subsequent deci, (which was first
recorded) L. conveyed to B.
all the right, title, and c'aime,
which he, the said A. S., lad,
and all the right, title and inte-
rest, which the said L. holds as
legatce and epicsentative to the
said A. S. deceased, of all, land
lying and being within the state,
of Kentucky, which cannot, at
this time, be particularly descri.
bed, whether by deed, patent,
mortgage, survey, location, con-
tract, or otherwise," with a co-
venant of warranty against all per-
sons claiming under L., his heirs
and assigns; it was held that the
latter conveyance operated only
upon lands. the right, title and in-
terest of which was then in L., and
which he derived from A. S.; and
consequently, could not defeat
the operation of the first deed,
upon the land specifically con-
veyed. Brown v. Jackson,, 449

EVIDENCE.

See PRACTICE, 2, 3, 4, 6, 12, 13, 15,
16, 18.

CHANCERY, 5.

F

FARTHER PROOF..

See PRIZE, 1. 2.

GUARANTY.

1. B., a merchant in New-York,
wrote to L., a merchant in New-
Orleans, on the 9th January, 1806
mentioning that a ship, belonging
to T. and S. of Portland, was
ordered to New-Orleans for
freight, and requesting L. to pro

cure a freight for her, and pur-
chase and put on board of her
500 bales of cotton on the own-
eis' account for the payment
of all shipments on the owners'
account, thy bills on T. & Son,
of Portland, or me, sixty days.
sight, shall meet due honour.”
On the 13th February, B. again
wrote to I.., reiterating the form-
er request, and enclosing a let-
ter from T. and Son to L., con-
taining their instructions to L.,.
with whom they afterwards con-
tinued to correspond, adding,
"thy bills on me for their account,
for cotton they order shipped by
the Mac, shall meet with due ho-
nour." On the 34th July, 1806,
B. again wrote L on the same
subject, saying, "the Owners
wish her loaded on their own ac-
count, for the payment of which
thy bills on me shall meet with
due honour at sixty days sight
L. proceeded to purchase and
ship the cotton, and drew several
bills, on B., which were paid.
He afterwards drew two bills
on T. and Son, payable in New-
York, which were protested for
non-payment, they having, in the
mean time, failed; and about two-
years afterwards, drew bills on
B. for the balance due, including
the two protested bills, damages
and interest. Held, that the let-
ters of the 13th February, and
24th July, contained no revoca-
tion of the undertaking in the let-
ter of the 9th January; that al-
though the bills on T. and Son
were not drawn according to B.'s
assumption, this could only affect
the right of L. to recover the
damages paid by him on the 1e-
turn of the bills, but that L. had
still a right to recover on the ori-
ginal guaranty of the debt. It
was also held, that L. by mak

ing his election to dra upon T.
and Son, in the first instance,
did not, thereby, preclude himself
from resorting to B., whose un-
dertaking was, in effect, a pro-
inise to furnish the funds neces-
sary to carry into execution the
adventure. Also, held, that L.
had a right to recover from B.
the commissions, disbursements
and other charges of the transac-
tion. Lanusse v. Barker, 101
2.The cases on the subject of guar-
anty collected. Note a. 148

See BILLS OF EXCHANGE, &c. 5, 6.

I
INSURANCE.

1. Insurance on a vessel and freight
"at and from Teneriffe to the
Havanna, and at and from thence
to New-York, with liberty to
stop at Matanzas," with a rep-
resentation that the vessel was to
stop at Matanzas, to know if there
were any men of war off the Ha
tarna. The vessel sailed on
the voyage insured, and put into
Matanzas to avoid British crui-
zers, who were then off the Ha-
vanna, and were in the practice
of capturing utral vessels
trading from one Spanish port to
another. While at Matanzas,
she unloaded her cargo, under
an order from the Spanish au-
thorities; and afterwards pro-
ceeded to the Havanna, whence
she sailed on her voyage for
New-York, and was afterwards
lost by the perils of the seas.
It was proved that the stopping
and delay at the Havanna was
necessary to avoid capture; that
no delay was occasioned by dis-
charging the cargo, and that the

risk was not increased, but di-
minished. Held, that the order
of the Spanish government was
obtained under such circum-
stanees, as took from it the cha-
racter of a ris major imposed
upon the master, and was, there
fore, no excuse for discharging
the cargo; but that the stopping
and delay at Matanzas were per-
mitted by the policy, and that
the unloading the carge was not
a deviation. This case distin-
guished from that of the Mary-
Jand Ins. Co. v. Le Roy, 7
Cranch. 26. Hughes v. The
Union Ins. Co.

