610.625 2. The crime of robbery, as mention- ed in the act, is the crime of robbery as recognized and de- fined at cominon law. Il. 630 3. The crime of robbery, committed by a person who is not a citizen of the United States, on the high seas, on board of a ship belong- ing exclusively to subjects of a foreign state, or on persons in a foreign vessel, is not piracy under the act, and is not punishable in the courts of the U. States. 11.630 4. When a civil war rages in a fo-
reign. nation, one part of which separates itself from the old es-
tablished government, and erects itself into a distinct governinent, the courts of the union must view such newly constituted go- vernment as it is viewed by the legislative and executive depart- ments of the government of the United States. If that govern- Inent remains neutral, but re- cogizes the existence of a civil war, the courts of the union can- not consider as criminal those acts of hostility which war au- thorizes, and which the new go- vernment may direct against its enemy. Id. 634 5. The same testimoney which would be sufficient to prove thata ves- sel or person is in the service of an acknowledged state, is admis- sible to prove that they are in the service of such newly crea- ted government Its seal cannot be allowed to prove itself, but may be proved by such testimo- ny as the nature of the case ad- mits: And the fact that a vessel or person is in the service of such government may be estab- lished otherwise, should it be in.- practicable to prove the seal. Id. 635
If an action be brought against an officer making a seizure under the laws of the United States, for a supposed trespass while the suit for the forfeiture is depend- ing in the United States' courts, the fact of such pendency may be pleaded in abatement, or as a temporary bar of the action. If the action is brought after a de- cree of condemnation. then that fact may be pleaded as a bar; if after an acquittal, with a certifi- cate of reasonable ce se of sei- zure, then that may be pleaded as a bar. If, after an acquittal,
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