159
2. To entitle the plaintiff to recover
in an action on a policy of insu-
rance, the loss must be occasioned
by one of the perils insured
against. The insured cannot re-
cover for a loss by barratry, un-
less the barratry produced the
loss: but it is immaterial whe-
ther the loss so produced oc-
curred during the continuance
of the barratry or afterwards.
Swann v. The Union Insurance
Company,

168
3. Cases on the subject of barratry.
Note a.
171
4. A vessel within a port, blockaded
after the commencement of her
voyage, and prevented from pro-
ceeding on it, sustains a loss
by a peril within that clause of
the policy insuring against the
"arrests, restraints, and detain-
ments of kings," &c. for which
the insurers are liable; and if the
vessel so prevented be a neutral,
having on board a neutral cargo
laden before the in-titution of the
blockade, the restraint is unlaw-
ful. Olivera v. The Union Insu
rance Company.
183
5. A blockade does not, according
to modern usage, extend to a
neutral vessel found in port, nor

But where his claim is for an
improvement on a machine, he
Bust show the extent of his im-
provement, so that a person un-
derstanding the subject may com-
prehend distinctly in what it
consists. Id.
514.518
7. The act for the relief of O. Evans
is grafted on the general patent
law, so as to give him a right to
sue in the circuit court, for an in-
fringement of his patent rights,
although the defendant may be a
citizen of the same state with
himself. I.
8. Note on the patent laws, APPEN-
DIX, note II.

See PRACTICE, 18, 19.

PIRACY.

518

13

1. A robbery committed on the high
seas, although such robbery, if
committed on land, would not,
by the laws of the United States,
be punishable with death, is pi-
rary, under the 8th section of
the act of 1790, ch. 36. (IX,) for
the punishment of certain crimes
against the United States; and
the circuit courts have juri-dic-
tion thereof. The United States
v. Palmer,
610.625
2. The crime of robbery, as mention-
ed in the act, is the crime of
robbery as recognized and de-
fined at cominon law. Il. 630
3. The crime of robbery, committed
by a person who is not a citizen
of the United States, on the high
seas, on board of a ship belong-
ing exclusively to subjects of a
foreign state, or on persons in a
foreign vessel, is not piracy under
the act, and is not punishable in
the courts of the U. States. 11.630
4. When a civil war rages in a fo-

reign. nation, one part of which
separates itself from the old es-

1

tablished government, and erects
itself into a distinct governinent,
the courts of the union must
view such newly constituted go-
vernment as it is viewed by the
legislative and executive depart-
ments of the government of the
United States. If that govern-
Inent remains neutral, but re-
cogizes the existence of a civil
war, the courts of the union can-
not consider as criminal those
acts of hostility which war au-
thorizes, and which the new go-
vernment may direct against its
enemy. Id.
634
5. The same testimoney which would
be sufficient to prove thata ves-
sel or person is in the service of
an acknowledged state, is admis-
sible to prove that they are in
the service of such newly crea-
ted government Its seal cannot
be allowed to prove itself, but
may be proved by such testimo-
ny as the nature of the case ad-
mits: And the fact that a vessel
or person is in the service of
such government may be estab-
lished otherwise, should it be in.-
practicable to prove the seal. Id.
635

PLEADING.

If an action be brought against
an officer making a seizure under
the laws of the United States, for
a supposed trespass while the
suit for the forfeiture is depend-
ing in the United States' courts,
the fact of such pendency may
be pleaded in abatement, or as a
temporary bar of the action. If
the action is brought after a de-
cree of condemnation. then that
fact may be pleaded as a bar; if
after an acquittal, with a certifi-
cate of reasonable ce se of sei-
zure, then that may be pleaded
as a bar. If, after an acquittal,